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ABSTRACT
This study examines Samoan opposition to New Zealand's rule in 
Western Samoa over the period 1920-1936. During the first five years of this 
period, opposition was expressed mainly through the imposition of boycotts 
on stores and bans on copra-cutting as well as petitions to the British 
government - New Zealand's authority to administer Samoa came through 
Britain - to remove New Zealand and to let the Samoans run their own 
country. In late 1926 however, a group of Samoans, in combination with 
local residents, launched a public campaign demanding changes to government 
policies and practices which had been introduced to speed up the 
development of the country in all spheres - political, social, economic - 
and which they argued would in fact damage Samoan society.
When government rejected these demands, the Samoan group, 
attracting a great deal of support from Samoans, quickly took control of 
the opposition movement - now called the Mau - and soon after, made 
Samoan self-government its principal objective. Between 1926 and 1936, 
the majority of the Samoans in the villages supported this call for 
self-government and demonstrated it by totally ignoring government 
authority and conducting their affairs their own way. During this ten 
year period, the Mau and its supporters virtually controlled Samoan 
affairs while government was reduced to making ill-judged and therefore 
futile attempts to bring about a settlement. It was not until the 
election of the first New Zealand Labour government in 1935 that an end 
to the confrontation was effected.
A central theme which runs through the thesis is that although 
Samoans were affected by government measures which brought immediate anger 
and frustration, the fundamental motivation behind their opposition was
( ü )
the belief that they had an inviolate right to control their own lives. 
The thesis is concluded with the observation that while Samoan opposition 
during these sixteen years, and particularly during the Mau period, did 
not bring about self-government, it did force the New Zealanders to 
abandon their 'progressive schemes', and more important it kept alive 
and burning in the Samoans the attitude that it was their right to 
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PREFACE
In June 1927, a District Inspector on Savai'i reported that 
when he arrived at a village called Lano to inspect the village and 
its plantations, the chiefs of the village held a meeting which 
brought down the decision that; 'they would not obey any Government 
instructions or laws, and that it was of no use ... to give any orders 
because they would not obey them - they would please themselves what 
they did'."*’ He went on to say that the same thing was happening 
throughout his whole district, which covered half of Savai'i. Since 
late 1926, open rejection of government authority by the Samoans had 
developed rapidly, and this state of affairs continued until 1936.
New Zealand established her civil administration in Western 
Samoa in May 1920, and in the following five years it had to contend 
with Samoan opposition expressed mainly through trade bans and 
petitions requesting New Zealand's departure from the Territory.
In 1924, government introduced 'progressive schemes' to boost the 
development of the country, particularly in the economic sphere.
These schemes however contained elements which constituted a direct 
challenge to certain fundamental principles on which Samoan society 
was based, such as the sanctity of chiefly control in specified 
areas, and the autonomy of village communities. Although warned of 
the consequences if it proceeded with its development programmes, 
government persisted and quickly sparked off Samoan opposition which 
soon reached the stage where the Samoans conducted their affairs their 
own way without bothering about government.
1 District Inspector Henry Buse to Resident Commissioner, 19 June 1927, 
A.0. 25/1-2.
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This thesis focuses on this confrontation between the Samoans 
and the New Zealand authorities during the first sixteen years of New 
Zealand's civil administration. The study attempts to do two things: 
provide a more detailed account of Samoan involvement in this conflict; 
and offer a view on the Samoan character which could assist in understanding 
their attitude and actions during this period.^ This view is given in 
the introductory chapter, while the following five chapters carry an 
account of the developing confrontation in chronological sequence.
Two themes which run through the thesis are first, that Samoan opposition 
to New Zealand's rule was basically motivated by their belief that it 
was their birthright to exercise control over their own lives; and 
secondly that Samoan attitudes and behaviour during the confrontation 
were principally determined by Samoan considerations rather than by 
government policies and practices.
This thesis came to be produced almost by accident. The author 
arrived in Canberra in March 1974 to start research on a topic on 
contemporary legal and political developments in the newly independent 
Pacific island nations of Western Samoa, Fiji and Tonga. For the rest 
of that year he pursued that subject both in Canberra and in the field. 
Difficulties encountered on fieldwork with access to official documents 
which were considered vital for the study, placed the project in jeopardy. 
Towards the end of 1974, he was kindly shown some remnants of O.F. Nelson's 
private correspondence by Tupuola Efi (later Prime Minister of Western
The three main works on the Mau: Davidson, J.W., Samoa mo Samoa,
(Melbourne, 1967); Mary Boyd, 'The Record in Western Samoa to 1945' 
in Angus Ross (ed.) , New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in 
the Twentieth Century, (Auckland, 1969); and Felix Keesing, Modern 
Samoa, (London, 1934) , do not attempt either of these tasks.
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Samoa), and a lucky discovery of more of Nelson's papers in a steel 
filing cabinet encased in an old sea chest which had been lying in a 
shed at the family home at Tuaefu, prompted serious consideration of 
Nelson and his role in the political upheavals of the 1920s and 1930s 
in Samoa as a likely research topic, to replace the legal/political one.
Although he did not have any academic background in history, 
his Department at A.N.U. agreed to the suggested change in topic. Back 
in the field again in 1975, he was given permission to use government 
material on the Mau, but then in response to a suggestion from the Samoan 
Prime Minister at the time, Tupua Tamasese Lealofi, for assistance with 
the work of the department, the author, himself needing facilitation of 
his access to government Mau documents - all held in the Prime Minister's 
Department - accepted provisional appointment in the Samoan Public 
Service as External Affairs Officer in the Prime Minister's Department 
with special responsibilities in legal and political matters. That 
appointment was subsequently substantiated in January 1976 when he took 
up full time employment with government until early 1978 when he took 
> leave to continue his studies.
Towards the end of 1975, the twelve files which contained all
the documents on the first six years of the Mau - between October 1926
to March 1932 - were discovered in a desk which had been consigned to
the incinerator by the Attorney-General's Department. No researcher
3had seen these files and yet they were the most crucial ones not only 
because they dealt with the critical early years of the conflict, but 
also because they contained a great deal of material, mostly in Samoan, 
which dealt with specific local occurrences, but which had not been used
3 See Davidson, J.W., Samoa mo Samoa, (Melbourne, 1967), p. 439.
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in reports to New Zealand, and were not available elsewhere. The 
accounts given in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, particularly concerning Samoan 
activities during the Mau period, depended heavily on material contained 
in these twelve files. Those accounts also benefitted from information 
and knowledge the author gained from many hours spent listening and 
learning from the old matai either in Apia or in the villages.
Of the many Samoans who assisted the author with information, 
instruction and advice, four had been chosen to represent their accounts 
of the events during the Mau and their instructions and advice on 
things Samoan. They are Toluono Lama of Palauli, Savai'i; Taulealea 
Taulauniu of Safune, Savai'i; Taito of Manase-Safotu, Savai'i and Vai 
of Manono. Toluono and Taulealea participated in the Mau mainly as 
messengers so that they were in a good position to know the decisions 
made in Apia as well as those taken in the districts; messages were 
normally relayed by word of mouth. Their accounts of what happened 
during the Mau - or those parts in which they were involved - were more 
uniformly verifiable, both through accounts by other Samoans and also 
through documentary records, than the versions given by others. Of the 
other two, Taito flirted with the Mau while Vai was a nominal Malo 
supporter in that Manono did not join the Mau. But these two provided 
not only a great deal of sound instruction and advice on Samoan customs 
and traditions, they also gave very balanced overviews of the whole 
conflict.
Finally on sources; a great deal of use is made of police 
reports - they normally appeared as 'Braisby to ...', Braisby being 
the Chief of Police during the whole Mau period - and it should be noted 
that they were often 'raw' reports direct from the field, and that
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invariably, events bore them out. Also where Mau documents on an 
episode were available, they confirmed the police information. The 
reports which were often misleading were those written by Administrators 
who obviously made use of only certain sections of police reports. 
Unfortunately most of the material in the files in New Zealand are in 
fact Administrators' reports, and this was one of the main reasons 
behind the decision to base this thesis principally on material found 
in Samoa.
There are several individuals and institutions whom I would like 
to thank personally. For financial assistance, I would like to thank 
the Australian National University, and the governments of Australia 
and Western Samoa. For assistance with source material, I would like to 
thank the Samoan government; Tupuola Efi and the Nelson family; staff 
of the Nelson library in Apia, as well as staff of the National Archives 
of New Zealand and the Alexander Turnbull Library in Wellington. And 
to all the Samoans who helped me, let me say: Fa'afetai le fesoasoani.
In Dr Deryck Scarr, I had an intellect who stimulated and 
guided my thoughts, and also a person who was sensitive to the forces 
which shaped my identity and determined my responses to life. In the 
last two years I had repeatedly changed this thesis - substantially 
written in 1979 - to bring it within the word-limit for a Ph.D. thesis, 
but mainly to present it in a way which was sensitive and responsible 
as far as the Samoan people were concerned. Deryck Scarr had appreciated 
my concern and had supported me. I would also like to thank Dr Neil 
Gunson and Dr David Marr for their comments and suggestions on earlier 
drafts. Mrs Wendy Adcock patiently typed this thesis, often from my
handwriting, and I thank her for a job well done.
(X)
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I would like to thank the Enrights especially for putting up with me 
during the last weeks of typing and Kelvin for drawing the sketch of 
the Apia waterfront which appears on page 213a.
To my parents who worked hard to give myself as well as my 
brothers and sisters a happy start in life and the opportunity to 
obtain a useful education, let me simply say: Malo le tapua'i. Ua
talia a oulua talosaga. Ua a'e manuia le faiva. To Tim and Val Dillon 
and the boys in New Zealand, we want to say thank you for your support. 
Lynne-Marie suspended her own academic career to care for our family 
while I worked on this thesis, and it is to her and our children that 
I owe the greatest debt. But for what it is worth, I would like to 
dedicate this study to some very special people - Malae and Mose Tai and 
my family in New Zealand.

















In an article which appeared in a Wellington daily newspaper
in 1921 and which dealt with the difficulties New Zealand was experiencing
in administering Western Samoa, the writer argued that the Dominion could
not be blamed for those troubles because for one thing, 'no form of
government would satisfy the Samoans who for long had been a peculiar
people'.^ A somewhat unusual choice of words perhaps, but as a one-line
summary of what Samoa and her affairs must have looked to the outside
world up to that time, it was altogether pertinent, especially given
that for the previous ninety years at any rate, the situation in Samoa
had been one of seemingly endless conflict regardless of whether the
Samoans conducted their affairs on their own, or with the interference
and assistance of outsiders, or with the formal involvement of major
powers such as Britain, Germany and the United States through treaties
and a combined administrative Commission in Samoa. And the situation
continued much the same after Germany took control of the country in
21900, followed by New Zealand in 1914.
This state of affairs resulted from a host of diverse factors,
Evening Post (Wellington), 6 Sept., 1921.
J.W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa (Melbourne, 1967) gives a good general 
picture of these developments; R.P. Gilson, Samoa 1830-1900 the 
politics of a multi-cultural community (Melbourne, 1970) provides a 
detailed study of the pre-1900 period; P.M. Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle 
(Dublin, 1974) describes in detail the involvement of the major powers 
in Samoa; and P.J. Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders under German Rule - 
a study in the meaning of colonial resistance (Canberra, 1978) looks 
at the German administration of Samoa 1900-1914 in detail.
2principal amongst which were disruptive forces inherent in the fa1a 
Samoa (Samoan way of life), new demands brought by the papalagi (white 
man), and the inevitable strains caused by two cultures undergoing the 
process of adjustment as they struggled to co-exist. As we shall see, 
Samoan existence at all levels revolved around the issues of protecting 
one's position by exercising its prerogatives diligently and by demanding 
that all others recognise and respect those prerogatives, while at the 
same time seeking to improve the influence - and therefore the status 
and if possible the rank - of that position; a recipe for conflict, 
particularly in the confined space of an isolated, ocean-bound group of 
small islands. On the other hand, the Europeans were primarily 
concerned with the promotion of productive economic activity, and towards 
that end, their involvement in the affairs of Samoa - at least up to 
1900 - was largely aimed at inducing more order and harmony into 
society than the Samoan institutions were providing. Because the 
Samoans did not share this concern for economic success, they neglected 
to try and safeguard the conditions required for the enhancement of white 
interests and that meant trouble from the papalagi. At the same time 
the Samoans who viewed the overwhelming material culture of the papalagi 
with awe, were nonetheless intimidated neither by this technological 
attainment nor by the papalagi themselves; instead they saw the 
products of this advanced technology as tools to be utilised and 
exploited to their own advantage, while the papalagi were rendered 
allies or opponents, at least as new participants, in the all-consuming 
contest for status. Thus did Samoan objectives gather in their wake 
not only fa'a Samoa forces but also European ones, and these influences 
in flux combined to produce the turbulence which dominated life in
Samoa during the second half of last century.
3After Germany took control of the country in 1900, the interests 
of the papalagi, and particularly those engaged in large-scale 
plantation agriculture, were given top priority by Government, so that 
European demands which had contributed to the unstable situation were 
largely removed. On the other hand, fa1a Samoa considerations remained 
and were in fact fuelled by official action in creating new institutions, 
positions and areas of influence where the struggle for prominence was 
extended. At the same time, this assumption of control gave Germany 
and her Administration in Samoa a position and a role which Samoans 
previously held, and which in the normal operation of their lifestyle, 
they were bound to try and regain. The conflicts therefore continued, 
and when New Zealand entered the scene in 1914 with the takeover of 
German Samoa at the outset of World War I, and stayed on as colonising 
power, she inherited a country with a history of turbulence, a people 
who would conduct their lives their own way, and a control which the 
Samoans were obliged to regain.
A closer look now at certain aspects of the fa1a Samoa will 
help first to clarify the attitude of Samoans to the phenomenon of 
assumption of authority by parties who lacked the appropriate traditional 
qualifications, and secondly to understand their behaviour in conflict 
situations.
I
3'Ua tau le gafa ole Tuiaana1 (the lineage of the Tuiaana has 
succeeded) Samoans say when a person who was not a suli moni (heir by
3 Eric Schultz, Proverbial expressions of the Samoans (Wellington, 1953),
p. 81.
4descent), such as an adopted member of a family, succeeded to the 
matai (chiefly) title of that family. The proverb expresses recognition 
of succession to matai titles by such persons, and illustrates the 
application of a more general principle of recognition within fa'a Samoa 
of succession to positions of authority by parties who lacked the usual 
credentials expected of successors. Thus, although Germany (1900-1914) 
and New Zealand (1914-1961) lacked the appropriate credentials to 
control Samoa because they were foreigners and they had, in Samoan eyes, 
unjustly usurped control of their country - ultimately by virtue of 
possessing superior force - the fact of that foreign control was 
recognised by the Samoans.
The principle is clearly one born of realism, tailored to 
accommodate irresistible demands resulting from uncomfortable situations 
caused by wars, force-backed actions and other somewhat irregular 
phenomena. Yet it is far from being a negative, submissive approach 
to such situations: central to it is the understanding that those
with the appropriate connections - e tau iai as the Samoans say - retain 
their right to the usurped position or role, which right and its exercise 
these parties are entitled, indeed are obliged, to try and regain.
Thus, while recognising the fact of German and New Zealand rule, the 
Samoans continuously strove to regain exercise of control over their 
own affairs - they had a right to it. On the other hand, the dominant 
party was expected to protect its position.
Germany and New Zealand plainly did not see their respective 
positions in Samoa, particularly in their relationship to the indigenous 
population, in this light. The deeds from which they derived their 
authority to rule Samoa were based firmly on colonial assumptions and 
practices and gave no recognition to the Samoans in the matter of who
5should have control in their country, much less envisaged any rights
being retained by the Samoans to the control of their affairs.
Germany obtained her 'mandate' to rule in an Agreement concluded in
December 1899 between herself, Great Britain and the United States.
That Agreement formalised, papalagi style, the partition of the Samoa
Islands, with the United States taking control of the eastern islands 
4of the group. New Zealand in her turn depended on the Treaty of
Versailles (The Peace Treaty of 1919) for her authority to administer
the group, so that she held Western Samoa by title of conquest from 
5Germany.
While these big-power Agreements denied the Samoans, in general 
terms, a say in who should control their country, the application of the 
papalagi conventions which governed the operation of the principle of 
constituted authority rendered illegal under domestic law any Samoan 
claims to a right to control; such claims amounted to sedition, the 
criminal offense of undermining constituted authority which was vested 
in and exercised solely by the government of the day. This authority 
could be legitimately challenged only through so-called constitutional 
channels - ballot box, parliamentary measures and the courts being the 
main avenues - all of which were virtually beyond the reach of colonised 
peoples, so that in practice, the authority of the colonising power was 
absolute.
See P.M. Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle (Dublin, 1974) for a detailed 
description of these transactions.
See IT 67/12/1 and IT 67/12/2 for the official correspondence on this 
issue; see also Mary Boyd, 'New Zealand's Attitude to Dominion 
Status 1919-1921. The Procedure for enacting a constitution in her 
Samoan Mandate' in Journal of Commonwealth Studies III (1965), 
pp. 64-70.
6There was, therefore, no room in the colonial mentality and 
practice for the operation of the principles which determined Samoan 
behaviour in situations such as those created by forcible takeovers; and 
therein lay the fundamental cause of the conflict which characterised 
the relations between the Samoans and the two foreign administrations.
The papalagi powers, following their own conventions and usages of the 
day, presumed they held absolute control and behaved accordingly. On 
the other hand, the Samoans, being conditioned by their own conventions 
and traditions, saw themselves as retaining their right to control 
their own affairs, and therefore contended to regain that role.
Unavoidable conflict resulted.
Insensitive attitudes and short-sighted actions on the part of 
the foreign administrations, caused resentment and dissatisfaction amongst 
the Samoans. Under certain circumstances these assumed criticial 
significance as they themselves became causes which provoked Samoan 
retaliation. They presented visible grounds of grievance and the 
reaction they incited was therefore immediate and urgent. In situations 
created by such factors, 'resistance' properly describes the Samoan 
response. At the same time, it was within such situations that the 
emphasis on the racial brown-white aspect of the conflict became more 
pronounced. However, notwithstanding these considerations, the fact 
remained that such provocative attitudes and actions, together with the 
resentment and bitterness they occasioned, still constituted but 
transitory causes in the total context of the Samoan response to an 
assumption of power backed by force, as the German and later New Zealand 
takeovers in fact were. As indicated above, that Samoan response was 
fundamentally determined on one hand by the belief that Samoans retained 
a right to the control which the foreign powers were exercising in Samoa,
7and on the other, by the obligation to regain that control. As can be 
appreciated, a response based on such grounds was essentially contingent 
neither on how the Samoans were treated nor on how the country was 
administered; nor yet on who, or which racial group, was in control. 
From the Samoan viewpoint, therefore, the nature of the conflict was 
basically one of contest for control rather than one of resistance.
The same fundamental considerations had been behind the continuous 
struggles between themselves, and the constant conflicts and 
confrontations at the national level during the 19th century.
To most Samoans, the foregoing was obvious; to the query 'Why 
the Mau?' the response was invariably either an immediate and often 
bristling 'ÄuA e tau iai' - we have a right to it [Samoa] - or a 
homily conveying the message that the enquirer. the wricer in this 
case, being a Samoan should know, and that he could ask such a silly 
question showed just how corrupted he had been by foreign ways of 
thinking. These homilies were therefore attempts to re-educate a 
wayward son and, more often than not, they were accompanied initially 
by a blank look, which soon changed to one of pity and ended up one of 
superiority as the unique virtues of the fa'a Samoa were driven home. 
During this re-education process though, emphasis was repeatedly placed 
on certain aspects of the fa'a Samoa which have subsequently come to 
constitute the principal points that follow.
While the Samoans thought that the reason for their attitude 
to foreign control was obvious, outsiders did not find it so simple. 
During the active period of the Mau movement, 1926-1936, the most 
repeated statement from the authorities, ranging from New Zealand Prime
Ministers to minor officials in Samoa, was that the Samoans in the Mau
8did not know what they wanted and had little if any idea of what the 
Mau was for. Writers on this subject did little better. F.M. Keesing, 
for example, who attempted the most ambitious analysis of the Mau, took 
the official view mentioned above as one of the basic premises on which 
he built his analysis.^
II
Today, as in the past, in Samoa ... the underlying 
motivation is pride - pride of self, of family, of 
race. It is an easy-sitting pride which looks 
unselfconsciously at other people. Inherently a 
proud people see value in dignity, and they expect 
recognition, both from strangers and among themselves.
In a few lines, McKay who was the most experienced New Zealand 
official on Samoan affairs, captured something of the essence of the 
Samoan character and made the point obvious that in order to possess 
some grasp of Samoan attitudes and behaviour, one needs to look at the 
foundations on which that pride is based. Rather than seek those 
foundations in an exhaustive discussion of the highly complex socio-
gpolitical structure of Samoa - a brief description of the basic
F.M. Keesing, Modem Samoa (London, 1934) , p. 179.
C.G.A. McKay, Samoana (Wellington, 1968) , p. 7.
For description and comments on the socio-political structure of 
Samoa, see for example F.J.H. Grattan, An introduction to Samoan 
custom (Apia, 1948); R.P. Gilson, Samoa 1830-1900; The politics of 
a multi-cultural community (Melbourne, 1970), chs. 1 and 2; J.D. 
Freeman, 'The social structure of a Samoan village community' 
(unpublished manuscript, 1948) 2 vols; A.F. Kramer, Die Samoa - 
Inseln (Stuttgart, 1902: translation by de Beer, 1941) vols 1 and 2; 
Margaret Mead,'The role of the individual in Samoan culture' in 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (vol. 58, 1928) , 
pp. 481-96; J.W. Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa (Melbourne, 1967), pp. 15-31.
9elements will be given to provide background - it is more productive 
to look at the issues of the definition and identity of the Samoan 
individual.
The aiga (family or local kin group) is the basic unit in the 
social structure of Samoa. It consists of people who are related by 
descent, adoption or marriage and who lay claim to a matai title which 
they serve and through which their place in the community is defined.
The head of the aiga is a person whom the local family members, together 
with relatives who live elsewhere - and serve other matai titles - but 
who have maintained aiga connections by assisting with major family 
functions, choose from amongst themselves to hold the family matai 
title. Once chosen, the titleholder assumes control over the aiga 
assets - the nature of this control is largely custodial as family 
assets are vested in the matai title itself, not the holder - the 
activities of its members, and represents the family in outside affairs. 
On their part, the untitled family members render him tautua (service). 
Although the matai has wide powers of control over the members of his 
aiga, the application of these powers is circumscribed by the freedom of 
the family members to move to another of their aiga if dissatisfied - a 
matai without tautua loses the respect of his fellow villagers and has 
to toil hard in the plantation to meet the aiga obligations to the village 
and church - and by the existence of the rarely used right of those 
same members to remove the title. By the same token, the untitled 
people are restrained from an arbitrary exercise of their rights by the 
inconvenience of starting anew in unfamiliar surroundings, and by the 
fact that one is more likely to succeed to a matai title in their aiga 
and village of origin than elsewhere.
Matai titles are of two orders, the ali1i (chief) and the tulafale
10
(orator); a distinction which is of little relevance in the aiga 
context where all matai perforin the same tasks, but of crucial importance 
outside the aiga circle. The difference between the two may best be seen 
in the division of chiefly functions; the ali' i, the source of 
authority, is a titular chief to whose title and person were attached, 
in Samoan tradition, a sanctity which placed him above involvement in 
'profane' tasks - such as speaking on his own behalf or distributing 
goods and wealth - which were performed by the tulafale whose role 
resembled that of executive and administrator. The distribution of 
political power however does not necessarily follow this division, the 
relative standing of ali'i and tulafale vary from village to village 
and district to district and in many places individual tulafale or 
groups of them possess and wield all the power while the ali'i play 
strictly a figurehead role. Within the categories of ali'i and 
tulafale there exist rank orders of all variations according to context 
and use.
The basic and most stable unit of political organisation is the 
nu'u (village) which is made up of a number of local aiga, constituted 
in a formal structure by the village fa'alupega. This is a fixed set 
of honorific greetings for the matai titles in the village and takes the 
form of allusions to the historical and genealogical origins as well 
as the functions, rights and duties of those titles not only in the 
village but also in the wider context of sub-district, district and 
country. Through those references, the various titles are defined and 
located in the village hierarchy, thereby providing a framework for 
interaction between the different aiga, while at the same time, the 
identity of the village is established in the wider extra-village context.
In providing the village with a formal framework for its internal
11
Operation as well as a separate identity in the community of villages,
9the fa1alupega establishes the autonomy of that village - a status 
jealously guarded.
Control of village affairs lies with the fono a matai (council 
of chiefs), the highest body constituted in the village fa'alupega.
The fono possesses extensive powers so that it is able, for example, to 
make village regulations, administer them and punish those who break 
them. It is not answerable to a higher authority for its conduct of 
village affairs, and the greatest moderating factor on the use of its 
powers lies in the close attention paid by each matai to the protection 
of the interests of his aiga.
Apart from the matai grouping, three other village institutions 
which are important in the everyday lives of the people, cut across aiga 
relationships: the aumaga or taulelea (untitled young men), Faletua ma
Tausi (wives of the matai), and the aualuma (unattached women of the 
village). The matai on the male side and the aualuma on the female side 
are traditionally the more important, status wise, in their respective 
areas. Nowadays though, the demarcation between the aualuma and the 
Faletua ma Tausi has narrowed significantly and the women deal with 
their responsibilities in the combined komiti a tamaitai (women's 
committee) in which older wives are often the more influential.
Villages are grouped into sub-districts and districts on the basis 
of historical and genealogical ties, with locality an important influence.
Although most used in connection with the village, the term 
fa1alupega is similarly applied to the highly compressed socio­
political-ceremonial definition of either individual, aiga, sub­
district, district or country in historical/genealogical terms. 
In this context, fa1alupega includes the gafa which is 
specifically the geneaology of a title or of an aiga.
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As in the case of villages, the political and ceremonial hierarchy 
within these larger groupings are defined and fixed by the fa'alupega 
of each district, but whereas in villages the focus of cohesion is the 
village fono, here that focus is provided by the particular paramount 
title acknowledged by the respective sub-districts and districts. In 
consequence, the political-ceremonial structure of each district is 
based largely on the traditional ties between the various entities 
within it - for instance individual titles and individual villages or 
groupings of titles and combinations of villages - and their paramount 
title.
The island of Upolu is divided into three districts - Atua, Aana 
and Tuamasaga - which are further sub-divided into eleven main sub­
districts. In Savaii, there are six districts - Fa'asaleleaga,
Gaga'emauga, Gagaifomauga, Vaisigano, Satupa'itea and Palauli - with 
seven notable sub-districts. Each of these districts has a political 
centre which is usually the traditional residential village of the 
relevant paramount chief. In Upolu these centres are Lufilufi in Atua, 
Leulumoega in Aana and the adjacent villages of Malie and Afega in 
Tuamasaga, while in Savaii, Safotulafai in Fa'asaleleaga is the traditional 
residence of the Malietoa titleholder on that island and although the 
other districts insist on their independence and primacy in the 
politico-ceremonial hierarchy of Savaii, Safotulafai is the senior 
traditional capital and reference to it generally suffices for the whole 
of Savaii, The political centres in the other Savaii districts are 
Palauli village in Palauli district, Satupaitea village in Satupaitea 
district, Saleaula in Gagaemauga, Safotu in Gagaifomauga and Asau in
Vaisigano.
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District fono meet infrequently and deal largely with ceremonial 
and ritual matters; and issues of warfare in the old days. In these 
fono and indeed in all district affairs, tulafale groups from the 
political centres dominate, but they are always careful to obtain the 
views of the leading matai from the constituent villages in their 
districts before acting. Just as it is the duty of the senior matai, 
particularly the tulafale, of a village to protect the interests of their 
village in district affairs, so it is the duty of the tulafale from 
the traditional centre in each district to uphold the interests of 
their district in national affairs. And at the national level in 
Samoan tradition, the main issues of contention were in fact largely 
concerned with the struggle between these orator groups for ascendancy 
on behalf of their respective districts. The orator groups from the 
traditional political centres in Upolu are individually and collectively 
known as Tumua, while those in Savaii are called Pule, so that it may 
be correctly said that the national affairs of Samoa were in the hands 
of Tumua and Pule.
Since the politico-ceremonial hierarchies at district level 
were primarily based on relationships with paramount titles, the struggle 
between the traditional centres was manifested principally and most 
dramatically in their tussle to assert the ascendancy of the paramount 
title acknowledged by their respective districts. At this top level, 
four such titles are recognised: Malietoa, Tupua, Mata'afa and
Tuimaleali'ifano. These titles belong to the two major lineages of 
Sa Malietoa and Sa Tupua, the former being headed by the Malietoa 
title and the latter by the other three with Tupua the senior title. 
Holders of these titles are referred to as tama-aiga (sons of the family),
reflecting the fact that behind each is a great series of kin and locality
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alignments, and indicating also the interdependent nature of the 
relationship between these titles and their Aiga.  ^ Although alliances 
between major groupings were not stable, in general the district of 
Tuamasaga in Upolu, Aiga-ile-Tai, and the whole of Savai'i were 
traditionally aligned with the Sa Malietoa lineage, while Atua and 
Aana were behind the Sa Tupua.
To establish paramountcy over the whole country, it was 
necessary for the holder of any of the tama-aiga titles to be 
bestowed the four highest ceremonial titles in Samoa; Tui Atua,
Tui Aana, Gatoaitele and Tamasoalii. The holder of these four titles 
was called the Tafa'ifa (holder of four) and only a person who had 
achieved this honour could rightfully be called the king of Samoa. It 
was the traditional right of the tulafale groups of the Tumua centres 
to bestow these titles - Lufilufi with the Tui Atua, Leulumoega with 
the Tui Aana, and the Tuamasaga orators with the Gatoaitele and the 
Tamasoalii - but because of their intense rivalry for ascendancy, it 
was almost impossible for any one person to be bestowed all four. However 
since the Tafa'ifa was the ultimate symbol of status in Samoan society, 
the orators of Tumua and Pule in the old days continually intrigued and 
committed their districts to war in their efforts to win that honour for 
their tama-aiga and hence their district.
Ill
Samoans see their own identification in two basic dimensions: 
that determined by inherited positions and values on one hand, and on the
10 Aiga is the term for major kin and district groupings.
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other, that determined by personal effort and achievement. The first 
is characterised by properties which are fixed, basic and to be 
protected, while the latter is characterised by variables which move 
according to competition and personal achievement. These two spheres 
are of course inter-related and often overlap, but Samoans never 
confuse them. The division is retained in the following analysis.
The enquiry 'Who are you?' from a Samoan, of another Samoan, 
seeks not to discover a name but rather to obtain information on the 
aiga and village connections of the other person. Without that information 
the enquirer, in Samoan terms, would in fact not know who the other person 
is, notwithstanding that he might be familiar with the other's name, 
and he would therefore be unable to relate properly to the other.
This situation exists because first and foremost the Samoan is defined 
and identified in terms of the genealogical constitution of the 
different aiga to which he is related through both his parents, as well 
as in terms of the internal hierarchy and the standing of the villages - 
and on a wider scale, sub-districts and districts - to which those aiga 
belong. Thus in the numerous villages visited by the writer either as 
a researcher or government official, his name, although known to his 
hosts, was never mentioned in the countless formal and semi-formal 
addresses made. Instead he was addressed always in terms of the gafa 
(genealogy of a title or an aiga) and the fa'alupega of his various aiga 
and of the corresponding villages; each speaker utilising one or more 
of these relationships as he saw fit. Sometimes his occupation and 
profession were added to his identification.
This procedure is normal, and a Samoan would be insulted if it 
were not observed, particularly amongst his own people. A Samoan, even 
as a child, learns by conscious instruction and by everyday experiences
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his place and role within his aiga, the place and role of his aiga within 
the village, his village within the sub-district and so on. He learns 
the gafa of his aiga, the fa* alupega of the family title and the 
fa1alupega of his village; and he learns too the fa'alupega, the places 
and roles of the other aiga in his village, so that he knows the 
relationships between the different entities within his village and 
understands how the whole community functions. The importance of his 
aiga and village in their respective context is constantly impressed on 
him by word and deed, so that he is positively encouraged to take pride 
in those things and thus in himself. The same applies on the wider 
scale of sub-district, district and country. Part of the identity of 
the Samoan is defined in terms of his relationship to these larger 
divisions and the institutions therein. At every available opportunity, 
the uniqueness and the virtues of the relevant entities within these 
divisions are emphasised and the individual is thereby positively 
reinforced in his view of those matters. In this way, a Samoan can 
identify personally with the interests of his village, his sub-district, 
district and country, so that the pride he feels for these things is 
personal and intense.
For all practical purposes, the fa'alupega of each aiga, village 
and so forth is constant in the context in which each operates. This in 
turn means that the rank, status and roles pertaining to each of these 
entities, and indicated and enshrined in the fa1alupega, are fixed. 
Therefore, the identity of the Samoan in terms of these factors is safe 
and secure: he knows with certainty who he is and what he is 
particularly in relation to others in the village as well as those 
outside his village. Thus at the basic level of his existence he has 
this definitive awareness of his identity, and on that is founded the
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confidence and the self-assurance of the Samoan individual.
The question arises though, particularly from an outside 
viewpoint, as to the operation of those factors in Samoan society, 
given its traditional nature and its hierarchical structure. Put in 
another and more blunt way, is one's regard for his aiga and village 
based simply on blind faith in tradition? On the other hand, do the 
factors discussed above in fact apply throughout the whole society as, 
for example, with individuals from minor families whose matai title may 
not rate a regular seat in the village fono?
The answers to both queries lie largely in the principles and 
the practices expressed in the Samoan proverb 'O Samoa ole atunuu tofi1 
(Samoa is an apportioned country) meaning each individual, each title 
or aiga, each village, sub-district and so on, each institution and 
organisation has a defined place and role in society; each possesses 
inherent dignity derived from being an integral part of the total 
society, and each therefore commands recognition and respect. On the 
other hand, the obligations and privileges devolving on each are bounded 
and these boundaries should be observed. In common usage, this proverb 
is most often employed to put another person in his place - 'know your 
place, keep to it' - and to assert one's own position.
Inherited rank, status, roles and rights which are enshrined 
and indicated in gafa and fa'alupega as well as in other traditions and 
practices are regarded by each group as constituting a sacred trust or 
heritage, held in the aiga title or the collective entity of the village 
fono. These inheritances had been earned or had resulted from 
traditionally-sanctioned tofiga (allocations) down the years and those
who succeeded to them by birth and descent or by other recognised means
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adoption or mavaega (dying wish of a matai) for example - hold 
inextinguishable rights to them. As matters vested in the aiga title 
and the village fono they belong to members of the respective groups 
past, present and future; the incumbents at any period being but 
custodians for the time being. In this role they exercise the 
prerogatives and enjoy the benefits flowing from their heritage. At 
the same time though, they have a duty to themselves as well as to their 
aiga or village - in the widest sense of past, present and future 
generations - to protect the standing and the honour of that heritage.
If it is usurped as a result of, say, a mavaega or wrested away by force, 
then that duty demands that they try to regain it. Samoan existence 
indeed revolves around the protection of one's inherited position and 
on the other hand the promotion of that position through achieved 
influence, as will be seen later.
The task of protecting one's heritage was tackled in a positive 
and dynamic manner by actively exercising the prerogatives pertaining 
to one's own inheritance and demanding that it be accorded due 
recognition and respect at all times - a positive approach which 
embodied the very essence of a living and vital culture. As can be 
appreciated, though, the operation of this approach, constructive as it 
is, creates an atmosphere of tension at all levels of society, touching 
and affecting everyone, including children. This was inevitable, given 
the fierce pride of each Samoan in his aiga, village and so on. Formal 
observances of rank, status and roles is part of everyday life, so that 
whenever Samoans meet for example - particularly the matai - whether in 
a fono or on an informal visit to the next door fale (Samoan house) 
formal greetings including respectful references to the gafa and the 
fa'alupega of the other are always made, the form being determined by
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the occasion and the personal preferences of the individuals involved. 
R.L. Stevenson, watching this lifestyle but obviously uncomprehending 
as to the forces behind it, somewhat irreverently described it thus:
'An elaborate courtliness marks the race alone among Polynesians; 
terms of ceremony fly thick as oaths on board a ship; commoners mylord 
each other when they meet - and urchins as they play m a r b l e s ^
This principle of protection through exercising prerogatives 
and demanding dues applied even when a position had been usurped, so 
that a party deprived of its position would continue, or attempt to 
continue, performing the roles pertinent to the usurped position as a 
means of keeping its rights to that position alive and vital. It would 
also take other measures to keep reminding its own members - even 
perhaps those yet to be born - as well as others of their rights to the 
usurped position. This is indicative of two significant strains in 
Samoan perception. First is the belief that without this active 
reminder, particularly to the community at large, that community will 
in time accept the rights of the usurper as full and complete, thus 
clothing his claims to the disputed position with untainted legitimacy 
and thereby effectively eliminating the original possessors with regard 
to that particular position. The second is the fatalistic belief of 
Samoans that in the normal evolution of things, the relative strength 
between the parties will change, and one day the deprived party will 
be strong enough to make an effective bid to regain its full rights.
'E sau aso, ae alu aso1 (days come and days go) Samoans say, indulging 
in a sentiment similar to that conveyed by the papalagi expression 
'our day will come'.
11 R.L. Stevenson, A Footnote to History (reprint London, 1967), p. 2.
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The measures which are calculated to keep the rights of a 
party alive are, if susceptible to public demonstration, given that 
treatment - a provocative act in itself - and such demonstration is 
invariably carried out in an aggressive manner. The public display 
is essential since it is the members of the community at large who must 
be kept impressed of one's rights, while the aggressiveness is a 
necessary ingredient in the strategy of testing the dominant party in 
the constant probe for weaknesses. At the same time, both parties 
would engage in promoting their respective cases by intrigue - 
manipulating and exploiting genealogical, traditional, religious and 
any other ties that may appear favourable to their interests.
Immediately on conflicts developing, attitudes and behavioural 
patterns elicited by such situations are assumed easily and naturally 
by Samoans as part of their everyday lives. The conflict thus becomes 
a personal matter and finds expression in the wide range of the 
experiences of the individual, rendering it more susceptible to 
bitterness which is very difficult to diffuse, let alone remove 
completely. In short, conflict situations are characterised by 
constant probing, particularly by the weaker party testing the defences 
of the other, by continuous intrigue on both sides, and by personal 
identification and involvement.
On the other side of the coin, the party in control is expected 
to protect its position and measures it takes to ensure that objective 
are understood even if they are deeply resented. Germany during its 
period of fourteen years of rule in Samoa took very strong measures to 
protect its position from the continuous attempts by the Samoans to 
contest control of their affairs, particularly at the national level 
where German control was most obvious. The German response did not
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give the Samoans any encouragement, which attitude the Samoans expected and 
understood in such a situation. By the same token they had the duty 
to regain full control of their heritage and so they worked away at it.
This duty was of particular importance to the orators of the Tumua and 
Pule centres, whose role was to protect the mamalu (dignity) and therefore 
the well-being of national institutions. The prominence of Safotulafai, 
the senior Pule centre, in the clashes during the German regime has to 
be seen in this context for proper appreciation of that conflict. As 
the most influential orator of that centre at the time Lauaki Mamoe was 
simply playing the role allotted him and his district by the fa'a Samoa.
He had no choice. Similarly in the confrontation during the New Zealand 
period, specifically the Mau of 1926-1936, it was the orators from the 
Pule and Tumua centres who controlled the Mau affairs.
During this latter struggle, the Samoans discovered soon after 
New Zealand took over from Germany that the newcomers were not as 
particular as the Germans in protecting their position. The lapses 
created by this relaxed attitude were exploited for all they were worth, 
as was proper under such circumstances. To place this matter in a 
proper perspective though, it must be said that the Samoan judgement of 
the two foreign administrations on this score was very much in terms of 
one being more vigilant than the other in protecting their respective 
interests, rather than in terms of respect for German force and contempt 
for New Zealand's less stringent approach.
But while the operation of this protectionist attitude towards 
one's heritage was responsible for much of the strife within Samoan 
society, it also played a very important part in preventing any one 
individual or group from being autocratic and domineering. Sensitivity
22
over the issue of inherited rights is such that mere suspicion by a 
group that it was being treated disrespectfully by others would often 
constitute sufficient reason for it either to wage war on its detractors 
or to change alliances or to withdraw recognition. This aspect of the 
fa1a Samoa was doubtless one of the major factors which prevented the 
establishment last century of a Samoan central government under one 
dominant group as happened in Fiji, Tonga and elsewhere in the Pacific. 
The success of the Samoans at the time in avoiding such a system 
safeguarded, for themselves and their descendants, each his/her 
respected place and role in society and guaranteed their freedom of 
choice and movement in the interests of their respective rights, without 
being restricted and compromised by the fact of one particular group or 
family exercising permanent superiority within their society.
At the same time though, these protectionist tendencies can also 
persuade individuals and groups to remain aloof or to join an alliance 
or organisation. This applies especially to groups whose positions in 
the fa'a Samoa are not secure, in the sense that there are competing 
claims from others to the prerogatives they are exercising. The six 
Pule districts of Savai'i fit into this situation. They all claim the 
same privileges and prominence, so that the struggle as to who in fact 
exercises these Pule rights, particularly at the national level, is 
continuous and intense. Doubtless this factor accounted to a large 
extent for the overwhelming numerical support given the Mau movement by 
all the districts of Savai'i; a support though, which when broken down 
to matters of financial contributions and ceremonial largesse - the 
real test with Samoans - showed that apart from one or two districts
the support was in fact lukewarm.
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Until the final quarter of last century there were only two 
Pule - Safotulafai and Saleaula - in Savai'i, while the other four main 
groups were designated Itu. Pule status ranks the highest politically 
in Savai'i and the four Itu had contended for Pule status for 
generations without success. In the aftermath of the Steinberger 
experiment of the 1870s to form a stable Samoan central government, the 
Upolu Tumua centres of Lufilufi and Leulomoega siezed on the unsettled 
conditions to make a bid to extend their political authority to Savai'i. 
Under the guise of visiting Savai'i to negotiate a settlement of the 
conflict that had been in progress, Tumua offered certain Itu districts 
of Savai'i Tumua status. Safotulafai, the senior Pule, immediately went 
to war against the Tumua and Itu forces. It won. However, rather than 
returning to the status quo Safotulafai, conscious of the need to 
guarantee that Savai'i political control remained in Savai'i, forced 
Tumua to withdraw their offer of Tumua status to Savai'i districts, and 
Lauaki Mamoe, speaking on behalf of Safotulafai, conferred Pule status on 
the four Itu. That action defeated Tumua designs on political control 
of Savai'i but now the struggle moved on to the next plane of contention - 
that for the leading Pule amongst the six.
Village institutions too such as the matai, aumaga, aualuma and 
Faletua ma Tausi are most protective of their standing. Every Samoan 
in the village, apart from those in their early teens and younger, 
belongs to one or the other of these groups by convention and compulsion 
if necessary. It is through these groups that they serve the interests 
of the village as an entity in its own right rather than merely a 
combination of families. As such, membership, obligations and loyalties 
attached to these groups cut across family ties and sometimes conflict 
with aiga interests. It is difficult to generalise on which interests are
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paramount to the individual Samoan, for in practice there does not appear 
to be too much difficulty in choosing which way to go, the response being 
largely contingent on the importance of the issues involved, the 
personalities concerned and the relevant context obtaining.
The taulelea hold a place and a role which from an outside 
viewpoint would appear servile and unrewarding; serving the matai in 
their own aiga and carrying out the orders and decisions of the village 
fono. Yet their position is not altogether lacking in honour and worth. 
Their relationship with the fono as well as with the matai of their own 
aiga is one of consultation rather than one of orders and blind obedience. 
If the matai fail to accord the position of the taulelea due recognition 
and respect, the taulelea may well refuse to repond favourably to fono 
requests. But if the requirements of respect are observed, then the 
taulelea would sacrifice himself at the word of the matai and the fono, 
because that is his role and that constituted part of his identity at 
that period of his life.
It is in this context too that another aspect of Samoan 
behaviour - that of politeness - can be best appreciated. The show of 
humility and deference by a Samoan is never an expression of inferiority 
but rather an expression of confidence in one's own position and the 
knowledge that others involved in the relationship recognise and 
respect the relative significance of all the relevant factors pertinent 
to the relationship. With that background, a taulealea feels it an 
honour to jump without question to an order of a matai, while the highest 
ranking matai in a village would sit slightly away from his proper place 
of honour in the fono, and after being identified in the formal terms of
the gafa and fa'alupega would refer to himself in ordinary terms.
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Even in the performance of the ifoga, the highest form of Samoan 
apology and a most humbling one, where the leading member(s) of the 
guilty or defeated party would sit with head bowed and covered by an 
ie toga (fine mat) literally offering himself up to the injured or 
victorious party as a sacrifice, those offering the ifoga are only 
apologising for some particular event but in no way conceding anything 
else; they would most likely be planning how to exercise their 
prerogatives better next time even as they apologised. A defeated party 
in the old days engaged in an ifoga, for example, was simply saying to 
the victorious party, 'this time you win and I am paying you respect 
for it, but my righcs could not be extinguished and when I am able I 
will contest with you again'. And the victorious party understood and 
accepted that situation - it was up to it to protect its position of 
dominance.
Within this dimension of Samoan life which revolves around 
ascriptive principles, direct challenges to rank, status and roles 
are uncommon though not unknown. Depending on circumstances, direct 
challenges in this area constitute the most explosive issues within 
Samoan society. If not arrested quickly, such challenges would 
invariably drive bitter and deep divisions between sections of a 
family, different families within a village, villages within a sub­
district, and so on. Divisions created in this manner are extremely 
difficult to heal and it might take generations if ever before a 
reconciliation is effected. Permanent new groups often result. 
Notwithstanding this situation, the contest for enhanced rank and 
status is very much a feature of Samoan life, but that struggle takes 




In contrast with the sphere of life dominated by inherited 
rank, status and roles, and stifled by the obsession to protect them, 
the dimension of Samoan life where one is defined and identified in 
terms of efforts and achievement is characterised by competition and 
contest. The factors which operate here are variable. One of the 
major ones is influence, and the extent to which it applies is 
determined by the personalities, the efforts and the attainments of 
the incumbent members of aiga, villages and so forth at any particular 
period. A high rating in these qualities and means would enable a 
family, village, sub-district or district to assume dominant influence 
and therefore effective control over the affairs of the group within 
which each operates.
Dominant influence does not mean autocratic or domineering 
posturing, it means rather that one's opinion carries a decisive amount 
of weight. In the case of a village for example, the gafa and the 
fa* alupega, and therefore the respective ranks, status and roles, 
remain constant; the conventions and practices which provide the 
framework of village organisation are observed as before; all remain 
normal. Within the village fono though, the trend and nature of its 
decisions - and therefore the direction and control of village affairs - 
would largely reflect the views of the matai enjoying dominant influence 
at the time, rather than the views of other matai, including the holder 
of the highest-ranking title. Often such influence is wielded behind 
the scenes but most people in a village would know who was in ascendancy 
at a time because his efforts, talents and success would be public 
matters, which were often adopted by members of the village as objects of
pride.
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Essentially the fa*a Samoa places no restrictions either on the 
nature or the extent of the achievement, or on the individual involved; 
these are determined by ability, opportunity and effort. Individuals 
who demonstrate ability are encouraged regardless of their antecedents. 
Thus a taulealea from a minor family who has shown exceptional ability 
in dealing with ancient chants would be preferred by a fono to perform 
such a chant on an important occasion over the heads of taulelea from 
the highest-ranking aiga; and a student who did well in academic 
studies would perhaps receive a special mention in the village church 
or be invited by the matai fono into its midst to be congratulated.
On the other hand, the highly competitive nature of Samoan society - 
resulting from and sustained by their fierce personal pride - often 
leads to others exerting greater efforts to match or to better the 
attainment of another individual, and sometimes to detract deliberately 
from such attainment; the Samoans themselves frequently saying that 
they must be unique in this practice.
Such an attitude, however, normally applies only in certain 
specific contexts, so that while within a village one family would be 
reluctant to admit the success of an individual in a rival aiga, members 
of the same family would boast of that very success as if it were their 
own - as indeed it is on the village level - to people from outside 
their village. The ramifications of this attitude therefore hardly 
affect adversely - they may even heighten the effect - the applicability 
of the general principle of according due recognition and respect to 
those who achieved through their own efforts and talents, in right of 
those achievements. With such recognition comes rank and status, and 
therefore privileges and obligations. Such achieved attributes however 
are never confused by Samoans with rank, status and privileges derived
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from gafa, fa'alupega and other Samoan conventions and practices.
There has of course always been a category within the fa1a Samoa in which 
such people are accommodated. Within that category were those who 
qualified - through their skill - for example to the tufuga (craftsman) 
group, which includes the tufuga fau fale (house builder), tufuga ta 
tatau (tatooer) and the tufuga fau va'a (boat builder). Around this 
craftsman group and similarly for others such as tautai (masters of the 
sea arts) there exists a complicated ritual and ceremony, which above all 
else demonstrates the prominent position they occupy within Samoan 
society.
Important as it is, the identification of a Samoan derived 
from achievement is generally taken as appendant to that determined by 
birth and descent. Thus a Faifeau (Samoan church minister) may be 
satisfactorily identified in terms of his vocation by members of his 
congregation who may drop in for a chat, but on semi-formal and formal 
occasions, the gafa and fa1alupega of his aiga and corresponding villages 
- and if applicable sub-districts and districts - always constitute the 
major part of his identification.
Similar considerations place restrictions on the extent to which 
one can exercise any influence he may have obtained through achieved 
success. Therefore while there are no limits to what one can achieve, 
influence resulting from such achievement can only be properly exercised 
within a sphere where the individual concerned is entitled by fa1a Samoa 
requirements to operate. Thus while a successful Samoan entrepreneur 
in a village may be powerful and influential by viture of his material 
wealth, if he is a non-matai then his influence must remain peripheral
in matters of village control. If he wants to play a more effective
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part in village affairs it is necessary for him to be a matai. And 
thus does the fa'a Samoa perpetuate and protect itself.
However to wield effective influence within the matai fono, he 
needs to hold a title which qualifies for what shall be termed here 
contending equality status, at the highest level of the fono. In 
simple terms, contending equality status describes a standing which 
a title must have to qualify to exercise certain privileges and roles 
within a particular context. For example, before the four Itu districts 
of Savai'i achieved Pule status in 1880, the leading orators from those 
districts, regardless of whether they were the most powerful personalities 
on the scene, could not exercise influence at the highest political 
councils of Savai'i and Samoa; they did not have contending equality 
status at that top level.
The term is also intended to convey the fact that in most 
situations several titles or groups which have the right to exercise 
a particular privilege would in fact hold varying ranks and command 
differing status. Thus in the case of the Pule groupings in Savai'i, 
they are regarded as having different ranks with Safotulafai the most 
senior, but each possessed contending equality status at the highest 
political level in the country, which allowed a tulafale of ability 
and achievement from any of the six Pule centres to exercise dominant 
influence in Savai'i or national affairs. This was what in fact 
happened during the Mau when Autagavaia of Palauli and Lavea of Safotu 
dominated Mau affairs. The reality within Samoan society is therefore 
one where in general terms, rank and status are of the highest importance 
but in practical terms, possession or attainment of contending equality 
status at the controlling level within each sphere of organisation is
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the crucial requirement. By and large then, the principal concern with 
Samoans is not so much achieving equality in status per se but rather 
attaining contending equality status.
It is probably due largely to this reality that the ranks of 
titles in villages or wherever are not as a rule ever specifically 
stated. People of course know which are the high-ranking titles from 
knowledge of gafa and fa* alupega and from ceremonial observances and 
other conventions and practices, but there is a great reluctance to put 
a specific and definite ranking on titles, particularly in public. The 
concern is more that one should have contending equality status, a more 
general and rather obscure definition of rank, but one which gives the 
fa1a Samoa that variety of options which Samoans are so fond of and so 
adept at maintaining.
With several titles and groups of different ranks possessing 
contending equality status within each sphere of Samoan life, the contest 
for dominant influence is always present, always intense and often 
bitter; and a great deal of importance became attached to personalities 
and achievement. Sometimes two or more matai at the top sphere would 
be exerting comparable influence and often they would end up adopting 
different causes such as the Mau or the Malo (government) or different 
religious denominations, even if it meant traumatic conversions. If 
conflict situations existed, then the normal Samoan response would be 
for each side to withdraw all forms of recognition from the other, 
conducting its affairs as if it constituted the whole and the other 
party did not exist. In confined villages environments though, the two 
parties would soon meet up and then during the initial period, physical 
and verbal clashes would be likely to occur if a conciliation was not
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effected. As time passed however, people who have always lived together 
in the same community would inevitably drift back to peaceful existence, 
although the cause of the split such as the Mau or religious denoninations 
might well remain and even become a permanent part of the life of the 
village.
It is on an understanding of the situation where contendir.g 
equality status rather than equality per se is the operational principle 
that the often-mentioned dualism in Samoan life can best be appreciated.
The concept should probably be best termed multi-ism, because it is 
rare indeed for any sphere of the fa'a Samoa to contain only twc titles 
or parties with contending equality status. And the multiplicity of 
such titles or groups within any one area is probably a major factor in 
contest and conflicts being a way of life in Samoan society. jV
But while this principle of contending equality status means 
that titles or parties of lesser rank can exercise effective control in 
their respective spheres, there are limitations on the extent of t.neir 
control. There is of course the need to retain support, which mitigates 
against being overbearing, but there is another and more compelling 
restriction, which is to do with the standing of the community in which 
the relevant action takes place. In a village situation, for example, a 
matai of lesser rank exercising dominant influence must always take care 
that he did not undermine the standing of the other important titles in 
the village to the extent that it would leave the village open to 
ridicule, particularly from outside, and thereby compromise the position 
of everyone in the village, as well as that of the village itself in 
outside affairs. Thus on occasions where outsiders are involved the 
holder of the highest ranked title is given all due honour and respect 
even if in actuality he wields very little influence in the village matai fono
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This practice of presenting a face of unanimity and tranquillity 
finds expression in the Samoan saying 'malu i fale1 (safe within the 
house) meaning, that squabbles should be confined to the immediate parties 
concerned and should not be broadcast. The rationale behind this attitude 
is basically self-protection; the fear is that the exposure of changes 
disagreements and divisions would be exploited by others to improve their 
own position. The same reason largely explains why members of an aiga 
follow their matai to a new religion or in an unusual course of action, 
and similarly why a village takes the lead of its highest ranking chief.
It is not an act of blindly following an autocratic leader, it is a 
necessary act of self-protection, so that one is in a position to 
protect the dignity and honour of the matai, and therefore protect one's 
own identity.
V
New Zealand's entry into Samoa occurred on 29 August 1914 when
a 1400-strong New Zealand military force under the command of Colonel
Rogert Logan landed in Apia and took control of the town; the following
day, Logan formally proclaimed the occupation of German Samoa by the
12forces of His Britannic Majesty King George Fifth. As it turned out,
New Zealand remained in the territory until 1962 when Samoa attained 
her independence.
The occupation of Samoa had resulted from a request by the British
13government for the seizure of the German wireless station in Samoa.
12 Logan to Liverpool, 2 Sept. 1914, G 1279/14.
Harcourt to Liverpool, 6 Aug. 1914, IT 39/2.13
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Nine days after receipt of that request, two New Zealand troopships left
Wellington and escorted by three British warships, proceeded to Noumea,
New Caledonia where they teamed up with three more warships - two
Australian and one French. The fleet, under the command of Rear-Admiral
Sir George E. Patey of the Australian Navy, called at Suva and picked up
fifteen Samoans who lived there, 'to be dispersed throughout the islands
14in order to explain our intentions', and then headed for Apia where on
the morning of 29 August, Patey demanded from the Governor of Samoa
surrender of the territory. An assurance that there would be no
opposition was received and the occupation forces disembarked and
15established themselves in Apia without incident.
Perhaps because the occupation was a military one and the whole
operation was launched hurriedly, Logan was not given directions on how
to administer the group once it was secured; being instructed only to
'take such measures as you may consider necessary to hold them and to
control the inhabitants'. ^  Relying on the provisions of the Hague
Convention 1907 and his own knowledge of laws and practices of war,
he tried to administer the country along the lines established by the
17Germans, utilising incumbent German officials. Insistence by these 
officials to continue administering Samoa in the name of the Kaiser 
however forced Logan to replace them with members of his force and a few 
local residents in a move which saw him take charge of the whole civil 
administration in three days. The changeover apparently did not cause
Logan to Liverpool, 2 Sept. 1914, G 1279/14.
On the seizure of German Samoa see, European War: (correspondence
relating to) Occupation of German Samoa by an expeditionary force 
from New Zealand (Govt, pamphlet, Wellington, 1915); see also 
G series 21-1 and IT 39/2.
Colonel W.G. Braithwaite to Logan, 13 Aug. 1914, IT 39/2.
Memorandum by Logan (5 Sept. 1914) , end. in Logan to Liverpool,
5 Sept. 1914, G 1280/14.
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any problems, perhaps because the existing administrative structures
and procedures were retained, except for the Education Department which
was temporarily disbanded because the buildings in the Department's
18compound were being used to billet the troops. Logan also distributed
copies of Colonial Office Regulations to departments with instructions
19'to carry on as nearly as possible in conformity with them'; his 
main objective though appeared not so much the introduction of new 
procedures as the familiarisation of his officials with British practice, 
anticipating that the Colonial Office would eventually take over control 
of Samoa.
In dealing with the local population, Logan adopted the policy
20of putting Samoan interests first. Thus on the issue of the
availability of Samoan land for European use, he would only consider
leaseholds in Upolu and rejected proposals concerning Savai'i: 'I am
strongly of opinion that the island of Savai'i should be retained
absolutely for the Samoans and that no European occupation should be 
21encouraged there'. On the other hand, his resolve to lower the
Chinese coolie population in spite of protests from whites, particularly
planters, was partly justified by Samoans' objections to the imported
labourers, 'who were brought in without their consent and remain against 
22their wishes'. Consequently when some villages declared that they would 
punish any Chinese who cohabited with any of their women, Logan did not 
interfere: 'I consider it my duty to give them [Samoans] all assistance
Logan to Liverpool, 27 Oct. 1914, G 1968/14.





Logan to Liverpool, 23 Oct. 1916, G 3396/16.
22 Logan to Liverpool, 19 Nov. 1917, G. 3197/17.
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I can to keep their race a pure one'. When the Faipule requested
tangible support, Logan responded with a Proclamation forbidding coolies
24from entering fale (Samoan houses).
Logan continued with the German practice of the head of government 
being directly involved in the administration of Samoan affairs. He 
discovered that the Germans had largely left the Samoans to run their 
affairs according to their customs and traditions, and had built a 
simple hierarchy of Samoan officials on the traditional structure to 
provide a formal link between government and the Samoans. At the top of 
this hierarchy were the two Fautua; normally the Malietoa titleholder 
and one of the tama-aiga from the Sa Tupua major lineage. Malietoa 
Tanumafili and Tupua Tamasese Lealofi were the Fautua at the time; the 
latter died in 1916 and was replaced by Tuimalealiifano. This office 
was one of high honour without real power created by the Germans to 
accommodate the heads of the two great lineages in the attempt to remove 
them from being the focus of district and kin rivalry which had caused 
so much upheaval during the previous century. Their role was to advise 
the Governor on Samoan affairs when consulted. Next came the Faipule - 
37 at the time - who were representatives appointed by the Governor 
from districts; they were the main channel of communication between 
the districts and the Governor whom they met twice yearly at Mulinu’u.
The Faipule institution was established by the Germans in their efforts 
to destroy the power of the orators of Tumua and Pule, many of whom had 
continuously plotted against the German Administration and had caused two 
major confrontations in 1904/5 and 1908/9 between government and the
23 Ibid.
24 Logan to Liverpool, 17 Apr. 1917, G 1121/17.
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Samoans. The latter clash resulted in the deportation of nine leading
25matai with members of their aiga to Saipan, in the Marianas.
Faumasino Samoa or Native judges - 25 positions - operated at
the district level too. Their jurisdiction extended only to Samoans
and covered those cases where they could either order restitution in
kind or a fine of up to 40 marks. The Komisi - 16 positions - were
Lands and Titles Commissioners while the Pule fa'atoaga - 8 in number -
were the plantation inspectors. These officials were appointed by
government. At the village level the Pulenu'u or 'village mayor'
operated. When Logan took over there were 155 Pulenu'u - 96 in Upolu 
. 26and 59 in Savai'i - and these officials were chosen by their respective 
villages according to their own practices. The Pulenu'u had authority to 
order compensation in kind or to impose a fine of no more than 6 marks 
for minor offences. His other duties included collecting the village 
taxes - a poll tax of 24 marks per matai and 20 marks each for other 
adult males - ensuring that the village and adjacent roads were clean 
and repaired, seeing that copra was properly made before sale, 
supervising the weekly search for rhinoceros beetles, recording births, 
deaths and saofai (title bestowal ceremony), and generally overseeing the 
welfare of the community.
Together with the Native Department providing direction and 
co-ordination, this hierarchy of officials constituted the system of 
Samoan administration which Logan adopted and which the New Zealanders 
used during their time in the territory. Logan however was more indulgent
See P.J. Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders Under German Rule (Canberra, 
1978), pp. 25-72 for a detailed examination of the Samoan response to 
Geman control.
All figures given on Samoan officials were taken from: Logan to 
Liverpool, 27 Oct. 1914, G 1968/14.
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towards the Samoans than the Germans. He allowed the Faipule to choose
replacements to vacancies in their ranks as well as appoint Native
27judges, Komisi and Pule fa'atoaga, and he permitted the establishment
of the Samoa ToeainaClub, 'a political and commercial club ... most of
2 8the chiefs are interested in it', despite being warned of the danger
of the club being used for political intrique as happened during the
political upheavals in the German period. He had allowed formation of
the club 'to encourage Samoans to be progressive and because failure to
give such permission might lead them to believe that the Administration
29was antagonistic to their interests'.
Logan therefore not only allowed the Samoans a great deal of 
freedom, but he also gave them positive support, to do virtually as they 
wished. Add to this his quick response to a Samoan request which saw 
the exiles on Saipan returned home in 1915 and we have a man and an 
administration whom the Samoans held in very high regard. Consequently 
the first four years of Logan's term was almost free of Samoan opposition 
and his standing was marred only by the fatal influenza epidemic which 
struck the country in late 1918.
Generally too, the white residents, with the exception of one 
H.J. Moors, learned to live with the military occupation; partly 
because they accepted war conditions and partly because export earnings were 
in a healthy state, and influential local residents such as O.F. Nelson 
and S.H. Meredith were making huge profits as a result of conditions
Logan to Liverpool, 27 Dec. 1918, G 30/19.




created by the war. Moors who was born in Detroit Michigan in 1854
had been a resident for about 40 years when the New Zealanders occupied
Samoa. Although he had sometimes assisted the occupation forces, the rest
of his time was seemingly taken up with efforts - including visits to
Washington and Wellington where he saw the Secretary of State and the
Prime Minister respectively - to discredit Logan and have him removed
from Samoa. To some extent Moors was supported in his efforts by Mason
Mitchell, the American Consul in Apia. Both men were implicated in some
questionable deals involving cash payments by certain German firms, and
involving also contacting German interests in Hamburg against military
regulations. Their efforts to have Logan removed totally failed, mainly
because he had done nothing to justify such action while at the same
time he had put together a very sound case against both Moors and
Mitchell. Also the threats and allegations proffered by Moors against
30Logan were so outrageous that they could not be taken seriously.
Logan's time in Samoa however was decided by a disaster which
befell the country, just as war hostilities ceased with the Allies
victorious. On 7 November 1918, the ship Talune from New Zealand arrived
in Apia and as a result of mismanagement, incompetence and negligence
on the part of officials outside and within Samoa, as well as the ship's
crew, passengers who suffered from pneumonic influenza were allowed to
disembark and disperse. Seven days later an epidemic broke out and
within two weeks, about 20% of the population had died; an estimated
3120% of Samoans, 33% of half-castes and 2% of whites perished.
30 See G 1857/16, G 558/17 and G 2222/18 for material on the clashes 
between Moors, Mitchell and Logan.
31 See 'Samoan Epidemic Commission (Report of)', AJHR, 1919, H-31C;
Logan to Liverpool, 27 Dec. 1918, G 30/19, and 20 Jan. 1919, G 308/19.
39
Amongst the Samoan survivors, grief quickly turned into
bitterness when they discovered that the fatal disease had been brought
to the country by passengers on the Talune and worse still, that its
introduction could have been prevented if proper precautions were taken
as done in American Samoa which had been kept free of the visitation.
In what turned out to be his last report from Samoa, Logan wrote, "I
regret to report that at present there is considerable unrest and
passive resistance amongst the Samoans and bitter resentment due to the
feeling that proper precautions were not taken to prevent the introduction
32of the influenza epidemic into Samoa'.
Two weeks earlier the surviving Faipule had seen Logan, put
their complaints and asked for an enquiry by a Royal Commission into
the circumstances surrounding the epidemic. Logan, under a great deal
of pressure, had chastised the Faipule telling them that 'they showed
not the slightest interest in their people while the plague was raging
and gave [him] not the slightest assistance in feeding the sick or
burying the dead, that half the deaths were due not to influenza but
to the neglect of their families by the Heads, and that they themselves
33were deeply to blame for failing to assist'. But after saying that 
Logan, a fair, sensitive and balanced man judging by his correspondence 
at this most trying time, admitted to his political superiors that the 
Samoans 'are entitled to know who is responsible for the introduction of 
the disease into Samoa' and recommended the institution of a Royal 
Commission. The Commission subsequently found that deficiencies in 
port procedures at Auckland, Suva and Apia, together with inadequate
Logan to Liverpool, 20 Jan. 1919, G 308/19.
33 Ibid.
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requirements for notification of dangerous diseases, as well as
carelessness on the part of the captain of the Talune, had resulted
in the introduction of the fatal disease into the country. On the
other hand, the high death rate was blamed in part on the failure of
Logan to obtain medical assistance from American Samoa - only a few
hours away by boat - and on deficiencies in the administrative procedures
34of the Health Department.
On 20 January 1919, Colonel R.W. Tate arrived to relieve Logan
who left the same day for New Zealand on leave. Eight days after his
arrival, Tate was confronted by a petition requesting the dismissal of
Logan as Administrator; an investigation into the circumstances
surrounding the epidemic and provision for orphans, and finally the
handing over of Samoa to the United States or to be administered by
the Colonial Office and for New Zealand to cease its involvement in
Samoa completely. Immediate disagreement amongst the matai present
over the requests saw the deletion of the last one, but more important
demonstrated that the petition was the work of only a few people who
might not necessarily be Samoans. Between this internal disagreement
and Tate's sympathetic response, the petition failed to obtain Samoan
35support and two weeks later it was withdrawn.
In October, Tate formally replaced Logan as Administrator.
Between this date and May 1920 when civil administration was formally 
established with Tate as the first civil Administrator, there was little 
outward opposition from the Samoans. Yet Tate had taken several measures
See 'Samoa Epidemic Commission (Report of)', AJHR, 1919, H-31c. 
Tate to Liverpool, 8 Mar. 1919 and ends. G 751/19.
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in connection with the appointment of Samoan officials which although they 
drew no objection at the time they were made, were nonetheless bound 
to bring Samoan opposition, now that the political future of the country 
had been determined. In the long term too, the end of the military 
occupation meant that the normal determinants of Samoan behaviour - as 
discussed above - in situations where they were confronted by usurpers 
of authority and position, came into full play. As we have seen Samoan 
behaviour in such situations was dominated by the belief that one 
retained a right to a usurped position, and by the obligation to try and 
regain that position. The following chapters will show how the Samoans 
exercised their prerogatives during the next sixteen years and how the




The first six years of civil administration fell naturally into 
two contrasting periods: May 1920 to March 1923 when Tate was
Administrator and progress on all fronts was rather tortuous; and 
March 1923 to the end of 1925 when Major-General G.S. Richardson who 
replaced Tate pushed the country along at a rapid pace. This contrast 
could be explained partly in terms of the way the Samoans responded to 
New Zealand civilian rule over these two periods. During the first 
two years, the Samoans put a great deal of pressure on government as 
they demonstrated the attitude, as Tate saw it, 'that they should 
themselves govern the country, and there is a strong inclination for 
them to interfere in various phases of government'.^ Towards the end 
of his term however, this pressure, applied largely through the Faipule, 
eased off as he began to understand a little of the local considerations 
behind the Samoan attitude and adapted his approach to try and accommodate 
them.
When Richardson arrived the situation as far as the Samoans were 
concerned was relatively calm. Inevitably though, Samoan pressure built 
up again - the Faipule were a main target this time - but rather than 
approach this challenge in a flexible frame of mind as Tate did, 
Richardson adopted a dogmatic and paternalistic attitude which resulted 
in Samoan opposition developing much deeper, towards the end of his first 
term, than it did during Tate's time.
1 Administrator to Minister, 3 Jan. 1921, IT 1/27.
43
Tate was born in Wellington in 1864 and was educated in New
Zealand; his predecessor and two immediate successors were born in
England where they also received most of their education. For almost
thirty years, he practised as a lawyer in the small country centre of
Greytown in the South Island, and then as a volunteer officer he
commanded the Wellington infantry brigade and later the Wellington
military district. In 1916 he became adjutant-general of the New
2Zealand forces; the post he held at the time he went to Samoa. He
3described himself as 'a solitary kind of a beast' who found 'infinite
delight' in the natural beauty of Samoa - his hobbies were gardening
and the study of insects - but he lamented that the beauty of the country
and one's enjoyment of it were spoiled by the morally inferior 'whites',
4both officials and residents, who lived in the place. He was not a man 
of imposing physical stature but he possessed a pleasant personality 
and a sharp, enquiring mind. He was keen to learn and was receptive of 
new ideas and constructive advice.
Tate's civil administration was instituted by the Samoa 
Constitution Order 1920 which itself was authorised by the Western 
Samoa Order-in-Council 1920 made under the name of the British Monarch 
in accordance with the provisions of an Imperial Act, the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act 1890. This formal transfer of authority to the New 
Zealand government to administer Western Samoa came about because the
2 See G.H. Scholefield, A Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, 
(Wellington, 1940).




Allied Powers to which Germany had surrendered her former territories
had decided that Western Samoa should be administered by His Majesty
5in his government of the Dominion of New Zealand. Under the Mandates 
system established by the League of Nations, New Zealand had full 
powers to administer Western Samoa as if it were part of the Dominion, 
subject only to the terms of the mandate.^
Apart from formally replacing German with British law in Samoa, 
the Constitution Order left the territory much as it was under the 
previous regime. All powers were concentrated in the Administrator.
In legislative matters he had the assistance of a Legislative Council. 
This body however was to be dominated by officials, and although there 
was a provision for unofficial members, the inclusion of such members 
in tie Council was not mandatory and only a person who was a natural-born 
British subject, or a Samoan or one born in Samoa could qualify for 
appointment.
Two categories of persons were recognised: Samoans and
Europeans. A 'Samoan' was a person who belonged to the'Polynesian' 
race - it included Melanesians and Micronesians - including those of mixed 
descent, but not those registered as Europeans or whose fathers were 
European either by birth or registration. Largely because the racial 
attitudes which prevailed amongst the white people in that period 
placed a strong emphasis on their racial superiority, a vast majority of
See IT 67/12/1, IT 67/12/2 and IT 67/12/3 for records of the 
negotiations over this transfer of power and the formulation of a 
constitution for Samoa. See also Mary Boyd, 'The Record in Western 
Samoa to 1945' in Angus Ross(ed.), New Zealand's Record in the Pacific 
Islands in the Twentieth Century, (Auckland, 1969), pp. 125-129.
On the Mandates system see, Quincy Wright, Mandates under the 
League of Nations, (Chicago, 1930).
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people of mixed descent sought to identify with their white blood, so
7that 'Europeans' in Samoa included a large number of half-castes.
According to Sir John Salmond, the New Zealand Solicitor-General 
and one of the most eminent lawyers in the Commonwealth in his time, 'due
Q
consideration of the interests of the native inhabitants' was a major
factor in the final form which the Samoa Constitution Order took. He
listed the following as the chief provisions specifically included for
the orotection of the Samoans: total prohibition of manufacture,
importation or sale of liquor; ownership of Samoan land to remain
subject only to Samoan customs and usages; succession to real and
personal property of Samoans to be controlled exclusively by Samoan
custom; alienation of Samoan land prohibited except by lease for
limited periods approved by the Administrator; forced labour of
Samoans prohibited ; contracts with Samoans unenforcable against them
except in cases where the court decided otherwise; and the opportunity
9for Samoans to be appointed on to the Legislative Council.
It is likely that the low key approach adopted in the Samoa 
Constitution Order, and followed in the Samoa Act 1921 which replaced 
it, was largely a result of the advice tendered by R.M. Watson who had 
served under Logan in Samoa and who was subsequently enlisted by Salmond 
he himself had not been to Samoa - to assist him with legislation on 
Samoa. In June 1919 Watson wrote to Salmond that in providing a code of 
law for Samoa, 'changes other than those specifically enjoined by the 
terms of the mandate are to be avoided as much as possible, particularly
7 In this thesis the people who belonged to this category are referred 
to as Europeans or 'whites' or papalagi.
8 Salmond to Gray, 19 Dec. 1919, IT 67/12/1.
9 Ibid.
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at the outset ... I cannot emphasise too strongly the importance of 
what the Germans called "self-government" of the Natives. It is the 
breath of Native existence'.’*’^  Watson later became the first Chief 
Judge in Samoa under New Zealand's civil administration.
Although Watson's advice was sound, and its reflection in the 
Constitution Order indicated a desire on the part of the New Zealand 
government to be sensitive to local considerations, it did not account 
for a host of complications in the situation in Samoa. As a result, 
this Order added to the growing discontent in Samoa rather than helped 
reduce it. Two official measures taken the previous year were particularly 
important with regard to the opposition to government at this time. The 
first was Tate's appointment of new Faipule and other Samoan officials 
to replace those who died in the epidemic, ^  and the second was the 
imposition of prohibition on the territory."^
II
Tate's action in appointing the new Faipule and other Samoan 
officials, robbed the Fono a Faipule of the only source of real power 
it had gained since it was established by Solf in 1905. Not unexpectedly, 
the Faipule were in the forefront of Samoan opposition to government.
In December 1920, Tate was deliberately insulted at Lufilufi
R.M. Watson to Sir John Salmond, 12 June 1919, IT 67/12/3. 
Tate to Liverpool, 3 Sept. 1919, G 2695/19.
Tate to Liverpool, 27 Nov. 1919, G 3132/19 with ends.
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while on his official malaga. The ta'alolo (ceremonial food presentation)
to welcome his party was a farcical affair: the food presented was
made up of only a few fowls and coconuts, while the presentation itself,
was conducted quietly by a small group of people. Singing and dancing
through the village by a great many people were in fact an integral part
of a ta1alolo, as were large pigs, specially prepared taro, and big
quantities of fowl and coconuts. During the formal exchange of speeches,
a Lufilufi tulafale said to Tate; 'You must know that you are ruling
Samoa by the authority of the Samoans but you have not ruled these
13islands with love ... you have been overbearing'. The principal 
reason given to back up this allegation of 'being overbearing' was the 
complaint that Tate had acted in many areas of government, including 
the appointment of papalagi staff, and the 'imposition of tax' - the 
Administrator in fact had no powers over taxation matters - without 
consulting the Fautua and the Faipule. It should be noted in this 
connection that the Faipule of each district had the specific 
responsibility of ensuring that the Administrator was properly received 
while on malaga.
This episode at Lufilufi occurred at a time when government was 
already under pressure from a sä (prohibition) placed by a large number 
of villages on the buying of European goods, as well as on the cutting 
of copra. An increase in the cost of goods accompanied by a drop in 
the price paid by traders for Samoan copra had triggered these measures. 
There was also suspicion on the part of officials, that the rejection of 
government authority by Samoans in American Samoa, had given encouragement
Tate to Minister, 31 Dec. 1920 and 3 Jan. 1921: IT 1/27. The
Lufilufi orator was apparently in possession of a written set of 
complaints against government, which indicated outside involvement 
in this insult.
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to the Samoans in the western islands to defy their own government.
This suspicion was not really justified because Tutuila was but a 
minor part of Atua in the traditional hierarchy of Samoa, and it was 
not done to follow the lead of a minor sub-district.
Instead of simply punishing those breaking the law, Tate
decided to tackle the sä and the Lufilufi insult in a more positive
way. He invited matai from throughout the country to a fono at
Mulinu'u so that he could explain and discuss with them matters of
government. During the meeting he recounted his experiences at Lufilufi -
matai from other districts immediately reprimanded the Lufilufi matai
present who offered an apology - and then he explained where his authority
to govern Samoa came from: 'Let there be no misunderstanding about the
system of government. I am not ruling Samoa by the authority of the
Samoans. The Allied Nations which won the war gave the control of
Samoa to New Zealand under King George of Great Britain and I am
15governing for New Zealand'.
He pointed out though that for him to govern the country 
properly, he needed the assistance and advice of the Fautua, Faipule and 
the other Samoan officials and he also needed the support of the 
Samoans. As far as the sä was concerned, he wanted an end to it and he 
also pointed out that the Samoan practice of punishing people for 
breaking such a sä was illegal. At the same time, he promised to hold
Administrator to Minister, 3 Jan. 1921, IT 1/27. The confrontation 
in American Samoa resulted in the Governor of the Territory shooting 
himself; the deportation of a few 'white agitators', the 
dismissal of a senior naval officer and the imprisonment of about 
20 matai.
Speech by Tate at Mulinu'u fono (29 Dec. 1920); Administrator to 
Minister, 3 Jan. 1921: IT 1/27.
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an enquiry into the high prices of goods, and to support the authority 
of the matai in their villages and districts. The matai present at 
this fono expressed a great deal of satisfaction with Tate for calling 
the meeting and for explaining and discussing with them the system of 
government under which Samoa was administered. They were also happy 
with the action Tate intended to take with regard to the high prices of 
goods. They pledged to obey the law and agreed with Tate that the 
Administrator should command sufficient powers to deal with persons 
who defied the law and fomented disaffection against government.
A few days after this meeting, Tate followed it up with three 
Proclamations: the first notified the institution of a Prices Commission
of Enquiry; the second confirmed that government had 'a high regard 
for government officials [Samoan] and has no intention of breaking down 
their authority or governing without their assistance1 ; ^  and the 
third repeated the assurance by the matai that they wanted to obey the 
law, and it also offered the reminder that interference with the freedom 
of an individual to buy or sell was an illegal act.
A week after these Proclamations were issued, matai from all 
over the country held a fono at Mulinu'u to which they invited Tate.
Again they assured him that they would obey the laws and would support him in 
administering the country. As a result of the goodwill expressed during 
these two meetings - 29 December 1920 and 13 January 1921 - and a 
noticeable improvement in the attitude of the ordinary Samoans, Tate 
told the Minister that he believed the 'Native unrest ... is practically
Tate to Minister, 31 Dec. 1920 and 3 Jan. 1921: IT 1/27.
Proclamation No. 3 (7 January 1921), IT 1/27. See same file for 
the texts of the other two Proclamations.
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at an end' 18
Tate had good reasons to feel that the situation was under 
control. From a Samoan viewpoint his decision to hold a fono at 
Mulinu'u open to all matai and allowing for explanations, discussion and 
a frank exchange of views was tactically brilliant. It met the crucial 
Samoan demand for consultation and it also fulfilled the need for 
recognition. On the other hand, following up with Proclamations 
demonstrating that he had kept his promises while at the same time 
tying the matai to their word, showed excellent political judgement and 
a sound understanding of human nature.
The Faipule however were far from happy with the situation.
Not only had Tate deprived them of their power of appointment, but he
had now gone directly to the people in the villages and districts.
Their opposition therefore intensified and when the Minister of External
Affairs, Hon. E.P. Lee visited the territory in July 1921, they presented
him with a petition addressed to King George V requesting that Western
Samoa be taken directly under Britain's wing because there was 'increasing
dissatisfaction' with New Zealand's rule. They wanted the administration
of the country to be left to them and the 'British subjects who have
been amongst us for a great many years and are thoroughly acquainted
19with our customs'. As far as Britain's involvement in Samoan affairs 
was concerned, they requested that it be limited to the appointment of 
a Governor to Samoa.
European influence, clearly indicated in this petition,was even
Administrator to Minister, 31 Jan. 1921, IT 1/27.
Petition to His Majesty King George V from the Government Councillors 
of British Samoa (16 July 1921), IT 88/6.
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more obvious in the separate list of grievances which the Faipule provided
to support their claim of dissatisfaction. These grievances all revolved
around the allegation that New Zealand had gone about establishing its
administration in Samoa, and had been administering the territory, without
consulting the Samoans; in so doing it had infringed on the 'sacred
20rights' of the Samoans as guaranteed by the Berlin Treaty of 1889. The 
fact of the matter was, Samoans did not base their claim to a right of 
control within Samoa on some treaty; they based it on the fact that it was 
their country.
European opposition to New Zealand's administration in this period
was very strong, and much of it could be traced to dissatisfaction with
prohibition and lack of elective representation. During February and
March 1920, a delegation from the papalagi community had met a large party
of parliamentarians and senior officials from New Zealand - led by Sir James
Allen Minister of External Affairs, and J.D. Gray Secretary of External
Affairs - and presented them with a list of requests.. The principal
requests were for more indentured labourers to work on the plantations;
cancellation of prohibitionary measures which were imposed in October 1919;
and provision in the Samoa Constitution Order, then impending, for elected
21unofficial members. Recruitment of more indentured labourers from China 
had provided some relief in the plantations, but when the Constitution Order 
was issued, not only did it consolidate prohibition, it also carried no 
provision for elective representation. In 1923 the Samoa Act 1921 was 
amended to allow for elected members and in 1924 O.F. Nelson, A. Williams and 
G.E. Westbrook were elected as members of the Legislative Council (MLCs).
See IT 88/6 for a copy of this list of grievances.
See IT 64/1 for a copy of the pamphlet containing the Europeans' 
requests entitled 'Samoa's Problems'. This file also contains all 
relevant material on issues connected with this visit.
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III
When the Faipule presented their petition to Lee in July,
Malietoa advised them to withdraw it and reconsider their position.
They listened to Malietoa's advice, but a few days later - after Lee
had departed from Samoa - it was presented again, apparently after
22the Faipule had had discussions with O.F. Nelson. This development
brought strong protests from several districts - for example
Safotulafai in Savai'i and Siumu in Upolu - which alleged that the
petition was not representative of the wishes of the Samoans, and
23declared their loyalty for Malietoa and government.
In September, two months after the Faipule presented their
petition, Norman Macdonald - he was a local resident - Secretary of
Native Affairs advised Tate that a substitution of the Fono a Faipule
by the Council of Tumua ma Pule 'would be an immense aid in establishing
24confidence and loyalty towards the present Administration'. He said 
that the Council of Tumua ma Pule was 'a representative body of the 
highest importance and [it] carried much more weight than our present 
Council of Faipule who are not representative and many of whom have no 
hereditary rank to entitle them to their appointment or the respect of 
the people, and moreover are nominees of government and not of the natives'.
Norman Macdonald to Tate, 23 Sept. 1921; PM to Governor-General, 
3 Nov. 1921: IT 88/6.
Ali'i and Faipule of Siumu to Administrator, 28 Jul. 1921; 
Safotulafai Chiefs to SNA, 9 Aug. 1921; Malietoa to Tate,
28 Jul. 1921: IT 88/6.
Macdonald to Tate, 23 Sept. 1921, IT 88/6.
25 Ibid.
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The Faipule were now faced with a most serious challenge to their
position. The interest of Tumua ma Pule, clearly shown in Macdonald's
advice, had given the Administrator an alternative to the Fono, and
continued opposition on their part could persuade Tate to dismiss them,
abolish the Fono and bring Tumua ma Pule into government. Such an
eventuality would be a disaster not only for them as individuals but
for their respective districts as well. They were left with no
alternative but to ease up on their opposition. Accordingly when the
reply to their petition came informing them that King George could not
undo the mandate and that New Zealand was in Samoa to stay, they accepted
it readily while at the same time they discarded a petition which had
been prepared for submission to the League of Nations if their requests
26were not satisfied. The change in attitude amongst the Faipule
completely mystified Tate who could not understand why the Faipule
seemed happy to accept a reply which merely repeated what he had been
27telling them all along.
He did not understand what Tumua ma Pule was, and so he told the
Minister that he was rather cautious of accepting Macdonald's 
28advice. He was fortunate though at this time to have the services
and advice of H.S. Griffin who had been a printer with the L.M.S. church
for about 20 years and who possessed a good command of the Samoan
29language as well as a deep understanding of Samoan culture. With
27
Administrator to EA, 19 Dec. 1921, IT 88/6.
Tate to Gray, 11 Dec. 1921, Tate Papers Ms. 264 Turnbull Library, 
Wellington.
Administrator to Minister, 27 Sept. 1921, IT 88/6.
Tate to Gray, 11 Dec. 1921 and 16 Dec. 1921: Tate Papers Ms. 264 
Turnbull Library, Wellington.
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his knowledge of fa1a Samoa Griffin doubtless appreciated the dangers 
inherent in the interest shown by Tumua ma Pule in participating in 
central government. Their involvement would mean conflict amongst 
the Samoans as the Faipule districts would not be expected to accept 
quietly their inevitable relegation in the government hierarchy.
The Samoans had by now accepted the Faipule system and the Faipule 
districts. In their own dealings the traditional rankings had remained 
unchanged, supreme and universally recognised. They had not allowed 
the introduction of the Faipule system by the Germans to affect the 
traditional structure of their society. They had accommodated it, 
but no section of the Samoan community had lost its position in the 
traditional political structure as a result of its introduction, and 
certainly not that of Tumua ma Pule as the Germans had believed.
The Faipule districts however would lose a place in the councils of 
government if Tumua ma Pule became part of government, and there would 
be a great deal of trouble.
Griffin, who quickly took over as Secretary of Native Affairs,
probably also appreciated that the Faipule would be much easier for
government to handle than Tumua ma Pule. Whatever the reasons,
Griffin moved to strengthen the position of the Faipule. With the help
of Rev. John Shinkfield of the Methodist mission, he persuaded Tate to
introduce a new procedure in the Fono involving more consultation
between the Administrator and the Faipule. The new procedure gave the
Faipule a great deal of satisfaction and brought them behind Tate and the 
30Administration. It also removed the threat from Tumua ma Pule and 
took the Faipule largely beyond the influence of the 'whites'. Moreover
30 Ibid; Administrator to Minister, 22 Oct. 1921, IT 88/5.
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it brought Tate for the very first time into close contact with a
section of the Samoan leadership and he discovered that his earlier
unfavourable impressions of them were wrong. In May 1922 for example,
he decided to take the Faipule through the Samoa Act 1921 - it came into
force the previous month - clause by clause. During three long days
of examining the Act, the Faipule displayed a keen intelligence he 'did
31not suspect5 and a capacity to apply themselves to a tedious task.
Another important factor which assisted materially in improving
the situation between the Samoans and the Administration was the
completion of Health and Educational facilities in the outer districts.
The first Health sub-station was opened in July 1921 at Tuasivi, Savai'i,
and the Samoans had voluntarily built houses for staff and patients
and had prepared the grounds. A government school which would offer
higher education for Samoan children built at Vaipouli also on Savai'i
was completed early in 1922. It too received enthusiastic practical
support from the Samoans. An indication of the people's satisfaction
with these efforts to improve their welfare was given when their
leaders suggested imposing taxes that would enable the construction of
32more such facilities.
With the improvement in government's rotations with the Samoans, 
1922 was a much happier year for Tate. His frequent contact with the 
Faipule had given him an appreciation of the Samoan and his customs.
He wanted to stay on but for his wife who had not been happy in Samoa 
and had been living in New Zealand. He now had time to enjoy his 
garden at Vailima, study the local butterflies, and as well, the relaxed
31 Administrator to Minister, 12 Mar. 1923, IT 88/5.
32 Tate to Gray, 15 Jan. 1922 and 5 June 1922, Tate Papers, Ms. 264 
Turnbull Library, Wellington'.
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atmosphere enabled him to drink in the natural beauty of the 
countryside.^
In August 1922 though, government's power to appoint Samoan
officials was challenged. A Pulefa'atoaga appointed to the Pule
centre of Palauli, Savai'i, was rejected because he came from a village
of lower rank in the district. All efforts to conciliate the dispute
failed. The matai of Palauli refused to back down even at a meeting
with Tate who ordered them to cease their opposition. Tate was on the
verge of charging the ringleaders with sedition when Griffin advised
him to impose banishment and to remove their titles. He followed this
34advice in spite of his doubts concerning the legality of his action.
The situation improved and stabilised when the Administration appointed 
a second Pulefa'atoaga for the district from the offended village. As 
a result of this episode the Samoa Offenders Ordinance 1922 which gave 
the Administrator powers of banishment and removal of titles was 
brought in. It was to become the most controversial law in Samoa 
during the following years.
When Tate left in March 1923, he was given a very warm farewell 
by the whole community, Europeans and Samoans alike. Although 
problematic areas still existed he had succeeded through patience and 
quiet determination in setting Samoa on a steady course for the future.
33 Ibid.
34 Administrator to Minister, 24 Aug. 1922, IT 88/5; Tate to Gray, 
22 Aug. 1922, Tate Papers Ms. 264, Turnbull Library, Wellington.
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'E sau le fuata ma Iona lou1 (each breadfruit crop brings 
with it, its own harvesting pole) is a Samoan proverb which gives 
expression to the fact of inevitable change. On a more specific level, 
it conveys the belief that when a situation demands it, the appropriate 
person will come along, while on the other hand, it carries the view that 
changes are to be expected from new personalities when they take over 
fresh responsibilities. Between 1923-1926, these attitudes to life 
were exercised to the limit as the new Administrator, Major-General G.S. 
Richardson embarked on a most comprehensive programme of change which 
extended to almost every sphere of the life of the people of Samoa. In 
many cases, as for example in the fields of health and education, the 
changes lay largely in the increased pace with which policies, set in 
earlier periods, were implemented. But in other instances, as with 
attempts to compel the Samoans to adopt a new system of land holding, 
and to follow new procedures in conducting their affairs in their 
villages and districts, Richardson's programme required fundamental 
change to Samoan institutions which had evolved down through many 
generations.
While Samoans recognised the fact of change, there was little 
doubt that they would reject changes which they saw as posing a serious 
threat to their way of life; something of which Richardson himself 
was well aware. During his first three years in Samoa though, little 
discontent surfaced until towards the end of 1925, as his powerful
IV
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personality, coupled with his indulgent attitude towards the Samoans, 
and the quick visible success of his progressive schemes, particularly 
in the fields of health and agriculture, generated an atmosphere of 
enthusiastic support for his government.
The people of Samoa awaited the arrival of Richardson with much
anticipation. Preceding him to Samoa had been stories proclaiming him
a distinguished soldier - 'It is known to us that you conducted the
military forces at the great war in which you triumphed' - and a man of
3 0influence within the ruling circles in New Zealand. Being people who 
valued rank and status very highly, the Samoans were proud to have such 
a man of distinction as their Administrator. They regarded the 
appointment as due recognition by the government of New Zealand of 
the importance of Samoa and its people. It was little wonder they 
greeted him with 'extraordinary enthusiasm and expressions of loyalty'.'
Richardson was indeed a soldier, and one of note. The post in 
Samoa was the first position he had held outside the armed forces.
B o m  in England in 1868 to a lower middle-class family, he had entered 
the army there as a private at 19 after turning down a career in 
commerce, progressed rapidly up the ranks to become a master gunner - 
equivalent rank to Sergeant - and in 1891 he was loaned to the New 
Zealand forces as a gunnery instructor. He impressed the New Zealand 
military leaders with his energy and drive, and they retained and later 
commissioned him as a Captain. During World War I, he saw action at 
Gallipoli, obtained promotion to Brigadier-General in 1916 and became
Faipule speech, Proceedings of Fono a Faipule, 6-13 June, 1923, 
IT 88/3-1.
Administrator to Minister, 10 May 1923, AJHR, A-4, 1923.
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General Officer Commanding New Zealand Forces in Britain. In that
post, he demonstrated ability at administrative work, and that led to
his appointment as General Officer in charge of Administration at Army
Headquarters in Wellington during demobilisation. He made himself
available for the Samoa post as retrenchment policies rendered future
38prospects in the armed forces somewhat limited and unattractive.
The Samoans quickly discovered that their new Administrator
measured up to their image of one with his military background and
reputation: impressive bearing, commanding presence particularly in
the immaculate uniform which he invariably wore, confident and self-
assured, a competent public speaker who appeared comfortable amongst
people of rank such as matai, and a man who clearly enjoyed ceremony
and formality. On the personal level, he was pleasant and friendly,
easily approached and mixed freely although retaining that touch of
39aloofness expected of a person of stature.
In April, barely a month after his arrival, Richardson imposed 
a medical tax of £1 per annum to be paid by all Samoan males 17 years 
and over. It was the first such tax imposed on the Samoans. Tate had 
enacted the medical tax legislation the previous year but had desisted 
from putting it into effect following representations from the 
Faipule claiming poverty amongst the Samoans. The Faipule had also 
advised the Administrator at the time that it would be in the interest
See: G.H. Scholefield, A Dictionary of New Zealand Biography,
(Wellington, 1940); Mary Boyd, 'The Record in Western Samoa to 
1945' in Angus Ross (ed.), New Zealand's Record in the Pacific 
Islands in the Twentieth Century (Auckland, 1969), pp. 133-134.
See F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material relating to the Mau 
disturbances in Western Samoa, 1926-1935', Ms. Auckland University 
Law Library; Information from Taito of Safotu, Savai'i, and 
Vai of Manono.
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of harmonious relations between government and the Samoans if the
latter were consulted before the legislation was invoked at some future
date. Whether Richardson was aware of these matters is unclear, but in
any event, after visiting a few villages and deciding that health
conditions amongst the Samoans needed urgent and dramatic improvement,
he immediately imposed the tax to help finance improvements which he
40proposed without canvassing the views of the Samoans.
The action encountered 'a considerable amount of opposition in
certain villages' and the Faipule 'Aiono 'Aipovi - a leading member of
the Fono - representing some of these villages spoke 'most strongly'
to Richardson over this matter following the adoption of a resolution
by the fono of his district that their people would not pay the tax and
41would go without medical treatment. To the Minister, Richardson
admitted his ignorance of the probable opposition to the measure, but a
little later commented - rather unconvincingly since the Samoan opposition
was probably a result largely of not being consulted - that the rejection
of the tax was natural since it doubled the tax obligations of the Samoans 
42in one swoop.
Notwithstanding these problems, withdrawing or altering his 
decision appeared not to have been considered by Richardson who felt 
he had to put a stop to the opposition or it might lead to more 
serious trouble; while on the other hand, he was convinced that his
Interim Report on Native Affairs, 17 Sept. 1923, IT 88/5; Notes 
for the information of the Minister of External Affairs from the 
personal diary of Richardson, 30 June 1923, IT 1/33.
Interim Report on Native Affairs, 13 Feb. 1924, IT 88/3; Notes ... 
from the personal diary of Richardson, 30 June 1923, IT 1/33.
42 Ibid.
61
decision was the right one in the interests of the Samoans, even if 
they did not know it. Behind these rationalisations though, one is 
left with the irresistible impression that Richardson's response to the 
situation was dictated primarily by the attitude that he had made a 
decision and it would stand: orders were orders.
'Aiono was summoned and Richardson, after hearing from 'Aiono 
the views of his district on the matter, told him that the tax was a 
just one, in the interests of the Samoans, and the opposition by his 
district was mistaken and wrong. The benefits which Samoans would 
derive from the measure were explained to the Faipule who was then 
instructed to carry the same message to the people of his district and 
to persuade them to accept the decision. Should he fail, Richardson 
threatened to disrate him, probably by replacing him as Faipule.
The people of Aana accepted 'Aiono's message - 'Aiono in all probability 
emphasised the Administrator's action of discussing the matter with
him, thereby in effect, consulting the district - and he continued in
. . . 43his post.
From this brief confrontation, the Samoans discovered that 
Richardson was a decisive man who was quick to make up his own mind and 
who followed his decisions through. At the same time, taking the 
trouble to explain to 'Aiono the grounds for his action, even in the 
form of a reprimand, was seen as an indication that he was not 
altogether insensitive to Samoan requirements. As it happened, 
reinforcement for this latter impression was soon forthcoming.
Partly in response to his call for greater economic activity,
43 Interim Report on Native Affairs, 13 Feb. 1924, IT 88/3.
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matai from a number of villages along the north coast of Upolu informed
Richardson that they had insufficient lands to meet their needs, let
alone increase their production, because the lands surrounding their
villages belonged to the Crown Estates: could they be given some of
the adjoining Government land? In his direct way, Richardson responded
by immediately allocating to some of these villages areas of undeveloped 
44Crown land. The account of this transaction spread quickly and 
requests for government land flooded in. Although he was not able to 
meet these requests and although the areas of land involved were apparently 
small, the action made a deep impression on the Samoans who regarded the 
giving of land as the ultimate expression of concern.
This episode also reinforced the stories circulating amongst the
Samoans about Richardson's being an influential man; to them, only a
man of high standing could immediately allocate a sacred commodity like
land, clearly without first referring to the New Zealand government.
Richardson indeed had not consulted the New Zealand government over this
matter and when he formally reported it some months later, he justified
his action by saying that 'I acted as I felt sure the New Zealand
government would desire me, by considering the true interests of the
45Natives rather than the future of the Crown Estates'.
All these things: his military reputation and bearing;
apparent comfort in the Samoan setting; pleasant personality; 
firmness as shown over the medical tax issue; power and influence 
tempered by indulgence towards the Samoans as demonstrated over the 
land allocation; but above all the impartation to the Samoans of a
Notes ... from the personal diary of Richardson, 30 June 1923, IT 1/33; 
Interim Report on Native Affairs, 17 Sept. 1923, IT 88/5.
45 Interim Report on Native Affairs, 17 Sept. 1923, IT 88/5.
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sense of genuine concern for their welfare, all combined to gain him 
much popularity and a great deal of respect amongst the Samoans, and 
formed the basis of their loyalty and support for him and his programmes. 
And it was a regard which was exceedingly hard to shake because it was 
based on Richardson's possession of qualities which were considered by 
Samoans as necessary and desirable in a strong and considerate leader.
Even when his demands for reform became outrageous, their support held 
until they saw that he would not learn and respect them as they did him, 
and that as a result he would seriously damage their fa1a Samoa.
For members of the local white community, the advent of
Richardson was also welcomed. Soon after his arrival, a group of their
representatives informed him that they would like to be consulted on
local matters, something which they alleged had not been done in the
past. He readily took this group into his confidence and immediately
utilised their assistance over such matters as official entertainment,
raising of funds for the beautification of the waterfront, and the
46promotion of the proposed electric lighting scheme for Apia. Like the 
Samoans, they found him pleasant and outgoing, full of ideas on how to 
promote the economic and social welfare of the Territory including proposals 
to assist the private sector by withdrawing government involvement in 
commercial enterprises and by releasing Crown land for development by 
private concerns.
These early encounters however contained certain negative 
features which although submerged by the overwhelming acceptance of 
Richardson, nevertheless harboured a potential for future disagreements.




In the first place, Richardson's obvious propensity for unilateral 
action was bound to lead to conflict with the Samoans. With a person 
of Richardson's status, their requirements for consultation would be 
relaxed, but even here, that concession would apply only up to a 
certain point and no further. Secondly, the Administrator's directness 
of action, particularly as demonstrated by the immediate granting of 
requests over land, stamped him in Samoan eyes as a simple, straight­
forward man, rather naive and unsophisticated in the ways of the world. 
Land was an asset of the highest importance and in accordance with that 
status, the Samoans believed that matters pertaining to land should be 
handled with appropriate restraint and a certain amount of decorum.
One should give such matters due deliberation, thereby subtly indicating
that all the parties concerned recognised the significance of the
47transaction and thus upholding their dignity. It was a weakness 
which at times exposed him to ridicule unbecoming of his position.
Richardson himself saw the Samoans in terms of the racial
stereotypes of the time. The Samoans, he reported a few weeks after his
arrival were 'a splendid but backward race ...', a people who had 'no
thought for tomorrow and no vision as to the future of [their] islands'.
He considered them lacking pride in themselves and their country and
also without a worthwhile purpose in life. In his judgement, hope for
the Samoans lay in changing their psychology through the education of
their youth, and the 'inculcation of a true, loyal and national spirit
into the minds of the young Natives and promoting aims and ideals to
49guide them in their future lives'.
Information from Vai of Manono.
Administrator to Minister, 10 May 1923, AJHR, A-4, 1923.
49 Ibid.
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As shown above though, the Samoans in fact held much pride in 
themselves and their fa1a Samoa, the concept in which their national 
unity subsists and the focus of their intense national pride. 
Richardson's mistaken notions about the Samoans and their society meant 
that notwithstanding the benefits that his programmes brought to the 
Territory, he was on the wrong track from the start. The real tragedy 
however lay in his inability to learn from the people of Samoa and to 
alter his basic assumptions accordingly. Due to this serious defect, 
his good intentions ultimately became patronising gestures exactly 
because he was trying to achieve objectives that were unnecessary and 
superfluous to the Samoans. Had he made the achievement of better 
health standards, improved educational services and reasonable economic 
progress his principal ends rather than means to creating virtually a 
new race of Samoans, he would have done infinitely better for himself 
as well as for the people of Samoa.
V
In June , Richardson held his first fono with the Fono a Faipule 
and brought down a programme of development which was less notable for 
the policies that were put forward than for the methods adopted to 
implement them. In the social field, he saw health as the first priority 
and the initiatives he proposed here, together with the methods he used 
to implement them, would serve as an example of the energy, enthusiasm 
and novelty which he brought to the pursuit of his objectives.
In December the previous year a dysentry epidemic had hit the
Territory and many deaths had resulted, especially amongst the children.
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The medical authorities advised that the occurrence of the epidemic
itself as well as its fatal effects on the population were due
primarily to the lack of proper sanitation in the villages, and the
ignorance of the Samoans about matters of health. When the health
programme was discussed by the Fono, Richardson brought in the Chief
Medical Office (CMO) Dr H. Ritchie who explained these matters to the
Faipule and then instructed them on simple measures to improve sanitary
conditions and to care for those who became ill. Each Faipule was
given a sanitation plan for use in the villages, and they were then told
by Richardson to instruct the people of their respective districts as
Dr Ritchie had instructed them, and to try and persuade them to adopt
the sanitation plan. They were also told that an organisation was
being set up to assist the Health Department in fighting disease and
in improving health conditions, and were also asked to encourage Samoan
50youths to come forward to be trained for medical work. And all 
this during a session of the so-called Samoan parliament, and a fono 
of high-ranking matai from throughout the country.
But this was not all: propaganda on the 'laws of health and
importance of sanitation' were carried regularly in the Savali, the 
Samoan-language official monthly pamphlet; cards carrying simple 
instructions on 'Rules for good health and simple remedies in case of 
sickness' were printed and distributed to each household; and certain 
villages near Apia were installed with sanitary arrangements as models. 
Beetle Inspectors were given wider powers - and a change of title - to 
deal with all matters concerning the welfare of the Samoans including 
general health conditions and sanitation thereby providing for the
50 See: Proceedings of Fono a Faipule, 4-13 June 1923, IT 88/3-1.
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regular inspection of villages. Also Richardson enrolled the assistance
of the local residents who had formed a Sanitary Committee which had helped
the Health Department previously during the dysentry epidemic in late
1922. On top of all this, Richardson personally addressed the Samoans
on these matters and 'endeavoured to frighten them into taking action
51in their own interests'.
In education, it was proposed that school attendance should be
compulsory for the children, that mission schools should adopt the same
teaching methods as those used in government schools, that the
training of Samoan teachers be speeded up and that Samoan boys be
encouraged to obtain higher education - through training in New Zealand
under a scholarship scheme - to fit them for positions in government
service. On the economic side, a scheme to improve copra production
involving the use of copra dryers to improve quality, and village/
district competitions to increase quantities, was explained to the
Faipule who were asked to urge their districts to adopt the scheme while
the Faipule from districts near Apia were asked to encourage their
52people to grow vegetables for the Apia market.
Politically, the Faipule were told that from then on they would 
be playing a major role as government agents in their districts, 
instead of being principally district representatives. They would 
spearhead the government efforts to improve the condition of the Samoans 
in their districts. At the same time Richardson moved to strengthen 
their representative status by requiring that all communications between 
the Samoans and government must come through the Faipule who would add
51 Interim Report on Native Affairs, 17 Sept. 1923, IT 88/5.
52 See: Proceedings of Fono a Faipule, 4-13 June 1923, IT 88/3-1.
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their comments and recommendations before passing the matter over to the 
appropriate official. As to the Legislative Council, it would be 
reconstituted to include three elected members from the local white 
community as well as two representatives to be chosen from the Fono a 
Faipule - a move apparently not supported by the Faipule whose Fono became 
legally recognised in 1923 in the amended Samoa Act 1921.
Among other proposals agreed to in this fono were: malaga for
the exchange of fine mats to be forbidden - seven months being given to
fulfil existing obligations; restrictions on co-habitation between
Samoan women and coolies to be more strongly enforced and a museum for
53Samoan artifacts to be built at Mulinu'u.
To the Samoans, the proceedings of this fono together with the 
practical measures to implement them served further proof of the genuine 
concern their Administrator had for their welfare. There were one or 
two proposals, such as contacting government through the Faipule and the 
restriction on malaga for fine mat exchanges which they could do without, 
but they had their ways of by-passing these and at most they presented 
but minor inconveniences. Fine mat exchanges for example took place most 
often in the context of deaths, weddings, faletele or church dedication, 
saofai (title bestowal)and so forth, and exchanges on such occasions could 
not be stopped. On the other hand, the simple ploy of matai turning up, 
individually or as a group at the doorstep of an official - including 
the Administrator - they wanted to see, was often sufficient to ensure 
an audience. As for the other measures, they knew that notwithstanding 
the Administrator's commands and the Faipule rhetoric they had the final
53 Ibid.
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say in whether these were adopted in their villages and districts, and 
they also knew that the success or failure of these proposals depended 
entirely on their response.^
Although obviously keen to advance Samoa's commercial progress
quickly, Richardson during 1923 recognised the constraints placed on that
progress by the operation of the fa1 a Samoa as well as by New Zealand's
duty to protect the interests of the Samoans, and indicated his
sensitivity to these factors by accepting that Samoan attitudes should
be respected. On the important area of land for example, he wrote:
If the Samoans would agree to discontinue their 
communistic mode of living, and allow the land to be 
cut up into small sections for individual ownership, 
more rapid development of the uncultivated lands would 
result, but there is no immediate prospect of the 
Natives agreeing to such a radical change in their social 
life. In the distant future the younger generations will 
probably desire to own land and develop it, as a very 
few probably do now, but it can be taken for granted that 
the Natives generally, are in favour of communal lands ...
I have been advised by influential merchants in Samoa 
that the first thing to do for the benefit of Samoa is 
to break down the Communal System, but those persons 
know too well that this cannot be done at present 
without disturbing the peace and happiness of the 
Natives. Such a change must come gradually and be made 
on their own volition.55
On the matter of commercial development, he also reported little 
progress because despite his exhortations, the Samoans continued to 
limit their copra production according to their needs which were few and 
consisting largely of food items, clothing material, oil for their lamps 
and cash to pay their church contributions and their taxes of £1 per annum 
per male 17 years and over. After meeting these needs, he calculated 
that 50% of the nuts from their existing plantations remained on the
54 Information from Toluono Lama of Palauli and Taito of Safotu.
55 Interim Report on Native Affairs, 17 Sept. 1923, IT 88/5.
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ground wasted. He concluded that 'To get the Natives to fully utilise
their resources and to further promote the commercial development of
Samoa, can only be done by increasing the population and by creating new
needs which should be of such nature as will be in the Natives' true
interests. For those reasons the commercial development of Samoa will
56be a slow process'. The new medical tax and the promotion of a plan 
to rebuild villages to a model prepared by Richardson the following 
year were seen as two new needs that would assist in boosting the 
economic production of the Territory. On the other hand, he did not 
favour launching any new enterprises for the Samoans while so much of 
their copra was allowed to go to waste.
Richardson admitted that the development of Samoa's economy
could be quickened by the introduction of fresh capital into the local
commercial and European community for the utilisation of unused land on
a large scale. For such ventures to be successful though, large
numbers of Asiatic coolies would need to be imported and he was against
such an influx occurring because he felt it would 'prejudice the welfare
57of the Samoans' and he wanted to keep 'Samoa for the Samoans'. The 
comparatively small contingent of Chinese coolies already in the Territory, 
he believed, did not pose a similar threat.
VI
Three months after presenting these views, Richardson appeared 
to have forgotten them. Between 22-31 January 1924 the Fono a Faipule
56 Ibid.
57 Interim Report on Native Affairs, 17 Sept. 1923, IT 88/5.
71
met and amongst the large number of matters brought before it by the
Administrator was a proposal for changing the land-holding system of
the Samoans. Essentially the change involved Samoan land being divided
up and vested in individuals by registered title instead of being vested,
through customary recognition and practice, in family matai titles as
5 8had evolved down from the past. Given his own acknowledgement that 
such a change must come from the Samoans themselves who would however 
not be ready for it for a long time yet and whose peace and harmony 
would be threatened if such a change was forced on them, his proposal - 
more like a command in the circumstances of the Fono a Faipule - was 
as radical as it was foolhardy if not downright provocative.
Another notable proposal he made was for the country to be
divided up into districts, each with a population of about 1200 and with
a Council of Chiefs, controlled by the Faipule, to administer local affairs
under regulations made by government. He saw the benefits of this proposal
mainly in two ways: it would quicken progress through the districts
taking their own decisions and implementing them on such matters as
water supplies, roads, sanitation and so forth instead of everything
being dealt with by the Native Affairs Department; and it would teach
59the Samoans to control their own affairs. In the context of Samoa, 
both these arguments were defective. In the first place water supplies, 
roads, sanitation, village remodelling, schools and indeed all the 
matters which would be given over to the local councils were matters on 
which they knew little and needed a great deal of government advice,
See: Proceedings of Fono a Faipule, 22-31 Jan. 1924; Interim
Report on Native Affairs (no. 2), 13 Feb. 1924: IT 88/3-1.
Interim Report on Native Affairs (no. 2), 13 Feb. 1924; IT 88/3-1.
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technical expertise and finance: the work required from the Native
Affairs Department would not decrease with the new creation. On the 
other hand, Samaons enjoyed discussing government schemes and plans 
with government officials, and if they could possibly manage it, with 
the Administrator himself. Working on a project, any project, involved 
not just physical work but discussions, oratory, food presentations; 
it became part of the social and political life of the people. As for 
teaching them to control their own affairs, that was just what they 
had been doing in their villages for a very long time indeed and their 
insistence on involving the officials in developments within their 
communities, which he had taken as proof that they could not manage their 
own affairs, was in fact a demonstration of a totally different aspect 
of their lives. At the same time he was well aware that Samoans did 
not take kindly to radical changes to their institutions and practices, 
and was therefore risking the peace of the Territory with a measure 
that would detract from the authority and autonomy of the traditional 
matai councils in their villages and districts.
matter of nuisance and annoyance to individuals at the grassroots level. 
Amongst these were fines on individuals - the onus was removed 
deliberately from aiga and villages - for playing cricket, for allowing 
pigs to roam in the village, and a proposed law making it compulsory to
matai councils were eminently suited to deal with on their own with 
proper encouragement from government. Dealing with them from Apia was
Apart from such measures with wide-ranging implications, there
were a number of others which^althougl appeared insignificant, were a
report cases of yaws. 60 These were just the kind of matters which village
60 See: Proceedings of Fono a Faipule, 22-31 Jan. 1924, IT 88/3-1.
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not only insulting to the matai councils but it also created discontent 
amongst the people at the grassroots level of Samoan society.
As far as administering the affairs of the Samoans went, the
proposals raised in this session of the Fono a Faipule constituted the
policies and plans which were pursued for the next few years. There was
no return to the sensitive consideration of the previous year; the
furthest Richardson went was to let the Faipule take his proposals to
their respective districts and try and persuade their people to accept
them. Of this procedure he remarked,
This may seem a strange and unusual procedure but 
with the Samoan Native it is unwise to force him to 
adopt any new custom but on the other hand, to first 
remove any suspicion that he is being exploited and 
show him that the change is for his benefit. By 
working the Faipule it is anticipated that there will 
be little difficulty in getting the Natives to carry 
out new instructions.61
This was a long way from his view expressed only a few months
earlier that 'changes must come gradually and be made on their [Samoans']
own volition' or disturb the 'peace and happiness of the Natives'. And
what happened if these beneficial measures were rejected by the Samoans
even after understanding the Faipule's message? Most of the measures
were backed up with fines but on the critical land tenure issue,
Richardson was adamant that there was neither compulsion nor pressure
on Samoans to adopt the new system if they were against it. In his
statement to the Royal Commission on the Administration of Samoa which
sat in September and October 1927, he said of this measure,
Those districts that do not wish to do this are not 
compelled to do so ... No pressure whatever has been 
used by the Administrator in this matter. The proposal
61 Interim Report on Native Affairs (no. 2), 13 Feb. 1924, IT 88/3-1.
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is merely an exhortation to the Natives to carry out 
if they so desire, and the policy in this, as in all 
other matters, is to educate them to help themselves, 
and to guide and direct reforms which must necessarily 
be made very gradually.62
In fact there was enforcement of this measure when it met
opposition right at the beginning as Richardson himself mentioned in
his Report on Native Affairs in August 1925: 'Up to the present I have
had the land in one District surveyed without trouble; in another
District the Natives would not assist the Surveyor, but prompt action
in dealing with the Chiefs who opposed the Survey overcame their
resistance. I am glad that this incident arose as the firm action taken
by the Administration to enforce the decision of the Faipule Fono has
been made known all over Samoa with the result that I anticipate less
6 3trouble in future'. It was the matai of Faleapuna village who, led
by their paramount orator chief Molio'o, created this particular
difficulty for government not only because they were against the
principle of individualising title to Samoan land, but also because the
government plan proposed sharing some of their traditional village land
with Falefa village which although their physical neighbour was a
distant acquaintance in Samoan political terms. And the 'prompt' and
'firm' action Richardson boasted about was charging Molio'o with
'undermining the authority of the district officals; and a general
64nuisance in opposing all village progress and proposals', having him 
examined by a Board of Inquiry of four Faipule - the main complainant 
was Faipule Fonoti of the Va'a-o-Fonoti district comprising Fagaloa and
Richardson's testimony in 'Report of Royal Commission concerning 
the administration of Western Samoa, 1927', AJHR A-4B, 1928, 
p. 383.
Interim Report on Native Affairs (no. 4), 21 Aug. 1925, IT 88/3-1. 
See: 'Report of Royal Commission ...', p. 479.
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Faleapuna - which recommended that he be dismissed from his position as
Plantation Inspector and ordered to leave Faleapuna and live in Aleipata
for a period of a year. Richardson's decision went further than this
recommendation; he also removed the title of Molio'o and demanded that
the man stay at Aleipata 'until he has changed his character and can be
65trusted to do his duty to those in authority over him' .
In late 1925, Richardson consolidated his plans by procuring from 
the New Zealand government the Native Regulations (Samoa) Order 1925, 
which provided, inter alia, for changes in the administration of villages 
and districts as well as for individualisation of Samoan land. Under this 
law, each Faipule district was to be administered by a district council, 
consisting of representatives from constituent villages and Samoan 
officials with the Faipule as president. These councils were to 'control 
all local matters' - from roadmaking to taro planting - in accordance with 
instructions from government, resolutions passed by the Fono a Faipule, 
and their own decisions in areas not covered by the first two. In villages, 
committees consisting of all village matai or a selected number of them 
and chaired by the Pulenu'u were established to conduct village affairs; 
which again had to be done according to directions from Apia as well as 
instructions from the district councils.
With land, the authority over cultivated land remained with 
individual matai, but they were compelled - as demonstrated by the Molio'o 
case above - to have these lands surveyed for use by individuals holding 
title by law rather than by Samoan custom. Uncultivated village land was 
to be transferred to district councils which would have them subdivided 
and allocated to Samoan taxpayers - males 17 years and over - without land. 
Councils were empowered to grant such occupants leasehold title for life,
65 Ibid.
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Charge rental and decide which immediate descendant of the leaseholder 
should succeed to the land after he died.
As can be seen from the discussion above on the socio-political 
organisation of the Samoans, Richardson's reforms constituted a most serious 
challenge to two fundamental principles of Samoan existence: the vesting of 
all aiga assets - land is obviously a major one - in the family title; and 
the autonomy of each village as constituted by its fa1alupega and embodied 
in the fono a matai and its pre-eminent role in the conduct of village 
affairs. Apart from these major difficulties, there was the problem that 
under the new system Samoan officials, especially the Faipule, had been 
given positions and roles to which they were not entitled in Samoan tradition.
With the promulgation of this law, therefore, Samoan discontent
developed deep but taking time to show so that the predominant atmosphere
throughout the Territory was still one of support and enthusiasm for the
Administrator and his government. To" a great extent, this attitude
reflected the depth of Samoan satisfaction with Richardson and what he did
during the early months of his term. In part though it was also a
consequence of the Samoan attitude towards unpalatable situations: ignore
them as far as possible and those responsible might get the message and
mend their ways. In this case, they rationalised that even if Richardson
showed no signs of relenting in his reforms, he would be leaving after his
66three-year term and then they would expect changes. In the event 
Richardson stayed on for a further two years, stretching their tolerance 
beyond limit, and he experienced in full the truth of his own view that 
the peace and happiness of the Samoans would be disturbed if drastic 
changes were forced on them.




Towards the end of 1926, the image which had been projected to
the outside world of contentment and support amongst the people of
Samoa for Richardson's administration received a severe jolt. Two
public meetings - 15 October and 12 November - in which 'whites' and
Samoans actively participated did the damage, both with their
composition and their proceedings which in the main consisted of
criticisms of government policies and activities.^ The conduct of
these meetings directly challenged some of Richardson's fundamental
policies, particularly that of non-involvement by 'whites' in the
political affairs of the Samoans and vice-versa; yet he did not appear
overly disturbed by them at the time. He was firmly convinced that
2the Samoans were contented with his administration and as for the
papalagi, he thought that 'the matter would adjust itself owing to the
strong opposition in Apia amongst Europeans to any concerted action of 
3this kind'. In any case, as he informed the Minister, there was no
cause for alarm because these activities constituted but 'a small
agitation' designed to promote the sitting Members in the elections for
the Legislative Council scheduled for November 1926. He accordingly
assured the New Zealand authorities that the dissent in Samoa was a
4temporary phenomenon which he could handle without difficulty.
For details of these meetings see 'Report of Royal Commission concerning 
the administration of Western Samoa, 1927', AJHR A-4B, 1928, pp. lix-lxiii 
and 448-457. See also A.O . 25/1-1.
Administrator to Minister, 22 Oct. 1926 and 11 Dec. 1926: A.O. 25/1-1. 
Administrator to Minister, 19 Sept. 1926, A.O. 25/1-1.
4 Administrator to Minister, 22 Oct. 1926 and 14 Nov. 1926: A.O. 25/1-1.
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The situation, however, did not develop as he had predicted.
The elections - won resoundingly by the incumbent members - came and 
went but the activities of the dissident group multiplied rather than 
decreased. Several incidents of anti-Administration behaviour amongst 
Samoans in the outer villages at the time, some involving Richardson 
personally, indicated that they had been quick to use the Apia initiative 
for their own ends. The officials however blamed the Samoan protest on 
invidious propaganda from the Citizens' Committee, the 15 man combined 
committee of Samoans and 'whites' which was dominated by Nelson and 
chosen during the first public meeting to co-ordinate the dissidents' 
activities. Richardson overreacted. He assumed a self-righteous 
attitude on behalf of the Administration and condemned the dissidents 
as 'self-seeking agitators'. Because of his belief that there was no 
dissatisfaction with government, he concluded that the active promotion 
of the agitation could only be motiviated by a desire for more power on 
the part of Nelson and those 'few' associated with him. He felt that 
in their greed for power these men were unscrupulously exploiting the 
Samoans, risking the peace of the territory and posing a threat to the 
'progress' he had worked so hard to achieve.^
As a consequence of these views, an attitude of contempt and 
resentment towards Nelson and those seen as his associates developed 
amongst the Administrator and his officials. This attitude tended to 
obscure reason and objectivity so that anything which the Citizens' 
Committee did was construed in the worst possible way, with the result 
that the dissidents' activities were invariably treated as suspicious 
and even seditious acts which had to be frustrated. On their part,
5 Administrator to Minister, 4 Jan. 1927 and 13 Jan. 1927; Administrator 
to EA, 30 Dec. 1926: A.O. 25/1-1.
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the dissidents viewed the obstructionist tactics and the resentful 
attitude of Richardson and his officials as being motivated by fear 
of their shortcomings in administering the Territory being exposed.
They were confident that if an impartial investigation was conducted, 
their criticisms would be fully vindicated.^ On the other hand they 
resented what they felt were attempts by Richardson to interfere with 
their freedom of expression, particularly as they believed he was 
trying to intimidate them to save himself. And so the attitude of 
personal bitterness was returned as the dissidents themselves treated 
the actions of the authorities with suspicion and distrust.
This mutual feeling of suspicion, distrust and personal 
animosity thus generated between the authorities and the dissidents, 
and more particularly between Richardson and Nelson, came to dominate 
their dealings almost from the day their differences emerged publicly. 
It coloured the initiatives and the responses of both sides; each 
reacting negatively to the other, creating an increasingly immovable 
barrier of personal feeling, and each successive act aggravating the 
situation further. The tactlessness and the provocation which 
characterised the actions of both groups during this early period 
indicated rather clearly that the antagonists were motivated less by a 
desire to protect and promote the wellbeing of the country than by a 
desire to discredit the other. To add to the difficulties, the New 
Zealand government decided to take its directions on this issue from 
Richardson without question, thereby allowing itself to be drawn into 
this undignified clash and effectively barring it from initiating a 
constructive approach to the problem. As a result,an otherwise normal
6 Nelson to Minister, 30 Dec. 1926; A.O. 25/1-1.
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Situation containing manageable differences largely involving the
papalagi population was transformed to one of confrontation and crisis,
7as the Samoans became involved.
For several reasons Samoan involvement in this confrontation 
seemed inevitable from the beginning. In the first place, the 
bitterness between the officials and the dissident 'whites' forced 
them to commit actions which, in spite of themselves, encouraged 
increasing Samoan participation. Secondly, Samoans made up 95% of the 
population and, given the mesmerising attraction political conflict has 
on them and their readiness to exploit any conflict to their advantage 
it was most difficult to keep them isolated from any major confrontation 
within the country. Finally, the dissidents were committed to Samoan 
involvement of some kind following Nelson's success in drawing a 
favourable response from three New Zealand political leaders over 
'Samoan grievances' during a meeting held in Wellington in early 
September 1926. It was indeed during these discussions that the New 
Zealand Prime Minister, perhaps unwittingly, committed a political 
blunder that was to spark off a chain of events which culminated in 
the establishment of an organised protest movement, which was taken 
over by the Samoans soon after - and called the Mau - and used as a 
vehicle through which they asserted their autonomy to control their 
own affairs. The ensuing conflict embroiled the country during the 
following ten years.
See A.O. 25/1-1 for material on the clashes between the authorities 
and the dissidents over this crucial period. See also F.D. Baxter, 
'Collection of material relating to the Mau disturbances in Western 
Samoa 1926-1935' Ms. Auckland University Law Library; Baxter's 
account dramatically conveys the tense atmosphere which prevailed 
in Apia at this period. Baxter practised law in Apia and acted for 
the Mau on several occasions.
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In late August 1926 O.F. Nelson, en route to Samoa from Sydney 
where he had been since early February seeing his daughters to school 
and seeking medical advice, called into Wellington and met the Prime 
Minister Rt. Hon. J.G. Coates together with the Minister of External 
Affairs Hon. William No.sworthy and Hon. Maui Pomare, Minister for 
the Cook Islands and a personal friend of Nelson's. During the meeting 
Nelson apparently gave a comprehensive statement on the different 
aspects of the Samoa Administration which he believed were creating a 
great deal of discontent amongst the people of Samoa; a discontent 
which, he warned the New Zealand leaders, threatened an 'impending 
upheaval' unless some effective remedial action was taken. Although 
he covered a wide area of Administration policies and activities, he 
concentrated on Samoan grievances emphasising in particular the 
banishment of individuals, mostly matai, from their villages, and the 
removal of matai titles by official decree without reference to the 
courts or regard for fa'a Samoa conventions. He told the New Zealand 
leaders that within Samoan society such measures resulted in degradation 
and caused hardships which he alleged were producing a rapidly growing 
dissatisfaction and anger amongst the Samoans. The New Zealand leaders 
apparently gave Nelson's representations sympathetic consideration 
with the result that when he returned to Samoa he openly pursued those 
complaints he had raised in Wellington, thereby bringing to the surface 
the discontent which the inhabitants of Samoa had increasingly felt 
against Richardson's administration.8
See Gray to Richardson (personal), 9 Sept. 1926; Gray to Administrator 
(official), 9 Sept. 1926: IT 79/78; 'Report of Royal Commission ...',
pp. 448-457; O.F. Nelson, The truth about Samoa (Auckland, 1928); 
Nelson to Minister, 14 Jan. 1927, A.O. 25/1-1.
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01. af Frederick Nelson was born on 24 February 1QQ3 in Safune, 
Savai'i. His father was Augustus Nelson, a trader of Swedish nationality 
who came to Samoa in 1868, and his mother was Sina Masoe a Samoan lady 
of high rank whose aiga had connections with the Sa Tupua lineage from 
which the matai title Taisi originated. He was the fourth of five
9children, the other four being girls and the eldest an adopted child.
He grew up in Safune, later attended the Marist Brothers school in 
Apia and in 1896 at the age of 13, he started an apprenticeship with 
the German trading firm of Deutsche Handels - und Plantagen - Gesellshaft 
(D.H. and P.G.) which was the dominating force in the business life of 
the country. In 1900 he joined his father's trading business in Safune 
and after his father retired in 1903, he rapidly expanded the business 
operations so that when D.H. and P.G. was liquidated by the military 
authorities during the war, he was well placed - stores and trading 
contacts in various parts of the country; small fleet of inter-island 
motor boats; management experience - to take advantage of the extra 
trade. In 1928 Nelson's company had 40 trading stores scattered 
throughout Western Samoa and a paid up capital of £150,000. His home, 
'Tuaefu', reflected his success.
In 1909 Nelson married Rosabel Moors - daughter of H.J. Moors - 
who had been educated in the United States. They had 6 children, 5 girls
For information on members of Augustus Nelson's family, see: 
formal note from the American Consul in Apia (Mason Mitchell) 
dated 14 Sept. 1917; Nelson to Tate 14 June 1919: A.O. 34/8/1.
The petition of O.F. Nelson to the League of Nations (Sydney, 1928); 
see also Samoa Times, 29 Nov. 1968 for information on the Nelson 
family and firm.
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and a boy who died in 1919, aged 5, as a result of the after effects 
of the influenza epidemic. Nelson also had a daughter - Luse - whose 
mother was a high ranking Samoan lady from the village of Safotu, Savai'i.
Nelson was a man of habit who lived by the clock; at home and 
at work he expected others to do likewise. In normal times, he got 
up at 6 a.m. - during the Mau period he got up at 3 a.m. and worked 
in his study - breakfasted at 7 a.m., and arrived at his office at 
8.30 a.m. He arrived back at Tuaefu at 5.30 p.m., and held a 'family hour' 
when family matters were discussed, while he drank his regular nightly 
ration of two bottles of beer. This was followed by dinner, always 
a formal affair with the girls appropriately dressed, and Nelson 
himself in suit and bowtie. Family prayers - hymns, bible reading, 
prayers - followed, and then bed by 9 p.m. ^  He was a staunch 
Methodist - his mother's villages in Savai'i of Asau and Safune were 
solidly Methodist and his aiga in both villages led in church affairs - 
and he built a chapel in the Tuaefu grounds and required all the 
inhabitants of Tuaefu to attend church.
In his dealings, he stood steadfastly by agreements or causes to
which he had committed himself, and he sometimes referred to himself as 
12a 'bitter-ender'. The following incidents will show how much such a 
trait was part of his character and will show also the immense personal 
pressures he was under during the time of the Mau. In about 1923, Luse
Information from two of Nelson's daughters, Sina Annandale and 
Billy Retzlaff and from Salafai Tufuga who was a close relative 
from Savai'i and who from 1920 until Nelson died in 1944, lived 
with the Nelsons' as part of the family. The following section 
on Nelson's personal and family life is based principally on 
information from these three sources.
Information from Billy Retzlaff.12
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arrived from Savai'i where she had been brought up by Nelson's mother 
to live with the Nelson family in Tuaefu. Rosabel had insisted on 
Luse's transfer but Nelson had not been enthusiastic, pointing out 
that if Luse came to live with them it would be on a permanent basis 
and she would be Miss Nelson because she was his oldest daughter, while 
Rosabel's girls would be known simply by their baptismal names; and 
he expected tension in the household if that happened. Rosabel 
however wanted Luse to live with them and therefore agreed to Nelson's 
conditions. So Luse arrived and was accorded all the privileges due 
her position as Miss Nelson.
Not unexpectedly, Luse's presence generated tension between
Nelson and his wife, and it soon led to their separation. Nelson
refused to allow Luse to leave his household once she was there, and
insisted on Luse's position as Miss Nelson being strictly observed, even
when adhering to these conditions meant separation from his wife. They
had agreed on Luse's place in the family and he stood by that agreement.
Rosabel, a strong-willed lady with a mind of her own, did not succumb
meekly to Nelson's demanding ways. She had been brought up by indulgent
parents and was headstrong and determined. Even before Luse's arrival
she had at times rebelled against the strict routine of Nelson's
lifestyle and had on some of those occasions gone and stayed with her
own family. After the differences over Luse began, her visits to her
/\y\ 0 \'x
family became progressivel^/frequent and longer in duration, and one 
day, as she prepared for another departure from Tuaefu, Nelson told her 
that if she went, she would not be allowed back. She went, and Nelson 
never allowed her back into the family, although he loved her and was 
heartbroken as his daughters discovered when they read one of his diaries 
after he died. It was only during his final illness that he agreed to
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reconcile with her after twenty years separation.
After they separated, Nelson told his wife that to prevent the 
children developing divided loyalties, they should remain with one 
parent and the other should keep away altogether. Rosabel responded 
that he could keep them, and as was his nature he adhered to that 
arrangement. Of course he could not eliminate the love between the 
girls and their mother; the girls sometimes visited her and each time 
that occurred, he was terribly upset. To Nelson, a clear headed man 
who lived by iron discipline and hard work, an arrangement on bringing 
up the girls had been made, and it should be followed, other factors 
including his own appreciation of the emotional difficulties involved 
notwithstanding.
At Tuaefu, Nelson lived in grand surroundings: a house of
mansion proportions and appointments, spacious terraced grounds,
magnificent gardens, tennis courts, a large Samoan fale afolau (living
guest house), and a private chapel, all testified - if in somewhat
ostentatious fashion, given its setting in Samoa at that period - to
abundant wealth. Apart from the enjoyment he derived from living
there, it would appear that Nelson looked on Tuaefu as his response to
the crude prejudices held by Europeans against half-castes at that
13time. He apparently felt these prejudices keenly and as a result
did not go out a great deal preferring instead to invite people -
14including the prejudiced - to lavish entertainments at Tuaefu.
Tate to Gray, 9 Apr. 1921 and 31 July 1921: Tate Papers Mss 264
Turnbull Library, Wellington.
14 Information from Salafai Tufuga.
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As the most successful businessman in the country, Nelson was
naturally regarded by the white community as its leading citizen;
in the first elections for the Legislative Council in early 1924 for
example, papalagi voters elected him as their 'First Member' on the
Council. Officials recognised this situation and it was Nelson to
15whom they turned for advice and assistance on local matters. As a
result, Nelson gained influence within government circles and members
of the white community came to expect it of him to speak and lead on
their behalf in matters involving government. This situation was
not lost on the Samoans, particularly those who were dissatisfied
with the Faipule as their contact with government. They brought
their complaints to Nelson who took them up with the Administrator
and his officials. This section of the Samoan community therefore
came to look to Nelson to promote their interests in their relations 
16with government. Nelson apparently was very proud of being regarded
by the papalagi as well as Samoans as their leader in their dealings
with government, and he took his responsibilities in this regard 
17seriously. It was therefore natural for him to call into Wellington 
and make representations on behalf of the inhabitants of Samoa.
According to Nelson his representations received sympathetic 
hearing from the three political leaders and especially from the Prime 
Minister, who expressed 'amazement' at the practice of banishment and
See: The petition of O.F. Nelson to the League of Nations (Sydney,
1928); O.F. Nelson, The truth about Samoa (Auckland, 1928).
Ibid; F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material ...', p. 5; Information 
from Sina Annandale, Billy Retzlaff and Fao of Asau.
17 Ibid.
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remarked that the conditions recounted by Nelson 'would not be tolerated
in New Zealand and nor would they be allowed in Samoa under his 
18government'. In consequence of this view - he had apparently been
warned of the growing unrest there by Pomare on his return from the
islands a few months previously - Coates instructed No..sworthy there
and then to proceed to Samoa and investigate. The Minister, who had
hoped to pay his first official visit to the mandated territory at the
end of the last parliamentary session for the year, indicated that he
19would sail for the islands on the October steamer.
On his part, the Prime Minister recollected ten months after
the meeting that his response to Nelson had been 'that while his
representations would receive due consideration and while government
desired to extend to the people of Samoa both Native and white the most
generous consideration similar to that accorded in New Zealand, the
government must consider also the opinions of the Administrator and
the Native Councils and the people of Samoa. For that purpose, the
Minister of External Affairs would himself visit Samoa as soon as
possible though his visit might be delayed owing to my absence at
20Imperial Conference'.
The implication of the Prime Minister's account was clear: 
Nelson had acted beyond that warranted by the response he had received 
in Wellington. In effect, though, the recollection by the Prime 
Minister helped confirm that Nelson's representations had been well
18 Record of meeting between Hon. W. No :sworthy and Apia residents 
(11 June 1927); Norsworthy to EA, 11 June 1927: A.O. 25/1-2.
19 See Nelson's address to public meeting (15 Oct. 1926); Nelson to 
Minister, 14 Jan. 1927: A.O. 25/1-1; Gray to Administrator, 9 Sept. 
1926, IT 79/78.
20 Coates to No :sworthy, 13 June 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
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received and had been responsible for provoking the Minister's visit 
to Samoa - justification enough for Nelson to claim sympathy from the 
New Zealand leaders and to promote publicly those matters he had 
raised with them.
Up to this time, though, there had been no word on the meeting
from the three political leaders who took part. They consistently
failed, or refused, to provide the Administrator with an account of
the discussions during the first crucial months of the conflict, and
they persisted in their silence even when Richardson, by blaming the
21Wellington meeting as the 'base of all the agitationV clearly 
indicated that the situation was getting out of hand and he was 
having problems coping on his own.
Depending on information gathered from Nelson's public statements
and correspondence, Richardson bluntly told the Minister that the
Wellington discussions had 'contained a charge against myself which
was unknown to me until the receipt of a copy of Mr Nelson's letter of
14th January ... it places me in an awkward position and shows why
22Mr Nelson had been so persistent and confident'. A little later,
when the New Zealand government was having problems finding a suitable
Minister to make the trip to Samoa, Richardson hit out again: 'This
trouble started with an interview between Nelson and the New Zealand
government and therefore government must send a Ministerial representative 
23to stop it'. But still no word on the meeting. When the Prime Minister 
finally gave his version, it was at the request of No sworthy, who was
21
22
Administrator to Minister, 17 Jan. 1927, A.O. 25/1-1. 
Ibid.
23 Administrator to EA, 14 May 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
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then in Samoa trying to save the situation. It came ten months too 
late for the Mau was by then well established.
It was a serious error of judgement. Acquainting Richardson 
at the earliest opportunity with the proceedings of the meeting would 
have been diplomatically proper and would have better prepared him for 
the attack when it came. In particular, if Richardson had known that 
his political superiors felt that at the very least the complaints 
raised by Nelson - and now by the dissidents - deserved consideration 
and investigation, it could well have tempered his self-righteous 
attitude. This could have prevented the bitterness which so quickly 
had reduced and perhaps even eliminated the avenues open for reasonable 
discussions aimed at a satisfactory solution.
Certainly Nelson was under no obligation - except perhaps that
of human decency, always a dubious one in the arena of politics - to
inform Richardson either of the object of his visit to Wellington or
of the discussions themselves, as the Royal Commission concluded he
should have done, while completely ignoring the fact that informing
the Administrator was the responsibility of the Minister and his 
24department. As it was, Nelson talked freely to Gray about his 
criticisms after the meeting whereas Norsworthy did not even raise the 
subject with his departmental head. Also soon after his arrival in 
Samoa Nelson openly gave his account of the meeting and repeated it 
several times, once in the presence of the Chief Judge and several 
senior officials of the Administration during the October public 
meeting, and also in letters to the Minister without being contradicted.
24 Report of Royal Commission ...', pp. xx-xxii.
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For Nelson the outcome of the interview would have been very 
satisfactory indeed. That he was able to discuss freely matters concerning 
the administration of Samoa over the head of the Administrator would have 
been most encouraging in itself, but that his representations on matters 
of specific concern to the Samoans were given consideration indicated that 
the New Zealand leadership was open-minded on the question of interaction 
between the Samoans and the 'whites' over political issues, rendering 
Richardson's strict 'political separation' policy at least open to 
challenge. This latter consideration was of particular significance 
because if followed up successfully it would provided him, an afakasi 
with papalagi legal status, the opportunity to participate openly in the 
important arena of Samoan affairs in which a person in his position must 
have influence before he could get far in the political affairs of the 
country. The Minister's visit presented him not only with the excuse to 
promote openly those complaints he had raised in Wellington but more 
important, particularly with the Samoans, it provided him with a cogent 
demonstration of his influence with the highest political authorities in 
New Zealand.
On their own, Nelson and those initially associated with him would 
have found it very difficult to attract support within Samoa for a 
concerted campaign against the Administration. This would have been 
particularly applicable to the Samoans, given that they had their own means 
of combatting disagreeable official measures, and given also their pre­
occupation with status and authority. And as far as they were concerned 
at the time Richardson had the status and held the power. But with Nelson 
claiming support from the Prime Minister himself and being able to point to 
a tangible demonstration of it in the form of the Minister's visit, the 
power structure in Samoa took on a different complexion; Richardson's 
position was rendered vulnerable and the discontented group was able to 
launch its campaign from a position of legitimacy and strength.
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In justifying his decision to interview the Prime Minister
in 1926, Nelson repeatedly asserted that he did it mainly out of his
concern for the welfare of the Samoans. In his petition to the League
of Nations in 1928 he wrote: 'In consequence of the unsatisfactory
position which existed in connection with Native affairs when your
Petitioner left Samoa and in consequence of reports received by your
Petitioner whilst in Sydney, your Petitioner ... visited New Zealand ...
and interviewed the Prime Minister of New Zealand and the Minister of
25External Affairs, the Hon. Mr No -sworthy'. He claimed that in 1924 
and again in 1925, being concerned with the rising discontent amongst 
the Samoans over the growing incidence of banishment, he had tried to 
warn Richardson of the dangers of this policy, but was ignored. Of 
the reports he received whilst in Sydney, he was particularly dissatisfied 
with an Order which interfered with the Samoans' freedom of movement in 
their own country by requiring all Samoans living in the Apia area who 
did not belong there and who did not have permanent employment to return 
to their own villages.
But Nelson was also the leading resident of Western Samoa 
and he carried many complaints of specific relevance to the white 
community. Perhaps the foremeost complaint here concerned the situation 
in the Legislative Council. Although the elected members were fully 
aware before entering the Council that they would be in the minority, 
they were obviously not prepared for the role of impotent spectators 
in which they found themselves. While Richardson assured them that he 
welcomed the freest discussion of all matters raised during Council 
meetings they soon discovered that any of their views that differed
25 The petition of O.F. Nelson to the League of Nations (Sydney, 1928).
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from the official ones were invariably ignored and rejected either 
through procedural requirements or through the official majority.
To make matters worse, the MLCs - and the officials as well - knew 
that under the existing rules of the Council there was nothing that 
could be done to change the situation.
The only way to obtain relief was to go outside the Council,
indeed outside Samoa itself. In his opening address to the October
public meeting he declared,
Your representatives in the Legislative Council can 
never reach the stage when they can control Government 
policy or bring about such reforms as you may direct them 
to do. For that reason we have no alternative but to 
appeal to a higher authority. That higher authority is 
vested in the New Zealand government and exercised through 
the Minister of External Affairs.26
In saying this though, Nelson betrayed his own political 
ambitions. It also became clear in the same address that his 
frustrations with the Administration resulted largely from his failure 
to reconcile his political amibitions with the realities of the political 
situation; in particular the status of Western Samoa as a mandated 
territory. While he accepted that an opposition party as in a self- 
governing country could not be formally instituted in the Legislative 
Council, he nevertheless sought to establish an effective opposition in 
that body, which would play virtually the same role (with greater 
powers) as an opposition party. He argued that even if the MLCs could 
not possess formal powers to frustrate government's programmes, their 
unanimous opposition should be recognised by withholding and submitting 
any contested proposal to a higher authority - the Minister preferably -
26 See Nelson's address to public meeting (15 Oct. 1926), A.O. 25/1-1 
and the Report on this meeting in 'Report of Royal Commission ...', 
pp. 448-453.
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before any action on it, if any, was taken. He told the meeting that
there was 'nothing constitutionally wrong' in pressuring New Zealand
for the 'gradual advancement of the political status of this country and
its people' and he asserted that 'the New Zealand government is
sympathetic with our aspirations' and that the Minister's visit 'may
be taken as a recognition of our further progress in the legislation of 
27our own affairs'. In effect though, given the political climate of 
the time and given also Samoa's status as a mandated territory, Nelson 
was being naively unrealistic.
II
Nelson arrived back in Samoa on 24 September:and immediately 
took steps to prepare for the Minister's visit. A provisional committee 
comprising the three MLCs decided to call a public meeting to decide 
on matters to be raised with the Minister and to choose a committee 
to translate these into formal submissions. Other leading papalagi 
were asked to assist in preparing matters for discussion and the meeting 
was advertised in the local weekly newspaper, the Samoa Times. At about 
this time also Nelson was invited to S.H. Meredith's house for a private 
welcoming-home function; there he met several high-ranking matai 
normally resident in Apia, including the two Fautua Malietoa and 
Tuimaleali'ifano and related to them his experiences whilst overseas. 
Particular interest was shown concerning the Wellington meeting and 
Nelson advised the Samoan leaders to put down in writing any matters
27 Ibid.
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they wanted to raise with the Minister and present them as formal
submissions when he arrived. The papalagi, he said, were doing just
that themselves and had called a public meeting to facilitate that
procedure. In the course of these discussions and on subsequent
occasions both Nelson and other prominent papalagi told the Samoans
that they could participate in the advertised public meeting if they
wished, Nelson having contemplated joint action if the Samoans were 
28agreeable to it.
A few days after the advertisement for the public meeting
appeared in the Samoa Times, Richardson informed the Minister: 'Although
I know of no local complaints, your visit is being made occasion for
29political deputation'. He suggested that the prohibition issue was
behind the deputation proposal and thought that the Minister would be
pressed for a definite statement on this matter with a view to repealing
the law. There was no suggestion by Richardson that the Minister delay
his visit. The day before the meeting, Norsworthy advised Richardson
30that his visit was 'unavoidably posponed autumn'. Family affairs 
and specifically Norsworthy's involvement as Trustee of his wife's 
family estate of which certain matters were then before the court, were 
responsible for the postponement.
The MLCs were informed of the postponement but the meeting took 
place as planned, Nelson indicating that the message came too late to 
alter their plans and in any case he thought that the delay would give
See Nelson's testimony in 'Report of Royal Commission ...', 
pp. 225/226.
Administrator to EA, 12 Oct. 1926, A.O. 25/1-1.
Minister to Administrator, 14 Oct. 1926, A.O. 25/1-1.
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the committee 'plenty of time to do their work'. In reality, though, 
proceeding with the meeting was largely an angry reaction to what was 
felt to be a breach of promise by the New Zealand leaders as well as 
the belief that it was Richardson who had influenced the change in plans.
The meeting attracted just under 300 people - about half of 
them Samoans - and all participated actively in the deliberations.
Since non-involvement by'whites' in the political affairs of the 
Samoans, and vice versa, was a fundamental principle of Richardson's 
administration, Samoan participation in this meeting constituted a 
major challenge to government. In a rousing opening address,
tNelson defended the Samoans presence by saying that Samoans had wanted
to participate; but he then introduced another aspect which involved
what amounted to a unilateral alteration of the MLCs' status in the
Legislative Council by claiming that they represented the Samoans:
'Until the Samoans are represented by their own elected members in
the Legislative Council, we feel that we represent the Europeans and
the Natives alike, so therefore could not exclude them from this 
32public meeting'.
Several prepared papers including some on Samoan affairs by
33the Samoan contingent led by Faumuina Mulinuu and Afamasaga Lagolago, 
were presented. All were critical of government. At the end of the 
meeting, a combined committee of 15 - the Citizens' Committee - was
F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material ...', p. 15.
'Report of Royal Commission ...', p. 449.
The use by Lagolago of the title Afamasaga was forbidden by 
Richardson in 1924 under the provisions of the Samoan offenders 
ordinance 1922, after he was found guilty of selling home-brewed 
liquor to fellow Samoans. People however continued addressing 
him by that title and it would therefore be used here.
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chosen and charged with two specific tasks: to contact the Minister
and try to persuade him to proceed with his visit to Samoa the following 
month, and to prepare submissions on the subjects raised during the 
meeting for presentation to the Minister. The Citizens'Committee was 
made up of six Samoans - Faumuina, Afamasaga, Alipia, Ainu'u, Tofaeono 
and Tuisila - all high-ranking matai, and nine members from the papalagi 
side comprising the three MLCs as well as S.H. Meredith, A .G. Smyth,
E.W. Gurr, F.D. Baxter, A.R. Cobcroft and Kurt Meyer.
Although Samoan participation was the most outstanding feature 
of this meeting, and combined action became the central issue in the 
confrontation between government and the discontented group, it is 
important to mention here those areas of government administration 
which created dissatisfaction and drew criticism from members of the 
Samoan as well as the papalagi communities. Samoan criticisms revolved 
mainly around the Faipule and their role in advising the Administrator 
on Samoan affairs. The Samoans complained that the Faipule were 
appointed by the Administrator and were therefore government officials 
rather than Samoan representatives; yet they were given powers to 
advise and decide on matters over which they had no traditional 
authority. Such matters included removal of matai titles - aiga members 
possessed exclusive authority over the aiga title,- banishment from 
villages _ the village fono was the only arbiter in village matters, - 
determination of questions concerning the individualisation of Samoan 
lands, and imposition of restrictions on certain Samoan customs and 
practices.
On the other hand, papalagi criticisms centred around the usual 
topics of officials (too many, inefficient, too highly paid, not interested
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in Samoa), public funds (too big a national debt, extravagant 
expenditure, public has no say in their control), Legislative Council 
(Administrator's rubber stamp), Medical department (inefficient and 
lacked competent medical staff), and prohibition (arbitrarily imposed, 
not required by mandate, not observed in New Zealand itself).
Three weeks after the first meeting Richardson experienced 
Samoan discontent first hand at village level when a large number of 
matai in two sub-districts - Fagaloa and Falelatai - situated at 
opposite ends of Upolu, rejected the authority of their respective 
Faipule with the result that some abstained from the meetings with the 
Administrator on his official malaga while others who attended bitterly 
assailed him in their speeches. At a village in Falelatai, dissident 
matai prohibited their people from attending a yaws clinic and
34encouraged a general attitude of non-cooperation with officialdom.
In a society where politeness was a prime virtue, where due 
recognition was jealously guarded and strictly observed and where a 
breach of these requirements invariably drew severe censure and heavy 
punishment, if not violence, these actions against the head of 
government were very serious indeed as Richardson was well aware. Yet 
in the same reports informing New Zealand Ministers of these disturbing 
incidents he assured them that the Samoans were in fact contented, and 
that the few 'agitators' had no support amongst the white community either. 
He confidently expected that if the opposition did not die from lack of 
support it would disappear once he became personally involved. He told 
the Minister: 'My name was kept out of all criticism, otherwise the
34 Administrator to Minister, 19 Nov. 1926, A.O. 25/1-1; see also 
'Report of Royal Commission ...', p. 357.
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movement would I believe have failed from the first as I think there
35would have been no support'.
In fact the criticism raised during the public meeting affected 
Richardson in a more serious way than any personal attack on his name 
could have done, because it was a direct attack on the fundamental 
principle on which his Administration was built. He was therefore 
deluding himself, and when he brought himself into the fray with a 
letter to the second combined meeting demanding discontinuation of 
combined political action, that letter achieved exactly the opposite 
effect.
Ill
The second combined public meeting held on 12 November was a 
dramatic affair even before it was formally opened. The hall was packed with 
a predominantly Samoan audience of about 600. Outside several Samoan 
policemen armed with batons patrolled the grounds of the Apia market 
hall, while inside four white constables kept watch on the proceedings.
Just after Nelson declared the meeting opened, the Acting Secretary to 
the Administration, Mr A.M. McCarthy, interrupted and read a letter 
from the Administrator. In the letter Richardson informed the meeting 
that 'the natives are unsettled on certain matters' as a result of the 
October combined public meeting. He then proceeded to justify the 
policy of 'political non-involvement' in the Samoan context:
35 Administrator to Minister, 19 Nov. 1926, A.O. 25/1-1.
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The effect of bringing the natives into the European 
political arena is unwise and likely to cause trouble. 
It is a simple matter to upset a native race which is 
composed of many factions like the Samoan race and I 
ask the Europeans not to do it. If you persist, you 
are doing a thing unheard of in the annals of colonial 
administration and are almost certain to discredit the 
European community in the eyes of the outside world.
The inevitable result must be to disturb the peace, 
order and good government of the territory. Every 
person knows what that means. I ask the Europeans to 
confine themselves to those matters which concern them 
and leave alone those matters which concern them not.^
The'whites'were assured of their 'British privileges' of 
freedom of speech and 'honest criticism' of government, while the 
Samoans were told that they had the 'fullest freedom' to bring their 
complaints before the Administration, although these must come through 
'properly constituted channels such as the District councils and the 
Fono a Faipule'. The Samoans were further assured 'of the fullest 
hearing and the utmost consideration' in any matter brought forward 
the proper way and moreover 'chiefs and taule'ale'a are treated alike 
and both have the same rights of redress for injuries as Europeans'.
In case there were any lingering doubts as to the Administrator's 
attitude he concluded:
I wish all people here to clearly understand that I 
do not approve of a political meeting which mixes 
native politics and European politics as its tendency 
must be to disturb the peace, order and good 
government of the natives. ^ 7
It was a hard-hitting statement on the policy of political 
non-involvement, and obviously aimed at stopping the malcontents in 
their tracks. For a number of reasons, however, it was doomed to 
failure from the start. Richardson's concern for the 'peace, order and
'Report of Royal Commission ...', p. 454; see also A.O. 25/1-1 
for police reports on this meeting.
37 Ibid.
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good government' of the country was shared by everyone, but his 
stubborn insistence on the rigid observance of the status quo, without 
holding out the slightest hope of a change, after a clear public 
expression of dissatisfaction with the existing system, was politically 
foolhardy. In spite of his contempt for Nelson and his associates, 
he could not afford to ignore their claims completely - if only 
because they were respected members of the white community and their 
criticisms were expressed within the limits of the law.
Worse still, requiring in such a manner the MLCs and those 
associated with them to back down was a crude attempt to humiliate 
them publicly. There was a feeling amongst the dissidents that they 
were being intimidated into giving up what they believed to be
3 8legitimate criticisms expressed along constitutional channels, and 
that belief was greatly strengthened by the thoughtless and provocative 
actions of two senior officials: A.L. Braisby, the Chief of Police who
arranged the show of police force when in fact nothing that the 
dissatisfied people had done up to that time was unlawful, or warranted 
such an exhibition, and McCarthy, who rudely interrupted the meeting and 
read the Administrator's letter, according to an eye-witness, in a 
'very hectoring manner'
The uncompromising demands of the letter and the bullying 
manner of its presentation stunned the meeting; more so because 
everyone present knew that this was the showdown between the 
Administration and the dissident group and more particularly between
'Report of Royal Commission ...', p. 454.
39 F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material ...', p. 35.
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Richardson and Nelson. Richardson though had adopted tactics and
created a situation that left Nelson with little choice but to defy
the Administrator's demands. He argued that the interests of Samoans
and Europeans could not be separated; that although the Administrator
could not be criticised as the representative of His Majesty, he was
certainly open to criticism as head of the government. He criticised
the Administrator and his policy of 'political non-involvement' which
he contended was unrealistic and had led to deliberate attempts to
'discredit the trader in the eyes of the native' thereby encouraging
dissension between Samoans and Europeans. The Samoans, he claimed,
were being denied access to the Administrator and were being intimidated
into a position where they would not criticise the Administration. In
dramatic fashion he declared: 'The Samoans have always been a free
people and a free people they will remain. They certainly should be
40allowed to state any grievances they may have'. He strongly 
encouraged continuation of the meeting in spite of the Administrator's 
letter, and the others followed his lead.
The meeting decided to send a delegation to New Zealand to 
present its submission to the Minister. To finance this venture it 
was agreed to call for public donations and matai from the villages of 
Solosolo and Mulifanua immediately made contributions to start the fund - 
a most encouraging if rather surprising response from the Samoans, who 
were usually suspicious and reluctant to contribute money, especially 
to unproven schemes involving local 'whites'. A.G. Smyth and Mata'u 
Karauna were appointed Treasurer and Secretary respectively to facilitate 
arrangements for the proposed New Zealand visit.
'Report of Royal Commission ...', p. 454.
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While continuation of the meeting could at least be defended 
on the grounds that the actions of the Administrator and his senior 
officials had provoked it, the decision to send a combined delegation 
to New Zealand paid for with funds from public donations could hardly 
be similarly justified. A public campaign for funds would naturally 
highlight grievances - real and imaginary - against the Administration. 
And regardless of all protestations of goodwill and honourable 
intentions on the part of the malcontents, the real effect of such a 
campaign was disaffection against the constituted authorities in the 
country.
Why was such a visit considered necessary? The existing 
situation did not appear to warrant it. There had been no harsh 
repressive measures and the opposition movement was still largely 
confined to the Apia inhabitants. Moreover the complaints voiced by 
the dissatisfied section did not contain one on whose immediate 
satisfaction depended the peace and wellbeing of the population: they
could all have waited for a few months until the Minister arrived.
The unequivocal public rejection of the Administrator's precise 
demands placed the responsibility to settle the issue once again on 
his shoulders. A crucial stage had been reached and in view of the 
tactless, bulldozing tactics he had adopted, the situation clearly 
called for determined and even drastic action to assert the authority 
of the government if his credibility and standing - and therefore 
those of the Administration - especially amongst the Samoans, were to 
be maintained. It was either that or conceding that the oppposition 
movement had legitimate grievances which deserved serious consideration. 
Richardson chose neither course of action. Instead he went on the 
defensive and the dissidents took the initiative. A long drawn-out
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confrontation looked certain unless the New Zealand government took 
a more direct and positive part in the tussle. But no such action was 
forthcoming from a government which appeared contented to take its 
direction from Richardson.
The Citizens' Committee moved quickly to implement the resolutions
of the November combined meeting. The Minister was asked to receive a
delegation in New Zealand. On Richardson's advice, the Minister
replied that he was prepared to receive a delegation in January provided
the dissidents' representations were submitted to the Administrator,
with matters concerning:Samoan affairs to be submitted to the Fono a
41Faipule for report. ceThe Citizens' Committee, interpreting the 
Minister's reply as agreement to receive the delegation, submitted its 
representations to theaAdministrator, cleverly leaving it up to him to 
refer to the Faipule those submissions he felt concerned Samoan affairs. 
They then switched thedr attention to the task of raising funds to 
cover the expenses of the delegation.
A list was sen£:round prospective contributors within the white 
community for pledges bf money while a pamphlet entitled 'Ole Fono Tele 
a Samoa' (The Great Foao of Samoa) was prepared by the Samoan section 
of the Citizens' Committee and approved by Nelson, for distribution 
amongst the Samoans toeassist the Samoan members in their campaign for 
funds and support in the villages. When they embarked on this mission, 
Richardson moved in smartly and stopped them: Faumuina and Mata'u
Karauna were ordered back from Savai'i almost on arrival, while Ainu'u 
was prevented from leaving Apia. Being satisfied that distributing
41 Minister to MLCs, 26 Nov. 1926; Administrator to EA, 13 Nov. 1926; 
MLCs to Minister, 23 Nov. 1926: A.O. 25/1-1.
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pamphlets which criticised the Administration and the laws of the
country in 'seditious terms' would tend to disturb the 'peace, order
and good government of the natives', Richardson invoked the Samoan
Offenders Ordinance 1922 to constrain Faumuina and Mata'u Karauna to
remain in their villages for a period of three months while Ainu'u was
42warned to stop his association with the Citizens' Committee.
The MLCs protested to the Minister over this action, claiming
that it was arbitrary and could cause trouble. They again urged an
immediate investigation. The Minister replied that the matter would be
referred to the Administrator and the Fono a Faipule then in session,
adding that he would be guided by the Fono's advice, it being the
43'competent body to advise on native affairs'. This was just what
the malcontents did not want, first because they maintained that the
Faipule were appointees of the Administrator and would invariably
support him and secondly because they argued that the Faipule did not
necessarily possess the appropriate authority in traditional politics
44to be accorded such a role. Norsworthy rejected these objections 
and informed the MLCs that the Fono as constituted had 'the entire 
sympathy and fullest support of the New Zealand government which also 
has the fullest confidence in his Excellency to appoint as Faipule 
only those persons who are best fitted to be leaders of their people'. 
As to an investigation, the Minister advised that the Fono a Faipule
Richardson's instructions (26 Nov. 1926) on Braisby's report 
(25 Nov. 1926) on this episode, A.O. 25/1-1.
Minister to Administrator, 8 Dec. 1926, A.O. 25/1-1.
MLCs to Minister, 9 Dec. 1926, A.O. 25/1-1.
Norsworthy to Nelson, 13 Dec. 1926, A.O. 25/1-1.
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had just sent a message assuring him an investigation as suggested by 
the MLCs was 'quite unnecessary' and he therefore could see 'no 
reason for any investigation into native affairs in Samoa at the 
present time'. ^
This response was a body-blow to the discontented group. The
Faipule, the centre of Samoan grievances, had been declared supreme and
untouchable by the Minister. Worse still, the investigation promised
Nelson, on which the malcontents placed so much hope to uncover
deficiencies in the Administration and thereby justify their opposition,
now seemed doomed. They felt however that the Minister (along with the
New Zealand government) was a victim of Richardson's misleading advice,
and they hoped he would change his attitude after reading their
submissions and discussing the situation with their delegation in New
Zealand. But they were fooling themselves. When the six Samoan
members of the Citizens' Committee chosen as members of the delegation
applied for travel permits to New Zealand, Richardson refused to grant
the permits on the flimsy grounds that the Minister's telegram of
16 November meant that no Samoan might be included in the delegation
47without specific permission from the Minister himself.
Once again the discontented group protested vigorously. Nelson
wrote to the Minister that 'It is inconceivable that the interference
with the liberty of the subject and other arbitrary acts towards the
Samoan natives can possibly be with the knowledge and consent of the




Sec. to Admin, to Braisby, 15 Dec. 1926; 
31 Dec. 1926: A.O. 25/1-1.
MLCs to Minister,
48 Nelson to Norsworthy, 30 Dec. 1926, A.O. 25/1-1.
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impossible condition that the Samoan delegates must be representative
of the Samoan people, including the Faipule, before he could agree to
receive them. The malcontents, though rapidly losing hope, countered
that they had the support of a 'large majority of Europeans and 90% of
the Samoans'. But this and other assurances and requests failed to move
the Minister. Angry and frustrated they cabled: 'Samoan delegates
49approved by Samoan people: will you receive them or not?' To which
terse enquiry the Minister responded that 'official advice' did not 
support their claims.
The day after the message asking this pointed question of the
Minister was sent, five Samoan members of the Citizens' Committee -
Afamasaga, Ainu'u, Tofaeono, Alipia and Tuisila - as well as district
representative Anae were arraigned before the Administrator at Mulinu'u.
The first three were ordered to cease working with the Citizens'
Committee while the last three including Anae were handed banishment
orders requiring them to return and remain in their respective villages
50for the next three months. The dissident group saw this action as
retaliation for the telegram and the feeling became prevalent that they
were being subjected to injustices and persecution for standing up for
their rights. The situation deteriorated further and 'bitterness,
51contempt and distrust became more widespread than ever before'. It 
was in these circumstances that Nelson wrote to Norsworthy bitterly 
complaining that for the Samoans:
MLCs to Minister, 11 Jan. 1927; Minister to MLCs, 13 Jan. 1929: 
A .0 . 25/1-1.
Administrator to Minister, 17 Jan. 1927; Nelson to Norsworthy, 
14 Jan. 1927: A.O. 25/1-1.
51 F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material ...', p. 58.
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martial law might just as well have been proclaimed 
and the whole place be considered a military camp 
... Intimidation and unheard of measures of the sort 
now perpetuated on the Samoans will never tend to 
bring about goodwill and satisfaction of the Samoan 
people in the New Zealand Administration of Samoa.52
The Citizens' Committee was thus prevented from carrying out the 
resolutions of the November combined meeting. But in its efforts to 
implement those resolutions, it widened the confrontation considerably - 
assisted by the uncertain and negative government response - and 
generated country-wide interest, which soon led to major changes in the 
nature and direction of the dissident movement.
IV
The dramatic events that quickly followed the October public 
meeting fired the interest of the Samoans throughout the country in 
the conflict being played out in Apia. Many were keen to become more 
involved and certain matai from the outer districts requested a place 
on the leadership ranks of the dissident group. With six Samoans already 
on the Citizens' Committee and with the movement in its infancy, it might 
appear that this request was premature if not presumptuous. It was not: 
the Samoan members of the Citizens' Committee were elected in a 
European-controlled public meeting and were therefore not village or 
district representatives, and moreover the claimant matai had an 
obligation to their respective aiga to have their status in the movement 
clarified before fully committing themselves. Supporting the dissident
52 Nelson to Norsworthy, 14 Jan. 1927, A.O. 25/1-1.
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cause would expose them, their titles and other members of their 
families to ridicule particularly in their close-knit village 
communities, unless they could demonstrate for others to see that they 
commanded recognition and influence within the new group. Because they 
were matai, nothing less than a place on the leadership ranks would 
satisfy this requirement in Samoan eyes.
The request presented Nelson with a dilemma. With his knowledge 
of the Samoans he no doubt appreciated the considerations behind it, and 
realised that refusal would alienate the Samoans and would render 
impotent all the efforts of the dissidents. On the other hand, 
agreeing to the request would open the door to full-scale Samoan 
involvement and could well take the movement beyond his control; the 
Samoan representatives would not be content - would not in fact be so 
allowed by Samoan requirements - with just being on the executive.
They would want to exercise control and they would be very difficult 
to resist.
Understandably Nelson hesitated. He told the deputation of 
district matai that the executive of the movement was chosen by a public 
meeting and that its composition could only be changed by a similar 
meeting. But this effort to blunt the Samoan initiative by reference 
to a European convention was a futile attempt. The Samoans knew the 
strength of their position and they countered by proposing the 
establishment of a new committee which would work in conjunction with 
the Citizens' Committee in directing the affairs of the movement but 
whose membership would be wholly made up of village and district 
representatives. The six Samoan members of the Citizens' Committee, 
who obviously felt the weakness of their position, strongly supported
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this proposal. Nelson gave his approval and the Samoan Committee -
53later known popularly as the Mau komiti - came into existence. It 
appears clear though that the other dissident 'whites', including those on 
the Citizens' Committee, were not consulted on this matter and they had 
very little knowledge and even less influence over the affairs of this 
new creation.
Within the dissident movement itself, these matai were accepted
as representatives of Samoan supporters and they asserted an
independence to express the views of those they represented, so far
as the Mau was concerned, in a most forthright manner. F.D. Baxter,
original member of the Citizens' Committee and legal counsel for the Mau
and its members during the first turbulent months of the confrontation,
wrote of the Samoan Committee:
From the time of its inception, the Mau Committee was 
the body which controlled and organised the native 
opposition, expressed its views and generally led in 
and guided its affairs. Nor was it prepared to be a 
passive organ of Nelson or the Citizens' Committee.
It would of course consider suggestions of the Citizens' 
Committee or Nelson, but it would not allow itself to 
be dominated or controlled. It had its own suggestions 
and ideas and made them known and felt. From the 
establishment of this Committee Nelson could influence 
the trend of native ideas and actions in so far as he 
could persuade such Committee to his views ...54
With the formation of this Committee, discussions began on the 
matter of the conduct of Mau affairs, and after several weeks of 
negotiations, consensus was finally reached, on the vital issues of 
procedure, finance and representation during a meeting at Tuaefu on 
15 February 1927, attended by the three MLCs as well as Gurr and Smyth,
'Report of Royal Commission ...', p. 219.
F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material ...', p. 58.
110
with Faumuina and Tamasese - appearing openly for the first time with 
the dissidents - leading a group of over a hundred and fifteen represent­
atives from all over Samoa. It was agreed that while fa*a Samoa practices 
would be observed in all respects during Mau meetings, certain European 
rules of procedure would also be observed to facilitate the business of 
the Committee. Thus every representative, regardless of the position of 
his village or district, was granted the right to speak if he had any 
contribution to make; a chairman to control the meetings was also 
provided for. On finances, the meeting agreed that the money donated so 
far - some £255-0-6 - was inadequate for the work of the Committee and 
decided to set specific amounts of contributions, styled as meaalofa - 
gifts: a minimum of 10/- per matai, 5/- per taule * ale1 a and 1/- per 
woman and child. It was further decided that these gifts had to be 
paid in by the last day of April. On the issue of representation, it 
was resolved to limit the number to one representative from each village 
and for the rest of the matai who had been involved in the protracted 
negotiations to return to their villages to collect contributions, 
organise their members and promote the Mau. The organisation of Mau 
affairs in the villages was left entirely up to Mau supporters in each 
village; and similarly for sub-districts and districts. In Apia, it 
was decided that it would be more convenient for Mau supporters who 
had come from all over the country and were scattered throughout the 
Apia area staying with relatives and friends to divide them into smaller 
groups for administrative and decision-making purposes. The four 
faitotoa (gates) at Lepea, Vaimoso, Apia village and Matautu were the 
result of that decision. It was also decided to appoint a full-time 
Secretary for the Samoan section of the movement and to expedite the
distribution and signing of the petition to the New Zealand Parliament.
Ill
The satisfactory conclusion to weeks of intense negotiations moved
the recorder of the minutes of the meeting to add this comment: 'It
was a most dignified and solemn fono and it became clear that the
country has turned with confidence to support this effort which is the
55search for the full dignity, freedom and wellbeing of Samoa'.
The successful establishment of the Samoan Committee on a firm 
and regular basis marked the point of no return from full-scale Samoan 
involvement that the Administration and even the dissident whites had 
been so keen to avoid. The adoption by the Samoan population at large 
of the label 'Ole Mau a Samoa' (The firm opinion of Samoa) for the 
opposition movement at this time perhaps epitomised the recognition of 
this fact best. It conveyed the message that for most Samoans, even 
those sympathetic to the Administration, the dissident viewpoint had 
become a legitimate, genuine expression of Samoan opinion, well-founded 
or otherwise. Amongst the Samoans, the Mau as it now stood was an 
organisation exercising its own prerogatives fa'a Samoa, and not merely 
a resistance movement.
The role of Mau supporters in the villages and districts in 
matters of representation, finances and general support gave them a 
powerful position in the affairs of the dissident movement; they knew 
that the existence of the Mau depended almost entirely on their support, 
and they knew how to exercise their power and protect their position.
In the matter of representation for example they regarded a representative 
chosen by a community through the process of consultation and consensus 
as but a mouthpiece whose function it was to express the views of the
55 Minutes (in Samoan) of Mau meeting held at Tuaefu on 15 Feb. 1927, 
A.O. 25/1-1. Translation by the writer.
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members of that community. The representatives on the Samoan Committee,
fully aware of such an attitudettherefore kept in constant touch with
their villages. In many minor matters they used their judgement, but
on important issues they would request and await instructions from those
they represented and they were not at liberty to divert from those
instructions without losing their representative status. In this way
the Mau supporters in the villages kept a very strict control on the
decisions of the Samoan Committee and through it the Mau. Thus within
six months of the opposition to the Administration surfacing, effective
control flowed from the people in the villages and districts to the
56executive in Apia rather than the other way around.
On the other hand, because the Samoan Committee was their 
committee, Mau members gave it their wholehearted support. They 
contributed money freely for its work and they stood by its decisions 
and instructions. The Samoan Committee in fact quickly came to be 
regarded by the Mau supporters as an institution of inviolate standing. 
Representatives might be removed through village/district resolution or 
by official decree, but the institution that was the Samoan Committee 
or the Mau komiti remained and new members were sent to fill the gaps 
and to continue its work. It was due to this fact that the banishment 
and imprisonment of Mau leaders were ineffective in stopping the Mau.
It was these changes to the power structure within the dissident 
movement, more than the frothy talk of the Apia dissidents or concern 
with publicised Samoan grievances, that brought a flood of Samoan 
support for the Mau. There is little doubt that the Samoans were
56 Information from Toluono Lama of Palauli, Taulealea Taulauniu of 
Safune and Fao of Asau.
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dissatisfied with the Faipule system and with official interference in
certain aspects of their fa1a Samoa - the two most publicised grounds
of Samoan complaints. However, they had their own ways of handling
these nuisances in the villages and districts. In most cases individual
Faipule were obeyed or ignored as it suited the people under their
jurisdiction. Sometimes a Faipule, conscious of his position, would
impose fines or in extreme cases recommend to the Administrator the
removal of a title or even banishment. But they knew the limits to
which they could go with their fellow-Samoans and they accepted the
situation. In a similar way, government Regulations and Orders
concerning certain Samoan customs were not allowed to stand in the
way of proper Samoan observances on the appropriate occasions. And
more often than not the Faipule as well as other Samoan officials
57participated in these 'illegal' functions.
Consequently, the opportunity offered by the dissident movement 
to protest against official actions that were largely ignored anyway, 
did not provide a very strong incentive for the Samoans to support the 
Mau. On the other hand, the prospect of exercising authority that 
could be felt at the highest councils provided a very powerful incentive 
indeed, for therein lies prestige and recognition. Moreover, the Samoan 
Committee offered a very real opportunity for full participation in the 
affairs of the country at the national level. In the early stages, 
most of the matai who joined the Mau had suffered or had a relative 
who suffered deprival of matai title or banishment by recommendation 
of the Faipule and use by Richardson of the Samoan Offenders Ordinance
57 Nelson to No.:sworthy, 14 Jan. 1927, A.O. 25/1-1; information from 
Le'aula of Saleaulatai and Vai of Manono.
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1922. Soon however, others supported the Mau for their own reasons - 
in the context of Samoan society, the perpetual struggle for status 
provided many pertinent reasons - thereby extending the motivation 
behind the Mau, beyond mere dissatisfaction with government.
V
The establishment of the Mau komiti resulted in many significant 
changes in the lives of the people in the villages. The Mau supporters 
had to choose representatives, decide on matters to be put to the Mau 
komiti, and regulate their own activities. They also had to maintain 
their representatives in Apia, collect funds and promote the Mau. 
Organising themselves presented no problems because they possessed a 
traditional organisation structure with which everyone was familiar.
The instigation of these activities was taken as a matter of course and 
the Mau supporters in the villages certainly did not need any 
encouragement from the Apia dissidents to do it. It was a normal 
response without which they could not function as responsible members 
o f the Mau.
This development quickly polarised the people in the villages 
into two camps: Mau supporters on one hand and the rest on the other.
Many of this latter group were Administration supporters but many more 
were people uncommitted either way but more concerned with the unity 
of their villages. As a result of this situation, it is almost certain 
that claims by both the Mau and government as to the support they had 
amongst the Samoans, were incorrect, and that the majority of Samoans
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kept their options open and exploited the situation as it suited their 
requirements. In many cases, when the Mau people first declared 
themselves openly in villages, they were in the minority and the matai 
fono in their respective villages banned the matai concerned from 
participating in village affairs.58 This had the effect of reducing 
them and their aiga to a status of nonentity in their village communities. 
If they had sufficient numbers, Mau matai responded by declaring their 
own fono as independent units from the main fono. With this development 
the confrontation became an integral part of the everyday lives of the 
Samoans in the villages, as rival fono strove for ascendancy in village 
affairs.
The confrontation in the villages had very little to do with 
concern over principles and policies espoused by either the Administration 
or the dissident executive committees in Apia. It was primarily 
motivated by considerations that were of special importance to the 
Samoans: rank, status and recognition. Consequently once Mau supporters
established rival fono in villages, the continuing existence of the Mau 
became of crucial importance to them; not so much because they accepted 
or even understood the rhetoric from the Apia committees, nor even 
because they themselves held strong objections to the Administration, 
but more because their pride and dignity fa'a Samoa depended on it.
With the emergence of this division in villages the classical 
form of Samoan response to confrontation situations of this type came 
into play: strict and exaggerated non-recognition of each side by the
other. As the sides drew apart, each adopted the policy of deliberately
58 Information from Vai of Manono and Leasiolagi of Salani.
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refraining from all possible acts of recognition of the other's 
existence. Thus Mau supporters ignored laws and Regulations 
promulgated by the Administration and they also treated official orders 
and programmes in similar fashion. They refused to obey the pulenu1u 
and other Samoan officials; they refused to work their plantations 
according to official instructions and exhortations, and they would 
not collect rhinoceros beetles for official inspection; some even 
started to prevent their children from attending government schools and 
to not allow the treatment of their sick people at government clinics.
During this period, Mau supporters in the villages received a 
great deal of positive encouragement from the Citizens' Committee. A 
petition alleging that the leading Faipule Toelupe had surrendered 
Samoa's sovereignty to New Zealand was circulated for signatures in 
late December and early January. It was a rather naive allegation but 
in the excitement of the developing conflict and the necessity for 
supporters in the villages to present an image of strength and purpose, 
it attracted many signatures. It was never submitted to the authorities 
but it achieved its main aim of articulating the grievances of which the 
dissidents were complaining. Other circulars containing lists of the 
complaints raised during the two combined public meetings were printed 
in large numbers and distributed widely.
In January S.H. Meredith went to New Zealand on a token trip 
in lieu of the cancelled visit by a combined contingent from the 
Citizens' Committee. He engaged an Auckland law firm to act on behalf 
of the Mau and specifically to arrange for the dissident movement,
59 Copies of this petition and Mau circulars are found in A.O. 25/1-1.
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including the Samoans, to petition the New Zealand parliament. He met
the Prime Minister in Auckland but was referred to the Minister of
External Affairs, whom he did not see but who in any case had indicated
that he preferred to discuss issues on Samoa during his forthcoming
60visit to the islands in May and June. Meredith ended his mission by 
releasing a pamphlet which purported to present the facts about the 
confrontation in Samoa up to that point in time, but its general tone 
and presentation were unmistakably calculated to inflame the situation. 
The impression conveyed to the Samoans by Meredith's messages and 
pamphlet was that the Prime Minister and the Minister had reneged on 
their promises to Nelson. On the other hand, the Mau supporters were 
advised that their complaints would not be ignored because other 
avenues such as the New Zealand parliament and the League of Nations 
existed where they would receive a hearing.^
During January and February a petition from the 'Chiefs of 
Western Samoa to the Government of New Zealand' was circulated for 
signing. It requested changes to the role of the Faipule, the maintenance 
of the authority of the Ali'i ma Faipule (collective term for the matai) 
in villages, the repeal of all the 'harsh laws imposed on the Samoans' 
and the satisfaction of complaints raised by the Citizens' Committee.
They also requested that Toelupe's alleged cession of Samoa to New 
Zealand be disregarded. This petition was not submitted to the 
authorities either but Richardson obtained a copy and commented on the 
contents at length for the information of the Minister. However it was
PM to Minister, 24 Feb. 1927; Minister to PM, 24 Feb. 1927:
A .O. 25/1-1.
S.H. Meredith, Western Samoa ... How New Zealand Administers its 
Mandate from the League of Nations (Auckland, 1927).
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not discarded, instead it was expanded into a comprehensive statement
of the dissidents' case, affixed with fresh signatures and readdressed
62to the New Zealand parliament. It was the Citizens' Committee's 
way of bypassing Richardson and Norsworthy, and therefore conveyed its 
loss of trust in these two men and their ability to settle the 
confrontation.
In mid-March a statement of objects and aims for the whole 
movement - now formally known as the Welfare League of Samoa - was 
adopted. The main object of the League was declared to be the raising 
of matters with the authorities which in the opinion of its members 
were important to the proper development of the country. The members
6 3of the League also reiterated their respect for constituted authority.
This statement of objects and aims, however, was given to the Samoans 
as the fa'avae, the foundation. To them the adoption of this document 
and its conveyance to the Administrator was the final step in the process 
of formalising the existence of the dissident movement. They took this 
document as now conferring legitimacy - according to the European way - 
on the movement's opposition to the Administration. In their view the 
Mau had become a constituted authority in its own right.
This view was certainly reinforced by the organisational 
structure which was established to coordinate the activities of the 
dissidents. A Mau office, staffed by full-time secretary Mata'u Karauna 
and a few volunteers, was established in the building which housed the 
head office of Nelson's firm in Apia. The 'official' business of the Mau 
was conducted through this office: on one hand it sent out to the villages
Copies of this petition and Richardson's comments are found in A.O. 25/1-1. 
Nelson to Administrator (with ends.), 23 Mar. 1927; A.O. 25/1-1.
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reports on the deliberations of the committees, instructions and
propaganda while on the other it received and recorded money
contributions from the Mau supporters. In operation on the national
level, the Mau resembled the organisation of the Administration, and
in the villages it was readily taken by Mau supporters as an alternative
government; a view which members of the Citizens' Committee made no 
64attempt to change.
The last significant activity of this promotion campaign was 
the launching in late May of the Samoa Guardian, a weekly newspaper 
with a Samoan supplement which carried the emotionally-laden title of 
'Ole Matua Tausi1 (The nurtured parent). Although strictly speaking 
it was not a Mau newspaper in that the Mau as an organisation did not 
hold any shares in it and had no literary involvement in its production, 
it was a Mau newspaper in every other respect. Nelson and his firm held 
most of the shares; Edwin Gurr, member of the Citizens' Committee, 
was the Managing Director and Editor; and the objective was clearly to 
promote the dissident cause largely by attacking the Administration. As 
a propaganda medium it was an outstanding success amongst the Samoans 
because the written word in a readily acceptable form - newspaper as 
compared to circular - added greater conviction and credibility to its 
stories.
All these activities gave a tremendous boost to the cause of 
the Mau. They presented a strong impression of exuberance, direction 
and commitment which in themselves constituted a powerful inducement to 
consolidate or to join the Mau ranks. During these first few months 
the Mau supporters in the villages needed just such activities to offer
64 'Report of Royal Commission ...', pp. 256-259.
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as tangible examples to justify and reinforce their newly-adopted
stand. Yet it appears clear that Nelson promoted these activites not
for the mere sake of strengthening the movement but more to create a
position of strength from which he could negotiate with the New
Zealand authorities. He seemed to believe that if it was clearly
demonstrated that the opposition was widespread amongst the Samoans,
the authorities would grant some of the Mau's requests, and he thought
that such a favourable response would afford him room to counsel
cessation of the Mau, without losing credibility and before it developed
completely out of his control. He informed the Minister that the object
of the Citizens’ Committee was to 'see New Zealand's administration in
Samoa firmly established in the confidence and the goodwill of the 
65inhabitants'. And he repeatedly asked for an investigation of the
Administration, in the confident belief that such an investigation
would uncover the 'true' situation which prompted their complaints
and would lead to remedial action. Nelson's political judgement
however was defective. In his haste to consolidate the 'concessions'
he believed he had won in New Zealand, he had thrown caution to the
wind and challenged the foundation of Richardson's administration,
without first preparing an alternative ground to fall back on. When
his gamble failed, he was stranded and he discovered that he had gone too
far to pull back. Certainly the Mau supporters would not be able to give up now.
The unfavourable response from New Zealand to Nelson's 
requests for an investigation of the Samoa Administration resulted 
largely from its acceptance of Richardson's assurances that the whole 
of Samoa was 'solidly loyal' except for Nelson and a few disgruntled
65 Nelson to Minister, 9 Mar. 1927, A.O. 25/1-1.
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Samoans in his pay. As for the increased interest and involvement of
the Samoans in the conflict, Richardson explained to the Minister that
this was not due to any real dissatisfaction with the Administration.
Rather it was the result of a tradition of political divisiveness which
made Samoans particularly excitable when subjected to disruptive
influences. This tradition, he said, had been at the heart of all
political upheavals in Samoa's past and the'self-centred, irresponsible',
local white residents had always provided the undesirable influences as
they were doing now. Furthermore, the Samoans 'were born intriguers and
agitators [who] seem to enjoy holding fonos [sic] and discussing
. 66political questions in preference to working on their plantations .
For several reasons Richardson believed that the agitation would
not succeed. First he thought the Faipule held a strong influence in
their districts; secondly he felt that 99.5% of the Samoans were
unsympathetic towards the Citizens' Committee, whose members he alleged
knew that the Samoans did not trust them and would never trust the
commercial community of Apia to look after their interests; thirdly
he believed the Samoans would see through the 'selfish designs of the
white agitators' as they did in Tate's time and would then reject them.
And finally he said that the Samoans, even the few who had been
influenced by the Citizens' Committee, were in fact:
not really disloyal to the government but enjoy 
taking occasional trips to Apia and being treated 
as of importance by receiving the confidence of certain 
Europeans and taking back to their villages the latest 
news which during this wet season while they are 
confined for long periods to their fales [sic] gives 
added interest to their usual occupation under such 
circumstances of discussing the latest village scandal 
or rumour.^
Administrator to Minister, 13 Jan. 1927 and 19 Nov. 1926: A.O. 25/1-1. 
Administrator to Minister, 2 Feb. 1927, A.O. 25/1-1.
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There was certainly a grain of truth in Richardson's analysis 
of the situation. Unfortunately his evaluation was motivated by 
contempt and an obvious desire to belittle. He never managed to rise 
above this level and give himself a chance of judging the situation in 
a more reasonable frame of mind. If he had, he might have realised that 
through his insistence on all Samoan views and complaints being 
channelled through the Faipule he had denied the rest of the population 
the recognition for which they craved and which the Apia dissidents were 
providing. He might even have seen that the increased Samoan interest 
in the confrontation was not due to the exaggerated rhetoric of the 
Citizens' Committee but rather to specifically Samoan considerations and 
the developing struggle within the villages.
As a result of Richardson's assessment of the situation ac
this time, his response to the dissidents' challenge was woefully
inadequate. On the Samoan side for example, apart from dealing with
the six members of the Mau komiti in January, he confined himself to
producing four circulars in which he confirmed government's faith in
the Faipule, and demanded an apology from those dissidents who had
criticised them. Since dissatisfaction with the Faipule was widespread
and the Faipule themselves as well as other Samoan officials were, during
this period, complaining that their authority and government's orders
68were being openly rejected, these circulars tended to inflame the 
situation rather than bring about a conciliation. In the fourth of 
these circulars - 26 March 1927 - the Samoans were told that a law 
had been passed prohibiting both Europeans and Samoans from undermining 
or exciting disaffection against the Faipule and other Samoan officials.
Bell (Savai'i) to SNA, 15 Jan. 1927; Administrator to Bell,




The law referred to was the Maintenance of Authority in Native
Affairs Ordinance 1927, which Richardson, in arguing for its
imposition, had assured the New Zealand government would 'quickly clear
the air as far as the natives are concerned and the Samoans will not
69support Nelson and the Citizens Committee any more'. It was an empty
statement, as was his declaration in late March that 'The trouble may
70now be considered at an end'. The ordinance in fact came too late in 
the progress of political affairs to be of much value; the Samoans did 
not bother about it, and the rapidly developing conflict, now spreading 
to the villages, created so much disorganisation from government's 
viewpoint that it was unenforceable. Thus while the opposition forces 
daily gathered increasing strength and support, Richardson did nothing 
effective to counter it either by asserting government's authority with 
decisive action or by giving the dissidents' case reasonable consideration.
VI
When Norsworthy arrived in Samoa on 2 June 1927 for his long- 
awaited visit, the Mau was well established. Even then, a display of 
statesmanship on his part could have provided the guidance and direction 
needed to set the country on the path of reconciliation. Such could 
be reasonably expected of a Minister in a crisis situation, but it soon 
became clear that Norsworthy was not up to the task. He listened only 
to Richardson and accepted the Administrator's view of the situation.
Administrator to Minister, 8 Feb. 1927, A.O. 25/1-1.
70 Administrator to Minister, 23 Mar. 1927, A.O. 25/1-1.
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Consequently, when he finally met a deputation from the discontented
groups after being in Samoa for over a week, he reprimanded them in the
strongest terms as he repeated the views and accusations which Richardson
had made against them over the months since the confrontation began the
previous October. In a cable to the Prime Minister the day after this
meeting, Norsworthy summed up the meeting - the position he had adopted
and the conclusions he had reached:
European Citizens' Committee limited to Nelson, Williams, 
Westbrook, Smyth, Gurr and Meredith who are deliberately 
working to ferment native disaffection. Interview 
yesterday convinced me they have succeeded in disturbing 
large number of natives who were organised to demonstrate 
outside Administration office. Past history of Western 
Samoa and recent events in American and Western Samoa 
proves that native political disaffection has dangerous 
possibilities ... Real demand is for full rights of self 
government for Europeans and halfcastes in Western Samoa 
which in the present social and political development of 
the native people is a monstrous proposal and so I told 
deputation. Natives in the movement are Nelson's dupes 
whom he has misled by his misrepresentations and more 
material inducements using his network of stores for 
thi.s purpose ... I informed European Committee I regarded 
their efforts to disaffect and disunite the fine race like 
the Samoans as criminal and deserved only to be dealt with 
as a crime ... I finally warned European Committee that 
agitation must cease and that I would allow them reasonable 
time to undo the harm already caused failing which the N.Z. 
Government would take whatever action necessary to end 
their activities.^
What this summary did not convey to the Prime Minister - perhaps
he guessed at it anyway because Norsworthy had been a ministerial
colleague for several years - was that his Minister lacked manners; a
deficiency which from the Samoan viewpoint was as serious as his lack
of political judgement. A participant in the meeting between Norsworthy
and the dissident leaders noted that 'Neither the tone nor the appearance
72of the Minister was impressive'; but he was being polite. While
Norsworthy to EA (for PM), 12 June 1927, A.O. 25/1-2. 
F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material ...', p. 75.
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Nelson on behalf of the dissidents' deputation tried to respond to
his statement, No-sworthy kept up a barrage of petty interjections
which the Samoan matai present, brought up in a culture where politeness,
respect and dignity were requirements of the highest importance, found
most distasteful. And when they themselves tried to speak, they were
rudely interruped without due regard to the standing of their titles or
the mamalu (dignity) of the aiga, villages and districts which they 
73represented. That ministerial display of boorishness guaranteed as 
far as the Samoans were concerned continuation of the Mau.
Samoan considerations too - for example withdrawal of recognition 
from the opposition party in a conflict - determined the nature of 
Mau activities while No ..sworthy was in Samoa. During King's birthday 
celebrations in the first week of June, the Mau held its own sports 
festival at Lepea in opposition to the official sports meeting at Apia 
Park, while the Administrator's traditional ball at Vailima was matched 
by one at Tuaefu. The Mau komiti had insisted on these separate functions. 
To maintain their 'separateness' in the streets of Apia, while at the 
same time respond to newspaper reports and government propaganda which 
claimed that the Mau was made up of only a few disgruntled Samoans, the 
Mau komiti required all Mau supporters to wear purple ribbons on their 
shirts, or use purple turbans as head wear. The komiti also persuaded 
the papalagi dissidents to decorate their cars in purple colours.
Finally the komiti organised a group of over 2,000 Mau supporters to 
gather outside the Central Office building on 11 June and offer tapuai 
(spiritual encouragement) - an essential part of any Samoan undertaking -
73 See: Record of meeting between Hon. W. No sworthy and dissidents'
deputation (11 June 1927) , A.O. 25/1-2.
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for the success of the fono between their representatives and the
Minister. Nelson had opposed this demonstration, but the Mau komiti
74went ahead with it.
During the meeting, Norsworthy told Nelson and his delegation
that he would not hesitate to take the most drastic steps 'to remove
what might easily become a festering wound on the body politic of Samoa'
and the following day he recommended to the Prime Minister that the
Samoan Immigration Consolidation Order 1924 be amended to facilitate
^the deportation of Europeans by Order-in-Council, and specifically to
allow Gurr - 'the real power behind this agitation' according to
Richardson - to be deported immediately: 'Drastic action is the only
V 6cure if Nelson and associates persit [sic] in agitation'. Coates
immediately had the relevant Order amended and told Norsworthy to warn
Nelson and those associated with him to 'abstain from their present
77conduct' or be deported.
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Norsworthy accordingly warned Nelson and the other papalagi
members of the Citizens' Committee who vigorously protested their
innocence of the allegations which Richardson told them had necessitated
those measures; but they nonetheless ceased their open association with 





See Nelson's testimony in 'Report of Royal Commission ...', p. 220; 
F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material ...', pp. 70-78.
Record of meeting between Hon. W. Norsworthy and dissidents' 
deputation (11 June 1927) , A.O. 25/1-2.
Norsworthy to EA, 12 June 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
Coates to Norsworthy, 14 June 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
Minister to Nelson, 13 June 1927; Nelson to Administrator, 17 June 
1927; Citizens Committee to Administrator, 18 June 1927: A.O. 25/1-2
This file contains many more letters exchanged between Richardson, 
Nelson and other dissident 'whites' over this issue.
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Lagolago - 'the chief agents of Nelson and his party ... who have been
very active fomenting discontent amongst the Natives ... and [who]
79were being used merely as tools of Mr Nelson and his Committee'
before the Fono a Faipule on 14 June, castigated them for 'agitating the
Samoans' and ordered them to disabuse the people gathered in Vaimoso and
Lepea of 'lies told them about government', and to disperse them to
their villages. They were given three days to carry out the orders, and
when at the end of that period they reported that their efforts had
80been unsuccessful, they were banished to Apolima island. As for the
rest of the Mau komiti, Richardson hoped that the banishment of 
Faumuina and Lagolago would frighten them back to their villages, 
but after waiting for a few days and finding that they had no intention 
of moving, he issued banishment orders under the provisions of the 
Samoan Offenders Ordinance 1922, expelling 36 of them to their villages.
On 15 June, Richardson released a Proclamation notifying the 
amendment to the Samoa Immigration Order and notifying also the warning 
to Nelson and the other papalagi leaders, as well as the demands made of 
Faumuina and Lagolago. Three days later, he formally requested Gurr's 
immediate deportation on the grounds that his articles in the Samoa 
Guardian showed that he had not heeded the Minister's warning. The 
following week, he further recommended that Nelson and S.V. Mackenzie - 
a local afakasi trader who apparently declared publicly that he had 
effective ways of spreading propaganda amongst Samoans - be deported also.
Administrator to Minister, 24 June 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
Administrator to Minister, 15 June 1927 and 24 June 1927; Faumuina 
and Lagolago to Administrator, n.d.; Braisby to Sec. to Admin, 24 June 
1927: A.O. 25/1-2.
Administrator to Minister, 24 June 1927; A/Administrator to Minister,
1 July 1927; A.O. 25/1-2.
Administrator to Minister, 18 June 1927 and 24 June 1927: A.O. 25/1-2.
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Richardson once again assured the New Zealand government that
the measures he had taken would return the country to conditions which
prevailed before October 1926, but stressed that the'European
agitators'must be punished after he heard from the authorities in New
Zealand that they preferred deportation after court proceedings and
that in any case he must provide specific reasons and tender solid
supporting evidence before the deportations he had recommended could 
83be considered. The Administrator was unshakable in his repeated
view that the Samoans were contented with his government; that the
agitation was due solely to the machinations of Nelson and his papalagi
associates, and therefore once those papalagi were punished the conflict
would end: 'I am informed that the European Committee wish to get
the Natives to carry on this agitation independently, but I know this
is impossible. The Natives have not been and are not now discontented
excepting those disaffected by Mr Nelson's propaganda. They are,
normally a happy and contented people and have full confidence in the
Government. The recent agitation was solely caused by Mr Nelson and 
84his colleagues'. He was deluding himself; all the evidence at the
time pointed to the Samoans assuming open control of the dissident
movement and they had clearly indicated that not only would they defy
government authority, but they would also abandon the constitutional
approach adopted by the dissident papalagi, if it did not suit their 
85purposes.
PM to Administrator, 30 June 1927, EA to Administrator, 29 June 1927: 
A.0. 25/1-2.
Administrator to Minister, 24 June 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
See letters from Mau representatives to Administrator, 21 June 1927, 
25 June 1927 and 5 July 1927: A.O. 25/1-2.
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When Faumuina and Lagolago - assisted by Nelson - conveyed to
a Mau fono in Lepea on 14 June the Administrator's orders to disperse,
and urged compliance with those orders, the fono agreed to the
majority of supporters returning to their villages, but would not consider
86persuading the Mau komiti to disperse. The reason was simple: the
Mau komiti was made up of representatives sent by districts to represent
them in Apia, and only the districts could alter that position. As
these representatives told Richardson in the very first letter they
wrote him since the beginning of the confrontation:
The Mau was not founded by Faumuina and Lagolago, 
but they took part as members of the Committee so 
elected by Western Samoa. Therefore they can only 
obey your orders but they cannot disperse the people 
or alter the wish of the people which they represent.
This message conveyed the essence of the fa1a Samoa basis of 
the Mau. The Mau komiti was comprised of representatives, chosen 
according to Samoan practices, who were in Apia to carry out the wishes 
of their respective villages and districts; it was not a collection 
of individuals with freedom to express personal opinions or make 
individual decisions on matters concerning the Mau. As representatives, 
each would ensure that his village or district received due respect and 
recognition in Mau affairs, while all would be subject to the combined 
opinion of the districts, as expressed in the Mau komiti consensus, 
the ruling decision for the Mau. Judging by their response to the Mau 
throughout the confrontation, especially with regard to banishments and 
deportations, government authorities clearly failed to appreciate this 
reality or otherwise ignored it, and instead based their actions on the
Faumuina and Lagolago to Administrator, (n.d.), A.O. 25/1-2.
Mau representatives to Administrator, 21 June 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
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mistaken perception that the Mau was controlled by one leader or 
another. Not unexpectedly therefore, banishing, deporting or imprisoning 
Mau representatives had little effect on the Mau; villages and districts 
simply sent replacements and the Mau komiti rearranged itself and kept 
on with its work.
When the banishment orders were served on the 36 members of
the Mau komiti they ignored them and when two komiti members - Tagaloa
and Fuataga - were charged in court for disobeying these orders, Tagaloa
told the judge that he would not obey any orders from the Administrator
or the court, while Fuataga 'insolently told the Chief Judge that he
88could not give any promise to appear in Court' when the case was
recalled. While this case was before the court in Apia, Richardson
was conducting an official malaga in Upolu during the last week of June,
in what he believed would be the final formality in settling the conflict
as far as the Samoans were concerned. In fact, he encountered such open
defiance and disrespectful behaviour that a similar malaga to Savai'i 
89was cancelled.
The Administrator's optimistic view of the situation as regarding
the Samoans was not supported by events which followed the Minister's visit.
From Savai'i, District Inspector Henry Buse reported that when he
arrived at the village of Lano on 17 June to inspect the village and
its plantations, a fono was held and it reached the decision that:
they would not obey any Government instructions or 
laws, and that it was of no use for the Pulenu'u,
Pulefa'atoaga or myself to give any orders because 
they would not obey them - they would please themselves
A/Administrator to Minister, 1 July 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
89 Administrator to Minister, 23 July 1927 and 25 July 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
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what they did ... Practically the same thing happened 
at the next village, Saipipi, and at this village I 
was informed that they would not take any beetles to 
the present Pulenu'u, but would select their own 
Pulenu'u and give them to him. As far as I can 
gather this is the position practically right from 
Pu'apu'a to Papa.
On the other hand, just before he left Apia for his Upolu
malaga, Richardson received a cable from Mata'afa, the Faipule of
Aleipata informing him that 'the people of Aleipata in the Mau said
they were instructed by their leaders not to attend your reception;
do not obey Govt, officials; do not clean villages or plantations;
do not search any beetles; do not pay Govt, tax etc.; but appoint
their own Pulenu'u and run their own show. Two fautasi left Apia 
91to the Mau today'. Richardson's reply to this message revealed some
of the grounds on which he cased his optimism concerning his ability to
influence the Samoans: 'Give fautasi crews order from me not to leave
Aleipata. All ali'i and faipule in district must attend my fono and put
their complaints to me. Tell them not to disgrace Aleipata and the good 
92name of Samoa'. While Samoans certainly held Richardson in the 
highest regard during his first years in the country, and they did in 
that time proudly follow his instructions, that regard had steadily 
dwindled since October 1926, and all but disappeared as a result of 
Norsworthy's ill-mannered behaviour. The Samoans had witnessed the 
highest ranking representative of the New Zealand government to visit 
Samoa since the beginning of the Mau, insolently flout the requirements 
of respect and recognition - these applied fully in fono even when 
facing opponents or lower status groups - and as a result, they now saw
District Inspector Henry Buse to Resident Commissioner, 19 June 1927, 
A.0. 25/1-2. Pu'apu'a to Papa refers to the north coastline of 
Savai'i, i.e. virtually half of that island.
Mata'afa to Administrator, 25 June 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
92 Administrator to Mata'afa, 27 June 1927, A.O. 25/1-2.
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government's response to the Mau largely in terms of insults to 
titles, aiga, villages, districts and country - that is, to fa'a Samoa. 
In these circumstances it would have been a 'disgrace' not to reject 
government's authority. This development was a major contributing 
factor to the flood of Samoan support for the Mau following Norsworthy's 
visit and resulted in the situation which District Inspector Buse found 
in Savai'i and Richardson himself faced on his malaga in Upolu.
In Apia, the confrontation between government and the Mau komiti 
quickly came to a head. Twice - 21 June and 25 June - the komiti wrote 
to the Administrator requesting a meeting between himself and its 
representatives, and impressing also on him the fact that the komiti 
was the executive body of the Mau. Richardson responded by instructing 
komiti members to disperse and meet him in their respective districts 
when he called there on his official malaga; they ignored those 
instructions and he issued banishment orders against them. They ignored 
these orders too and told Richardson that they would no longer bother 
with government:
While we have been supporting the 'Mau' in order to 
bring before Your Excellency matters about which we 
are dissatisfied, Your Excellency has absolutely 
disregarded us (the whole country). Therefore, we, the 
proper representatives of the whole country will no 
longer bother with matters of government ... We formed 
the 'Mau' and continued to support all the laws of the 
Government for the past seven months, but in doing this 
we have belittled ourselves in your opinion. Therefore, 
we have decided to remain gathered in Apia ... and it shall 
not be possible for anyone to depart until we receive the 
answer we are waiting for ... if any of the people in the 
country disobeys any orders, and Your Excellency deems it 
right to punish them, THROW THE PUNISHMENT ON OUR SHOULDERS, 
THAT WILL BE ON THE WHOLE COUNTRY. [Their emphasis].93
93 Chosen representatives of the whole country to Richardson, 5 July 
1927, A.0. 25/1-2. A few changes to the official translation were 
made by the writer in this quotation.
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This declaration of the intention to defy government and to go 
their own way, 'formalised' for the Mau at the national level a 
development which had been in progress in the villages since the 
formation of the Samoan Committee in late 1926. It was also a rejection 
of the constitutional methods advocated by Nelson and the dissident 
papalagi. This letter therefore marked two very important developments 
in the conflict: the formal commitment by the Mau to the concept of
self-government; and the assumption by the Samoans of full control of 
the dissident movement. From that time, matters of purely European 
concern were relegated and not bothered about, and Samoan considerations 
came to dominate the opposition movement completely; the Mau komiti and 
the Mau itself became the focal points of opposition instead of the 
Citizens' Committee and the Welfare League of Samoa.
With Samoans in control of the opposition movement, a new sense
of urgency and drama entered the confrontation. In a large number of
villages, Mau factions had become dominant and had assumed control of
village affairs, incorporating in their ranks government officials who
wanted to join the Mau and isolating those who wanted to stay with
government. In these areas, rejection of government authority quickly
became a normal occurrence. From around the country, reports indicating
a dramatic increase in cases of open defiance of government authority,
94poured into Richardson's office and in the third week of August the
Resident Commissioner in Savai'i wrote: 'I regret to report that the
95Samoans on this island are in a mutinous state'. He referred to a case 
of a Samoan young man who escaped from police custody and whom the police
See A.O. 25/1-2 and A.O. 25/1-3 for these reports.
95 Resident Commissioner to Sec. to Admin., 24 Aug. 1927, A.O. 25/1-3.
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in Savai'i had had to give up after four attempts to arrest him had
been resisted by Samoans who now threatened violence if the police
persisted. He said the Samoans were settling their troubles their own
way and had desisted from using the court for settlement of disputes
and were also refusing to accept court summonses and court decisions.
He feared that a clash between the Samoans in the Mau and those who
supported government could occur at any moment and he felt that such a
clash would not be confined to a village or district. He concluded
by saying that, 'there is great tension here and the slightest thing
will cause serious consequences. The present situation is not likely to
96continue without loss of life'.
In the event, no serious clashes occurred between the Mau and 
Malo (government) supporters either at that time or at any other time 
during the active phase of the Mau. This lack of violence was remarkable 
given that the situation was very tense and given also that the Samoans 
were not averse to resorting to violence especially if the dignity of 
their titles, aiga and so forth were at risk. Since government had no 
effective way of preventing a clash between the Samoan factions, we 
have to look to the fa1a Samoa for an explanation. In the process, 
we would also discover some of the answers to the question as to why some 
Samoans supported government.
Malo supporters were mainly people related to government 
officials. These officials had gained their posts by virtue of the 
high rank of their matai titles - most of the Faipule came into this 
category - or as a result of strong personalities, notable personal 
achievement or good fortune. Through their official positions, these
96 Ibid.
135
individuals had exerted influence in the affairs of their villages 
and districts, and had assisted relatives and friends. Ultimately 
that influence was used to try and improve the rank of the officials' 
aiga titles and perhaps the standing of their respective villages in 
district hierarchies. Government posts therefore became entangled 
in the fa'a Samoa, with the result that the obligation on the part of 
the officials and their relatives to protect their titles, aiga and so 
on, became extended to include protection of their government positions 
and government itself. This development was accepted by the rest of 
the community including Mau supporters, even if they opposed government 
and resented the influence wielded by officials. In the sense therefore 
of support for government by Samoans being expected and acceptable in 
fa1a Samoa, it did not constitute a major explosive issue amongst 
Samoans.
Similar considerations applied to Mau supporters. Many 
individuals in villages and districts possessed contending equality 
status with regard to government posts and they saw in the Mau an 
opportunity to challenge the influence of government officials and to 
promote their own interests. It was not unusual in fa1a Samoa terms 
for these people to exploit the opportunities presented by the Mau, 
and of course supporting the Mau meant tying Mau interests to those of 
their titles, aiga, villages and districts.
A crucial factor in curbing violence was matai control. In each 
village, the matai fono - whether it be Mau or Malo orientated - 
clamped down very heavily on the incidence of violent clashes, because 
such incidents reflected badly on the way it was exercising its powers; 
and the issue of matai control was far more important than the Mau or
the Malo. This matter of matai control, particularly in the villages,
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was of course one of the major issues in the conflict; Mau supporters
alleging that Richardson's changes in the administration of Samoan
affairs as well as his land individualisation scheme compromised the
autonomy of matai fono in villages and districts, while Malo supporters
argued that the fa'a Samoa had withstood outside intrusions in the past
97and would do so again without the necessity for a Mau.
The case of Malietoa Tanumafili needs mentioning in connection 
with his lack of enthusiasm for the Mau. In Samoan tradition, the 
place of the Malietoa title at the top rank of the politico-ceremonial 
structure was totally secure. Support for the Malo or the Mau by the 
titleholder would not have altered that place. Being at the top, it 
could not be improved on; while the thousands of Samoans - Malo as 
well as Mau supporters - who belonged to the eight Aiga of Malietoa as 
well as others whose titles were defined in terms of connections with 
the Malietoa title ensured that the place of the Malietoa title was 
maintained. In government circles, Malietoa Tanumafili was the senior 
Fautua - that is, he held the highest ranked official post available to 
a Samoan. Since the New Zealand takeover of Samoa in 1914, successive 
Administrators - Logan, Tate and Richardson - had treated him with 
respect and had often sought and abided by his advice on Samoan affairs. 
In contrast, Tuimalealiifano had not been treated by the authorities the 
same way as they did Malietoa, and had since his appointment as Fautua 
in 1916 been involved in several clashes with government. Statuswise
Information from Vai of Manono. Of all the villages and districts 
which supported government, Manono was the most united and solid 
in its support. That support however did not override fa*a Samoa 
requirements; she continued with her ancient role of hosting 
parties of Samoans travelling between Upolu and Savai'i, and 
assisted these groups regardless of whether they were Mau or Malo.
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therefore Malietoa Tanumafili was at the top in both the traditional 
as well as the governmental sphere, so that in terms of Samoan 
preoccupation with status, his position could hardly be improved, in 
the circumstances prevailing at the time.
The central question in the minds of most people with regard
to Malietoa and the Samoans who supported government however was the
emotional one of patriotism. The Mau, it was said, was a Samoan
independence movement, and therefore all patriotic Samoans should have
supported it. This proposition of course was too simplistic and
disregarded a host of crucial fa1a Samoa considerations some of which were
mentioned above. What Malietoa thought about this specific point is
not known, but when a Mau delegation requested him in March 1928 to
join them, he turned down the request and advised the Mau leaders to
return to their villages and districts, and ensured that they exercised
98full control there. On the other hand, he did not put much time and 
effort into attempts to persuade Mau supporters to give up the Mau, 
indicating that he was fully aware of the fa'a Samoa considerations 
behind the Mau, including the obligation to regain control of the 
country, and he accepted that Mau supporters had quite properly decided 
- even though he disagreed with their judgement - that the Mau was the 
best way to pursue that obligation. Instead he concentrated his 
efforts in trying to keep the peace, and as the Mau leaders always 
accorded him recognition due to the Malietoa title, he was most 
successful in his endeavours.
Richardson's response to the rapid escalation of open defiance
Report by Constable Pese re: Mau fono held at Lepea, 14 Mar. 1928; 
Report by Special Constable Tuliau, 14 Mar. 1928: A.O. 25/1-6.
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of government authority was to issue banishment orders against more
Mau leaders and to remove their matai titles. Between 2-28 July he
99issued 49 banishment orders - more than were issued during the rest 
of the years of the Mau/Malo conflict. In a situation where government 
did not possess the effective means to assert its authority, and where 
banishment orders had been demonstrated - only a few weeks previously - 
to be a useless weapon against Mau leaders, issuing these orders was 
an invitation to further insult; and he got what he asked for.
When the first orders were served, the recipients allowed
themselves to be removed by the police to the destination villages
stipulated on their orders. This development was resented by Mau
supporters in villages and districts who had successfully defied
government authority in their own areas, and who were conducting their
own affairs. They sent instructions to their representatives in Apia
not to submit to banishment orders and they sent reinforcements to
assist their representatives carry out their instructions."^^ When a
police contingent went to Matautu village during the first week of
August to enforce banishment orders served on several Savai'i Mau
leaders, they were told that the orders had been rejected and
101furthermore, they could not arrest the matai concerned.
Faced with a large number of Mau supporters, the police were 
unable to effect the arrests. For two days they tried, but with more 
Mau supporters pouring into Apia in anticipation of a major clash, the 
police had little chance of succeeding. With tension mounting, Malietoa
99
100
See 'Report of Royal Commission ...', pp. 484-485. 
Information from Taulealea Taulauniu.
101 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 5 Aug. 1927, A.O. 25/1-3.
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stepped in and persuaded the Mau leaders gathered at Matautu to meet Chief
Judge Woodward who was then acting as Secretary to Administration.
Woodward came to the fale where the Mau matai were staying and told them
that there would be no further banishment orders if they kept the
peace, and furthermore the Mau could put its complaints against government
through him. With Malietoa's assistance, the Mau leaders undertook to
keep the peace and they also agreed to choose a delegation to meet
102Woodward and discuss their complaints.
Although Richardson would not admit to it, Woodward's negotiations 
with the Mau leaders meant that government had been forced to recognise 
the Mau komiti as the controlling executive body of the opposition 
movement. On a broader perspective, this whole episode confirmed, 
particularly amongst Samoans, the Mau's position of strength and 
government's powerlessness to do anything about it. In these 
circumstances there was very little chance of a settlement being reached 
without some drastic action on the part of government. The two 
alternatives it had were to use overwhelming force to stamp out the Mau, 
or otherwise make a sincere and determined effort to discover the root 
causes behind the Mau and find an effective remedy for them.
In the event, government took neither of these courses 
and instead enacted the Samoa Amendment Act 1927 - effective as 
from 5 August 1927 - allowing the Administrator to deport both papalagi 
and Samoans who in his opinion posed a threat to the welfare of the 
country. Government also appointed a Royal Commission to investigate 
the complaints made during the two combined public meetings in October
102 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 5 Aug. 1927; statement by Woodward, C.J., 
15 Aug. 1927: A.O. 25/1-3.
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and November the previous year. The Royal Commission sat through
September and October and its report, released in November completely
exonerated Richardson and his Administration. Its findings did not
have the slightest effect on the Mau, mainly because the Commission's
attention was focused on matters which had little to do with the Mau
as it existed in late 1927. In December, Richardson invoked the Samoa
Amendment Act 1927 and served deportation orders on Nelson - exiled for
five years - as well as Smyth and Gurr, each of whom was exiled for two
years. Soon after these orders were served though, Mau supporters
clearly indicated to Richardson that this measure would have little impact
either on them or the Mau. On Richardson's request Nelson, accompanied
by the Secretary of Native Affairs, met the Mau komiti and tried to
persuade them to disperse all the Mau people gathered in Apia to their
villages, but according to Baxter who was present, the Samoans 'refused
103to listen to Nelson's suggestions, and showed him scant courtesy'.
Once again Richardson's response had proven ineffective, and 
the New Zealand government clearly had to rethink its approach to the 
whole conflict before any progress towards settlement could be made.
In the light of Richardson's failure to come to grips with the 
situation, government could look to introduce a new man as Administrator 
and hope that he could break through to the Mau and effect a conciliation.
103 F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material ...', p. 121.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ASSERTIVE YEARS: 1928/1929
At the beginning of 1928, the Mau was clearly the dominant 
party in Samoa, and a perceptive Baxter noted that the attitude of 
the Samoans in the Mau was that the dominant position they commanded 
was theirs by right; it was therefore the Administration which was 
being defiant and troublesome. But then he dropped back to the 
'civilised' mentality:
The Administration was unable to function in native 
matters, the Mau defied and ignored the Administration 
with impunity. Mau meetings were held openly and 
insultingly around and in Apia and the Mau conducted 
itself generally in a manner to show that it regarded 
the Administration as nought and that it could and 
would do just as it liked.1
This defiant demonstration of strength from the Mau Samoans,
supported by numerous special reports available to Richardson, all
stating that the Mau was under the control of the Samoans and would
continue unabated after Nelson's deportation, quite failed to divert
his attention from his obsession with the belief that the 'primitive
and childish' Samoans would be lost without Nelson, and thus the Mau
would collapse once he had gone. Accordingly he informed External
Affairs that 'When the deportees leave, I anticipate complete although
gradual break up of the Mau' and he hoped to get the Administration
2functioning fully within three months.
In the event, he was proven wrong and had to call on the
F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material ...', p. 115.
2 Administrator to EA, 4 Jan. 1928, A.O. 25/1-4.
142
assistance of warships from New Zealand. He left soon after at the
end of his two-year extension and was replaced by Colonel S.S. Allen.
The new Administrator was born in England in 1882 but emigrated with
his family to New Zealand a few years later. His family had a strong
background of service in public office: his father was a long-serving
Liberal MP in England - for a brief period too he was a member of the
New Zealand House of Representatives until he was unseated on petition -
and his mother's father as well as his older brother were also MPs in the
old country. He himself tried unsuccessfully to enter the New Zealand
parliament in 1925 and two years later became mayor of the small town of
Morrinsville, near his family property, in the North Island. He was
educated in England - he graduated in Arts and Law from Cambridge - and
at the outbreak of the war, he joined the New Zealand forces and was
later promoted to command the Auckland regiment. He was wounded in
3combat and was twice decorated for bravery.
Allen's approach to the Mau issue was essentially to avoid 
direct confrontation as much as possible but when necessary to move 
quickly and decisively to achieve an objective. These tactics in 
themselves hardly made an impression on the Mau, but with the passage 
of time the hostility between the Samoans themselves, particularly in 
the villages showed signs of dissipating and this gave hope to the 
Administration that the Mau might be brought to an end.
Within the Mau, the disagreements and the arguments inherent in 
any Samoan alliance of this nature became more exposed as the limelight 
shifted directly on to them without being diverted by Nelson. At this
See G.H. Scholefield, A Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, 
(Wellington, 1940); G.H. Scholefield (Ed.), Who's Who in New Zealand, 
(5th edition, Wellington, 1951).
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period though, the dominant position they enjoyed overshadowed 
everything else, and the main task they faced was to retain the 
initiative in order to maintain that position.
I
On 13 January 1928, Nelson and Smyth left for New Zealand under
deportation orders. Gurr, the other deportee, was expected to leave for
American Samoa; he discovered, however, that he was not allowed into
that Territory, and he therefore went to New Zealand on the next trip of
the Tofua after being held under house arrest at the Malolelei retreat 
4up on the hills.
Before Nelson's departure there were rumcurs that the Samoans
would try and prevent him from leaving. But on the day, only members
of the Mau komiti numbering some thirty-five were present at the wharf
to farewell him. The Mau had discussed the issue in several heated
meetings with Atua, led by Leota Aoese of Solosolo village arguing that
the deportees should be prevented from leaving. The majority view,
however, was that there was nothing further that the three could
usefully do in Samoa, and so it was decided to allow them to leave in 
5peace.
This decision, however, did not prevent a contingent of Mau 
supporters from Palauli district from parading through the main road 
in Apia 'singing defiant and obscene songs against government' the day
 ^ Administrator to EA, 21 Jan. 1928, A.O. 25/1-4.
5 Report by Sergeant T.M. Lafo re: Mau fono, Vaimoso 11 Jan. 1928,
A.O. 25/1-5.
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before Nelson and Smyth left. A few days earlier the same group had
set off from Savai'i with the stated intention of landing and occupying
Mulinu'u, but had been dissuaded from that course after Malietoa had
7warned the Mau leaders against it. Richardson called an enquiry into 
the parade episode, but the Palauli matai, Autagavaia and Lagaaia, who 
apparently led the march, refused to receive the summons to the enquiry, 
whereupon Richardson cabled External Affairs to send six policemen 
because he expected trouble when he carried out his intention of 
arresting the Palauli offenders, and recent experience had taught him 
that the Samoan policemen would be ineffective in arresting other
Q
Samoans. Unbelievably, Richardson was queried as to what authority he 
would make the arrest under, and he was disciplined enough a soldier to 
bother to reply. The requested policemen were sent, but J.G. Coates, 
the Minister of External Affairs, commented that he thought it was not a 
good move to arrest the Palauli matai since this would conflict with 
Richardson's intention of ending the Mau without the use of force, and 
also because many earlier offenders had not been arrested. Notwithstanding, 
Richardson was offered any further assistance he might need, including 
warships.^
The Palauli insult struck at the very heart of the mamalu (dignity) 
of New Zealand as a country and as a people, for the object of the abuse 
was the tumutumuga (the summit) of her pride as it was represented in 
Samoa in the person and the office of the Administrator. Consequently
Administrator to EA, 16 Jan. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5.
7 James Southon to Administrator, 9 Jan. 1928; Frank Lewis, minute 
on follow-up to Southon's report, 9 Jan. 1928: A.O. 25/1-4.
O Administrator to EA, 16 Jan. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5.
Coates to Administrator, 23 Jan. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5.9
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the Samoans expected a swift and comprehensive retaliation as demanded 
by fa*a Samoa conventions for such acts. But when the response came - 
a proposed enquiry which the Palauli leaders contemptuously brushed 
aside - it was pathetic; it would have been better if government had 
ignored the incident.
The total inadequacy of the government response to Papauli's 
crude assertion of the Mau's supremacy in Samoa marked what was possibly 
the lowest point to which New Zealand sank in her virtual capitulation 
to the Mau's ascendancy. During the German period in Samoa, a reported 
reference by a Samoan speaker in Savai'i to the person of the governor 
immediately led to his arrest. The man, Malaeulu of Amoa was later 
forcibly released from gaol by a group of matai. They had assumed that 
Malaeulu had been imprisoned as a result of involvement in certain 
trading proposals, and they felt that imprisonment for this reason was 
unjustified and wrong. However when they discovered that Malaeulu had 
been imprisoned as a consequence of an insult to the governor, they fully 
appreciated the situation and the utmost necessity of the government 
action and they therefore returned him, with apologies, to gaol."*-^
In the weeks preceding and immediately after the departure of 
Nelson, both the Mau and the Administration had engaged in moves to deal 
with the new situation. During the first two weeks of January, one of 
the Faipule from A'ana district, Aiono Aipovi, had under instructions 
from Richardson canvassed that whole district in an attempt to bring the 
Mau and non-Mau factions together in a fono at Leulumoega so that they
P.J. Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders under German Rule (Canberra, 1978), 
pp. 44/45. Hempenstall's interpretation of this incident differs 
somewhat from that given here.
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might work out their differences. The Mau matai received Aiono in a 
way befitting his title and the position of his village of Fasito'outa 
in the fa1a Samoa. However they declined the invitation to a combined 
fono, and an initiative which Richardson had hoped would set a precedent 
for the rest of the country came to nothing.
The week following the deportees' departure, Richardson himself
visited Fagamalo village, the administration headquarters in Savai'i, and
held a fono with matai fron. Gagaemauga district - where Fagamalo is
located - in an attempt to find a solution to the Mau/Malo conflict on
that island. While the Administrator held his fono though, Mau supporters
from villages in the vicinity of Fagamalo, who had declined to attend the
fono, held a day of sports, feasting and dancing at Saleaula, the
traditional political centre of that district and located close to 
12Fagamalo. Prior to his departure for Savai'i Richardson had issued a 
public notice informing the Samoan people that now he had deported those 
responsible for creating the trouble in Samoa, the Samoans - whom he 
assured he did not blame since they were not to know that they were being 
exploited - should return to their villages and conduct their affairs 
according to the powers granted them in the Native Regulations Order of 
1925. This public declaration that the Samoans were stupid, as well as 
confirmation of an Order whose contents were as much a specific and 
immediate cause of Samoan dissatisfaction as anything else, was hardly 
the appropriate issue on which to base a conciliation effort in the 
circumstances.
Report from Aiono FP recorded by Frank Lewis, 9 Jan. 1928; 
Administrator to Minister, 13 Jan. 1928: A.O. 25/1-4.
12 Report from police operative Taulua, Fagamalo, 18 Jan. 1928, 
A.O. 25/1-4.
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On his return from Savai'i he instructed the officials who
dealt with Samoan affairs to call together all the Samoan officials on
both Upolu and Savai'i so that he could personally impress on them the
importance of performing their tasks with strength and determination.
'No one must be allowed to defy officials and the Government ... Laws
must be obeyed. Happiness can only be obtained in a community where
13the people work and obey the law'. In the meantime he despatched
Iiga Pisa, one of the most widely respected Samoans and an official in
the Department of Native Affairs, to the Pule centres of Safotulafai,
Palauli and Satupa'itea, to try and persuade them into giving up the
Mau by spreading government propaganda. As with Aiono in Aana, Iiga
Pisa was well received in accordance with Samoan customs except in
Palauli where the Mau matai refused to meet him. As for his message to
14abandon the Mau, it was politely but firmly rejected.
On the Mau side, there was also a great deal of activity although 
characteristically the Samoans were more concerned with the relationships 
between themselves and with exercising their prerogatives without 
bothering much about government. At a Mau Komiti meeting where it was 
decided to allow Nelson's deportation to proceed peacefully, it was 
suggested that Malietoa, Tuimalealiifano and Mata'afa should be persuaded 
to join the Mau, whereupon the inevitable rejoinder came: 'Wins/ send for
them? Are you not sons of the high chiefs and kings; leave them alone, 
we have quite a number of high chiefs in the Mau'.15 In conflict
13 Administrator to SNA and Resident Commissioner, 31 Jan. 1928,
A.0. 25/1-5.
Report from Iiga Pisa, n.d., A.O. 25/1-5.
Secret report from a Samoan police operative re: Mau komiti meeting
held at Matautu, 4 Jan. 1928, A.O. 25/1-4; Information from Pad of 
Asau, and Taito of Safotu, Savai'i.
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situations at the national level, one of the roles of the high-ranking 
titles, particularly the Tama-aiga ones, is to provide a rallying point 
for the contestant parties; their presence imparts legitimacy, status 
and an impression of widespread support because they represent the 
mamalu (dignity) of major groups in society at the highest ceremonial 
level.
On another level of traditional politics, certain Pule centres 
sought to move beyond the stage where Pule and Tumua orators controlled 
Mau affairs in open fono, to the stage where they would actively consult 
between themselves at the traditional political centres before presenting 
what would virtually be final decisions to Mau fono for formal approval. 
After its demonstration in Apia, the Palauli party took the unusual step 
of proceeding directly to Lufilufi, several miles down the east coast. 
Before leaving Savai'i, Palauli and its Pule neighbour of Satupaitea had 
met and decided on this course of action and a Satupaitea contingent met 
up with the Palauli group at Lufilufi. Between the two Pule, they tried
to persuade Lufilufi into forming an alliance. The proposal had a
two-fold objective: the first was to commit this Tumua more fully to
the Mau and the second was to form a united opinion between the three of
them on all issues, which would be very difficult to resist within the
councils of the Mau. Lufilufi, which although sympathetic towards the 
Mau had shown no great interest in the conflict, was apparently 
unsympathetic to the Pule proposals, perhaps because it felt it was being 
used or perhaps because it simply wanted to keep its options free.16
Although these issues involving the Tama-aiga and Tumua ma Pule
16 Braisby to Administrator, 15 Jan. 1928; police operative Malua's 
report re: Palauli at Lufilufi, 16 Jan. 1928: A.O. 25/1-4.
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were of far-reaching importance to the Samoans, they went by without 
attracting much attention, particularly from the officials. Literally 
all the attention was focused during this period on a Mau measure which 
was relatively unimportant in terms of the Mau position at the time and 
in terms also of significance within the fa'a Samoa. This was the ban 
imposed by the Mau on its supporters against buying goods - except soap 
and kerosene - at the big stores in town, and the institution of a Mau 
'police' to try and enforce that ban.
The final decision on these measures was taken at a general Mau 
fono held at Vaimoso on 11 January - two days before Nelson and Smythe 
left for New Zealand. The same fono also decided that as soon as Mau 
lafoga (contributions) scheduled for February were paid in, a Sei or ban 
would be placed on copra cutting, subject however to the specific needs 
and circumstances of each village community. On the issue of farewelling 
the deportees, it was resolved that members of the Mau komiti only would 
represent the Mau on the occasion. Finally it was decided that after 
the departure of Nelson and Smythe, all Mau supporters from outside 
villages then in Apia would return to their respective communities, 
leaving in Apia five members from each district to represent it on the 
Mau komiti. ^
The boycott on the stores and the appearance of the Mau police 
should not have come as a surprise - the Mau had not made any attempt at 
hiding its intentions over these matters, and reports from reliable 
sources reaching government had been full of them for the previous 
several weeks. Richardson had made enquiries and had discovered that 
uniforms for the rumoured Mau police were in fact being prepared by
17 Report by Sergeant T.M. Lafo re: Mau fono held at Vaimoso,
11 Jan. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5.
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Nelson's company. The latter was confronted and he assured officials
that he did not know anything about a Mau police, but that if uniforms
18were indeed being prepared by his firm he would prevent their issue.
It appears likely that Nelson was against the formation of a Mau police
and the boycott of Apia stores and had warned the Mau leaders accordingly,
19in spite of allegations to the contrary by the authorities. On the day
of his departure, though, three men dressed in the Mau police uniform -
a violet lavalava with a white stripe around the bottom part, a violet
turban and a white shirt or long-sleeved singlet - wore it in public for
the first time when they provided Nelson and Smyth with an escort at
the wharf. Nelson was as powerless as Richardson in influencing the
Mau if it was of a different opinion. Several months later when the
Mau considered reinstituting a boycott of shops, Nelson in a report from
London to the papalagi Citizens' Committee wrote,
The decision of the Mau [to reinstitute the boycott of 
stores] is not to be wondered at, but I am very sorry 
to learn of it. Not because of c.ny loss in trade which 
my own firm may suffer as a consequence as much as I 
think that a boycott is an ill-advised move, more 
especially if the Mau again resort to picketing the 
shops and thus produce another clash with the Police. 
Furthermore, the boycott can produce no satisfactory 
results to the cause of the Samoan people. Any move 
by the Mau likely to cause a clash with the Police or 
the Government is to be regretted. We are, however, 
powerless to prevent such actions on the part of the 
Samoan people, even though it suits the Government's 
ticket to blame us for them.^0
A hundred men were appointed to form the first group of Mau 
police and on Saturday 21 January they made their appearance on the
Administrator to Minister, 13 Jan. 1928, A.O. 25/1-4.
F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of material ...', pp. 129/130; 
Administrator to EA, 30 Jan. 1928, A.O. 25/1-4.
Report by O.F. Nelson No. 17, 10 Sept. 1928, Mau Papers, PM's 
Dept., Apia.
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Apia streets in parties of three to five. During the following weeks 
many more appeared and the numbers were estimated at over three hundred.
As against this group, government had four papalagi policemen and about 
twenty-five Samoan constables. Despite their overwhelming numbers, the 
Mau policy avoided creating any situation that could result in a clash 
with government police. They moved along when requested by shopkeepers 
and government forces alike and they concerned themselves largely with 
informing Samoan shoppers of the ban imposed by the Mau and questioned 
their purchases, apparently with the view of applying sanctions through 
the relevant village fono. The Chief of Police reported that 'They 
maintain a dignified, quiet but nevertheless aggressive appearance', 
adding however that so far - after three weeks - the activities of the 
Mau police did not justify serious attention by his forces.^
Nonetheless, this Mau initiative added fuel to the growing fears 
amongst certain sections of the white community, that they faced a real 
threat of attack from the Mau supporters.
As the excitement over the boycott and the Mau police gathered 
pace daily, government made its first direct approach to the Mau 
leadership. On 31 January, the Secretary of Native Affairs wrote to 
twenty-four Mau leaders to meet the Faipule - then gathered at Mulinu'u - 
the following week, 'concerning the matter of the welfare of Samoa'.
The reply came back that the Mau would tapuai, that is, they would offer 
spiritual encouragement, and wished the fono and the government good 
fortune; in short they would not attend. The invitation was reissued 
with the concession that the Administrator would meet them after their 
meeting with the Faipule if they wished. It was again rejected. A
21 Inspector of Police to Sec. to Admin., 8 Feb. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5.
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delegation of four Faipule, high-ranking matai Tuatagaloa of Falealili,
Toelupe of Malie, Leilua of Safotulafai and Aiono of A'ana went to
Vaimoso to try and persuade the Mau to meet with the Faipule or the
Administrator, but they were asked instead to join the Mau. Richardson
then offered to meet the Mau without the Faipule, a dramatic backdown on
his part, since one of the cornerstones of his Samoan policy had been
that all Samoan affairs must be conducted through the Faipule. But the
Mau leadership made a mockery of the Administrator by ignoring this
22sacrificial offer.
The last straw was added when the Mau komiti formally replied in
a letter to the overtures from the Faipule. The Faipule were told that
their efforts to effect a settlement were not out of concern and love
for Samoa but were motivated by a desire to satisfy the Administrator so
that they could hold onto their posts; that they should have resigned
long ago instead of continuing to advise the Administrator on the
punishment of the Samoans. Lastly they confirmed that the Mau would not
end regardless of what government did; at that moment though they were
still awaiting a reply to their petition to the New Zealand government
23and were also petitioning the League of Nations.
On receipt of this letter, Richardson immediately cabled 
External Affairs that all efforts at conciliation had failed and force 
was required to end the conflict: '... am convinced the Mau natives
imagine they are so strong and Government weak and are too thoroughly
^  SNA/Mau leaders, 31 Jan. 1928; SNA/Mau leaders, 6 Feb. 1928;
Mau komiti to SNA, 6 Feb. 1928; Administrator to Minister,
10 Feb. 1928; Administrator to Mau komiti, 20 Feb. 1928; 
Administrator to Minister, 21 Feb. 1928: A.O. 25/1-5.
23 Mau komiti to Faipule, 13 Feb. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5.
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poisoned by propaganda to give in without resistance or settle down
without display of force. I am sure it is in the best interests
Mandate and will save trouble in the end if two or three warships
despatched here at once to land small parties and temporarily isolate
24Apia while we disperse the Mau committee to their homes'. Meantime, 
Braisby devised a scheme for the protection of whites should any 
violence erupt before the warships arrived.
Exactly four weeks to the day after Nelson's departure, 
Richardson had to ask for warships; his boast that he could bring the 
Samoans to heel once Nelson's influence had been removed wholly dashed. 
Actually he was totally lost and just did not have any idea of what was 
going on. The Mau was controlled by Samoans who were fully aware that 
they held the dominant position and were exercising their prerogatives 
as appropriate in a conflict; in this situation, government's overtures 
amounted to inviting further insults and abuse.
Richardson's biggest hurdle was an inflexible mind in which were 
cemented notions of primitive natives who had no idea of what they 
wanted and were therefore easily exploited by unprincipled papalagi and 
afakasi like Nelson. He now blamed the activities of T.B. Slipper, 
legal adviser to the Mau, and Nelson's letters for the Mau's attitude 
towards government - an insult to the intelligence of the New Zealand 
leaders, who however did not appear to have any better appreciation of 
the situation themselves. The notions of the primitive native and the 
enlightened white were pervasive indeed amongst the papalagi.
At this period the Mau was very much on its own and keen to
24 Administrator to EA, 13 Feb. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5.
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demonstrate that it could operate without Nelson, although this was 
probably a lesser consideration than the need to consolidate its 
position amongst its supporters as well as amongst the Samoan community 
at large. The boycott of the Apia stores can be best appreciated in 
this light. It was less an attempt to hurt government finances, than 
a demonstration to the Samoans that the Mau komiti was in control.
Even A.L. Braisby, who was not credited with powers of perception by 
his own people, could see this; he reported of the boycott and the Mau 
policy, 'They are merely an impertinent sign of defiance to the 
Administration. A product of the Mau Committee - without sense or
25reason. A mark of the power and authority of the Mau - fa'a Samoa'.
The boycott after all was only applied to the big stores along Beach 
Road - Nelson's company was the most seriously affected, largely because 
it had most of the Samoan trade - and all other stores including small 
ones just around the corner in Apia itself were unaffected.
II
On 21 February, the warships H.M.S. Diomede and H.M.S. Dunedin 
arrived at Apia. But instead of frightening the Samoans away from town 
as Richardson had hoped, more were drawn in from the villages. The 
evening of the same day, an extraordinary meeting of the Legislative 
Council - without the M.L.C.s Williams and Westbrooke, who left in 
protest at not having been given sufficient time to consider the 
proposals put to the Council - passed an Ordinance which empowered the 
Administrator to declare any area of Western Samoa a 'disturbed area'
25 Inspector of Police to Sec. to Admin., 8 Feb. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5.
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and authorised him also to impose restrictions on activities within such 
areas as he thought were required for the maintenance of peace, law and 
order. The sub-districts of Vaimauga and Faleata, extending several 
miles either side of Apia along the coast and encompassing all inland 
Apia, were declared 'disturbed areas', and within these areas, Samoans 
were prohibited from carrying arms or weapons of any kind and no fono 
were to be held without the permission of the appropriate Faipule or 
Pulenu'u. In addition the wearing of the Mau police uniform, which had 
become a general Mau uniform, was outlawed, and Samoan malaga (visits) 
in any part of the Territory were subjected to prior Faipule permission.
On the public notice proclaiming these measures, Richardson sought to 
make it clear that the armed forces were in Samoa not to fight the
2 6Samoans but to protect them and put an end to the state of lawlessness.
These new measures however failed to make any impression on the 
Mau, which continued with its activities as if nothing had changed. As 
a consequence, two parties from the warships landed on Thursday 
23 February and immediately rounded up about 250 Mau police who were on 
the Apia streets at the time. They all came quietly. On the way to the 
marshalling point, many more Mau supporters joined up, and by the time 
the group was transferred to Vaimea prison, a couple of miles inland of 
town, they numbered some four hundred. Later in the day the Chief Justice 
visited the prison and heard a count of nine charges, including seditious 
conspiracy, read out against the internees, who refused to enter a plea 
or to have legal counsel. The Chief Justice informed them that he took their 
attitude as signifying a plea of not guilty.
The following day about 200 more Mau men marched into Apia and
26 Administrator to EA, 21 Feb. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5.
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gave themselves up to the armed forces, but Richardson ordered them
transported several miles out and dropped off. After two days at
Vaimea the internees were transferred to Mulinu'u as their large
numbers and the rain had rendered the prison facilities inadequate.
At Mulinu'u they stayed in the fale vacated the previous day by the
Faipule. The next few days brought many more Mau supporters into Apia
with the purpose of joining their detained brethren, but government
forces prevented them from doing so. One of these was the Fautua
Tuimalealiifano, who protested strongly to the Administrator over the
internment of the Mau. He later went to Mulinu'u and apparently
encouraged the internees to be strong in the Mau, whereupon Richardson
decided that he would be dismissed as a Fautua but after the negotiations
27with the Mau were over.
On 27 February the court sat at Mulinu'u, and although the Mau
detainees repudiated government and otherwise showed indifference to
the proceedings, the Chief Judge proceeded with the hearing and
found all the Mau men present guilty of intimidation and of wearing the
Mau uniform. The following day he sentenced each one to six months
imprisonment on the first conviction. Within a few days though he was
to regret, somewhat bitterly, this particular court session when he
discovered that the prisoners came and went at Mulinu'u as they pleased.
'No suggestion was made to me before I passed sentence that the sentence
could not be carried out' he wrote to the Administrator. 'Had any such
2 8been made I would never have invited this humiliation of authority'.
27 Administrator to Minister, 28 Feb. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5; see also 
C.J. Woodward's report on the trial of Mau prisoners enclosed in 
Sec. to Admin., to EA, 9 Mar. 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.
28 Chief Justice Woodward to Administrator, 6 Mar. 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.
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The Chief Judge felt that warders in charge of the prisoners 
should have been instructed to fire on escapees. He feared that the 
display of powerlessness by the authorities would make it impossible to 
hold any Samoan prisoner anywhere in the Territory in the future. The 
implications, however, of this 'powerlessness' were far wider than the 
holding of prisoners. To the Samoans, it amounted to almost criminal 
negligence concerning the matter of protecting one's position; they 
were only too ready to exploit to their advantage New Zealand's failure 
to protect its interests. After this demonstration of abject negligence, 
the rejection by the Mau of Richardson's attempts at conciliation was 
guaranteed, if it was not already assured before the arrival of the 
warships.^
The internment/imprisonment of these Mau men presented 
Richardson with the opportunity to make personal contact with them. 
Several times before he had asserted that if only he could effect such 
contact with members of the Mau komiti the conflict could be solved, 
but that the dissident whites had deliberately kept the Mau people away 
from him. Not altogether a convincing statement since, for one thing, 
his policy had been that the way to him was through the Faipule. In any 
case, here was his opportunity.
As soon as the court had finished with the Mau detainees 
Richardson offered them his solution for settling the conflict. He 
asked that the Mau be ended and asked also a Mau agreement to be given 
to the following:
(i) non-allowance of interference by whites in Samoan
C.G.A. McKay, personal communication, 26 Apr. 1975, was emphatic 
that the Mau would have been brought under control then if the 
forces from the two warships had been instructed to deal with the 
dissidents firmly at the time.
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political affairs and vice-versa,
(ii) act constitutionally under powers given in the Native
Regulations Order-in-Council 1925 in determining between 
themselves questions of land, fine mats and other matters 
concerning Samoan customs,
(iii) nominate another Faipule if displeased with the present 
one; otherwise a deputy Faipule could be appointed,
(iv) reactivate the District Council fono and submit to the 
Administrator matters of concern,
(v) obey the law,
(vi) Palauli district to apologise for its insult to government,
(vii) sentences against them to be suspended if these conditions 
were observed,
(viii) end the Mau and everyone to work together in harmony,
(ix) a deputation of chiefs to visit New Zealand 'to learn
first hand from the N.Z. government its goodwill towards
, 30 them'.
In short, Richardson was conceding to the Mau virtually everything 
they had raised as a grievance against the Administration. Through their 
spokesman Tamasese, the Mau prisoners refused even to consider 
Richardson's proposals, claiming instead that what they wanted was for 
the New Zealand government to hand over to the Samoans control of the 
affairs of their country; a demand which Richardson said was seditious 
and impossible. Several times, and in a most conciliatory though still 
heavily patronising manner, Richardson tried to persuade the Mau men at 
Mulinu'u to change their attitude, but to no avail.
30 Administrator to Minister, 28 Feb. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5.
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The Administrator then proposed to the New Zealand government
a change of tactics: he would remove from Mulinu'u twelve leading
members of the Mau, take them on board one of the warships and make
another attempt at talking them over. If this attempt failed then he
intended banishing three or four of the leaders to Niue Island and
confining the rest at Vaimea prison. External Affairs immediately
responded that the Samoans could not be transferred to Niue because the
Cook Islands of which Niue was part was not a part of New Zealand as
defined in the Samoa Act 1921, whereas such identification was legally
31required in the matter of destination for any banished Samoan.
Faced with the alternatives of banishing the prisoners within Samoa or 
to the Tokelau Islands; imprisonment at Vaimea or New Zealand; or 
remittance of sentences and dispersal, Richardson, who probably felt 
that the support he was receiving from New Zealand at this critical 
juncture in the conflict was not all that it could be, chose the last 
alternative.
He thought that banishment would be ineffective, while 
imprisonment in New Zealand could be politically embarrassing to the 
New Zealand government. He also feared that local imprisonment might lead 
to greater humiliation if the Mau decided to free the prisoners. In an 
attempt to minimise the political capital which the Mau was bound to 
make out of this government back-down, Richardson told the Mau prisoners 
when remitting their sentences that he was doing it to demonstrate his 
sincerity in trying to negotiate a settlement. To the Minister he said 
that as his term was drawing to a close, he wished his last act to be 
one of kindness and consideration for the Samoans as 'consistent with
31 Administrator to EA, 5 Mar. 1928; EA to Administrator, 6 Mar. 1928: 
A .0 . 25/1-6.
160
my attitude to them ever since I had been with them'.
And so the Mau marched away from Mulinu'u in triumph. On his 
part, though, Richardson rationalised that the processes he had gone 
through with the Mau, even if they had failed to bring about a 
conciliation, had in fact placed the authorities in a better position 
to deal with Mau individuals in a decisive manner. In accordance with 
this view and apparently also to demonstrate to the non-Mau Samoans 
that government was not powerless against the Mau, Richardson instructed 
that Tamasese be arrested if he attended a publicised illegal Mau fono. 
Tamasese was duly warned by A.M. McCarthy, the government lawyer who 
was acting as Chief of Police whilst Braisby was away on leave, but 
when the Mau fono was held as planned in Apia two days after the Mau men 
had marched out of Mulinu'u, Tamasese attended.
As Tamasese left the fono, the police moved in to arrest him. 
Tamasese refused to go quietly with the arresting party; his 
companions crowded around him, preventing the police from removing him 
forcibly and enabling him to get away to Vaimoso in a taxi. The police 
party, accompanied by a small contingent of soldiers from the warships 
under the control of Commander Godfrey, the officer-in-charge of the 
armed forces in Samoa, followed Tamasese to Vaimoso and the police again 
tried to arrest Tamasese. He once again refused to go quietly and the 
police, faced with a hostile crowd and unable to count on assistance 
from the soldiers whom Commander Godfrey - under strict instructions from 
New Zealand not to use force and not to be involved in situations 
requiring the use of force - had ordered to stand back, could not get
32 Administrator to Minister, 28 Feb. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5; 
Administrator to EA, 6 Mar. 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.
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near Tamasese to effect the arrest. Godfrey then ordered all the
33government men to withdraw. Although Richardson was frustrated by
the inability of the soldiers to act firmly and felt that Tamasese
must be arrested, no further attempts were made during his time in
Samoa; the New Zealand authorities having advised against any further
arrests even if such inaction created a bad impression. They did not
34want to compromise the situation for the new Administrator. While 
it was true, as Richardson reported, that at the time 'law and order 
depends on [the] good will of [the] natives', and this inaction 
therefore hardly affected government's position of powerlessness, 
withdrawing from this particular confrontation in fact compromised the 
situation more for the new Administrator than if the arrest was pressed.
On the Mau side, another attempt was made to strengthen their 
position fa'a Samoa. Fresh from their 'victory' at Mulinu'u, the Mau 
leaders despatched a delegation led by Tuimaleali'ifano, who was working 
openly with the Mau although still a Fautua, to request Malietoa to 
join them. A formal letter from the Mau komiti was carried by the 
delegation to strengthen its representations. Malietoa turned down the 
request with a warning that the Mau was risking the peace of the country. 
He advised that the Administrator's concessions be accepted and the Mau 
dispersed. On receipt of Malietoa's response, Namulau'ulu, a leading 
orator of the senior Pule Safotulafai, declared the support of his 
district of Fa'asaleleaga for Malietoa's views and moved that the Mau 
adopt Malietoa's advice. Autagavaia of Palauli strongly opposed this
33 Administrator to Minister, 10 Mar. 1928, A.O. 24/1-6. Report 
by Sergeant H. Urwin re: attempted arrest of Tamasese, 8 Mar. 1928,
A.O. 25/1-5.
34 EA to Administrator, 21 Mar. 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.
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motion and the matter was allowed to drop and the fono turned to
35consider Richardson's proposals.
The Vaimoso faitotoa considered that the Mau should accept all 
the Administrator's ten points, though on the condition that Nelson 
be returned. The Lepea contingent supported this position. Namulau'ulu, 
on behalf of the Matautu faitotoa, wanted the immediate acceptance of 
the three concessions concerning Faipule appointments, titles, fine mats 
and other Samoan customs ani traditions, with further discussions to be 
held over the rest of the proposals. The fourth group, resident in 
Apia and dominated by Autagavaia and the Palauli district representatives, 
was of the opinion that everything offered by government should be 
rejected, and the Mau await the results of Nelson's efforts overseas 
before committing itself to any consideration of the official approaches. 
No compromise was reached and so the deadlock continued.
At this time too, Faumuina and Lagolago, whose banishment had
been terminated, were trying to win back their influence within the Mau.
They tried to gather together the six original Samoans elected onto the
Citizens' Committee in October 1926, but only Ainu'u joined them.
Within the councils of the Mau, they advised a more conciliatory
attitude towards government, pointing out that the conditions offered
by the Administrator satisfied all the original specific grounds of
Samoan complaints - thereby indicating that they did not regard self-
3 6government as one of the Mau objectives as they knew them. But they 
35 Report by Constable Pese re: Mau fono held at Lepea, 14 Mar. 1928,
A.0. 25/1-6; Administrator to Minister, 28 Feb. 1928, A.O. 25/1-5; 
Report by Special Constable Tuliau, 14 Mar. 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.
36 Police Commissioner to Administrator, 12 Mar. 1928 and 26 Mar. 1928, 
A.O. 25/1-6.
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were behind the times, and the Mau supporters, revelling in their 
power and dominance, were not impressed with their views. Faumuina 
probably appreciated that the time was not opportune to press their 
claim for the leadership and so he returned to Lotofaga, his village 
on the south coast. Lagolago, on the other hand, stayed on and 
started several initiatives aimed at settling the conflict and regaining 
his influence in the public affairs of Samoa. He was not to succeed.
The Mau was greatly encouraged at this particular time by the 
spate of defections to its ranks of important titleholders who had 
formerly held official posts. Soon after Nelson's departure, Pulepule 
of Solosolo village, a high-ranging aloali1i (chief's son) who was a 
Fa'amasino (Samoan judge), and another aloali'i, Saipaia of Faleolo 
village, who was a Pulefa'atoaga (Plantation Inspector) joined the Mau. 
In Savai'i too, Samoan officials throughout the island went over to the 
Mau. And in the first week of April, the tama-aiga Tuimaleali'ifano was 
formally replaced as Fautua by Mataafa Salanoa Muliufi, thus severing 
his official links with government and cementing his place within the 
Mau.
Richardson heeded instructions from New Zealand and henceforth 
left the Mau alone. However, he told the New Zealand authorities that 
government should 'definitely decide on a policy of dispersing the Mau 
komiti'. He reported that the Mau was declining and that it was being 
kept alive by 'hotheads' such as Autagavaia and Tamasese, who he alleged 
made a pledge to Nelson to keep the Mau going and were being paid to 
maintain that attitude. Before Nelson's departure, he had reputedly 
promised the Samoans that he would either return when the grievances 
of the Samoans were satisfied or would die abroad. He was also reported
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as having earnestly urged the Mau komiti at the wharf, just prior to his 
departure on deportation, to stick to the Mau, and sworn that he would 
return with the victory. And Richardson to the end insisted that the 
continuation of the Mau had been due to these mutual pledges by Nelson 
and a few Mau leaders, supported by letters, speeches and writings by 
both Nelson and Holland, with active on-the-spot encouragement by 
Slipper. Many of Richardson's allegations were unsubstantiated and he 
failed to take into account the rhetoric of Samoan oratory as well as 
the clear demonstrations by the Mau Samoans that they were in control.
Two weeks before his departure, Richardson met about a thousand 
non-Mau Samoans at Mulinu'u, whom he had allowed to gather - 'the Mau 
people had been doing it for months, so why not the non-Mau people' - 
and ascertain from government just what it intended to do about the Mau. 
After three days of meeting he managed to calm down this group with the 
assurance that New Zealand had ample forces and determination to cope 
with the situation; that they could best serve their country by letting 
government handle the Mau rather than taking matters into their own hands. 
He then promised them that if there was any lawlessness within their 
districts and they wanted special police assistance it would be forth­
coming on request. Also that if after a reasonable time the Mau leaders
still failed to respond favourably to the conditions offered them, New
37Zealand would then act to bring each leader to his senses.
The involvement of the non-Mau Samoans in the conflict was 
feared by many leaders, papalagi and Samoan, as constituting the most 
dangerous threat to the peace of the Territory. After Palauli had 
insulted the Malo, just prior to Nelson's departure, non-Mau Samoans
37 Administrator to Minister, 28 Mar. 1928; Administrator to EA, 
25 Mar. 1928: A.O. 25/1-6.
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from Vaimauga had gathered and planned to punish the Mau offenders
themselves. Richardson and the Faipule persuaded this group not to
carry out its plans. But as Mau activities increased around Apia,
ridiculing government and by implication the non-Mau Samoans, many
more from outer districts, notably those of Falealili and Aleipata,
joined their Vaimauga colleagues and threatened a direct confrontation.
When the Mau delegation arrived on 14 March with its message for
Malietoa to join them, that Fautua had just returned from dissuading
the non-Mau contingent, then camped at Vailele village - about three
miles east of Apia - from carrying out its threat. Hence Malietoa's
warning to the Mau delegation that the organisation was risking the
peace of Samoa. It was a similar fear of a widespread clash between the
Samoans which persuaded Richardson to allow the Mulinu'u meeting and to
give all his assurances, empty though they sounded in the circumstances.
That this threat was real and that a sizable group of non-Mau Samoans
felt deeply disturbed about the whole Mau affair, could be gauged by
the numbers who attended the Mulinu'u meeting and by the repressive
measures which were taken against Mau people in certain villages. A
few days after Richardson's departure on 6 April, village fono in at
least one Vaimauga village banished Mau supporters from its midst,
38destroyed their houses and plantations and shot their pigs.
Ill
At the time of Richardson's departure, government's authority was 
virtually non-existent so far as the Samoans were concerned. A communication
38 Administrator to EA, 11 Apr. 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.
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from the Resident Commissioner in Savai'i towards the end of April 
spelled out the situation: of those he had summoned to appear before
him to answer the charge of non-payment of the gun tax, 155 refused to 
accept summons and declared that there were no laws in Samoa, 121 
summons were not delivered - mostly because defendants were kept out of 
sight of the messengers, and 252 were summoned but would not appear.
He went on to say that there were also many civil and criminal cases 
where those involved openly stated that there was no law in Samoa and 
that New Zealand had no control here. He concluded by pointing out 
that the situation was not helped by the common knowledge amongst the
39Samoans of two convicted men from Savai'i roaming freely around Apia.
Non-recognition of the papalagi conventions was not confined to
official institutions and official measures. At Nelson's plantation
located near Palauli, for example, Samoans from nearby villages had
on several occasions killed pigs which belonged to the plantation
while the manager watched in impotent rage. For a period of over
eighteen months, this manager had brought several cases against Samoans
who had openly taken things from the plantation, but none of these cases
had been settled, and he had not received any protection from government 
40either.
Towards the end of April the Samoan military police, seventy-four 
strong, landed in Apia and replaced the contingent of marines left 
behind by the warships which Richardson had summoned. The following 
week Colonel S.S. Allen, the new Administrator, arrived-and assumed control
39 Resident Commissioner to SNA, 28 Apr. 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.
40 R. Ott to Resident Commissioner, extract in Resident Commissioner 
to SNA, 28 Feb. 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.
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from Colonel Hutchens, who had acted as head of the Administration since 
Richardson's departure. Allen's welcome was a dignified and joyful 
occasion; seven tajalolo from both Upolu and Savai'i were presented, 
songs specially composed for the occasion were sung and young people 
from government schools performed dances.
Allen did not take long to give an indication that he was 
prepared to act against the Mau and that he would be resolute and 
decisive, using whatever means was at his command. Three weeks after 
his arrival, he ordered the arrest of Leota Aoese of Solosolo village 
on the grounds that -ke had allegedly threatened to kill one of the 
Faipule - Fonoti of: the Vaa-o-Fonoti district. He instructed that the 
civil and the recently arrived military police forces combine to effect 
the arrest during a .jttau fono attended by hundreds of Mau supporters at 
Matautu village. Allen himself was on hand to witness the action.
A Verey light was fired to signal the start of the operation; 
civil police armed with batons made up the arresting party, supported 
by troops armed withirifles with bayonets fixed. Leota was one of the 
most active, influential and militant of the Mau leaders and he was 
popular with Mau supporters. When the government forces had declared 
their intention, the Mau taulelea, who were congregated outside the 
house in which the fono was held, grappled with Allen's men, hindering 
their advance; whereupon the Mau matai ordered the taulelea to stand 
back and let the government men carry out their mission unmolested.
The taulelea obeyed, but not before several of them had suffered head 
injuries from the free use of gun butts.
Allen togetherewith Tamasese and other Mau leaders inspected 
the casualties; the new Administrator concluding from the polite
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disposition of the Mau leaders that the action had had a 'satisfactory'
impression on the Mau people. On being queried further by External
Affairs over the incident, Allen responded: 'It is believed a trial
of strength was inevitable and that result will be satisfactory'.
Whereupon the inevitable offer of assistance by way of warships was
41made; Allen declined the offer.
Leota was convicted and sentenced to three months' imprisonment. 
Faipule Fonoti now petitioned the Administrator to remit the sentence 
after his differences with Leota were settled fa'a Samoa. Allen however 
refused to grant Fonoti's petition on the grounds that Leota was 
convicted of a 'deliberate and premeditated defiance of authority' and 
to remit his sentence would be injurious to good government. The new 
Administrator thus succeeded in making his point clear to the Mau as 
well as to the rest of the population.
On the King's Birthday - 4 June - the Mau in reply made their
point clear to Allen. Early that day, two contingents of Mau men
numbering between 900 and 1,000 and all wearing the Mau uniform converged
on the central office building from both ends of town, each contingent
being led by members of the Mau komiti and a brass band. At 8 a.m. the
two parties met up in front of the central office just as the
Administrator arrived, the bands played 'God Save the King' as they
took the salute, followed by three cheers for King George. The group
then marched to Vaimoso where about two thousand people engaged in
sporting competitions - with prizes awarded - singing and dancing, in
42celebration of the King's birthday. Celebrations of this nature used
Administrator to EA, 26 May 1928, 27 May 1928 and 29 May 1928;
EA to Administrator, 29 May 1928: A.O. 25/1-6.
Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 8 June 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.42
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to comprise one of the most important official functions on such 
occasions, but there were none this time. Allen had won his trial of 
strength, and the Mau had won theirs by making a mockery of government, 
in the nicest possible way, which added more weight to the insult.
In the second week of June Allen embarked on his first full
scale malaga of Upolu and the following month he conducted a similar
malaga in Savai'i, briefly reporting that both were satisfactory.
Apart from those malaga, Allen kept to himself, neither initiating any
actions against the Mau, nor within the Administration, nor yet saying
much to the New Zealand government. He read books and studied the
files. He was by nature a reserved man, but he had also decided not
to accept social invitations so as to avoid the charge of discrimination
should he decline some. Also he apparently felt that by removing himself
from the social life of the white community, he would discourage rumours
and reduce the pettiness which preoccupied this section of the population.
On the other hand, Allen might have decided that none of the members of
43the white community was worthy of his company.
In late June he received a confidential cable from Sir William 
Parr, the New Zealand High Commissioner in London - through the New 
Zealand government - who had just returned to London from presenting 
New Zealand's case, with Richardson's assistance, before the Mandates 
Commission in Geneva. Before the Commission had been the petition from 
the Mau and a petition from Nelson. Parr reported that members of the 
Commission had privately told him the authority of the mandatory power 
must be maintained, while at the same time the existence of the Commission 
could not be used as an excuse for failure to take whatever action was
43 S.S. Allen, 'Notes on Samoa', IT 1/57; F.D. Baxter, 'Collection of 
material ...', p. 151.
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necessary to maintain law and order. Parr quoted the Chairman of the 
Commission as having said,
Authority must be maintained ... it would be disastrous 
to mandatory system if spectre of the Mandates Commission 
Geneva were to hamper authorities in maintenance of 
order and proper respect for mandatory's authority ...
I sympathise with Richardson in difficulties of position 
... Commission desires the New Zealand government should 
fully understand they support New Zealand government 
wholeheartedly in maintaining order and respect and 
confidence ... No disorder must be allowed because of 
ideas of Geneva ... Your first duty to prevent any unjust 
and illegal assumption of authority by anybody.^4
These views agreed with Allen's on the Samoa situation. He
thought, however, that to make a move just then would be premature.
The Mau leaders had indicated that they were awaiting the results of
their petition to the League of Nations and Allen considered that the
right psychological moment to get into contact with the Mau would be
when those results came through. In the meantime he made preparations
for that moment when effective action was required. Members of the
military police were gradually introduced into the outer areas, even in
districts where papalagi police or soldiers had not been seen over the
previous five years. Government posts were established in far flung
districts such as Aleipata in Upolu and Falelima in Savai'i, and manned
45by white policemen. Allen's objective in gradually infiltrating his 
men to the outer districts was obvious. By the time the report of the 
Mandates Commission on the petitions from the Mau and Nelson came to 
hand, members of the military police had gained a useful degree of 
familiarity with the local conditions and a little knowledge of the 
people. At the same time the Samoans found the presence of the papalagi
44 Enclosed in EA to Administrator, 26 June 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.
45 Braisby to Lt. Moore, 15 Aug. 1928; Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 
27 Sept. 1928: A.O. 25/1-7.
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police in their midst not so unfamiliar.
On the Mau side, non-recognition of the laws and other
government measures had become very much a part of their lives.
Nonetheless they appreciated the improvement in the atmosphere of the
relations between the officials and themselves as the bitterness and
the excitement became diffused under Allen's almost nonchalant attitude
towards the Mau. They accordingly refrained from more calculated
provocations such as processions and demonstrations through town, public
performances of taunting songs about the officials and deliberate baiting
of police. They knew their strength and they knew others recognised it
too and it was not necessary to make a demonstration of it. They could
enjoy it in a relaxed atmosphere and this was what they did; individual
villages and districts treating each other to ta* alolo, feasting and
dancing, at the four Mau headquarters around Apia. There was keen
competition and old forms of food presentation such as the talo paia
(sacred taro) were revived and indulged in with all the ceremony and
46pomp traditionally attached to such occasions.
At the same time though they were continually on the watch to
ensure that their position was not compromised. A letter from the Chief
Justice demanding the appearance in court of tax defaulters who were Mau
members, was met by a Mau komiti response that they wanted to be left
alone and not be bothered by allegations of breaches of laws with which
they were not happy. The Mau's position was set out thus:
We do not wish to be forced or to be subjected to any 
punishment from the government for we are dissatisfied 
with the laws and the government of today; we absolutely
46 Report by Sgt. Seiuli, 2 Aug. 1928; Briasby to Sec. to Admin., 
25 Aug. 1928: A.O. 25/1-7; information from Toluono Lama of
Palauli.
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refuse to have anything to do with the laws we are 
unhappy with until we receive a determination of our 
case which is being put to the highest court in the 
world. If we lose, fine; if we win, fine. But 
right now we want to do just those things which 
would bring prosperity and happiness to our country, 
while at the same time keeping the peace ... As for 
those you have asked concerning tax, we declare before
y°u ' 47THEY WILL NOT APPEAR BEFORE YOU [their emphasis]
This letter merely presented what the Mau people had been saying 
in court and in the villages for a long time. Still, spelling out such 
an attitude in a formal letter - the impact is even greater in Samoan - 
was not only dramatic, but placed the court and government in a most 
difficult position; it gave them no room at all to move.
IV
On August 18 Allen called in three Samoan members of the original 
Citizens' Committee - Lagolago, Tofaeono and Ainuu - discussed the 
recently arrived Mandates Commission Report with them, and afterwards 
gave them a copy for the information of the rest of the Mau komiti.
After considering this document, the komiti decided that they would 
await the resolutions of the General Council of the League of Nations 
before deciding on their next course of action, thereby thwarting Allen's 
plans of getting through to the Mau over this Report and discussing an 
end to the conflict. The petition had been rejected by the Commission.
In the last week of August, Tamasese was summoned to court to 
answer a charge of unpaid tax. The Mau people sensed that the arrival 
of the Mandates Commission's report and their refusal to accept it had
47 Mau komiti to C.J., 14 June 1928, A.O. 25/1-6.
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signalled the renewal of active confrontation and the summons on 
Tamasese was the opening shot. They responded by increasing their 
festive and ceremonial activities and by conducting these through the 
main streets of Apia. The ta1alolo processions would start at Vaimoso, 
for example, with Matautu on the other end of town the destination.
Or the other way round. And because ta1alolo processions included 
dancing and singing by any number of people, their passage through the 
Apia main street meant a major demonstration. Government did not 
interfere with these activities. At the same time Allen, recognising 
the rift within the Mau leadership and Lagolago's support for conciliation, 
tried to get the original six opposition Samoan leaders to exert pressure 
on the Mau and persuade it to enter into discussions with government 
aimed at a settlement. He however did not understand the nature of 
Samoan leadership, and so failed to see that he was engaged in a futile 
exercise. Lagolago was in a difficult position because he had not been 
living in his village of Fasito'otai and was not in fact the representative 
of that village on the Mau komiti - in short he did not have a proper 
base of power to support him. It was the same with Ainu'u, of 
Sapapali'i village but living in Apia. Also the original six were 
chosen by a papalagi-style meeting, and not sent in by their districts. 
Faumuina and Alipia were in the same position but they had rectified the 
situation - the former through Richardson's decision to transfer him from 
Apolima island, where he had been serving banishment, to his traditional 
village of Lotofaga, and Alipia through circumstances in not being 
banished and using the time to gather village/district support. Even 
after Faumuina's banishment ended, he remained in Lotofaga, visiting 
Apia only for short periods; he obviously appreciated the position and
was biding his time for a thrust at regaining his influence within the
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Mau leadership. And so the attempt to bring the Mau to a conclusion 
through Lagolago ended in failure after Lagolago and Ainu'u played a 
final desperate hand during the first week of September by writing a 
stirring letter to the Mau komiti reguesting its members to come to
48terms with the Administration, failing which they would abandon the Mau. 
They abandoned the Mau. Significantly, the new Mau komiti who considered 
the letter from Lagolago and Ainu'u contained only one of the 'original 
six' - Alipia of Leuluamoega, who had always been considered a hardliner 
but whose influence appeared to have been largely eclipsed by the Pule 
orators led by Autagavaia.
Other attempts were made during this period to bring the two 
sides together. Allen himself did not take any direct initiative, but 
he encouraged those who offered to try. Thus when members of the Citizens' 
Committee - as well as other leading residents - led by Meredith and 
Williams suggested playing a conciliatory role between the Mau and 
government, Allen told them to proceed with a message to the Mau that he 
would talk with its leaders without prejudice and with an open mind. On 
the other hand, he made it clear that a settlement could only be discussed 
directly between himself and the Mau komiti. The suggestion by the white 
residents, to meet the Administrator in a conference, was rejected out 
of hand by the Mau. But rather than give up, they cabled Nelson in 
London to advise the Mau komiti to meet the Administrator.
Nelson was cautious, and with justification. Censorship in 
operation in Apia would have meant that the contents of the telegram 
were known to the officials and it therefore put him in a difficult 
position, for to advise the Mau would have negated his claim that he had
48 Afamasaga and Ainu'u to Mau komiti, 5 Sept. 1928, A.O. 25/1-7.
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ceased to guide the Mau since the Minister's visit in June 1927, and
that claim was a vital part of his appeal against wrongful deportation
then before the Privy Council. On the other hand, not to advise the
Mau could have been used as evidence that he wished the confrontation
to continue. At the same time he was worried that he did not have much
knowledge of the details of the Administrator's offer on which to base
any advice he might give. He also feared that if the Mau decided to
follow his advice and found the results of a meeting unsatisfactory,
he would lose their respect and confidence, something which he was
wholly unprepared to risk, these he said being worth more to him than
his return to Samoa. The whites came back and said that the fono would
be held with the full understanding that it would not in any way
prejudice the interests of the Mau or of Nelson. In response Nelson
said that while he was most willing to assist in reaching a settlement,
his legal advisers considered it necessary that a direct request from
49the Administrator be made before he could act. Whereupon that attempt 
ended in failure, but resulted in Meredith and Williams virtually 
abandoning the cause and Nelson as well as the Mau losing a great deal 
of resident support and sympathy.
In reporting to the Mau on this episode Nelson said that he 
agreed with the residents that they should discuss conciliation.
However because he did not know the conditions offered, he therefore 
could not give appropriate advice, but at any rate the Mau had the 
power in their hands, and the wisdom to know what best to do, and it 
was not for him to tell them. Earlier in the same report, however, he 
had attacked the New Zealand representatives at the Mandates Commission
49 Report by O.F. Nelson No. 18, 1 Oct. 1928, Mau Papers, PM's Dept 
Apia.
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as having told lies on the Samoa situation. Moreoever he made clear 
his doubts on the League of Nations' adoption of the Commission's report, 
alleging naively that the whole thing was a plot by the big powers and 
Europeans to browbeat Samoa into submission.
Nelson had guessed correctly. There is little doubt that if he 
had advised a reconciliation with the Administration at this point, the 
Mau would not have taken his advice, but would have probably ditched 
him. After the Mulinu'u episode, when Tamasese demanded self-government, 
there was little doubt that the Samoans would not be satisfied with the 
removal of the causes of specific grievances. Everything appeared to 
be in their favour and there was no compelling need to give up with 
their fundamental requirements unfulfilled. On Nelson's part, after 
the condemnation he received in the report of the Mandates Commission 
he needed the continued existence of the Mau and their support of him 
more than ever if he were to have a chance to clear his name.
In the second week of September Tamasese and Tuimaleali'ifano
saw Allen and informed him that they had no grievances but that they
were waiting for a report from Nelson concerning their petition to the
League of Nations. That report arrived the following week, but there was
no approach from the Mau. Instead, more ta'alolo were conducted through
Apia and Mau tax defaulters became more resistant to receiving court
summonses. Concluding that there was no possibility of reaching a
settlement through peaceful discussions, Allen asked the Minister for
authority under the Samoa Amendment Act 1927 5.2(b) to return ten of
the Mau komiti to their villages and restrain them there for a period of
50two years in each case. Two weeks after the request was made, Coates
50 Administrator to Minister, 30 Oct. 1928, A.O. 25/1-7.
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replied that Allen must comply with the procedure prescribed by s.2 of 
the Act before authority could be given. Probably feeling annoyed at 
this, Allen decided to defer any action under this legislation and to 
proceed with the arrest of Tamasese instead, for disobeying court orders 
and non-payment of tax. He believed that some fight was inevitable and 
that it was essential that court orders be enforced and not only those 
as chosen by the Mau. Coates left the decision on any necessary action 
to Allen's discretion. But he was clearly uneasy and he offered Allen 
the assistance of 'one or two warships' each capable of landing a party 
of a hundred men. The Administrator, however, did not accept the offer, 
considering that the police were sufficient to deal with any contingency 
that might arise. In any event, Tamasese was then ill and action had 
been deferred.
Another unfortunate event had a bearing on Allen's decision to 
press ahead with the arrest of Tamasese. On October 13 he had written 
to the Mau komiti requesting a meeting on Friday 16. The letter was 
delivered just before noon and while it was being considered a party of 
six armed policemen arrived to arrest Tamasese. They were unsuccessful 
in doing so - they were stoned by women and children and Tamasese did 
not offer himself up. Two days later McCarthy went to Tamasese with a 
letter from Allen asking him to surrender to the court or bear the 
responsibility for any further trouble. The Mau leader was not able 
to agree and during a court case that resulted from this incident - the 
Samoa Guardian alleged McCarthy went to apologise to Tamasese and 
McCarthy won a defamation claim in a case that went to the Supreme 
Court on appeal - Tamasese said that the decision was not his but that
51 Administrator to EA, 14 Nov. 1928 and 18 Nov. 1928; Coates to 
Administrator, 14 Nov. 1928 and 19 Nov. 1928: A.O. 25/1-7.
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of the Mau komiti which he was bound to follow.
On Monday 26 during a fono of the Mau komiti which lasted
until early on Tuesday morning, Tamasese pleaded with the komiti to
agree to his seeing the Administrator, but the komiti was firm that
he should not. Just before sunrise the same morning, armed police in
two trucks and a van arrived and arrested Tamasese after a brief struggle,
Tuimaleali'ifano calling out to the Mau people to refrain from any
52attempt to prevent Tamasese's arrest. The following week Tamasese
was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for resisting arrest and six
weeks' for contempt of court. The Mau did not appear to take any
particular interest in the case, few of them appearing in court during
the hearing, and Allen concluded that the result of the arrest and the
sentence was good and materially weakened the Mau. He suggested that
Tamasese should serve his sentence in New Zealand and the New Zealand
authorities readily agreed. On 15 December Tamasese left Apia to serve
53his sentence in New Zealand. He was under the charge of Berendsen, 
the Secretary of External Affairs, who ironically was a member of the 
team which severely condemned the handling of the internal operations 
of the Samoa Administration.
The day before Tamasese was taken to New Zealand, a full fono 
of the Mau met to consider what action to take, if any. Tuimaleali'ifano 
led the meeting and he put the question: war or peace? Namulaulu of
Safotulafai on behalf of the Matautu faitotoa spoke first and counselled
52 Report by Braisby re: Arrest of Tamasese, 26 Nov. 1928 and 27 Nov.
1928, A .0. 25/1-7.
53 Administrator to PM, 5 Dec. 1928; EA to Administrator, 7 Dec. 1928: 
A.0. 25/1-7.
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that Tamasese should be allowed to leave for New Zealand in peace and
he was unanimously supported by speakers representing the other three
faitotoa, including the fiery Autagavaia who spoke for the Apia 
54contingent.
Allen told the New Zealand authorities that hard labour and
strict prison discipline should work an improvement in Tamasese's
attitude. Berendsen however considered - the Minister agreed with him -
that Tamasese should not be treated as an ordinary prisoner but should
be proffered some degree of consideration while in prison. Allen was
asked to reconsider his suggestion and he responded that while Tamasese
should be kept apart from criminals he warned that 'any special
privileges given him should ... be carefully studied because they are
likely to be construed as an indication of superior status, which I
55think is quite a wrong idea to convey to a native prisoner'. In the 
event Berendsen's sensitive counsel prevailed.
V
The imprisonment of Tamasese in New Zealand did not bring about 
any obvious changes in the situation. Within the Mau, in which Tamasese 
had acted as chairman of the Mau komiti on occasions, Tuilmaleali'ifano 
who had also acted in that capacity continued in that role, with 
Faumuina, who had returned from his village on the south coast, also
Report by police operative re: Mau fono held at Matautu, 14 Dec.
1928, A .0 . 25/1-7.
Administrator to EA, 15 Dec. 1928, A.O. 25/1-7; EA to Administrator, 
14 Jan. 1929; Administrator to Minister, 17 Jan. 1929: A.O. 25/1-8.
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acting on occasions. The changes created no problems for the Mau komiti
partly because the real function of a chairman here was to be the front
man, the spokesman for the Mau and partly because Samoan fono did not
normally require a formal chairman, all participants knowing their
respective rights and obligations. Because of the status accorded to
the position of chairman and the public nature of its function, it was
invariably assumed by a person of high rank, which rank rather than the
position of chairman, determined his place and dues in the fono. The
views of such a chairman, however, were by no means the last word for
the Mau. The power within the Mau komiti and hence the Mau was held by
the village/district representatives; during negotiations those views
were expressed by four spokesmen - usually orators from the Tumua and
Pule centres - appointed by representatives resident at the four
faitotoa. The opinions represented by these four spokesmen were the
ones that counted - if they coincided, that was the ruling decision and
if they differed, as they often did, then a compromise was negotiated.
And the chairman must go along with that decision. Tamasese, when
asked in court why he attended Mau public meetings which were outlawed,
replied that the Mau komiti decided to hold such meetings and there was
nothing he or anyone could do to stop them - he was only chairman and
56was obliged to follow the decisions of the fono. He was not trying to 
evade responsibility, he was stating a basic fact of life.
On the government side, Allen was now not optimistic that 
Tamasese's imprisonment would bring the Mau to the conference table.
He appreciated that Tamasese in fact was, despite appearances, not the 
dominating influence within the Mau and he told the New Zealand authorities
56 Administrator to Minister, 17 Jan. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
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to remember that Tamasese was but a tool in the hands of 'very astute
57men in the Mau komiti'. He however had to complete the arrest and 
sentence of Tamasese not only in pursuance of his policy that any action 
started must be pursued resolutely to the end, but also because he 
believed that if Tamasese got away with non-payment of tax no other 
Samoan would feel obliged to pay either. Notwithstanding his appreciation 
of Tamasese's role in the Mau, Allen increased his efforts after 
Tamasese's departure to break through the Mau's refusal to talk with 
government. But again these efforts - mainly attempts at persuading the 
Mau - were unsuccessful. A fresh approach was clearly needed.
Since Allen's arrival he had quietly studied the situation and 
by the end of 1928 he had resolved on several alternatives. It appears 
that his strategy was not to meet the Mau head-on, as Richardson had 
done, and thereby give the dissidents more ammunition, but rather to 
undermine their position by removing the causes of what seemed to be 
their main complaints while at the same time holding the police ready 
to act decisively when required. Allen obviously learned two important 
lessons from Richardson's era - the first was not to give the Mau a 
rallying call, such as a law directly aimed at smashing it; the second 
was that the New Zealand politicians seemed prepared to parade its 
armed forces only as a threat, and the Samoans had called that bluff.
He prepared his plans accordingly. In the area of taxation Allen 
proposed to do away with the poll tax and towards this end he had an 
enabling ordinance passed in November 1928. He believed that the 
collection of unpaid taxes up to that time would be sufficient to 
demonstrate and re-establish the authority of the government. But he
57 Administrator to Minister, 10 Dec. 1928, A.O. 25/1-7.
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was not prepared to see the unpaid taxes piled up demonstrating further
58government's lack of ability to function. At the same time, of 
course, he would remove one of the Mau taunts that while they only paid 
5/- for Mau lafoga (contributions) others were paying 36/- for the 
government poll tax.
Concerning the administration of Samoan affairs Allen proposed 
to amalgamate the civil and military police into one force, the Samoa 
Constabulary, and to place several of its members in the districts as 
government agents. This would not only give him representatives in 
the outer districts he could implicitly depend on, but it would also 
enable him to reorganise the whole network of Samoan officials who, 
apart from not functioning in the contentious climate created by the 
Mau, were also costing the Administration a great deal of money. By 
the beginning of 1929 Allen had established several police posts 
throughout both Upolu and Savai'i and these were manned by small 
contingents of white policemen. They would form the basis of Allen's 
programme: the district officers would be located in these police
posts and they would have white policemen to assist in collecting 
outstanding taxes as well as help to carry out other functions as 
determined by the Administrator.
Allen's plans received a boost in the second half of 1928 when 
the New Zealand government expressed concern about the administration 
and the finances of the Samoa Administration. The matter was raised by 
Berendsen, who had taken over from J.D. Gray as Secretary of External 
Affairs and who obviously did not want his administration of the
58 Administrator to PM, 15 Mar. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
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department to be saddled with any injudicious actions of his predecessor.
Allen himself had expressed grave concern over the same matters and, for
the same reasons as Berendsen, readily agreed to an extensive
investigation. The Prime Minister appointed a committee of enquiry
consisting of the Public Service Commissioner, the Assistant Secretary
to the Treasury and the Secretary of External Affairs; he told them
that his main concern was the 'very heavy subsidy-call on the New
Zealand taxpayer' made by the mandated territory, and he wanted this
eliminated or reduced. The committee was not bound by any set order
59of reference, the Prime Minister wishing for the fullest enquiry.
The committee finished its investigations in December and 
submitted its report to the Prime Minister in mid-January 1929. It 
summarised its findings thus:
Staff: we consider the service is overstaffed and
the officers generally inefficient.
Finances: we regard the finances as in a very unhealthy
condition, showing an entire absence of control.
It recommended the replacement of principal officers of the 
Samoan Administration including the Secretary to the Administration/ 
Deputy Administrator, the Treasurer, the Officer-in-Charge of the 
Repatriation Estates and the local Internal Auditor. It further 
recommended a drastic reduction in the benefits received by staff in 
the matters of allowances, leave on pay, rent-free housing, etc., and 
the bringing into line of staff with those in the New Zealand public 
service. Samoans and half-castes should not be employed except 'where 
warranted by the special nature of the duties' although a 'limited 
number of pure Samoans should of course be retained in order to provide
59 The full report is contained in file IT 1/49.
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the race with the necessary opportunity to learn self-government'.
When the committee submitted its report, it was to the new 
Liberal government which had defeated the Coates Reform party in the 
December 1928 elections. Although it gave a highly unfavourable 
reflection on the Samoan Administration, the report was probably 
received with less concern by the new government than it would have 
been by its predecessor - it enabled the new government to clear 
itself of the mistakes of the past and start anew. Sections of the 
Report were subsequently published in May followed by a public statement 
that government was not responsible for the mistakes of the past and 
would not discuss them. Allen himself had discussed their conclusions 
and proposals with the members of the committee before they left Samoa 
and had agreed with them. The findings and their publication would 
also clear him and give him the opportunity to instigate his measures 
unemcumbered by recent history. But while these were perhaps 
justifiable steps to take in the circumstances, the fact remained that 
the Administrator and the New Zealand government were the responsible 
parties for the administration of Samoa, regardless of the personalities 
who filled those institutions.
In early February the new government made its first policy 
statement on Samoa: it desired an end to the Mau and promised treatment
of Mau aspirations 'in a generous spirit' but the Mau must first give 
up its attitude of passive resistance. Government would not negotiate 
with any movement which was subversive to the good government of Samoa 
and laws would be enforced. Allen thought that the effect of this
60 IT/1/49.
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Statement would be favourable but that it would take some time for the 
good to show because 'permeation of the Samoan intellect is a long 
process'.  ^ in the event it appeared that permeation did not even 
start, for the Samoans ignored the invitation by the Prime Minister to 
discuss a settlement while at the same time they persisted with their 
refusal to pay taxes and their ignoring of government authority. The 
Administrator now informed the Prime Minister that he was most doubtful 
that the Samoans would come to the conference table and, after 
expressing his concern for the continuing situation where government 
was suffering through allowing the Mau Samoans to get away with defying 
the law, he requested permission to use the military police to a greater
degree to enforce the payment of taxes and thereby to reassert to some
, , .  ^ 62 extent the authority of government.
Although 'considerably disturbed' by Allen's pessimistic view 
of the situation and also well aware of the necessity to maintain 
government's prestige, Ward was reluctant to accede to Allen's 
proposals. He clung to the possibility of a negotiated settlement, 
which he believed had improved by the change in government, though at 
the same time he assured the Administrator that the policy set out in 
the public statement would be followed. He suggested four alternatives 
which he thought could break the deadlock: the first was for Allen to
travel to New Zealand with representatives of the Mau for discussions; 
the second was for Allen to travel to New Zealand by himself to discuss 
plans with government; the third was for a Minister and the Secretary 
of External Affairs to travel to Samoa for consultations, and the fourth 
was as in the third alternative, but with Tamasese travelling with the
61 Administrator to EA, 11 Feb. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
62 PM to Administrator, 15 Mar. 1929; Administrator to PM, 15 Mar. 1929: 
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Minister to Samoa, having been released before the end of his prison
term for the purpose. The Prime Minister favoured the fourth
alternative and was not keen on the first - apparently Richardson's
suggestion - on the ground that he believed the settlement should be 
63effected in Samoa.
On receipt of this reply from the Prime Minister, Allen then
requested 'urgent' permission to proceed with the plan of attack for
which he had been preparing the ground work for several months - the
abandonment of personal tax and the reduction in the numbers of Samoan
officials. Plans for announcing the changes the following week had been
finalised. As for the alternatives proposed by the Prime Minister, Allen
said the first one would be a 'futile and extravagent joy ride' for the
Mau people while the fourth one would be useless as 'no gesture of
conciliation was appreciated by the natives' and in any event the
importance of Tamasese was overrated. On the other hand he would
welcome a visit from a Minister, particularly if that turned out to be
the Prime Minister; he could also travel to New Zealand at any time,
although preferably not before May with the change in the Secretary
64to the Administration just occurring.
Once again, though, the Prime Minister refused Allen's request, 
stating that they needed time to consider the plan to abandon the 
personal tax and that they felt that an announcement to drop direct 
taxation unaccompanied by some plan for an alternative tax would be 
regarded as a sign of weakness and capitulation to the Mau. And they 
could not afford to give way any further just then. At the same time
6 3 PM to Administrator, 15 Mar. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
64 Administrator to PM, 15 Mar. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
187
the New Zealand government was not ready to approve an increased export
tax on copra which Allen had suggested as the alternative tax to cover
for the termination of the personal tax. On the other hand Allen was
told he could proceed with the reduction of Samoan officials if he
wished and that a visit by a Minister to Samoa in late April was being
65given serious consideration.
Allen was upset by the Prime Minister's response, but he abided
by the instructions although under protest: 'I wish to make it clear
that I consider this bad policy and adopt it only as least of evils with
66which your instructions confront me'. The Administrator's main 
concern with the instructions from New Zealand was that it placed him 
in a difficult position with regard to explaining away the dispersal of 
the Samoan officials; he was also aware of the*danger of the Mau 
claiming a victory out of the suspensions, in the absence of an 
announcement of the intention to abandon taxation.
VI
Within Samoa the situation was relatively quiet. The Mau was 
doing as it pleased and government restricted its counter activities to 
the arrest of a few Mau members of insignificant standing. Mau komiti 
fono were held regularly and some of its untitled members were picketing 
Vaimoso village at night causing some inconvenience. Every so often 
though the Mau flexed its muscles: in early February, after a few
weeks free of direct confrontation or demonstrations, Faumuina led a
65 PM to Administrator, 18 Mar. 1929, A .0. 25/1-8.
66 Administrator to PM, 18 Mar. .1929, A .0. 25/1-8.
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group of over a hundred Mau men from Lepea to Magiagi village just
inland from Apia where it was learned - from a Samoan policeman -
that the military police would try and effect arrests at dawn on that 
0»1
particular day. The arrests were not attempted. A few days later 
the same group paraded in full Mau colours through roads in the areas 
around Apia and through the township itself. The police did not try 
to confront the Mau men. Two weeks before this episode, Public Works 
men, backed by about forty military policemen, cut the water supply to 
the villages of Vaimoso and Lepea for failure to pay water rates.
They were confronted by women and young people in those villages but 
the Mau matai ordered that the government men be allowed to carry out 
their task without hindrance.
Most of the initiatives during the first two months of 1929 came 
from Lagolago and his ex-Mau komiti associates. Lagolago consulted the 
Fautua and the Faipule and suggested that the Malo matai send a 
deputation to meet the Mau komiti. The purpose of such a deputation was 
to impress on the Mau leadership the futility of their continued 
resistance now that the League of Nations had given its decision, and 
to let the Mau members know that the Samoans in the Malo also had the 
interests of the country at heart and would suffer equally whatever 
fate befell the Mau. While the Fautua and the Faipule apparently 
agreed to this proposal in principle they were obviously too astute to 
participate in its execution. Malietoa, however, on his own met some 
of the Mau leaders and exhorted them to keep thepeace. Since the Mau 
from the beginning had always accorded recognition and respect required 
by the fa*a Samoa to him as the Malietoa, and had heeded his advice to 
keep the peace on previous occasions when he had given it, Malietoa's
67 Inspector of Police to Sec. to Admin., 13 Feb. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
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advice at this juncture probably had some bearing on the relatively 
68quiet atmosphere. Lagolago though, irrepressible as ever, continued 
with his abortive efforts not only to bring the two sides together 
through personal contact but also in publishing statements informing 
the Mau supporters that the Mau, through irresponsible decisions taken 
by a certain section of its leadership, had strayed far from its fa1avae 
(foundation) and that if this continued the Mau would be destroyed and 
no benefits for Samoa would have accrued from their efforts. The Mau 
ignored Lagolago's attempts at conciliation.
In March Allen proceeded with the suspension of the Samoan 
officials. On the whole this step was accepted by those concerned with 
resignation, but they made it clear to the government that they 
considered the move 'ill-advised and an encouragement to the Mau morale'/ 
They suggested an alternative of continuing in their posts with reduced 
or no pay, but government rejected that proposal. Doubtless these 
suspended officials were more worried about their own standing within 
their respective villages and with the inevitable mockery to which they 
would be subjected by the Mau supporters. Their plight, however, was 
lessened to some degree by the appointment of the white District 
Officers and the stationing of small contingents of white police in 
the districts. These white men afforded a cogent example that government 
had not forsaken the Malo Samoans in the village, and even the suspended 
officials could point to the white policemen as a demonstration that 
'their' side had not given away control of the country to the Mau, in 
fact was asserting it in a most positive manner. A further reason which 
made the suspensions more palatable to the Samoan officials was the
Malietoa to Hütchen, 5 Feb. 1929; Braisby to Administrator, 
6 Feb. 1929: A.O. 25/1-8.
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assurance by government that the measure was a temporary one and that
once the Mau had been brought under control the positions would be
restored. At the top of the heap, with the Faipule, the impact of the
changes was lessened further still with the retention of most of them
as 'advisers' by Allen, who in his ignorance of fa'a Samoa considerations
70was impressed by the dismissed Faipule's not going over to the Mau.
In late March the Resident Commissioner in Savai'i conducted
an island-wide malaga to inform the Samoan officials of the changes in
the administration of Samoan affairs. He reported that the changes
were received reasonably well, while on the general situation the Mau
and Malo supporters in the villages appeared to be coexisting in peace,
hospitals and schools were well attended and copra cutting was on a
satisfactory level throughout the island. In most villages he had
little trouble meeting Mau people, although attempts to arrest tax
defaulters and others wanted by the law were unsuccessful. In one
district he was met by Mau people in a fono and they told him to
discontinue the issuing of summonses on Mau people, particularly for
non-payment of taxes. He was told the Mau had made it plain to the
Administrator that no taxes would be paid until the conflict had been
71resolved; continuation could only result in more problems.
The Resident Commissioner nonetheless persisted with the 
summonses, anticipating that the white District Officers would be able 
to enforce them as soon as they became established in the villages.
At the same time he recommended that to create a psychological advantage 
for these white officials, the villages of Palauli, Salailua and Safotu
70
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be raided and the Mau people there taught a lesson. However, despite 
this recommendation, the overall tone of the report was optimistic - 
the people in the villages were settling down to their normal routine 
of existence and the bitterness created by the Mau/Malo conflict was 
gradually disappearing. It was on this note that Allen left for 
consultation with the New Zealand government in early April.
Although there were reports that Cabinet was not impressed with 
Allen during the consulations, the decisions taken were a total victory 
for the Administrator - cabinet confirmed his proposal to abandon 
personal taxation while at the same time instituting an increase of 10/- 
per ton in export tax on copra. It was also decided that a small charge 
should be made for medical services for everyone after Allen had opposed 
a cabinet proposal that 'loyal' Samoans continue to receive free medical 
care, on the grounds of complexity of Samoan customs and other technical 
reasons. Personal taxation had incorporated within it a medical levy.
In announcing these decisions the New Zealand government declared that 
it was anxious to reach a settlement in a conciliatory manner as soon 
as the Mau ceased its defiance of the law. Meantime the laws would be 
enforced 'where necessary' and outstanding personal tax, which remained 
a debt to the Administration, would be collected 'as opportunity offers'. 
Allen now had everything as he wanted for an effective - as he saw it - 
offensive against the Mau. And this occurred at an opportune moment 
for the Administration, for the Mau party was experiencing problems 
within its ranks.
Since February/March 1928, when the government backed down in its
72 PM to Administrator, 2 May 1929; Administrator to PM, 2 May 1929: 
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confrontation with the Mau even with the warships and soldiers behind 
them, the Mau leadership in Apia had gradually exercised greater powers 
until they reached a stage of instructing and demanding certain things 
from their supporters in the villages. To a large extent the people in 
the villages went along with this, contented that the Mau komiti was 
getting satisfactory results. They paid contributions to the Mau, they 
sent food into Apia for the maintenance of their respective representatives 
and the Mau komiti and they visited Apia when required to join the Mau 
festivities, demonstrations and other activities. But with Allen's 
policy of avoiding confrontation in the form of direct action or 
provocative laws on one hand and pursuing whichever action was taken 
to a successful end on the other, the Mau leadership was denied 
opportunities to demonstrate that it was moving forward all the time, 
exercising its prerogatives and deriving strength from the weaknesses 
of the government. They had exhausted the avenues to which they could 
properly take their complaints, the League of Nations being the highest 
authority, and now they were without a visible focus around which to 
gather their forces and translate their strength into a meangingful 
'victory' of substance, rather than of just promises and words. The 
Mau in short was languishing, not moving; its position of strength 
beginning to become a disadvantage to its continuing vitality. They 
had to find ways to maintain their image of dynamic progress - even if 
only in appearance.
To add to the Mau problems, the dramatic events of the early 
years of the confrontation, which created such intense feelings within 
village communities, had largely been forgotten and the villagers had 
generally returned to their cordial relations in their everyday lives. 
People still sided with the Mau or the Malo but their differences had
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been elevated largely to a formal level - individuals would join a 
Mau demonstration and afterwards go fishing with a non-Mau person.
In this situation it was imperative for the continuing credibility
of the Mau komiti that it be very careful in its choice of action proposed
to the villages and that it be even more careful with the way those
proposals were put; because nothing was happening that could provoke
any fresh, appealing initiative and they were forced to fall back on
old ones. In the first months of 1929 Mau supporters in the villages
were instructed to cease cutting copra once they had paid their Mau
donations. They were also told that copra cut for this purpose was to
be sold to Nelson's stores only. After a token show of observing these
instructions for a few days, the Samoans carried on as they wished. The
Mau komiti reacted by instituting a system of fines for individuals and
villages who failed to abide by its instructions, and ended up with a
list of fines for practically every village in the country as well as
73the majority of leading matai in the Mau, even on the komiti itself.
It was clearly a farcical situation. The komiti dispatched delegations 
to the villages to discuss the situation with the Mau supporters, and the 
clear message it received back was that it could not order the people in 
the villages to do anything; it could advise and entreat but it could 
not command. Certainly the komiti could not demand fines; it should 
have realised that such fines would be ignored. The komiti was rapidly 
approaching the very attitude that the Samoans found objectionable in 
the government. The Samoans in the villages would run their affairs as 
they saw fit according to their own circumstances and even the Mau komiti 
could not dictate to them.
73 A.K. Bell to Braisby, 20 Mar. 1929; Statement by trader A.M. Kurau, 
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To refer to an illuminating instance. In the village of
Faleasi'u, which lay about fifteen miles from Apia along the north-west
coastline, the Mau reigned supreme. Even the office of the pulenu1u
had been withdrawn. At the time the villagers were building a new
church - L.M.S. - and although they were very active in the Mau their
main interest at the time centred on its construction. To keep up with
money requirements as the work progressed congregation members had cut
copra and, instead of drying the copra themselves, sold it to a particular
trader who had a copra dryer. This way the villagers could obtain money
quickly, although at a lower rate than if they had sun-dried the copra
themselves. This trader was not one of Nelson's. When the Mau komiti
instructions concerning a ban on copra cutting and selling only to Nelson
stores were issued, they were ignored. The Mau komiti sent a deputation
which urged the Faleasi'u people to cease building the church and
cutting copra, but it too was ignored. The village was then fined, but
that was disregarded as well. They did, however send £10 to the komiti
as a 'present' - the fine was £30 - for the Mau, the money having been
given by the trader, with whom the villagers had continued doing
business. When a papalagi policeman went to Faleasi'u to enquire about
the matter, he found all the matai at the church site and they told him
74that they were firmly in the Mau and would assist it if requested.
This was just the attitude which constituted the problems in the 
villages for the Mau leadership; the people declared that they were 
Mau supporters but followed the lead of the Mau komiti only in so far 
as it coincided with their own perception.
Actually there had been instructions from the komiti to ban
74 Report by Braisby, 13 Mar. 1929; Report by Const. William Jenner, 
15 Mar. 1929 and 21 Mar. 1929: A.O. 25/1-8.
195
copra cutting before and these had not caused conflicts within the 
movement. On those occasions, however, implementation of the instructions 
had been left to the discretion of the people in the villages. Mau 
people in each village knew just what to do with such instructions: they
knew how to preserve their integrity as Mau supporters in their own 
particular context while at the same time maintaining the dignity of the 
Mau komiti in Apia. But with the komiti1s insistence on strict observance 
of its instructions and introducing fines, that room for manoeuvring 
and use of discretion was removed, and there was really only one way 
Samoans would act in such a situation.
While the komiti might have acted rashly at this period as a 
result of a perception that the villagers had given it a sufficient 
mandate to make demands on them, its action was actually triggered by 
a decline in the Mau contributions. This was worrying because the Mau 
needed the money for Nelson's work in New Zealand and its own activities 
in Samoa; more importantly, the falling contributions indicated that 
interest in the Mau was waning.
But if there were difficulties within the Mau there were 
greater problems amongst the dissident whites. Since Nelson rejected 
the suggestion from the leading dissident whites to advise the Samoans 
to meet the Administrator in late 1928, the Citizens' Committee had been 
slowly but remorselessly disintegrating. Williams had moved up to 
become the first elected member in the Legislative Council without a 
word of protest on behalf of Nelson, who had been disqualified from 
the Council through absence from meetings. Meredith was said to have 
left the movement, undoubtedly being assisted in this direction by a 
similar move by his brother-in-law Lagolago. Through his monthly
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reports as well as by personal letter Nelson had striven hard to keep
the dissident whites committed to the cause. One of the specific
measures suggested by Nelson to assist in revitalising the Citizens'
Committee was its reconstitution to bring in new blood and especially
to incorporate in its ranks T.B. Slipper, at that time highly regarded
by Nelson. The dissident whites did not share Nelson's trust in Slipper
and they excluded him from the reconstituted Citizens' Committee. In
April Nelson informed the committee that rejecting Slipper would bring
the whites and the Mau into conflict, and he went on to say that if he
was forced into a situation where he had to make a decision which to
stand with, Mau or Citizens' Committee - he could not remain neutral -
he would stand with the Mau on the grounds that it was the 'main body'
and it had also 'contributed all the fighting funds without which the
75struggle would have had an ignominious end'.
This choice would not have been a difficult one for Nelson.
He was finding the Citizens' Committee an embarrassment; he complained 
to the committee about its intention to give departing senior 
Administration officials sympathetic send-offs to New Zealand. At this 
time also the Mau were complaining that reports from Nelson to the 
whites were being passed on to the Administrator. And of course the 
whites never were in a position to force the government to take serious 
note of their views, as the Samoans were.
While these problems emerged within Samoa, Nelson was having 
some success in publicising the cause of the Mau in New Zealand. In 
late February a public meeting held at the Auckland town hall drew over 
a thousand people and passed resolutions calling for the release of
75 Report by O.F. Nelson (no. 25), 20 Mar. 1929, and (no. 27), 
18 Apr. 1929: Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
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Tamasese and the revocation of the deportation orders on Nelson, Gurr 
and Smyth. This meeting was promoted by the Samoa Defence League.
When the resolutions were presented to government it proposed to answer 
the matters raised in speeches given during the meeting, but Allen 
wisely advised that the submissions and speeches should be ignored.
After this meeting the League, assisted by several Samoans living in 
Auckland, conducted open-air meetings - sometimes every day of the week, 
conditions permitting. However, despite its efforts, its success in 
hard terms was minimal - Nelson himself admitted that 99.9% of the New 
Zealand population did not give a damn about Samoa. The League was 
also a failure in raising money for the cause, let alone its own
7 6activities; the Mau had to send money from Samoa to keep it going.
On another front, Nelson started publishing the 'New Zealand Samoa 
Guardian' in late April to publicise the cause of the Mau which he 
felt was being mishandled by other newspapers in New Zealand.
For the Mau therefore, at this period, there was no assistance 
in any form from the Citizens' Committee, and at the same time it had 
to support financially the white effort in Auckland, which was largely 
one for appearances, with no real bite. The Mau, in other words, was 
going it alone. And although Nelson's optimism gave them encouragement, 
they were never under any illusions that they held their own fate and 
that of the Mau in their hands. With the difficulties encountered in 
keeping the Mau people motivated sufficiently to maintain its forward 
momentum, and with Allen grasping the initiative, it was not unexpected 
to find doubts within the Mau komiti as to the viability of continuing 
the Mau on its course of refusal even to talk to the Administration.
76 Report by O.F. Nelson (no. 25), 20 Mar. 1929, and (no. 28), 
26 Apr. 1929: Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
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During May, after public notification of the changes in the taxation
structure within Samoa, Tuimaleali'ifano, nominal chairman of the
komiti, suggested that a fono with the Administrator should be arranged;
and he was supported by representatives from Leulumoega, Samatau,
Falelatai and South Aana, all of them from Aiga closely allied to the
Tuimaleali'ifano title. The other representatives disagreed. Led by
Faumuina, this group argued that the proper response to government
measures was to put Mau police back on the streets and reimpose a boycott
on the stores. Tuimaleali'ifano did not take this rebuff lightly, he
left the fono immediately and returned to his house at Tifitifi,
77Faleolo. After a short period, he returned to Vaimoso. Similarly, 
the villages which sided with Tuimaleali'ifano showed their displeasure 
by withdrawing from Mau activities for a period of time.
The return of the Mau police on the Apia streets and a renewed
boycott of stores did not eventuate. Instead, a fresh initiative was
attempted in the form of setting up a malo fou (new government) to
look after the affairs of the Mau supporters. Because the representatives
of the Mau people in the villages/districts were already in Apia
constituting a fono of representatives, it was decided that setting up
a judiciary would be the next step at that stage. Four fa1amasino or
judges were appointed, Faumuina and Saipaia to sit at Lepea with
Tuimaleali'ifano and Fuataga to be located at Vaimoso. Each fa1amasino
was allocated ten leoleo or policemen who would enforce that fa'amasino1s
judgements and these 'officials' were to be paid. To enable the Mau to
meet the costs, all those who had been relieved of the government personal
7 8tax were asked to pay 2/- to the Mau funds. However because these 
77 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 14 May 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
78 Braisby to Administrator, 28 May 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
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fa'amasino were not given a clear jurisdiction - there were after all 
no 'laws' they could adjudicate on - and because the host of problems 
involved in organising such a scheme was apparently not even considered, 
and because there was no such tradition in fa'a Samoa they could invoke, 
the project was a failure from the start. Due to the lack of thought 
given to these aspects, it would seem that the scheme was tried not so 
much to promote a malo fou for the Mau but rather to try and remedy the 
difficulties the Mau was experiencing in obtaining donations from its 
supporters and in keeping its claims alive and vital.
Another decision of the Mau fono had even greater impact.
Forced by the same need to keep the Mau before the public eye, the
komiti decided to encourage the appearance of Mau members in full
uniform in Apia. Apart from encouraging individuals, the Mau also
organised groups - sometimes numbering up to five hundred - to march
through the villages surrounding Apia town and through Beach Road,
showing the Mau colours. During the first two weeks of June, three
such parades were mounted starting with one on 3 June, the King's
birthday, when all the Mau leaders joined in the procession of some
five hundred men in full Mau uniform which arrived in front of the
central office building just as the police were raising the flag, and
79called cheers for King George. Faumuina led these parades.
At the same time the stepped-up attempts by government to secure 
tax defaulters - many of those had participated in Mau parades without 
being challenged - necessitated the precautionary measure of allocating 
uniformed groups of five or more Mau supporters to accompany prominent 
Mau matai who were themselves tax defaulters. The intention was to
79 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 14 June 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
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discourage the police from arresting the senior men, but since the 
escort was normally made up of the sons and close relatives of the 
matai concerned, it was inevitable that fighting would result if arrest 
was attempted.
On 15 June a police party arrested Tagaloa of Saluafata on Beach
Road. He was a leading Mau matai and his six companions, armed with
heavy sticks, fought the arresting party of six policemen, armed with
batons and at least one wielding a pistol. It was a willing encounter
and soon members of both parties were bleeding freely from head wounds,
but the police had managed to secure Tagaloa. Minutes after the clash
started, police reinforcements as well as more Mau men arrived
simultaneously, swelling their respective numbers to about forty.
Faumuina was amongst the later arrivals and it was due to his resolute
stand against the extreme pressure from the Mau men to continue the
fight and free Tagaloa - Allen's characteristically juggled account of
this incident to the New Zealand authorities would not admit to Faumuina's
peace-seeking role - that the clash did not develop into a more serious 
80confrontation. Tagaloa was subsequently sentenced to nine months' 
imprisonment for non-payment of tax and resisting arrest.
This incident was significant on two main counts. In the first 
place it was the first time that the Mau men had resorted to actually 
fighting government police. During previous occasions when the police 
had encountered the Mau, as for example when arresting (or attempting 
to arrest) Mau members, the Mau men had hindered but had not fought 
them. When the attempt was made to arrest Tamasese on an Apia street,
80 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 15 June 1929, Allen to EA, 15 June 1929: 
A .0 . 25/1-8.
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the Mau men present simply crowded around Tamasese, bundled him into a 
taxi and took him to Vaimoso. When the police went after Tamasese at 
Vaimoso, even at the time when they succeeded in arresting him, it was 
the women and the children, not the men, who resisted the police 
parties, largely with stone throwing.
The second consequence of Tagaloa's arrest was the police reaction
to the injuries of its members. Two days after the clash Braisby issued
instructions that 'all European police on duty will carry loaded
revolvers', spare ammunition, and batons. The off-duty men were
instructed to carry batons at all times, with revolvers handy but not too
evident. The instructions continued that if wanted men marched into
town with Mau parades, the police would concentrate their numbers and
arrest those men as well as any others who might try to prevent their
arrest. The guns might be used when police were in 'danger of serious
injury' or in 'defence of life'. In addition to these measures, Braisby
instructed all the papalagi police to attend, at the British Club,
81classes he would be giving on street fighting.
The Chief of Police prefaced his instructions with the statement
that going by the 15 June incident 'it is obvious that passive resistance
by the Mau has ceased and they are prepared to resist and assault police
82with clubs and other weapons'. Undoubtedly, this was an argument used 
by Braisby to obtain Allen's agreement to policemen carrying guns. Allen 
and Braisby had held a meeting just prior to the latter's instructions 
being issued and it seems clear that the Administrator was fully aware 
and had agreed with the instructions before their distribution. These
81 Braisby to Sgt. Waterson, 17 June 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
82 ibid.
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instructions were not withdrawn during Allen's time as was suggested to 
the New Zealand government would be done, once the excitement created 
by the incident of Tagaloa's arrest had died down.
Actually, the Tagaloa incident occurred at a time when a rather 
serious row was developing within the Mau. It concerned the type of 
reception for Tamasese, who was expected in Apia during the last week 
of June. After word was received that Tamasese was returning to Samoa, 
Lufilufi, representing Atua, suggested that Tamasese be accorded a royal 
reception in the traditions of Samoa. Specifically it was proposed that 
a fale ula (a specially constructed and decorated round fale for use by 
a Tupu, particularly during ceremonial occasions) be constructed at 
Vaimoso for Tamasese. Atua's suggestion immediately brought to the 
surface wider issues, notably those concerning the Tupu o Samoa,
Tumua ma Pule and traditional allegiances which made up such an important 
part of the life of the Samoans but which since the turn of the century 
they had, at the insistence of the colonial administrations, tried to 
accommodate in a peaceful state of co-existence.
Fa'asaleleaga district led by Safotulafai rejected Atua's 
suggestion on the grounds that such treatment for Tamasese would be 
tantamount to declaring him Tupu o Samoa, a development Fa'asaleleaga 
could not accept because it recognised Malietoa as the rightful holder 
of that position. Several other groupings in the Mau supported 
Fa'asaleleaga and after the Vaimoso faitotoa expressed a similar opinion, 
the Mau komiti dropped Atua's proposal. When representatives of Atua 
meeting at Lufilufi learned of the komiti's decision, they threatened to
leave the Mau immediately, their anger heightened by the failure of the
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komiti to consult them before the decision was taken. But with the 
arrest of a prominent Atua marai in the Mau, that district could hardly 
defect just then. On a more general level, the arrest helped shift the 
focus of the Mau people elsewhere and prevented this potentially 
destructive confrontation from developing into open conflict.
This difference of opinion between Tumua and Pule highlighted 
another important aspect of the Mau. On one hand the tama-aiga involved 
in the Mau were of the Sa Tupua - Tupua Tamasese and Tuimaleali1ifano. 
Their traditional support came largely from Atua and Aana districts of 
Upolu. On the other hand the greatest support for the Mau came from 
Savai'i, Malietoa country. Because the Mau was organised along 
fa*a Samoa lines, it was the representatives from the villages and 
districts who exercised real power in the councils of the Mau. At the 
same time dominant influence was wielded by the representatives of those 
villages and districts whose people were giving most assistance in terms 
of money contributions, food presentations, participation in activities 
and so on. Because the biggest tangible support came from Savai'i, the 
Mau was effectively run by the Pule representatives. This situation of 
Upolu ceremonial leadership competing with Savai'i political dominance 
created a system of checks and balances within the organisation. From 
another viewpoint the whole episode concerning a royal welcome for 
Tamasese also highlighted the point that the Samoans considered it 
important to join the Mau so that they could protect their fa'a Samoa 
positions and prerogatives in Mau dealings.
In the last week of June Tamasese arrived back from New Zealand.
83 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 14 June 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
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The occasion should have been one for the biggest Mau demonstration 
yet, but the differences that had arisen within the ranks of the Mau 
concerning the royalty issue, together with the uncertainty created 
by the policy of aggression indicated by recent police action combined 
to reduce the reception for Tamasese into a subdued affair. On the day, 
the Mau marched into town in strength, all its leaders, including those 
wanted by the police, participating. But the demonstration lacked 
fire, and that defiant confidence which had marked Mau processions in 
the past. The police did not attempt any arrests.
Tamasese's welcome went off without trouble. Part of this was 
obviously due to the desire of the Mau supporters to preserve a united 
appearance. On the other hand, there was also the factor that even 
amongst the Sa Tupua people themselves, there was lacking a united 
opinion on the issue of Tamasese's reception. The problem was that 
Tuimaleali'ifano was also in the Mau, and although Tamasese held the 
senior title - Tupua - in the Sa Tupua maximal lineage, Tuimaleali'ifano 
was the person who, in terms of age and experience, the Sa Tupua people 
were more likely to look to for leadership. Tamasese was not yet thirty 
years old, had spent much of his life in Apia and was therefore largely 
unknown to the Samoans in the villages and districts. He had first come 
to public notice during the negotiations with Richardson at Mulinu'u 
earlier in the year. On the other hand, Tuimaleali'ifano had a long 
record of involvement in public affairs both as an individual and as a 
Fautua, a post to which he was appointed by Colonel Logan during the 
military occupation as a replacement for Tupua Tamasese Lealofi, the 
Sa Fautua appointed by the Germans.
For several weeks after Tamasese's return the situation remained 
relatively quiet, the hindrance of traffic through Vaimoso and Lepea by
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the Mau being the main immediate issue of contention. At times the
Mau pickets provoked the police, but Allen at this period restrained
Braisby and his men. One evening during the first week of August, for
example, Braisby, at the wheel of a police car containing five other
policemen, refused to stop on being signalled by a group of Mau
taulele1 a and women near Vaimoso, and the car was stoned. Braisby was
hit on the back of the head and, temporarily knocked out, stalled the
car. He recovered quickly, however, restarted the car and took off.
The following morning Braisby wrote a letter to the Mau leaders and the
matai of Vaimoso village, drawing their attention to the obstruction of
traffic through Vaimoso and the stoning of the police car. He warned
them that if such activities continued, the police had been instructed
to use firearms and 'whatever other means possible' to counter the
hindrances, and if a clash occurred the 'consequences will be on your
heads'. Allen ordered the letter not to be sent. On the same day this
letter was written Braisby recommended that street lights at Vaimoso and
Lepea be put out of action, rather like the water supply being cut off
earlier, but Allen again countermanded Braisby's initiative and the
84street lights remained.
Allen was aware of the internal problems experienced by the Mau 
leadership and he did not want any over-reaction by the police to 
interfere with the process of decline which he believed was occurring 
to the Mau. In mid-August the Prime Minister sent Allen a summary of 
what he intended to say in parliament concerning Samoa, and included in 
the speech was the prospect of the Prime Minister visiting Samoa at the
Inspector of Police to Sec. to Admin., 3 Aug. 1929; Braisby to
Mau komiti, 3 Aug. 1929; Sec. to Admin, to Braisby, 6 Aug. 1929;
A/Sec. to Admin, to Braisby, 16 Oct. 1929: A.O. 25/1-8.
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end of the session. Allen immediately cabled the Prime Minister
advising that he should not announce any intention to visit Samoa as
this would arrest the decline of the Mau. He went on to say that 'no
grounds should be given anyone else but myself to open any negotiations'.
The Prime Minister concurred and so his statement was confined to the
reiteration of the old policy that government was ever prepared to talk
to the Mau with a view to settling the confrontation, once the Mau obeyed
and recognised the law. He also announced that two Samoans would be
nominated to the Legislative Council - Malietoa and Mataafa the two
Fautua were nominated and the number of European elected members was
reduced from three to two - and that expenditure was being reduced and
attempts made to render the territory self-supporting. In any case,
he concluded, New Zealand would not contribute large subsidies while
86hostility and ingratitude by a large section of Samoans continued.
As before, the Mau, in a dominant position in spite of internal 
clashes and setbacks in villages, ignored this statement. The komiti's 
problems however were mounting and at this period were compounded by 
the growing despondency in Nelson's letters - the strong optimism had 
faded as moves he had initiated in New Zealand through several avenues 
of courts, cabinet and public meetings became defeated outright or 
failed to produce the results for which he had hoped. Now rather than 
promising success for the Mau, as he had tended to do in earlier periods, 
he was emphasising the need to continue because the Mau had sacrificed 
so much. While saying that the Mau could do as it decided - it always 
did anyway - when it came to the issue of a settlement being negotiated
Administrator to PM, 20 Aug. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8. 
EA to Administrator, 9 Sept. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
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in Samoa without him, he reminded the Mau of his commitment to the
cause and the personal sacrifices he had made. Nelson was facing other
problems whose solutions were somewhat at variance with the thinking of
the Mau komiti. The main one concerned the difficulties his firm was
experiencing over its copra trading; it was losing money in this area
and was unable to meet regular shipping commitments even with the Mau
komiti instructions to the Mau people to sell their copra exclusively
to Nelson's stores. Nelson therefore urged the komiti to lift its ban
on general copra cutting, withdraw its instructions to sell only to his
8 7stores and to forget about its fines. He obviously wanted the normal 
market forces to operate and he was clearly conscious too of the negative 
response with which Samoans would react to measures such as those adopted 
by the Mau komiti. The komiti ignored Nelson's advice.
It did, however, consider another initiative concerning the 
construction of a building at Vaimoso which could serve as a point of 
focus for Mau people. Tamasese suggested that the contingents at 
Vaimoso and Lepea combine to build a fale tele - a round fono house - 
which would be the fale fono of the Mau similar to the Faipule fale fono 
at Mulinu'u. The contingent at Lepea, however, opposed this idea 
because it raised other fa'a Samoa issues such as the relative standing 
of Vaimoso and Lepea in Faleata, and it was dropped. Instead it was 
decided to renovate the old bandstand at Vaimoso village and convert 
it into premises which would serve as Mau headquarters offices. The 
Mau fono would continue to be held in one or the other of the fale tele 
belonging to Vaimoso families, which had been used for that purpose
87 Letter from Taisi, 14 June 1929 and 11 Nov. 1929: Mau Papers,
PM's Dept., Apia.
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in the past. These decisions were taken before Faumuina and 
Tuimaleali'ifano left for New Zealand - they paid their taxes to get 
permits - in late August, to assist as witnesses in Nelson's suit 
against the New Zealand Herald newspaper for defamation and libel. 
Nelson therefore had first-hand information on the trend of thinking 
within the Mau leadership at this rather difficult period.
88
On the day of the opening ceremony for the new offices, a fono
of the Mau leaders appointed eight high-ranking matai from its ranks and
charged them with the task of visiting all the villages throughout
Upolu and Savai'i - the four Upolu matai would travel in Savai'i while
the four Savai'i matai would conduct the Upolu mission - in an attempt
to boost the diminishing interest in the Mau. Specifically, the two
delegations would reconfirm the ssa (ban) on copra cutting; chase up
the unpaid Mau contributions of 4/- per matai and 2/- per taule1 ale1 a ;
obtain some idea of the numbers of Samoans in the villages who had
died as a result of an influenza virus which had been affecting the
population; and explain why the komiti felt that the Mau should not
participate in the matter of the appointment of Samoan representatives
89on to the Legislative Council. The overall effect these delegations 
had on Mau supporters in general is unclear, but one thing they found 
was an almost universal non-compliance with komiti instructions 
restricting the cutting of copra. Even more significant was the 
discovery that many of the leading members of the Mau, including komiti 
'chairman' Tuimaleali'ifano were involved, sometimes personally, in 
breaching the copra ban instructions. Imposition of fines on the 
offending villages and individual members of the komiti was strongly
88 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 14 Sept. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8,
89 ibid.
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contested in the komiti fono when these matters were discussed and
. 90created yet another area of discontent within the Mau leadership.
In New Zealand, Nelson dropped his case against the New Zealand 
Herald newspaper, which meant that the trip by Tuimaleali'ifano and 
Faumuina was wasted. Nelson, however, bold and enterprising as ever, 
sought to utilise the opportunity of personal consultation with the 
two Mau leaders to launch new initiatives to help bolster interest in 
the Mau in Samoa. A petition to King George V, which had been under 
consideration by the Mau for some time, was finalised to be taken to 
Samoa for signing. Though a highly visible sign of the Mau's 
continuing pressure and existence, this petition followed several 
others which had all failed to achieve their goals, and there was 
every reason to believe that this petition would also suffer the same 
fate. More important, the Samoans were well aware of this fact and 
were not likely to be jumping with renewed vigour at yet another 
petition.
It is in this context that the other initiative suggested by 
Nelson achieves proper significance. Seizing on the Mau's attempt to 
form a malo fou (new government) a few months earlier, Nelson quietly 
suggested that the concept should be pursued further. His suggestion, 
however, differed from the one espoused by the komiti in the sense 
that the appointment of Mau judges and policemen was done perhaps 
largely as a means of improving its funds. Nelson was more interested 
in appointing Mau officals in villages/districts who would perform such 
functions as recording births and deaths, co-ordinating the search for
90 Administrator to Minister, 26 Oct. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
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rhinoceros beetles, and generally performing duties previously carried
91out by government officials. Mau people in the villages had been 
doing some of these things for quite some time, but Nelson wanted 
these duties and the people performing them placed on a formal level. 
Although this suggestion was a logical one, given the procession of 
actions the Mau had engaged in, it demonstrated clearly the difficult 
position the Mau leadership had reached in coming up with projects to 
sustain the interest of the Mau. For such a system to work, a strong 
central authority was of course needed, but if the komiti was being 
openly rejected on the matter of copra cutting, how could it hope to 
get away with instructing the Mau Samoans on other aspects of their 
lives?
On 15 November Tuimaleali'ifano and Faumuina arrived back from 
New Zealand. The occasion brought the biggest Mau demonstration seen 
in Apia. Soon after the Tofua anchored the first parties of the Mau 
arrived in town. These consisted of several groups of fully uniformed 
men armed with 'large clubs, knives and sticks'. There were about 
twelve men in each group and they stationed themselves at strategic 
places along Beach Road. Soon after, two large parties of uniformed 
Mau members marched in from the eastern and western ends of town. The 
two parties were led by brass bands and numbered about 1,500. They 
met in front of the market near the central office and then congregated 
next to the customs buildings where their numbers swelled to over 3,000. 
Meantime eleven decorated fautasi (long boats) manned by Mau crews had 
put out into the harbour to bring in the two leaders. On landing they 
joined the welcoming crowd and led them to Vaimoso. The reception party
91 Letter from Taisi, 14 June 1929, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
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contained all the leading Mau matai including those on whom warrants
had been served - Matau Karauna was amongst them - as well as many
taulelea wanted by the law. Mau flags were carried and a ta'alolo party
from Matautu was also present. But despite the numbers involved and
the assertive manner in which the Mau carried out the reception the
whole undertaking went off without a hitch. In the afternoon of the
same day over four thousand people congregated at Vaimoso, where a
92feast and entertainment took place. The petition to the King was
signed and returned to Nelson by the same boat and Faumuina, in
reporting on their visit the following day, urged the Mau to continue
with establishing its own administrative structure through which the
affairs of its members could be regulated in a more orderly manner.
He called on those present not to lose interest in the struggle because
the Mau had won; claiming that H.E. Holland - whom he referred to as the
Sui Palemia, which normally means acting Prime Minister, but perhaps
used here to mean alternative Prime Minister as leader of the opposition
parliamentary party - had promised Tuimaleali'ifano and himself that the
mandate over Samoa would be given to another country and control of
Samoa would revert to the Samoans themselves once the petition to the
93King had been heard.
The enthusiastic reception was due largely to the fact that the 
Tupu o Samoa issue was not raised on this occasion, and the aggressive 
approach adopted by the police in recent months appeared to have 
subsided. At the same time the deployment of Mau men during the 
reception in Apia strongly indicated that they were conscious of the
Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 18 Nov. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8.
Faumuina's speech at Vaimoso (copied verbatim), 16 Nov. 1929; 
Administrator to Minister, 19 Nov. 1929: A.O. 25/1-8. Holland and
the Labour Party had come out in support of the Mau, although on 
doctrinaire grounds rather than on an understanding of the situation 
in Samoa.
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possibility of trouble and were probably under specific instructions 
to deal firmly with any police attempts to disrupt the demonstration. 
Although Faumuina's reported speech was a gross misstatement of the 
situation in New Zealand, it should be interpreted in the context of 
the occasion and the rhetoric normally used in Samoan oratory at such 
times. No one would have taken what Faumuina said as the exact 
representation of the position in New Zealand, yet the speech constituted 
a fiction which Samoans utilised to meet their respective requirements, 
while recognising it for what it was. In this case, the Mau supporters 
would have used Faumuina's speech to strengthen their resolve in the 
Mau, and together with the assertive and enthusiastic reception they 
had put on to welcome the two leaders, the Mau appeared to be regaining 
the initiative in the conflict.
The vigour and confidence displayed by the large number of Mau 
supporters who had come from all over Samoa to welcome their two 
leaders was seen by Allen as a negative development. For some time, 
he had believed that the changes he had introduced, especially in the 
areas of administration, taxation and police supervision, together 
with the internal conflicts occurring in the Mau ranks, were combining 
effectively to weaken the Mau to the extent where it would either die 
out, or its leaders sit down with him and negotiate a settlement.
While there were tangible grounds for his belief, the reality of the 
situation was that difficulties experienced by the Mau had not in fact 
been translated into abandoning it, let alone into recognising government, 
as demonstrated by the Faleasiu episode and the continued refusal to pay 
taxes. Now with a buoyant mood again evident amongst the Mau people, 
the conflict appeared no nearer a settlement than when Allen first
arrived some twenty months earlier.
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CHAPTER 5
BREAKING POINT - MAU PUT TO THE TEST: 1930/1931
As 1929 drew to a close, the attention of the Mau became 
focussed on the imminent return of Gurr and Smyth from exile. Gurr 
though, after consultation with Nelson, chose to remain in New Zealand 
where he had been assisting the dissident effort, particularly the 
production of the New Zealand Samoa Guardian, while Smyth who had spent 
most of his two years in exile in Fiji, planned to arrive in Apia on 
28 December. To mark the occasion and to honour this papalagi who had 
suffered as a result of his association with the Mau, the Mau komiti 
decided to stage a major reception to welcome him home.'*' Such a function 
would also help reinforce the confidence of Mau supporters, through their 
involvement and united effort.
In the weeks leading up to Smyth's arrival, several clashes occurred
2between Mau members and the police. While there was nothing different
between these and earlier clashes, there had been some very important
changes in the relevant circumstances, as a result largely of the apparent
recovery of the Mau from what Allen had felt was its progress to
disintegration through internal dissension. In his desire not to
interrupt that process of Mau self destruction Allen had placed restraints
on police actions against Mau supporters. But with the Mau displaying
unity and consensus, it became unlikely that the imposition of such
3restraints on the police would continue. As a result, the likelihood of
'*' L. Tamasese, circular letter to Mau, 3 Dec. 1929; Braisby to Sec. to 
Admin., 10 Dec. 1929: A.O. 25/1-9.
2 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 12 Dec. 1929; Administrator to EA, 27 Dec. 
1929: A.O. 25/1-9.

























violence erupting during a Mau/police clash became greater than ever 
before, particularly given that police frustration at being unable to 
counter, in their own way, what they saw as Mau provocation, had built up 
over a long, trying period. That fatal clash occurred when the Mau 
marched to welcome Smyth back to Samoa.
I
As dawn broke over Apia on the morning of 28 December 1929, the
Lady Roberts, which had travelled overnight from Pagopago, entered the
harbour and was joined by several fautasi manned by Mau supporters from
Fa'asaleleaga district in Savai'i, providing her with an escort. On
board the Lady Roberts was Smyth and also Robert Hall-Skelton, a New
Zealand lawyer who had been a leading activist in the New Zealand Samoa
Defence League in Auckland. Hall-Skelton's mission in Samoa was to
collect material for Nelson's libel case against the New Zealand Herald
newspaper. At the same time on land, a procession of uniformed Mau men -
the Vaimoso party - numbering some nine hundred entered Beach Road on the
western end of town and, led by a brass band and a flag-bearer carrying
the Mau flag, marched toward the central office building, where it was
to meet a similar party from Matautu village on the eastern sweep of
Apia bay; together they were to provide the reception 'committee' for
4Smyth and Hall-Skelton, when they stepped ashore at the Tivoli jetty.
This account of the incident is based on the following sources: 
Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 30 Dec. 1929; Administrator to 
Minister, 31 Dec. 1929: A.O. 25/1-0; Mau representatives to
Nelson, 9 Jan. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia; 'Coroner's 
Finding in the Inquest Respecting the Fatalities in Western Samoa 
on 28th Dec. 1929', AJHR, A-4B 1930; Evidence of Proceedings of 
Inquest, A.O. 25/1-9 and IT 1/23/11.
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As the Vaimoso party marched past the Customs buildings located 
at the western end of town, Braisby informed police headquarters by 
telephone that Matau Karauna - the man Allen said he had selected to 
be arrested if he participated in the march - was in the procession, 
playing in the band. The police chief then went out into the harbour 
and boarded the Lady Roberts. The arresting party of seven white and 
one Samoan policemen waited at the corner of Ifi'ifi street and Beach 
road about a hundred metres from the police station for the procession 
to arrive. Police efforts to identify Matau however failed while the 
Mau column was on the move, and this prevented the police from 
attempting the arrest at the road junction where they had waited, the 
position most advantageous to them if they ran into trouble. In trying 
to identify their man, members of the arresting party walked alongside 
the band, and Mau 'police1 were ordered to close ranks alongside the head 
of the procession and prevent the police from entering the column. When 
the band was just past the central office buildings, the procession came 
to a halt and turned to face the buildings, apparently for the purpose 
of saluting - symbolically and perhaps also contemptuously - the seat 
of government and the flagpole which stood near the main entrance. The 
Mau had done this before. In that instant, Matau was recognised by the 
police and even as the procession turned and continued, the leader of 
the arresting party, Sergeant W. Fell, managed to break through the 
Mau ranks and tried to arrest his man by putting his arms around him.
The rest of the arresting party were prevented from following Fell and 
as a consequence fighting - fists mainly at this stage - broke out. When 
this fighting started the supporting police party of some twenty men, 
all armed with revolvers - three of the arresting party had revolvers 
while four carried ropes - joined in and as Fell was struck to the ground
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the police used their guns freely, firing into the Mau ranks. The Mau 
people pulled back in the face of this onslaught, taking with them five 
of their members dead and many more injured. They were armed with 
batons only and since they could not get near the police to use these, 
they resorted to stone throwing. The police retreated to the station 
and armed themselves with rifles and bayonets in accordance with their 
battle plan, but Constable William Abraham did not make it; a heavy blow 
on the head had killed him.
Once the police gained their barracks they resorted to rifles 
and a Lewis gun mounted on the second-storey verandah. The coroner 
subsequently found that this rifle fire mortally wounded Tamasese and 
two other men who went to his aid, while the Lewis gun had not been 
fired directly into the crowds. It appears that at this point in time 
the leaders of the Mau were strenuously trying to regain order and calm 
down their members, as they had tried to stop the fighting on Beach road. 
With intensified rifle fire and the Lewis gun hammering from the police 
station, their efforts succeeded. The bodies of the dead and wounded 
were picked up and the Mau party returned to Vaimoso. The Matautu party 
had halted some distance from where the fighting took place and it was 
not involved in the clash.
The Mau plans concerning its welcome for Smyth had been well
known to the police. During the last week of November, the Mau komiti
had finalised the details of its reception and villages/districts were
notified. The police obtained a copy of that notice as well as an account
of the komiti1s deliberations during that particular meeting as it did
5for all other Mau meetings. The intended reception was to be similar to
5 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 10 Dec. 1929; L. Tamasese, circular letter 
to Mau, 3 Dec. 1929: A.O. 25/1-9.
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two previous occasions that year - in June and November - when Mau
leaders returned from New Zealand. On these two occasions, men wanted
on warrant had paraded with the Mau but the police had taken no action
to arrest them. This time according to Allen, he determined that this
flaunting of the law with impunity would not be tolerated and he ordered
at least one wanted man to be arrested. In his report to the Minister
on this fatal incident, he wrote,
It seemed to me impossible to allow persons wanted by 
the Police to be paraded in this manner, and I therefore 
gave consideration to the arrest of at least one such 
person if similar action should be taken by the Mau on 
this occasion. I accordingly instructed Inspector Braisby 
to be in.readiness to arrest one of the wanted men and 
selected one K. Mata'u to be arrested if brought in to 
the town. This man was chosen for the reason that he is 
recognised, and he is one of those for whom a warrant was 
issued for assault in June last.6
On the morning of 27 December Mr Rudolf Kruse, a Director of 
Nelson's firm, approached Braisby and requested that Smyth and Hall-Skelton 
be allowed to land at the Tivoli wharf rather than at the Customs wharf.
His reason for this request was that 'many friends and other people' 
would like to meet Smyth and Hall-Skelton on their arrival and the 
Tivoli wharf was a more appropriate place for the reception particularly 
as there was construction work being carried out at the Customs wharf. 
Braisby did not give Kruse permission immediately but consulted Allen 
over the request and in the afternoon he notified Kruse by phone that 
permission was granted. However before Kruse left his office in the 
morning, and before consulting with the Administrator, Braisby told him 
to let the Mau know that if men wanted on warrants paraded, they would 
be arrested. Kruse told Braisby that he was not a representative of the 
Mau and that he doubted if the Mau would heed such a warning delivered
6 Administrator to Minister, 31 Dec. 1929, A.O. 25/1-9.
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by him. Still he undertook to pass on the message if he saw the Mau
leaders. Later that day Kruse met Tamasese at Vaimoso to tell him
about the landing at Tivoli wharf and he also passed on the message
from Braisby. According to Kruse, Tamasese, on hearing Braisby's
warning, smiled and said that he would discuss it 'with the others'
that night. At the same time Kruse felt that Tamasese did not take
7the warning seriously. Tuimaleali'ifano testified during the inquest 
that Tamasese in fact mentioned the warning and that he had counselled 
Tamasese both that night and before the march started the following 
morning, not to permit the wanted men to participate in the procession.^
As we have seen earlier though, the final decision for the Mau rested 
with the village/district representatives and there is no evidence 
that they received the warning.
After his consultations with Allen, Braisby drew up action plans
and that evening gathered all his forces and gave them their instructions.
The plans were comprehensive and well-rehearsed because Braisby was
certain that his warning would not be heeded and that if an arrest was
9attempted violence would result. Strangely enough, Braisby, although 
certain that there would be violence, chose to be absent from the scene 
of action at the crucial time.
The Territory's Chief Justice J.H. Luxford who acted as coroner 
at the inquest which followed found that the measures taken by the 
police were reasonable and justified except for the rifle fire which
7 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 30 Dec. 1929; R. Kruse's testimony, 
Evidence of Proceedings of Inquest: A.O. 25/1-9.
g
Tuimaleali'ifano's testimony, Evidence of Proceedings of Inquest,
A.O. 25/1-9.
9 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 30 Dec. 1929, A.O. 25/1-9.
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fatally wounded Tamasese and two men - Tuia and Migao - who went to his 
aid. He added though that 'In circumstances as then prevailing it is 
inevitable that some action will be taken which may appear at the time 
to be justified, but when inquired into subsequently will be found to 
have been unnecessary'.10 As for the Mau, they had defied the law and 
paid the consequences, notwithstanding that government had allowed 
that defiance of the law to develop to a critical stage.
The Mau regarded the coroner's findings as biased and unsatisfactory,
Certainly there were several important matters which the inquest failed
to clear up. For example, there was the issue of who were killed by
revolver fire, rifle bullets or the Lewis gun; Dr Herbert Hutson who
examined the dead and treated the wounded testified that he did not see
anyone with more than one bullet wound, but Hall-Skelton told the inquest
that he saw several Mau casualties carrying more than one wound.11
Neither the Mau's lawyer nor the coroner pursued the matter. But Slipper
who represented the deceased Samoans, at least should have persisted over
the issue, particularly as there were avenues clearly open to him to
resolve this matter. He could for instance have produced photographic
evidence - the Mau and the families of the dead men engaged the highly
respected Apia photographer John Tattersall to photograph the men and 
12their wounds - and a statement by Tattersall on what he saw and 
photographed would have been invaluable. Then there was the matter of 
policemen using rifles after the retreat from the clash on Beach road.
11
'Coroner's Findings ...', AJHR, A-4B, 1930.
Evidence of Proceedings of Inquest, A.O. 25/1-9.
Administrator to Tattersall, 30 Dec. 1929, A.O. 25/1-9. Allen was 
worried about these photographs and requested Tattersall to notify 
him before releasing them.
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This matter, including all the relevant orders and instructions, and the 
fact that only eighteen of twenty men in the supporting party went onto 
Beach road - the senior policeman said no one was left at the station 
to cover a retreat - could also have been well exposed by incisive 
questioning. That those and other matters were not cleared up 
satisfactorily must be blamed largely on Slipper's ineptitude, so that 
although the Administrator refused to guarantee safe conduct to some 
people in the Mau - by then declared a seditious organisation - whom 
Slipper wanted as witnesses, they could hardly have made any difference 
to the final outcome. Slipper had the full right of cross-examination 
and was able to call 22 out of the 35 witnesses that appeared before the 
coroner. But his questioning of leading witnesses, particularly those 
called by the government, showed incompetence of almost criminal 
magnitude and highlighted again the tremendous disadvantage the Mau was 
put to in relation to its legal representatives. This lack of competent 
legal representation was first demonstrated during the Royal Commission 
sitting in 1927 and would be demonstrated again in the following years.
In the situation that existed at the time it seems a futile 
exercise to put the blame for what occurred on any one party. On one 
hand, government had a duty to administer the affairs of the territory 
and a crucial part of that duty was to uphold the existing law, whether 
it was 'good' or 'bad' law. The Administration had failed miserably 
in this duty, and its failure in the past to arrest wanted men who had 
participated in Mau processions rendered Braisby's indirect warning on 
the matter ludicrous. It was hardly unrealistic for the Mau to disregard 
this warning under the circumstances.
On the other hand, there could be no doubt the Mau people knew 
that continued flouting of the law, particularly in a way openly insulting
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to government, would one day lead to a violent confrontation. If this 
had not occurred before it was certainly not due to discretion and 
good judgement on their part. The general confrontation had progressed 
to a stage where there were really only two alternatives remaining, 
given the steadfast refusal of the Mau to discuss a settlement: use of
force by government, or New Zealand to abdicate and leave the territory 
to the Samoans to do as they wished. As there was never any possibility 
of the second alternative being realised, the use of force appeared 
inevitable. The Mau leadership contained too astute politicians not to 
appreciate the realities of the situation and even though the government 
had been erratic in carrying out its duty, it was the Mau which, each 
time it paraded wanted men in Apia, was knowingly chancing the inevitable.
This incident marked a change in Allen's policy of dealing with 
the Mau. For several months before this fatal clash occurred, Allen had 
desisted from taking a strong line, believing that the Mau was gradually 
declining due to internal disagreements. Even the New Zealand 
government queried Allen's inaction over the Mau pickets and interference 
with traffic at Vaimoso and Lepea. It would seem that this time Allen's 
hand was forced by Braisby when he sent the warning to the Mau that 
wanted men would be arrested if they paraded. Braisby informed Allen 
that he had given the warning and the Administrator chose to support him, 
although obviously like Braisby, he was fully aware of the high probability 
of violence resulting from this initiative. In all, eleven Mau members 
died as a result of the shooting that morning - the last one died in 
February 1930 - and over fifty were wounded. Of the police party involved, 
one died and a few others received minor injuries; a remarkable result 
given that the police had asserted they were under an intense barrage 
of stones, and it was an established fact accepted by the police, that a 
stone thrown by a Samoan was a lethal weapon.
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II
The day after the shooting, Allen in response to an offer of help
from the Prime Minister cabled that no immediate assistance was needed,
except more ammunition and Mills bombs. He added that offers of
assistance from Malo Samoans were pouring in and he anticipated 'the
general effect [of the shooting] will be good though Skelton's presence
13here will tend to encourage confirmation of the trouble'. Prime
Minister Ward responded immediately, suggesting deporting Skelton and
perhaps even Smyth; but Allen considered such action unjustified just
then because Skelton was collecting material for a court case while 
14'Smyth is an ass'. Allen was waiting for the Mau reaction after the 
funerals were over before recommending a comprehensive policy on 
handling the Mau under the changed circumstances. In the meantime, 
he decided after consultation with the Fautua to adopt an aggressive 
stance towards the Mau.
In New Zealand Ward summoned his Cabinet Ministers from their
holidays to his bedside in Wellington on the last day of the year (30th
in Samoa), and the same day he advised the Administrator of Cabinet's
decision to make available at Suva the cruiser Dunedin to be at his
call, and assured him that 'in case of Mau aggression Cabinet is willing
place all assistance at your disposal which in your judgement may be 
15necessary'. At the same time Cabinet stressed that it would prefer to
Administrator to EA, 29 Dec. 1929, A.O. 25/1-9.
PM to Administrator, 29 Dec. 1929; Administrator to EA, 29 Dec. 
1929: A.O. 25/1-9.
PM to Administrator, 30 Dec. 1929, A.O. 25/1-9.
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have the opportunity of considering any major steps Allen intended
taking; a requirement which 'most upset' the Governor-General who
expressed in very strong terms his feeling that the Administrator was
16being hamstrung at a critical time by the New Zealand government.
Such was the intensity of the Governor-General's criticisms that Sir
Joseph was moved to reply, 'Your Excellency will appreciate that the
government and not the Administrator have to take full responsibility
for whatever occurs in Samoa and in this respect I will say that this
government do not fear criticism, but they must realise their
responsibilities and require to carry public opinion in New Zealand 
17with them'.
A week after the shooting Allen concluded that the Mau had 'lost 
heart and is disorganised'; if government maintained its aggressive
18policy 'we can now break up the Mau and probably without bloodshed'.
On this premise Allen recommended that he require the Mau to hand over 
twenty men wanted on 'criminal charges' - an extravagent term - within 
five days, failing which he would proceed with force to arrest them; 
that with regard to leaders not on this list, he be authorised under 
the Samoa Amendment Act 1927 to confine them to their own villages; 
and that the Mau be notified to disperse to their home villages from the 
Apia area. To enforce these measures Allen said he would require 'more 
force at my command and you should send warship to Suva as suggested to 
proceed here when required', assuming that the warship would carry a
Charles Ferguson to Sir Joseph (Personal), 2 Jan. 1930; 
Governor-General to G.W. Forbes, 30 Jan. 1930: IT 1/23/8-15.
PM to Governor-General, 4 Jan. 1930, IT 1/23/8-15.
Administrator to EA, 3 Jan. 1930, A.O. 25/1-9.
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landing force of about a hundred and twenty men. All the 
recommendations were immediately approved.
Allen put his intentions into effect at once. The list of
twenty charged or convicted with criminal offences included Faumuina
(abusive language), Matau Karauna (assault) and Autagavaia (threatening
to kill). The second list contained sixty names of those whom the
Administrator required to meet him at Mulinu'u on 8 January. On this
20list appeared Tuimaleali'ifano's name. Accompanying these lists was 
a notice requiring Samoans who did not belong to Faleata and Vaimauga 
districts to leave these districts before 11 January on the grounds 
that these districts were 'disturbed areas', as proclaimed by Richardson 
in early 1928, although completely ignored by the Mau and not enforced 
by government since that time.
The day following the serving of these notices, the Mau met in a 
criticial fono at Vaimoso to decide the response to Allen's demands. 
Present at the meeting were lawyers Slipper and Hall-Skelton and they 
apparently advised the Mau to agree to the Administrator's requirements 
so as to avoid further bloodshed. The Mau leadership, however, was 
uneasy and regarded the notices as an excuse to lure them out to be shot. 
They did not trust Allen and they did not believe he had any intentions 
of settling the confrontation any other way but by force. But they were 
not prepared to abandon the Mau. They therefore decided neither to 
surrender 'wanted' men nor to meet the Administrator at Mulinu'u but 
instead to evacuate their members from their bases around Apia, move to
19 Ibid.
20 Copies of lists and notices all dated 6 Jan. 1930, in A.O. 25/1-9.
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villages outside the Faleata and Vaimauga districts and be prepared to
shift into the hills if they were pursued by government forces.
Faumuina who had been unanimously chosen to succeed Tamasese to the
recently created post of General Secretary of the Mau, the Mau komiti
(twenty in number), the secretarial staff and other assistants did not
however join these parties. They moved inland of Apia and coordinated
21Mau activities from a shifting base in the hills.
This decision was put into effect that same night, encouraged
along by rumours that Allen intended to attack Vaimoso. The Mau office
was closed, the flag lowered and by 9 p.m. Mau parties started moving
out. Those who resided at Vaimoso and Lepea - some twelve hundred -
headed for the villages of Leauva'a ‘and Levi further west along the
coast, while some five hundred who had lived at Matautu and Apia
villages made their way to Falefa and Falevao villages along the
northeastern coastline. The parties used motor vehicles and boats
but most walked. Their movements were quiet and orderly; by
22morning the four faitotoa around Apia were empty of the Mau.
It appears that the decision to evacuate by the Mau leadership 
was taken without waiting for directions from the villages/districts. 
Directly after the shooting, messengers were dispatched to the villages/ 
districts with the news and asking for directions on the next move.
News of Savai'i Mau parties preparing to depart for Apia was received 
on the same day that Allen handed down his notices to the Mau. When
Mau representatives to Taisi, 9 Jan. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., 
Apia; Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 8 Jan. 1930, A.O. 25/1-9; 
Information from Taulealea Taulauniu of Safune, Savai'i.
22 Ibid.
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these Savai'i parties arrived in Upolu they found the Mau already at
Leauva'a and Levi. It appears that the Savai'i opinion counselled
against meeting the police in an open clash because the police had guns
and other weapons while the Mau possessed none, and it also cautioned
against provoking the police or giving them an excuse to use their guns
again. Those Mau people already in Apia were advised to stay where they
were though, and more people would be sent in to bolster their numbers,
particularly in anticipation of police arrests of men wanted by 
23government. Mau supporters in the villages, however, had not been in
Apia during the fatal shooting and had not experienced the trauma of
seeing defenceless men shot down. At the same time the decision to
disperse from Apia was taken firstly to deny the police any excuse for
further shooting and secondly to give both sides a cooling down period.
The headquarters in Apia had not been abandoned for good. Indeed the
Mau intended to return to its strongholds around Apia after only two
24weeks in the outer districts.
Allen, however, was not going to allow the Mau to return to Apia. 
He believed that the Mau departure from Apia indicated clearly that it 
was breaking up and its members demoralised; he intended to capitalise 
on that demoralised spirit and crush the Mau completely. He therefore 
asked the New Zealand government to consider ways of granting him legal 
powers to outlaw the Mau as an organisation and also powers to deal with 
anyone, especially any European, who became involved in promoting the Mau.
Information from Taulealea Taulauniu of Safune, Savai'i; Resident 
Commissioner to Braisby, 6 Jan. 1930, A.O. 25/1-9; Administrator 
to Minister, 3 Feb. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
24 Mau representatives to Taisi, 9 Jan. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., 
Apia.
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The New Zealand government responded by suggesting an Order-in-Council
empowering Allen to declare the Mau illegal and seditious while at the
same time providing for the imposition of a penalty on any person,
European or Samoan, assisting or associating with it or attending meetings
under its auspices. This approach was suggested because it would 'avoid
the necessity for formal evidence at trial of undoubted seditious nature
25of organisation and thus preclude opportunity of propaganda evidence'.
Allen immediately agreed to the suggested Order-in-Council - 'it seems
exactly what is needed especially with regard to Europeans' - and
26requested that it be proceeded with at once. Together with the 
warship^ which departed from New Zealand on the night of 8 January 
(N.Z. time) complete with a Moth aeroplane, tents and a reporter from the 
Auckland Star and sailed directly to Apia at Allen's request instead of 
standing by at Suva, Allen was provided with all the requirements which 
he felt were necessary for a sustained campaign of aggression against the 
Mau.
But that was not the end of his problems. The inquest, which 
commenced on 2 January 1930 was going well for the government; still, 
he was forced into an awkward position when he was requested to guarantee 
safe conduct for Mau people who were required as witnesses at the inquest 
and he could not see his way to give such a guarantee. The allegations 
that the inquest was less than fair to the Samoans were valid in themselves 
and were skilfully exploited in anti-government propaganda even though it 
was doubtful that further witnesses would have materially improved the 
Samoans' case, given their lawyer's dismal performance during that hearing.
EA to Administrator, 8 Jan. 1930, A.O. 25/1-9.
26 Administrator to EA, 8 Jan. 1930, A.O. 25/1-9.
228
On another matter, Allen refused transmission of an account of
the shooting to the New Zealand press because in his view the account
was 'offensive, untrue and seditious' and also because he felt that the
27account reflected on the inquest which was still in progress. Hall-
Skelton objected, and cabled Holland to raise the matter with the New
Zealand government. Holland duly obliged and both the government in
New Zealand and the Administrator were required to come up with
justification of the Administrator's use of censorship on correspondence.
At the same time as this issue was being thrashed out, attempts were
made - apparently led by Hall-Skelton and Smyth - to organise a public
meeting amongst the white community. The attempts were unsuccessful in
the end, but Allen was again put to much trouble - including police
intervention in the preliminary meetings - to stamp out that potential
28source of embarrassment. Hall-Skelton and Smyth left Samoa soon after.
On 10 January the Order-in-Council which contained powers 
authorising the Administrator to declare the Mau a seditious organisation 
arrived from New Zealand. The same day he issued three further notices 
to the Mau: virtually the whole of the north coastline of Upolu was 
declared a 'disturbed area' and non-residents of that area were asked to 
leave for their own homes immediately. Furthermore heavy restrictions 
on movements, as well as a ban on fono and ta'alolo, were proclaimed for 
the 'disturbed areas'. The Order was published the following day and 
became effective on Sunday 12 January. The same day, the Dunedin arrived 
in Apia. The Mau was declared a seditious organisation on Monday and the 
operations by combined police and military forces commenced immediately.
27 Administrator to EA, 3 Jan. 1930 and 5 Jan. 1930; A .0. 25/1-9.




The arrival of the Dunedin acted as the final confirmation to 
the Samoans that Allen intended using firepower to crush the Mau.
There were fears that the warship would bombard the villages in which 
the Mau had congregated. Because they did not want these villages to 
suffer and because they believed that they would be shot on sight, quite 
apart from not wanting to give up the Mau, the decision was taken to
take refuge in the bush. Apart from a few who could not possibly
survive in the bush, such as the old man Tuimaleali'ifano, all the Mau
2<men then present in the villages along the north coast took to the hills.
As all of them had spent a large portion of their time in the bush 
during the normal course of their lives, working their plantations, 
hunting and felling trees for the building of fale and boats, the
prospect of staying out there was not a daunting one. They could erect
bush shelters within the hour and an inelaborate Samoan fale took only a 
few hours to put up with so many helping hands available. For food, the 
plantations in whichever location they were at provided their 
requirements and of course they did not need cooking ranges, pots and 
other kitchen utensils to prepare and eat their food. In addition, 
those that remained in the villages nearby - mainly women and young 
people - prepared loads of food and took it up to the fugitive Mau. For 
drinking they collected rainwater by using leaves attached to tree trunks 
if they were a distance from rivers and lakes, and there was always 
available coconuts, with their plentiful supply of juice and flesh.
They were in fact set for a lengthy stay if the circumstances demanded it.
29 Information from Taulealea Taulauniu of Safune, and Toluono Lama 
of Palauli, Savai'i; Administrator to EA, 15 Jan. 1930, A.O. 25/1-9.
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Allen's objectives and the means for achieving them were simple. 
He aimed to secure 'those required on warrants or otherwise, and 
dispersing the rest to their villages' and to achieve this, he planned 
to corner the Mau at the western end of Upolu. To ensure that the 
wanted men did not slip over to Savai'i he had virtually all the boats 
which were found on the north coastline of Upolu seized and brought to 
Mulinu'u. The New Zealand government which was told that only Mau boats 
had been seized felt that this was an illegal act, but Allen blandly 
asserted that his action was legal while the boats were used in support 
of a seditious organisation.^
The Administrator did not launch an operation on the eastern end 
of Upolu conjointly with his initiative in the west, believing that the 
staunchest adherents of the Mau were concentrated in the west and that 
if he succeeded in removing those from the councils of the Mau, it would 
quickly die out. Also, several villages on the eastern half of Upolu 
such as Lauli'i, those in Falealili district and several in Aleipata 
had remained nominally Malo supporters and he did not expect the Mau 
fugitives in that part of the island to last for any lengthy period of 
time amongst those Malo people. He did, however, establish police posts 
to keep an eye on the movements of the Mau on that side of the island 
and he sent emissaries, such as Tupua Sam Meredith, formerly of the 
Citizens' Committee but now an M.L.C. and a Malo supporter, to try and 
talk these Mau people into giving up. These missions failed to win over 
the Mau members, while at the same time the Malo villages when visited 
by the Mau treated them as visiting Samoan malaga parties and accorded
30 Administrator to EA, 15 Jan. 1930; PM to Administrator, 15 Jan. 1930 
A.O. 25/1-9; Mau representatives to Taisi, 6 Feb. 1930, Mau Papers, 
PM's Dept., Apia; T.W. Reid, A Man Like Bati, (London, 1960), p. 124
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them all the courtesies and hospitality befitting the titles of the
visiting matai and befitting also the standing in Samoan tradition of
31the villages and districts represented in these parties.
During the first two weeks of operations, when combined teams
of police and military men conducted daily excursions into the interior
of Upolu, concentrating on the area between Apia and Mulifanua village
along the northwest coast, nothing was seen of the Mau except youths
carrying food inland. The Administration in this period resorted to
arresting a few of the Mau matai, including Tuimaleali1ifano, as well
as a few taulelea found in villages who probably had nothing to do with
the Mau. These men were charged with minor offences and dispatched to
their villages while Tuimaleali'ifano was held in custody at Mulinu'u
32for a week 'to keep the old fellow out of trouble'. Saipai'a, an 
important titleholder but without influence within the Mau - though his 
title had entitled him to a conspicuous place in the Mau leadership - 
indicated that he had left the Mau, and Allen, in need of positive 
results to report, made much of Saipai'a's 'defection', although he
33was fully aware of his lack of influence and support within the Mau.
After two weeks of fruitless sorties into the bush, the government
forces had their first break. On 22 January two Mau camps - including
the principal one on the western side of Upolu - were located. On the
main camp, the Inspector of Police reported,
It consisted of about five acres of bush land in tall 
timber. The fales [sic] were large. Some of them would 
accommodate 100 men. Twenty three fales [sic] had been 
built of bush timber. The roofs were well made and were
Mana [Luafalemana of Falefa village] to Tupua [S.H. Meredith], 21 Jan. 
1930, A.O. 25/1-9; Administrator to EA, 3 Feb. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
Administrator to EA, 15 Jan. 1930 and 16 Jan. 1930: A.O. 25/1-9.
Administrator to EA, 18 Jan. 1930, A.O. 25/1-1Q; Administrator to EA,
3 Feb. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
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waterproof, thatched and tied with sinnet. Banana 
leaves and wild tomua [sic] being used. Several of 
the fales [sic] had floorings of light poles laid on 
thick branches and altogether were quite comfortable 
and weather proof. 4^
The police/military forces estimated that over a thousand men
had used this camp, that practically all their food had come from the
villages on the coast and that the camp had been occupied twenty-four
hours before they had stumbled onto it. No occupant of the Mau camp
was seen. The armed parties, however, came across several groups of
youths carrying loads of food and drinks inland and they captured the
food as well as some of the youths. They also arrested as a matter of
course any Samoan males they found inland away from their villages,
working in their plantations or engaged in some task in the forest,
35on suspicion that those Samoans might be Mau supporters.
During one of these encounters - the Mau in the bush were under
strict orders not to engage the armed government forces in any type of
hostility - a young man, Molia from the village of Safune in Savai'i,
was mindlessly shot in circumstances which generated a much more bitter
feeling amongst the Samoans toward government than even the shooting on
28 December 1929. A party of about thirty police and military men had
surprised a group of about ten youths inland of Fasito'otai village.
These young men were part of a network which relayed food from the
villages to the Mau in the bush, and they were waiting for the food to
arrive; when they were pounced on. All succeeded in escaping except
3 6for Molia, who was stopped by a bullet. According to the
34 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 23 Jan. 1930, A.O. 25/1-9.
35 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 20 Jan. 1930, and 23 Jan. 1930: A.O. 25/1-9;
Nonu's testimony, A.O. 6/8/52.
3 6 Inquest on Molia, A.O. 6/8.52; Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 23 Jan. 1930, 
A.O. 25/1-9; Administrator to EA, 23 Jan. 1930, A.O. 25/1-11.
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version of the incident told amongst the Samoans, Molia had been on
his haunches looking up pleadingly at the white policeman, when this
man shot him. He then told the critically wounded Molia to stand up
and walk to the track. This was a kind of callousness which the Samonas
found most distasteful notwithstanding their acceptance of the existing
state of conflict. In their talk the word papalagi became interchanged
37with the word manu - animals.
The evidence given during the inquest into the shooting - Molia 
died four days after being shot - established from the testimonies of 
the two white policemen present at the shooting that Molia had thrown a 
stone underarm at the policeman - Lance-Corporal L.R. Ricketts - pursuing 
him, and Ricketts, 'fearing' for his life, shot him. Since Molia was by 
himself in the clearing and was also covered by another policeman with 
his revolver- Ricketts' statement that he feared for his life against an 
unarmed youth - Molia said he was 16 years old but the authorities 
asserted he looked 28 - was unconvincing. So was his testament that he 
fired as he ducked to avoid the stone; he was said to be a short man 
and it would be reasonable to assume that if his statement was correct, 
his gun would have been close to the ground when it was fired. However 
Molia, who Ricketts said was standing at the time, was shot just below 
his ribcage and the bullet followed a downward course in his body ending 
up lodged in his upper thigh. Molia's deposition, taken by the Chief 
Justice at hospital, stated he was shot while on the ground, having 
collapsed from exhaustion. During the inquest, several policemen who 
testified implied very strongly that the shooting was motivated by a 
sense of revenge on the part of the white policemen for the death of




The Chief Justice brought in a formal verdict that Molia had
died from Ricketts' bullet, but added that 'it would be improper at
this stage to make any comment on the case'. This strange statement
was given clearer meaning when Allen caused charges of manslaughter to
be brought against Ricketts. These were subsequently dismissed. But
there was an interesting twist; the four assessors - local white
residents - who heari the case with the Chief Justice, stated in their
unanimous acquittal decision that Ricketts was 'justified in firing on
39Molia for his own protection, believing his life to be in danger'.
Allen himself, as hard a colonial official as any, felt that the
shooting was unjustified 'as no life was in danger' and had offered
40his resignation on the strength of that belief. His offer was 
declined by the Minister.
To the Mau, the assessors' opinion was typical of the attitude
adopted by the local whites, many of whom had initially been supporters
of the dissident movement. They were now offering their services to the
government forces as informers and as guides - a local planter was the
guide for the party that shot Molia and his account of the incident was
most condemnatory of Molia's party, much more so than any of the police
evidence. Nelson, who had always been careful to present to the Samoans
the good side of members of the white community, wrote from New Zealand:
My heart feels the shame when I think of our brethren 
Europeans and halfcastes and some Samoans who have 
dodged from the course that we had all decided to take.
O O See A.O. 6/8/52.
39 Administrator to EA, 19 Mar. 1930, A.O. 6/8/52.
40 Administrator to EA, 23 Jan. 1930, A.O. 25/1-11.
235
I cannot forget the days when this thing was 
initiated, when most of the papalagi doubted 
that the Samoans would stick to it, believing 
that only the papalagi could be trusted to stand 
fast. But now we see the faithful and the 
unfaithful. Only a few Samoans have opted out 
but the papalagi and most of the halfcastes have 
now shown that they are unfaithful.41
Since late 1928 the Samoans in the Mau had known that they were
virtually on their own. They rather preferred things that way, recognising
that Nelson was probably the only white who could be of any real
assistance to them. On the other hand it confirmed their view that when
the crunch came whites would reject the Samoans and side with their own
kind. Those whites who persisted with the Mau - Nelson was obviously the
best example of this - were naturally regarded as men of exceptional
courage and conviction. They were respected and admired. The trust in
Nelson was thus largely a result of the Samoan perception that he was
prepared to sacrifice his wealth and position, but above all prepared to
42deny his white blood for his Samoan side.
IV
With the discovery and destruction of the main Mau camp, Allen 
and the government forces believed they had the Mau cornered and 
increased their efforts in an attempt to bring the conflict to a quick 
end. The districts of Lefaga and Falelatai on the southwestern coast were 
declared disturbed areas and forces on land, supported by the spotter
A letter from Taisi [to the Mau komiti], 3 May 1930, Mau Papers, 
PM's Dept., Apia.
42 Information from Pad of Asau village.
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plane and naval units on the inter-island vessel Lady Roberts, swept
onto the south coast of Upolu to round up the Mau men who were believed
to have crossed over the mountain range from the north side after their
43camp had been destroyed. stepped up also were night raids on the
villages throughout the whole of Upolu and especially those in the
disturbed areas. On the pretext of searching for Mau men who might have
sneaked in from the bush under cover of darkness for food and shelter,
government forces entered fale (p) and freely used their bayonets to
slash through matting, mosquito nets, clothes' chests and beds. They
did not find any Mau men but they persisted in these searches,
44humiliating the women and terrorising the children.
During these night raids and also in daytime searches, the
government forces senselessly wrecked furniture and removed or destroyed
fishing apparatus - spears, goggles and nets - and anything else, such as
battery-powered torches, which the people in the villages might
conceivably use to obtain food or to assist the Mau. When a delegation
of Samoan women asked Allen and the Commander of the naval forces to cease
these night raids and searches, Allen firmly told them 'that they had
only their own husbands and families to blame for them, and they must
45use their influence with their own families to end the Mau ...'. This 
callous response helped spark off the women's Mau.
Allen's response to the women was partly due to his frustrations 
at being unable to pin down the Mau. After several weeks of military
Administrator to EA, 25 Jan. 1930 and 28 Jan. 1930: A.O. 25/1-9;
Administrator to Minister, 3 Feb. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
Mau representatives to Taisi, 6 Feb. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., 
Apia; Administrator to Minister, 17 Feb. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
Administrator to Minister, 17 Feb. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
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operations, not a single important Mau leader - Allen had a list of 
eighty - except for Tuimaleali'ifano, had been secured. The Mau 
parties in the bush had evaded the government forces with ease and the 
declaration of disturbed areas, the imposition of restrictions on travel 
and other Samoan activities, as well as the subjection of those in the 
villages to intimidating tactics, had not stopped the supply of food and 
intelligence reaching the fugitive Mau. The disintegration of the Mau 
confidently predicted by Allen just did not look like eventuating.
It was time to take another look at the situation and Allen 
whittled the possibilities down to two alternatives. The first was for 
the New Zealand government to dispatch immediately to Samoa a force of 
two hundred and fifty men which it had recruited and given training at 
Trentham. It was thought that these additional men would place 
continuous pressure on the Mau, which would result in 'a fair prospect
46of securing the leaders which is the most important object to aim at'.
The Commodore favoured this option. The second alternative was for the
naval forces in Samoa to continue as they had been doing for as long
as possible and then for the Samoan constabulary to maintain whatever
pressure they could on the Mau after the navy had left. Allen preferred
this alternative. 'My own impression is that this is all that will be
47required, and that no further force will be needed'. He did, however, 
ask for additional powers to control traffic, food supplies and to censor 
mail. He also floated the idea of imposing martial law.
The New Zealand government, by an Order-in-Council, immediately 
granted Allen the additional powers he had requested and Allen put these
Administrator to Minister, 3 Feb. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
47 Ibid.
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to use directly on the arrival of the Order in Apia. Members of the
police force as well as the military were given virtually unfettered
powers to detain and search any person travelling in Upolu, to seize and
examine and if necessary to possess and retain anything carried by such
persons, and finally members of the government forces 'may employ such
force as is necessary to effect these duties. By proclamation
Allen restricted all travel on Upolu - outside a one-mile radius from
the Central Office in Apia - to hours between 5.30 a.m. and 6.30 p.m. ;
travellers were to use only the main road along the coast and defined
public paths. Medical practitioners and white missionaries were not
affected by this proclamation and a written permit from the police also
placed one beyond these restrictions. All those travelling by sea
around Upolu were required to call into Apia harbour - though only
between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. - and offer themselves up to H.M.S. Dunedin
or any other designated vessel for examination. Finally, all those who
travelled on Upolu were not allowed to carry any amount of food greater
than required for their sustenance during the trip, unless specifically
48authorised by the Administrator himself or his appointee. All these 
measures, according to Allen, were necessary to prevent food and information 
getting to the Mau people in the hills.
Soon, however, he had to admit that they were not effective and 
after trying other approaches such as dropping propaganda leaflets on 
Mau positions in the bush, pursuing tentative approaches from certain Mau 
leaders, and encouraging missionary initiatives, and coming up with Mau 
stragglers only, Allen began to doubt his judgement given only two weeks 
earlier and started to come around to Commodore Blake's view that the 
force standing by in New Zealand would be needed. He wrote, 'I had
The Western Samoa Gazette, 7 Feb. 1930 and 8 Feb. 1930; copies 
of all Orders and Instructions are found in A.O. 25/1-10.
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confidently expected some [Mau leaders] would have been caught before
now ... It is essential to obtain some success with the leaders before
our efforts can at all be relaxed. I reluctantly think, therefore,
49that the force you are preparing will probably be needed'.
Allen had just then discovered after six weeks of continuous 
operations that the main body of the Mau which his forces had been 
pursuing did not include the core of the Mau leadership which had 
remained in the hills inland of Apia since 7 January and had coordinated 
the activities of the Mau from there. Through messengers, they had kept 
in constant touch with all the Mau parties as well as Apia and thence 
Nelson in Auckland.
On Allen's discovering this, the armed forces were pulled in
from the south of Upolu and an intensive operation was mounted for
Faumuina and the Mau leadership. This concentrated campaign again
failed. At the beginning of February the Mau leaders had dispersed and
joined the other Mau parties, leaving with Faumuina only one
representative each of those Mau parties east and west of Upolu. Two
of the strongest and most militant leaders, Autagavaia Siaupiu of Palauli
and Lavea Tausitino of Safotu, both of Savai'i, were the chosen
representatives. With messengers and other taulelea this party was
reduced from about fifty to under ten and in this way they felt that
the control centre of the Mau would be able to evade capture more easily
50while still being able to function effectively. When Allen launched 
his operation to capture the Mau leaders inland of Apia, he did not
Administrator to Minister, 17 Feb. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
Mau representatives to Taisi, 6 Feb. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., 
Apia; Administrator to EA, 14 Feb. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
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realise that it was doomed to failure from the start, for not only was 
he searching for a few Samoans in dense tropical forests but that part 
of the hills where the Mau leaders moved was known intimately to 
Faumuina - it was his land.
While government forces were engaged in this futile search, Mau 
parties in other parts of Upolu came down the hills, especially at 
nights, and joined occupants of villages near their camps in feasting. 
This provided welcome relief, for it had been a particularly wet 
January/February and hiding out in the bush had become uncomfortable, 
particularly for the older men, some of whom had to be carried around 
on stretchers fashioned out of sticks and leaves.
To add to Allen's worries, increasing numbers of the naval
contingent, unused as they were to tropical conditions, were
succumbing to sickness and the Commodore was sufficiently disturbed by
the condition of his men to request an almost immediate departure for
New Zealand. Government in Wellington was not happy with this, partly
because it did not want to send the Samoa Military Police unless it was
absolutely necessary, partly because it wanted the naval party to be in
Samoa when the military police arrived if they were sent, but mainly
because the Minister of Defence - Hon. J.G. Cobbe - was on his way to
52Samoa and they wanted his views before taking any action.
Information from Toluono Lama of Palauli, Savai'i; T.N. Reid,
A Man Like Bati, (London, 1960) provides an excellent account 
of the weather conditions at the time when the Mau was in the 
bush, and recaptures also the general atmosphere in Samoa during 
the Mau.
52 PM to Administrator, 17 Feb. 1930 and 25 Feb. 1930: A.O. 25/1-10.
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Cobbe arrived on 19 February and conciliatory overtures on his
behalf, conveyed mainly through the white missionaries, intensified,
and soon succeeded in persuading the Mau to come in for a conference.
This success was due largely to two factors - trust amongst the Mau in
the word of the missionaries that everyone in the Mau could attend
without fear of being arrested or molested in any way by the military
forces or the police, and secondly trust that Cobbe would ensure that
the promises made by the missionaries on behalf of the government would 
53be upheld. The Mau had long since lost all faith in Allen and 
believed him to be a vicious, dishonourable man.
The Mau leadership saw Cobbe as a man more likely to be 
sympathetic to their requirements if only because he had not been 
personally involved in the confrontation and therefore should not be 
embittered towards them. As a member of the New Zealand cabinet he 
was an active decision-maker on Samoan affairs, which role gave him a 
higher rank and status to the Administrator. The Samoans were always 
sensitive to matters of this nature and would invariably deal with 
persons of standing almost as a compulsive demonstrative of their own 
preoccupation with such matters.
So the Mau came down from the hills and in a series of meetings 
held amongst its supporters just prior to negotiations with government, 
decided that whatever the result of the talks, they would not return to 
the bush. They would not resist the armed forces, but neither would they
Mau representatives to Taisi, 8 Mar. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept.,
Apia; Cobbe to EA, 2 Mar. 1930; Administrator to EA, 25 Feb. 1930;
R. Bartlett to Administrator, 28 Feb. 1930 and 2 Marl 1930: A.O. 25/1-10.
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give up the Mau. On the government side Cobbe was optimistic of
negotiating a satisfactory settlement with the Mau and advised the
New Zealand government not to make any definite arrangements for the
dispatch of the military police to Samoa. Allen, on the other hand,
after consistently arguing that if only the Mau would agree to sit down
with him and talk matters over the conflict would have ended long since,
now said on the eve of such talks taking place that he was not optimistic
55of a satisfactory outcome.
The Administrator might have felt annoyed at being told by the 
Prime Minister just how important it was to obtain a settlement and 
being directed that should a deadlock emerge, points at issue should 
be immediately conveyed to Cabinet for a decision and in the meantime 
not to allow the conference to disperse. In his response to the Prime 
Minister Allen said, 'It should be understood we are not dealing with 
civilized or intelligent people and negotiations which would be conducted 
in such a case are not possible here. Samoans are devoid of reasoning 
faculty and success or failure must therefore depend on a few simple 
issues . ..' . ^
Throughout the talks that followed Allen's conduct betrayed a 
lack of confidence and also a lack of knowledge on how to handle the 
situation, with the result that he was reduced to falling back on a show 
of contempt for the Mau leaders and their thoughtful approach to the
Mau representatives to Taisi, 8 Mar. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., 
Apia.
Cobbe to EA, 25 Feb. 1930; Administrator to EA, 24 Feb. 1930 and 
3 Mar. 1930: A.O. 25/1-10.
Administrator to EA, 2 Mar. 1930; PM to Administrator, 2 Mar. 1930: 
A.O. 25/1-10.
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negotiations. He appeared obsessed with the fear that the Samoans were 
playing with him and he therefore adopted bulldozing tactics and at the 
first meeting he made three demands - end the Mau; surrender those 
wanted by the court for trial; Mau leaders to meet the Administrator 
in fono whenever required - which he refused to allow to be subjected to 
negotiation. Furthermore he required immediate replies from the Mau on 
his demands, insisting that they were subjects that did not require much 
time for resolving.^
Because there was never any question of ending the Mau under the 
conditions then obtaining, the actual response to the demands did not 
pose any difficulties. The point at issue was more whether they should 
even bother to discuss these demands with the Malo. In the end they 
decided to play out this pretence, first to give the Mau a chance of 
getting together unimpeded to discuss future directions, secondly to 
impress on the Minister that they were reasonable men and because they 
just could not resist the challenge of embroiling themselves in political 
discussions.
While Allen's insecurity and inflexibility predetermined the
failure of the talks, the considerations which prompted the Mau to
indulge in the discussions ensured that they would not be hurried, but
would proceed through recognised fa'a Samoa procedures which are required
in dealing with such matters. Faumuina, on behalf of the Mau, told the
government delegation: 'No one could claim control of the Mau; there
was no one leader. All were equal. They must therefore have a decision
on behalf of the whole of Samoa. They desired time to thoroughly
58discuss the Administrator's proposals'.
57 'Notes on meeting with Mau leaders at Vaimoso', 3 Mar. 1930; 
Administrator to EA, 27 Feb. 1930: A.O. 25/1-10.
5 8 'Notes on meeting with Mau leaders ...', 3 Mar. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
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On the second morning (Tuesday 4 March) Allen returned to
Vaimoso, as he had promised the previous day, to receive the Mau's
reply. Faumuina appeared by himself with Tuimaleali'ifano and
informed the Administrator's party that no decision had been reached.
Whereupon Allen, probably angered by the rebuff from the Mau, returned
to his office and cabled the Minister of External Affairs that 'My
impression is we shall get no further, that no answer is intended
and that we shall not be able to prolong the conference beyond tomorrow
because there is nothing more to say and therefore we shall have to
59commence action again'. He went on to say that he believed the 
second and third points presented no difficulty but that the first 
one was dividing the Mau and no answers were intended. He was wrong 
again, the Mau answered the first point the following day - the Mau 
would not end - but continued its deliberations over the other two 
demands.
With that, the Mau deflated Allen's act and once again placed
the onus on him to come up with another proposal to end the confrontation.
Cobbe suggested a more conciliatory approach, but Allen convinced him
that his demands were the very minimum he could allow the Mau. So
another Ministerial visit, undertaken without definite policy directions
from Wellington except to play it by ear and trust the man on the spot,
60ended in failure to bring the Mau to a satisfactory cessation.
The Mau, however, decided to give up to the authorities the 
wanted men, although it insisted that these men had not been protected
Administrator to EA, 4 Mar. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
For J.G. Cobbe's report on his visit to Samoa (20 Mar. 1930) , see 
IT 1/23/8-18.
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by the Mau but had escaped capture through the incompetence of the
police and the military forces. The men marched to the police station
and turned themselves in. On the issue of meeting the Administrator
there were differences amongst the Mau; some wanted such meetings
although on the understanding that non-Mau Samoans would not participate.
In the end it was decided that any meeting with the Administrator would
be a waste of time until the governments both in Samoa and in New Zealand
saw their way clear to meet some, if not all, of the requests made by
61the Mau since late 1926.
As a parting shot, the Mau presented the Malo party with a list
of seventeen 'points' which requested inter alia the dropping of
charges against Mau leaders so that negotiations could be established
on a secure and dignified basis; expressed dissatisfaction with the
findings of the inquests into the 28 December killings and Molia's
shooting; complained of the hardship suffered by the women and children;
questioned the way New Zealand had carried out its mandate of Samoa and
raised again the matter of the Berlin Treaty of 1889 and the 1900
Treaty which effected the division of the Samoa islands and the belief
62that New Zealand should abide by the terms of the treaties. Most of 
these submissions came from Nelson, by way of the Tofua that had just 
berthed, and were submitted by the Mau more as a gesture than anything 
else, because all had been made before and Allen had stated categorically 
that they would not be conceded; in any case the crucial decision, that 
the Mau would continue, had been taken.
P.T. (Tamasese Meaole] to Taisi, 3 Apr. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., 
Apia.
Faumuina and other Mau leaders to Administrator, 7 Mar. 1930,
A.0. 25/1-10.
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The conduct of these negotiations, particularly on Faumuina's
part, generated dissatisfaction amongst the ranks of the Mau. Two
incidents were responsible for this state of affairs, and both occurred
on Wednesday 5 May. When the negotiations opened that day Faumuina
informed the Malo party that the Mau would not end while on the matter
of the Mau members wanted by the police the Mau had not shielded them
and if the police wanted to arrest these men, then it was their job to
get them. According to the new Tamasese titleholder - Tamasese Meaole -
this was the decision of the Mau and Faumuina should have confined
himself strictly to that, but he went beyond and indicated to the Malo
party that the Mau would in fact hand over the wanted men although he
0 3had not been authorised to say so. Faumuina and the twenty members
of the Mau komiti, on the other hand, maintained that the Mau had in
fact decided to hand the men over, and this appeared to be borne out
by the men offering themselves up at the police station, rather than
64waiting for the police to come and arrest them. Apart from 
demonstrating just how sensitive Samoans are on being properly 
represented in the strictest sense of the word, this incident also 
showed how a decision reached through consensus was easily amenable 
to different interpretations.
The second incident was Allen's pardon and withdrawal of the 
charge - abusive language - which had been preferred against Faumuina.
Allen said he did this as a mark of sympathy and also as a demonstration 
of their genuine spirit of conciliation towards the Mau. Tamasese 
recounted that Faumuina's failure to reject this pardon shook 'the 
country', particularly when it was remembered that the late Tamasese had
P.T. [Tamasese Meaole] to Taisi, 3 Apr. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept,
Apia.
Mau Representatives to Taisi, 8 Mar. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.64
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rejected offers from the Malo of official posts and also when so many
other Mau leaders still had charges hanging over their heads. 'The
country was exceedingly angry with him [Faumuina]; even to the stage
of some asking him if he had performed thus out of cowardice. Some
65felt that he was a Judas'.
In fairness to Faumuina though, his behaviour would not have 
appeared to indicate such a state. As pointed out above, the decision 
to give up the wanted men was apparently made by the Mau before 
Faumuina made that undertaking to the Malo party. On the question of 
being pardoned there are several matters to note - first, the charge 
against Faumuina grew out of either Allen's or Braisby's imagination. 
There was no basis for it and it would not have stood up in court, 
even in a court obviously experiencing difficulties with remaining 
outside politics. The charge was clearly made with the purpose of 
bringing Faumuina into talking distance of the authorities rather than 
of putting him in prison. Secondly, it would have been futile if not 
dishonest to reject the pardon on the spot. It was not within Faumuina's 
powers to reimpose a charge on himself. This was demonstrated when 
he led the wanted men to the police station and offered himself up to 
police custody saying that he did not accept his pardon, and the police 
told him that they could not arrest him. At the same time, Faumuina 
himself had been offered several official posts since the beginning of 
the confrontation but had rejected them.
Tamasese's account of these matters doubtless reflected certain 
feelings amongst the Mau people; it would appear, however, that he
65 P.T. [Tamasese Meaole] to Taisi, 3 Apr. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., 
Apia.
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overdramatised them somewhat with a view to the post then held by
Faumuina. Nelson clearly believed this, for in responding to Tamasese
he advised him: 'My own true opinion is for you to remain quiet until
66the country decides to appoint you - there will be opportunities'.
In the meantime, he urged Tamasese to accept the leadership chosen by 
the Mau and work with diligence and dedication for the good of Samoa.
Of course the clearest demonstration that Faumuina had not abused his 
position and exceeded his brief to the extent indicated by Tamasese 
and in the stories that have persisted even up to now, could be seen 
in the fact that the Mau did not remove him as 'Chief Secretary', the 
top administrative post in the Mau organisation.
Throughout the discussions both sides maintained a restrained 
hold on their presentations while remaining steadfast in their positions. 
The Mau, however, was prepared to negotiate - although admittedly after 
confirming that the Mau would not end - and the concessions on the 
wanted men, as well as the admission to the possibility of fono with 
the Administrator, were made with the purpose of persuading Allen and 
his party to soften their position somewhat and engage in reasonable 
negotiations. The Malo people however, dominated as they were by Allen's 
contempt for the Mau leadership, refused to recognise this opening.
Tuimaleali'ifano in a speech rebuking Allen's attitude, which 
the latter said was 'both rude and hostile' but in fact was merely 
forthright and frank, made the pertinent comment: 'We now see that you
are only trying to get something good for you out of us. What about us?'
Taisi to Tamasese, 17 Apr. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
67 See' Report of meeting held at Vaimoso' (5 Mar. 1930), A.O. 25/1-10.
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He said that the New Zealand government had been lying about the 
situation in Samoa and had blamed the Mau for the continuation of the 
conflict and yet, he continued, referring to the 1918 epidemic and the 
1929 shooting, 'thousands of Samoans have been buried in the earth' and 
this established that there are 'people amongst you who have committed 
offences'.
This was one of the major issues raised by the Mau, which argued
that it was ludicrous for the government to pursue those of its members
who had not paid taxes and those who wore Mau uniforms - 'there are no
bullets in them' - while at the same time those responsible for shooting
and killing Samoans had gone Scot free. The reference to Malo people
who had committed offenses was also a thinly-veiled indication of the
Mau belief that the 1929 shooting was deliberately planned and that
Allen had been intimately involved in the operation. Tuimaleali'ifano
concluded by returning to the central point of the Malo's refusing to
negotiate: 'Now what have you given the Mau? You only urged the Mau
to give up and you have nothing to give to satisfy us. The Mau will
68not say yes until you have put a crown on the Mau'.
Another demonstration of the hardening attitude of the Mau to 
Allen's inflexibility came in the form of reversing clear indications 
given earlier during the talks that although the Mau would not end, 
they would disperse to their villages and continue the work of the Mau 
there. In his concluding remarks Faumuina told Allen and his party 
that the Mau would not disperse from Apia 'and you can do what you wish 
with the Mau'. Allen thought that this was an empty boast and so
68 Ibid.; the belief that Allen was intimately involved in the 1929 
fatal shooting was used as a theme of a Samoan song which is still 
one of the most popular in the country.
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reported to his Minister in Wellington. But when the truce ended and
the armed forces checked out the Mau strongholds around Apia, they
discovered that Faumuina had meant what he said - the Mau had not 
69dispersed. Furthermore, the forces discovered that the Mau intended 
to allow the Malo to do as it wished with them as they had told Allen.
When the police and military arrived at Vaimoso on Saturday
morning 8 March, they found the Mau matai and taulelea engaged in 1ava
ceremonies. They all wore their Mau uniforms in defiance of repeated
warnings by Allen on this specific point during the talks. On being
told that the Mau would not disperse and was waiting for a reply to
their requests, the armed forces entered the houses and started tearing
the stripes off the lavalava(p). The Mau people remained seated and
continued with their 1ava. They were then informed that they would all
be taken to prison, whereupon they finished their 1ava and then gathered
at the roadside waiting to be transported to prison. They had already
decided to embarrass the Malo with large numbers in prison, as they
had successfully done in early 1928. This time, however, only some of
the leading figures were retained by the police in prison and the rest
sent away. This group returned to Vaimoso. They were however not left
70alone by the Malo forces.
Vaimoso village was immediately placed under siege conditions. 
Guard posts were established in the village and strict restrictions on 
movement were imposed. Males were allowed to leave but no one was
Administrator to EA, 8 Mar. 1930 and 6 Mar. 1930; 'Report of 
meeting at Vaimoso' (5 Mar. 1930): A.O. 25/1-10.
70 P.T. [Tamasese Meaole] to Taisi, 3 Apr. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept. 
Apia; Administrator to EA, 10 Mar. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
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allowed to return and no new ones were allowed to enter. Only women
and children were permitted some freedom of movement. The troops
confiscated all the food they could find in the village and no food
was allowed in from the outside. No concessions were made for the
normal residents of Vaimoso. After two days of this treatment and with
still a core group of about 400 (Allen reported 200) refusing to shift
from Vaimoso, Allen - also recognising that starving out the people
congregated at Vaimoso was not working - changed his tactics. His armed
forces in large numbers moved in on Monday 10 March and forcibly loaded
Mau people from villages outside Vaimoso onto vehicles and boats and
71delivered them bodily to their respective villages.
Allen was determined to keep them there with two objects in 
mind - to prevent the Mau from 'coming to a head again at Vaimoso or 
elsewhere' and to give the people a chance of living together once again 
in their villages and hoping that time would bring harmony. The problem, 
of course, was to immobilise the Mau, which had clearly indicated its 
intention to contest government authority, while at the same time ensure 
that the measures taken to effect immobilisation were not so outrageous 
and violent that they in themselves created bitterness and resentment, 
and therefore jeopardised the chances of achieving this second objective.
In the event, Allen chose to persist with his policy of aggression 
against the Mau and to put pressure on Mau supporters in their villages 
and districts. The declaration made the previous month restricting 
travel was revoked but replaced by a declaration (dated 13 March) 
regulating travel between Upolu and Savai'i so that effectively all
71 P.T. [Tamasese Meaole] to Taisi, 3 Apr. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., 
Apia; Administrator to Minister, 12 Mar. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
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Samoans travelling between these two islands required permits.
Moreover, powers to all police and military men to detain, search and 
arrest were extended to cover both Upolu and Savai'i and those 
travelling inter-island. Allen also ordered that the wearing of Mau 
uniform 'must be stopped' and Mau fono anywhere must be promptly 
dispersed. He wanted the traffic between Savai'i and Upolu to be 
closely watched and added another condition to the grant of travel
permits - 'no permits given to anyone who has not paid all arrears of
, 72tax .
The day after the Mau were forcibly removed from Vaimoso he 
ordered a police patrol to circulate throughout Upolu to break up any 
Mau gatherings, check on the wearing of Mau uniforms and deal with any 
cases of intimidation. He also had contingents of marines patrolling 
the 'disturbed' areas - all the north coast and southern 'A'ana - 
daily, to enforce the same instructions. When the Dunedin left for 
New Zealand on 13 March, three days after the dispersal of the Mau, 
a party of twenty-five marines was left behind to assist the police.
The police and the marines executed Allen's orders with relish. 
After months of frustrations in being unable to come to grips with the 
elusive members of the Mau, they suddenly found themselves presented 
with Mau men who literally gave themselves up to the armed forces, and 
they now had the powers and the instructions which enabled them to give 
full rein to the satisfaction of their frustrations on those upstart 
natives. Mau meetings were routed with bayonets and gunbutts freely 
in use; old matai were prodded, pushed, kicked and had lavalava ripped
72 Administrator to SNA and Resident Commissioner, 10 Mar. 1930, A.O. 
25/1-10; copies of all declarations and police orders are found in 
this same file.
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off them. Fautasi were fired on and occupants made to run, normally 
from Mulifanua or somewhere in 'A'ana district, carrying their suitcases 
all the way to Apia, where they were put on other boats and dispatched 
again to Savai'i. Those Mau people found in villages not their own 
were force-marched back to their own villages, led by a soldier 
and with another one bringing up the rear and prodding or beating along 
those who slowed down. A truck carrying more military men normally 
followed these processions and the marines alternated. Often during 
these marches older men would drop by the roadside unable to move,
and they would either be lifted on the truck or left to the care of
73Samoans. Many of those people had tried to visit Apia to see their 
matai and relatives who were in prison.
With most of the Mau leaders in gaol - Autagavaia, Namulauulu 
and Alipia were imprisoned for eighteen months each - these tactics 
succeeded to the extent that fewer of the Mau people persisted in 
returning to Apia and there appeared to be a lull in the activities of 
the Mau on the national scale. Allen, although cautious, reported to 
his Minister that the Mau was 'quite broken'. His caution was well- 
placed, however, for the Mau men, many of whom had been away from home 
for months and in some cases years, were taking a much-needed break, 
enjoying being home and being with their families. But they certainly 
had not given up the Mau.
The tough line adopted by the authorities in dealing with Mau 
members on the outside was being repeated in the prisons. Stories
P.T. [Tamasese Meaole] to Taisi, 3 Apr. 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., 
Apia; L. Naea, 'Report to Leulumoega', 30 Apr. 1930, A.O. 25/1-11 
[Naea was apparently a Mau operative in 'A'ana and this handwritten 
report was for the Mau leaders]; Administrator to Minister,
17 Mar. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10; Braisby to Administrator, 25 June 1933, 
A.O. 25/1-14.
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concerning groups of old matai being squashed into a tiny cell or
kept in solitary confinement for a few days under the most appalling
conditions reverberated throughout the Samoan community. At the same
time, the repeated arrest and imprisonment of the 84-year-old
Tama-aiga Tuimaleali'ifano, first for telling the Mau not to disperse
after the Mau/Malo discussions and then for other minor 'offenses', was
deeply resented by the Samoans, not so much because they objected to
the measures pursued by government - they expected such measures in a
conflict - but because although they appreciated the situation, they
nonetheless could not reconcile themselves to high-ranking matai,
including a Tama-aiga of old age, being manhandled and imprisoned by
'whites' whom they considered men of low breeding and no status. In
responding to reports of what was happening in Samoa at that time,
Nelson put in writing the characteristic Samoan reaction, 'Ae o ai
fo'i ua tago Iona ivi tufanua ia Tuimaleali'ifano. Tainoino ua
anu-i-lagi'. (Who would lay his common hands on Tuimaleali'ifano.
74Despicable boors, they spat at the heavens.) As a consequence of
this resentment, the effect of these measures was the opposite of what
Allen was trying to achieve. As Tamasese wrote: 'Government obviously
believe that this harsh and humiliating treatment will break the will
75of the Mau ... but not a chance'.
The Mau's response to Allen's aggressive policy was anticipated 
in New Zealand, and Allen was warned of fears held by some Cabinet 
members that the continuation of repressive actions, particularly against 
Tuimaleali'ifano, would be counterproductive to the resolution of the
Letter from Taisi, 3 May 1930; P.T. (Tamasese Meaole] to Taisi, 
3 Apr. 1930; Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
75 Ibid.
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whole conflict. Allen however, asserted that by forcibly suppressing 
the Mau, he had created a platform on which to build a constructive 
reconciliation process, and he had already moved on to the second 
objective of preparing for a representative fono which he hoped would 
serve as the major instrument in bringing everyone together. 'Repression 
of the Mau by itself will be useless, and the thoughts of the people
. 77should be guided towards working together in harmony with the government . 
The problem, of course, was that Allen needed his repressive measures 
strictly enforced even as this process of reconciliation was under way, 
and the Mau flatly refused to be forced by such means to even consider 
a settlement.
In New Zealand, Cabinet, after considering with Cobbe his report
on the situation in Samoa, decided to disband the Samoa military police
which had been in training at Trentham, and to replace forthwith the
marines left behind in Samoa by the Dunedin, with civil police from 
78New Zealand. With this decision, government appeared to have put 
behind it the traumatic events of 28 December 1929, and their aftermath.
In Samoa though, several significant developments resulting from those 
events had emerged and were already having an influence on the character 
of the confrontation.
PM to Administrator, 5 Apr. 1930, A.O. 25/1-11; Berendsen to PM, 
7 Apr. 1930, IT 1/23/8-18.
Administrator to SNA and Resident Commissioner, 18 Mar. 1930; 
Administrator to Heads of Missions, 18 Mar. 1930: A.O. 25/1-10.
PM to Administrator, 20 Mar. 1930, A.O. 25/1-10.
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VI
The principal one of these developments was the establishment 
of the women's Mau. On the afternoon of the Monday (10 March) on which 
the Mau men were forcibly removed from Vaimoso, about fifty women, 
mostly wives or relatives of Mau men, and prominent amongst whom were 
Paisami Tuimaleali'ifano, Fa'amu Faumuina, Ala Tamasese, Mrs R. Nelson 
(she signed her name in Mau correspondence as Faletua Samoana Taisi) 
and her sister Mrs P. Muench (she went by the name of Filoi Tuicogamaatoe) 
held a meeting at Vaimoso. They decided to contact villages outside 
Apia and requested the womenfolk there to gather at Vaimoso with the 
purpose of continuing the work of the Mau now that the men had been 
forcibly dispersed. The following day about four hundred women from 
the four Mau faitoto1 a (seats) of Vaimoso, Lepea, Matautu and Apia, as 
well as from the surrounding areas, gathered at Apia village and 
decided to take up the case of the lawyer T.B. Slipper, who had been 
convicted of libel and defamation against Allen, and had been sentenced 
the previous week to three months in gaol and a fine of £105. Slipper 
had landed himself in that position as a result of a letter he had 
written on behalf of the women who had protested against the cruelties 
suffered by the women and children during day searches and night raids, 
complaints which were rejected out of hand by Allen. The women now 
wanted to publicise what they saw as the injustice of the penalty
79imposed upon Slipper on their behalf and they wanted to pay his fine.
Within ten days of the original message going out the women held 
their first general meeting with women from villages outside Apia, 
including Savai'i, participating. This meeting decided that the women
79 Braisby to Administrator, 11 Mar. 1930; Administrator to Minister,
12 Mar. 1930; Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 29 Mar. 1930: A.O. 25/1-10.
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would organise a Mau of their own along the same lines as the men's 
Mau. They would wear as uniform a blue or violet dress over a lavalava 
of the same colour, and with a white border similar to the men's 
lavalava. Alternatively the dress could have the white border at the 
hem with a plain lavalava. They further decided to hold weekly meetings 
on Wednesdays, the meetings to be followed by cricket matches and other 
festivities. About a thousand women attended.
In the last week of March the first of these weekly meetings was
held at Vaimoso. On the day the Mau women resident in the faitoto'a
of Matautu and Apia congregated and marched to Vaimoso in their uniforms,
much in the same way as the Mau men used to do. The following day,
groups of up to five hundred women marched from Vaimoso and Lepea to
Apia where meetings and entertainment were held and then marched back
in the evening. Their processions were orderly and well conducted.
The meetings themselves followed the normal procedures adopted by the
women in the conduct of their affairs, with an 'ava preceding the
discussions and the order and presentation of speeches following the
ranking of the titles of their respective husbands in fa'a Samoa, while
those without husbands took their place according to the ranks of their
family titles. By the end of March, therefore, the women's Mau was
80firmly established and had made its presence felt.
From the outset Allen viewed the women's Mau with utter contempt. 
He believed it was something engineered by Mrs Nelson and Mrs Muench in 
conjunction with Slipper. He doubted that it was of any real importance 
in keeping the Mau alive, and in fact felt that it could be of assistance
80 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 29 Mar. 1930; Administrator to EA, 
3 Apr. 1930: A.0. 25/1-10; P.T. (Tamasese Meaole] to Taisi,
3 Apr. 1930, Mau Papers, PMs Dept., Apia.
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to government because he thought the Mau men found the women's
activities an embarrassment. Allen, however, did not let go of the
matter there; he repeatedly referred to the women as prostitutes,
'the immoral class of women' whom the dispersal of the Mau from Apia
81'had left without occupation'. Mrs Nelson and Mrs Muench were 
charged with aiding the Mau, an illegal organisation, and were convicted 
and discharged on the condition that they disassociated themselves from 
any activity connected with the Mau. This had no effect on the women's 
Mau.
The assault by Allen on the women's Mau appeared quite in
keeping with his character. In this case his frustrations were greater
because he seemed quite impotent at dealing with women in any positive
constructive way. He wrote that 'I confess I have no solution and
merely expect that if they are left alone they will tire of it. It will
82be strange if women can run anything for themselves ...'.
This was yet another example of Allen's abysmal ignorance of the 
Samoans and their way of life. Samoan women in fact operate within a 
social and political structure parallel to that in which men conduct 
their affairs and together they run their communities. They are 
interdependent and each is a necessary component of the machinery 
responsible for the overall welfare and efficient conduct of their 
society. Neither group is subservient to the other, rather each holds 
a position of authority and respect which, disregarded, would lead to 
the deterioration of the vitality and standing of their respective
Administrator to Minister, 2 Apr. 1930; Administrator to EA,
3 Apr. 1930: A.O. 25/1-11; Administrator to Minister, 17 Mar. 1930;
Administrator to EA, 28 Mar. 1930: A.O. 25/1-10.
Allen to Berendsen, 23 Apr. 1930, A.O. 25/1-11.
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communities. At the same time the ability of the Samoan women to 
organise and implement projects, even more than the men at times, was 
a well-established fact of Samoan life.
The women's Mau, however, did not undergo the same explosive 
growth as experienced by the Mau in its various stages. A great many 
factors contributed to this situation, but it appears that the principal 
ones were firstly, that the Mau was far from finished, particularly in 
the villages, and the need for the women to take over the struggle 
completely was not seen by many as necessary in these circumstances. 
Secondly, many Mau men had just returned to their families and villages 
after being away for lengthy periods and it was natural for the 
families to be in no hurry to see others of their members disappear to 
Apia, or even to be too occupied with matters outside the family.
Thirdly, Samoa was experiencing the effects of the depression and it 
was essential that as many members as possible of each family worked in 
their plantations to try to offset the dramatic drop - to about half of 
what they had been getting - in the price of copra. Also the food crop 
production, which the women and young people had had to look after in 
addition to their own normal responsibilities, had suffered, as 
indeed had other facets of life, and this was the opportunity to try 
and straighten these matters out. It was surprising that the women's 
Mau was as alive and as active as it was under these conditions.
Another significant development during this period was Allen's 
increased attempts to hurt Nelson. In early March, immediately after 
dispersing the Mau from Apia, he raised with the Minister the subject 
of taxation and the need for some kind of system to replace the personal 
tax which he had suspended in 1928. The thrust of his suggestions,
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however, involved the introduction of a heavier tax on companies. But
he made it quite clear that he wanted only Nelson's firm to be subjected
to such a scheme and he did not want the other 'British companies' such
as Burns Philp and Morris Hedstrom to suffer. The Minister turned down
Allen's suggestion - '... you will no doubt agree that until it is
clear that Nelson and his associates definitely refuse to accept the
present more promising condition of affairs it would be unwise to 
83take this step'.
Allen, like Richardson before him, had consistently asserted that
Nelson would never accept any conditions which did not include his being
in control of the country and now Allen - further angered by what he
believed were efforts by Nelson's relatives and friends in Samoa to
sustain the conflict - set out to demonstrate beyond doubt this
contention. A series of police searches was initiated against the
premises of Nelson's wife, his relatives and on the houses of several
leading Mau members most of whom were in prison at the time. Similar
searches were also conducted on hotel rooms of visitors who were
84friendly with Nelson's relatives. The aim was to obtain correspondence 
from Nelson which Allen was confident would show that Nelson did not 
accept 'the present more promising condition' and would also confirm 
Allen's firm belief that but for Nelson's exertions, the Mau would now 
be over and the whole conflict settled once for all.
The searches uncovered several letters between the Mau and 
Nelson (and vice-versa) but their contents were not as Allen had believed.
Administrator to Minister, 12 Mar. 1930; Minister to Administrator, 
25 Mar. 1930: A.O. 25/1-10.
84 Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 2 May 1930, 15 May 1930 and 24 May 1930; 
Administrator to EA, 16 May 1930: A.O. 25/1-11.
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Nelson's letters, while exhorting the Mau to be strong and resolute,
were taken up largely with descriptions of the work done in New Zealand
on behalf and in support of the Mau. These in themselves were of
little magnitude, almost trivial, and had even less effect on the
official policy on Samoa. More important, if anything they were
discouraging to the Mau. Often these letters conveyed almost despair:
'I am just so worried and afraid that any predictions of better things
to come are being judged by you in the light of greater atrocities by
85the New Zealanders rather than improvements'. And the petition to
the King by the Mau leaders had been rejected. He vowed, however,
always to stand by the Mau and the 'god-given rights' of the people of
his country of birth. On the other hand letters from the Mau komiti
as well as from Mau individuals conveyed unrepentant pride and defiance;
we have suffered, even unto death, but we won't give up, indeed we are
not even discouraged. There was little doubt that both the Mau and
Nelson derived strength from one another, but it seems clear that Nelson
needed it more, particularly at that time when everything was going
against him, not only with his family and firm but also with his
86attempts to protect the interests of the Mau in New Zealand.
Meanwhile preparations for the fono of district representatives 
were going ahead and Allen reported to New Zealand that the Mau 'has 
shown no sign of life whatever' for several weeks since their dispersal 
to the villages. By 'life' Allen obviously meant dramatic demonstrations 
in Apia, crowded fono at the Mau seats around Apia, mass exodus into the
Letter from Taisi, 3 May 1930, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
A great deal of the correspondence between the Mau and Nelson 
during 1928 to 1935 is found in the Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
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bush and the like, which of course had ceased. But the Mau was
certainly alive and during this period Mau parties were being continually
harrassed and Mau fono broken up by his armed forces. At the same time
reports from the districts, especially from Savai'i throughout this
time, informed of increased Mau activities at the village/district
level. The Resident Commissioner in Savai'i went so far as to declare
that Allen's tough proclamation regulating the movement of people between
Upolu and Savai'i was 'a farce' because inter-island visits by Mau
people, in breach of that proclamation, were as heavy if not heavier
8 Vthan before the proclamation was promulgated. At the same time the 
refusal of the Mau to participate in the fono of district representatives 
that Allen had so strongly promoted, contradicted Allen's assertion.
Whatever life Allen admitted to as persisting in the Mau he
blamed on 'outside influence' without which, he said, 'the Mau would now
completely collapse'. The refusal of the Mau to participate in his fono
was blamed squarely on Nelson's orders. 'Strict orders have gone out
to them [Mau people] from Apia, emanating from Nelson, that they must
88not take part and they are frightened at present to disobey'.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Nelson in fact had 
repeatedly advised the Mau to nominate candidates for this fono and the 
Mau had just as stubbornly rejected his advice. This was indeed the 
first major issue since the outbreak of the confrontation over which 
Nelson and the Mau had held such strong^opposing views. In the past, 
the Mau had always taken Nelson's advice very seriously - as indeed they
Report from Resident Commissioner, 1 Apr. 1930; District Officer 
(Tuasivi) to Administrator, 2 Apr. 1930; Administrator to EA,
3 Apr. 1930; Administrator to Minister, 12 May 1930: A.O. 25/1-11.
Administrator to Minister, 12 May 1930, A.O. 25/1-11.
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did in this case too - and in the vast majority of cases that advice was 
adopted. In the few instances where the Mau saw matters differently 
Nelson had invariably deferred to the Mau decision without further 
argument. When he repeatedly told the Mau that his opinions were 
given as advice but that the final decision always rested with the Mau, 
he was not in any sense being modest about his role. He was merely 
articulating what in fact was the practice, and moreover the practice 
which, as a man who knew Samoans and the way they thought and acted 
fully realised, was the only way acceptable to them.
In this case however Nelson, although reiterating his acceptance
of the Mau decision, kept on returning to his views that the Mau should
put up candidates and participate in the Administrator's fono. He went
to some length to explain his reasons - there were people in each village
and district who would participate and government would claim a
representative fono, but if the Mau participated it could possibly get
in thirty out of thirty-three representatives and, because these people
could dictate matters in the fono, the fono would be a Mau fono and all
89the world would see the real strength of the Mau.
The Mau, however, would not be moved from the unanimous 
decision of the Mau komiti not to participate. They argued that to ask 
their supporters to put up candidates for the fono would be taken by 
those people as a betrayal of the objectives of the Mau and would cause 
dissension and destroy the movement. They insisted that without 
concessions from government over Mau grievances, participation in such 
a fono would be a meaningless exercise. 'Samoa would still be without
89 Letter from Taisi, 16 Apr. 1930 and 3 May 1930: Mau Papers, PM's
Dept., Apia.
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authority or power to negotiate with government over the affairs of
Samoa in the future. It would be just as before and as exists now
where Samoa is not consulted over anything such as finances, laws and
, 90so forth, when after all this country is the country of the Samoans .
And so the fono of district representatives was held without Mau 
participation. Allen, however, reported that in several districts 
'former' Mau matai joined in meetings that chose the representatives 
but declined to sign their names on the nomination papers. This devel­
opment, in Allen's view, was another demonstration of the improvement 
in the general state of affairs in the country. Other favourable 
indications, he pointed out, included increased payment of outstanding 
taxes - though he had ordered payment of taxes as a condition for the 
granting of travel permits within the country - the increase in numbers 
of children attending schools, the attendance of Mau people at the 
Lands and Title hearings, the decrease in incidents of intimidation 
by the Mau, the improvement in copra cutting and beetle catches and 
the apparent relaxation of Mau restrictions on its members concerning 
the stores to which they could sell their copra. There was also 
growing harmony within villages/districts, Mau and Malo people 
increasingly working together in village affairs.
The situation in Samoa at the time was in a general sense as
Mau letter to Taisi, n.d., this letter was seized at Mrs Nelson's 
house during the police search on 15 May 1930; Reports of Mau 
fono proceedings end. in Administrator to Minister, 22 May 1930; 
A.O. 25/1-11. Other reports of the proceedings of weekly fono 
of the Mau komiti (new representatives had been chosen to represent 
those in prison) normally held inland of Lepea, are found in the 
same file A.O. 25/1-11.
91 Administrator to Minister, 12 May 1930; Administrator to EA, 
7 June 1930: A.O. 25/1-11.
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Allen had put it. However, it is doubtful this improved situation 
had resulted from the Samoans abandoning the Mau as Allen asserted and 
that whatever residue remained was due wholly to white influence, both 
inside and outside of the country. In fact as argued earlier the Mau 
was very much alive, particularly in the villages/districts, and the 
return of those who had been in Apia strengthened rather than weakened 
the movement. On the other hand the process of reconciliation in the 
villages had been going on since after the first few months of the Mau 
emerging. The harmony in the villages now proclaimed by Allen was 
the result of that lengthy process of reconciliation which grew out of 
the village environment and the nature of the Samoans themselves, 
and certainly not from an overnight change of heart, as Allen implied. 
This process had been at work all the time, as we have seen, and Allen 
had failed to notice it because he had been too preoccupied with the 
more spectacular Mau activities in Apia. That he could see it now 
was due to these Mau activities ceasing, allowing him a broader view, 
rather than because forcibly dispersing the Mau from Apia had 
persuaded people to abandon the Mau and effect a reconciliation with 
the non-Mau people in their villages/districts.
The fono of district representatives was held in the first week 
of June. The main issue put up by Allen for consideration was the 
reconstitution of the Fono a Faipule. He proposed basing the new fono 
along the following lines: the Faipule to be chosen by their own
districts; the term of appointment to be one year initially, and 
consideration to be given to making it three years later; the Faipule 
not to exercise any executive functions in their districts; a reduction 
in the number of Faipule districts and therefore of Faipule themselves. 
He suggested finally that the new fono should commence its sittings
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before the end of the year. All the proposals were adopted by the
fono except for the proposal to reduce the number of Faipule districts.
92The fono decided to leave those as they were.
Although this fono was disappointing for government in that the 
Mau declined to be involved, it still made a contribution - albeit in 
a way calculated to prevent the Mau claiming success - towards a 
settlement. That contribution was a positive one in that it included 
decisions to introduce fundamental changes to certain practices 
which were among the principal grievances raised by the Mau right from 
the outset. Two in particular were the method of choosing Faipule and 
the exercise by the Faipule of executive powers in the villages/districts.
So much had happened between the early stages of the Mau and 
mid-1930 that it appeared as if the issues of Faipule selection and 
Faipule authority in the districts had ceased to be relevant. This 
was not so and they had remained amongst the most crucial issues 
because they were practices which contained a serious threat to the 
working of the fa'a Samoa in the villages, that is a threat to the 
Samoan system at its heart.
Dealing with these two matters was a more constructive approach 
than suspending the Fono a Faipule because it was essential to have 
Samoan representatives involved at the national political level. These 
measures taken together with the cessation of banishments and removal 
of titles since Allen's arrival - the powers to impose such punishment 
however remained - as well as with the suspension of the measures to
Proceedings of fono between nominated Samoan representatives and His 
Excellency the Administrator, held at Mulinu'u, June 1930; 
Administrator to Minister, 10 June 1930: A.O. 25/1-11.
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individualise land and administer the Samoans through district and 
village councils, effectively removed the last of the immediate 
threats to the proper functioning of the fa'a Samoa as the Samoans 
saw it.
The problem for government was that the Mau wanted more than
the removal of these threats. They wanted more say in the affairs of
the country at the national level. They rightly felt that the Mau
would have been for naught if all it achieved was the removal of these
objectionable measures. The Fono a Faipule would still be muzzled by
the Administration and the Samoans would still have no say in the
affairs of their country. Through the Mau they had forced the New
Zealanders to take notice of them and their claims to a right to
exercise control of their own affairs. As the Mau spokesmen told Cobbe
and Allen, the 1Mau was Samoa1; it was the effective means through which
the Samoans could communicate with government in a way which government 
93could not ignore. And they intended to maintain that position until 
there were changes to policies and official institutions which would 
give the Samoans an effective say in the conduct of the affairs of 
their country. The 'concessions' made by Allen were welcome but they 
were clearly not sufficient, and they did not undermine the resolve of 
the committed Mau supporters - although they probably made a significant 
impression on the majority of the people, most of whom held the view 
that so long as government did not intrude in the conduct of their lives 
in the villages/districts, it was acceptable.
For this reason and others suggested earlier, the general
93 Report of meeting at Vaimoso (5 Mar. 1930), A.O. 25/1-10; Mau 
letter to Taisi, n.d., A.O. 25/1-11.
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atmosphere in the villages/districts looked much more promising -
particularly to government - than it had appeared over the previous
three years. Allen still found the women's Mau a nuisance - convicting
Mrs Nelson and her sister and fining them for promoting a seditious
organisation had done little to dampen the enthusiasm of the women in
their Mau - but he dismissed it as an insignificant political force.
His optimism at this period was due largely to his experience on his
malaga throughout the country during June and July. He found that the
'hostility of the Mau had largely ceased and that they are beginning to
94resume their part in village and district life'. Although a certain
section still held aloof, he reported, 'It is quite evident in every
district that the Mau has ceased to exist as an active force and native
speakers everywhere asserted it is over'. Moreover, he continued
'There seemed also to be a great sense of relief and a very genuine
95pleasure everywhere at "the end of the Mau"'. He believed that what
remained to be done to effect 'complete union and harmony' was the
persuasion of that section of the community which still refrained from
cooperating with government to resume their usual place in the affairs
of their villages/districts. This task, he believed, could best be
done by the indivd:ual matai who now cooperated with government, and
96he was actively encouraging these matai to perform it.
Although Allen did not give it the credit it deserved, the 
centenary celebrations to commemorate the arrival of the missionary John
94 Administrator to Minister, 10 June 1930, A .0. 25/1-11.
95 Administrator to Minister, 24 July 1930, A .0. 25/1-11.
96 ibid.
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Williams in July 1830, was an event which had greatly influenced the 
Samoans into assuming the appearance of cooperation and harmony between 
themselves. By 1930 the church had become an integral part of the life 
of the Samoan, and religious allegiance often transcended political 
divisions. Virtually all the aiga in Samoa were connected in some way 
to the L.M.S. church and so they all joined the celebrations, whether 
they were of a different religious denomination, and regardless of 
whether they were Mau or Malo supporters.
In these conditions, Allen was predictably angry at being
informed by the Prime Minister of a possible conference in Wellington
between himself, the Fautua and four Mau leaders including Nelson, to
settle the matter. Allen responded immediately that 'such a meeting
as suggested in Wellington would be absurd in my opinion in present
situation. The plain fact is the Mau is quite dead and action is not
called for and indeed would tend to destroy confidence and revive the
97Mau for which purpose the suggestion is probably intended'.
The suggestion for the meeting had been put to Prime Minister 
Forbes by Mr Patrick Fitzherbert, a lawyer recently deported from Samoa 
by Allen because 'he is becoming a focal point for the Mau'.
Fitzherbert had practised in Samoa - he went at Nelson's instigation - 
for two months before his deportation; he represented members of the 
Mau after Allen had removed Slipper's licence. During a lengthy 
interview with the Prime Minister, Fitzherbert had pointed out that the 
Samoans had absolutely no faith or trust in Allen and would never deal 
with him - hence the necessity to exclude him from the suggested talks
97 Administrator to Minister, 17 July 1930; Minister to Administrator,
17 July 1930; Administrator to Minister, 24 July, 1930: A.O. 25/1-11.
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in Wellington. After receiving a record of the interview, Allen,
as was his customary reaction to criticism, dug up sordid details of
Fitzherbert's private life while in Samoa, information which he passed
on to the Prime Minister with an expression of dissatisfaction at his
taking Fitzherbert seriously. With uncharacteristic restraint he
wrote: 'May I venture with the greatest respect to point out the
apparent strangeness of a penniless adventurer, after two months of
revel in Samoa, being able to elicit a statement of policy from the
99New Zealand Government?'. That was the end of that suggestion of 
settlement.
Between this time and the time Allen left Samoa in May the 
following year, his reports to the New Zealand government all told of 
an improving situation. 'There are no administrative difficulties 
now, either in enforcing justice or in the general work of government’10C 
he wrote in October. He went on to point out instances' where men 
prominent in the Mau were working alongside others who had supported 
the Malo in the administration of their villages/districts and even 
at national institutions such as the Land and Titles Commission, where 
some of those men prominent in the Mau in the previous years were 
sitting as komisi (Samoan assessors).
The changes were even more dramatic in the villages themselves; 
referring to a malaga recently conducted by the Resident Commissioner 
in Savai'i, he repeated that 'At Sala'ilua where for two years there was
See record of the interview end. in Secretary of External Affairs 
to Secretary to Administration, 29 July 1930, A.O. 25/1-11.
Administrator to Minister, 24 July 1930, A.O. 25/1-11.
Administrator to Minister, 13 Oct. 1930, A.O. 25/1-11.
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no single loyal chief and no meeting was possible, the whole of the 
chiefs of the village as well as all from the adjoining village of 
Gaga'emalae assembled, fales (sic) were decorated for the meeting and 
for the Commissioner to live in - and the same sort of thing occurred 
generally right round the island'. He concluded confidently - 'The 
foregoing evidence will be stronger proof that the Mau is over, than 
any unsupported assertion of mine would be. I say no more therefore 
except that so far as I can judge there is now great peace and harmony 
throughout the territory. The Mau has ended as swiftly and imperceptibly
.. V ,101as it began .
While there were grounds for Allen's optimism, he had greatly
exaggerated them. When the reconstituted Fono a Faipule met in November,
only two former Mau matai, Saipaia and Asiata Iakopo of Satupaitea, out
102of the thirty Faipule, entered the Fono. The Mau komiti had decided
that the Mau would not participate and although there was disagreement 
amongst Mau supporters as to the wisdom of this decision, particularly 
with Nelson strongly against it, the decision was accepted. At the 
same time Saipaia and Asiata were never so very influential in the 
movement, so that their entry into the Fono was not a significant setback 
for the Mau. In the second place, reports continued to come in
concerning Mau activities in villages and Mau consultation at district
a . , , , 103and national level.




Administrator to Minister, 20 Nov. 1930, A.O. 25/1-11.
103 Braisby to Sec. to Admin. 30 July 1930, and 16 Sept. 1930; 
McCarthy to Administrator, 26 Nov. 1930: A.O. 25/1-11.
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exchanged and decisions taken and relayed back to the villages. Since 
July Mau activities had increased, particularly with regard to money 
collections. With the difficulties encountered since the end of 1929, 
the Mau lafoga (money contributions) had largely fallen into disarray 
but with the settled situation and with the majority of Mau people back 
in the villages it had been revived on an organised basis. This step 
was necessary to enable the Mau to respond positively to a plea for 
financial assistance from Nelson, who was facing difficulties in New 
Zealand, especially in keeping the New Zealand Samoa Guardian in 
production. The newspaper had started printing a Samoan supplement 
through which Nelson would communicate with the Mau in lieu of reports 
and letters which government had begun seizing off the boats, and it 
was therefore even more important now that the newspaper be kept going. 
Notwithstanding this, though, the fact that people contributed to Mau 
funds during a period of severe economic depression and other vital 
requirements - thousands of pounds would have gone to the L.M.S. 
centenary celebrations - was certainly a sign of life in the Mau at the 
very least.
As the year went by, too, other Mau activities became more
evident. Allen himself enquired of the police several times about Mau
leaders from the outer districts, including Savai'i, whom he had seen
in Apia, and also about fono(p) being held at Vaimoso 'without attempt
104at concealment and obvious to anyone passing on the road'. Under
the pretext of attending Samoan and religious functions, prominent Mau 
leaders had regularly obtained travelling permits and travelled in 
large groups between islands and districts and consulted other Mau
104 Administrator to Inspector of Police, 17 July 1930 and 18 July 1930, 
A .0. 25/1-11.
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people. On the other hand, activities conducted by the women's 
Mau such as the commemoration service on 28 December for those who 
died on the same date the previous year, kept the confrontation to 
the fore within Samoa.
Police, however, managed to arrest Mau matai who had visited 
various centres to coordinate a demonstration in Apia on Allen's 
departure and Allen was able to leave without disruption from the Mau. 
Even then the Mau had the last word. Its leaders rejected an 
invitation to particpate in arrangements for a farewell to Allen and 
had already taken steps to prepare themselves to continue the struggle 
with the new Administrator when he arrived.
105 Braisby to Administrator, 21 Mar. 1931, A.O. 25/1-12.
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CHAPTER 6
RESURGENCE, DECLINE AND SETTLEMENT: 1931-1936
On 1 May 1931, Brigadier-General H.E. Hart arrived in Samoa 
to replace Allen. It was a change-over which adherents of the Mau 
were happy to see; for although they would rather there were no more 
Administrators from New Zealand, they nonetheless appreciated the 
reality of the situation, and they preferred any replacement to Allen 
whom they despised. Also, apart from relieving Samoa of Allen, the 
advent of a new Administrator would give the Mau fresh opportunities 
for development.
Hart was born in 1882 and like Allen had studied law and 
practised as a Barrister and Solicitor in a small country town - 
Masterton in this case - on the North Island of New Zealand. Like 
Allen too, he had a notable military career and had earned his rank 
during the War. In his work as a lawyer, Hart had often appeared as 
advocate before the Native Land Court which dealt specifically with 
Maori land disputes."'’ In personality, the Samoans found their new 
Administrator a very different man from Allen. With them, he was 
indulgent yet firm, frank and direct yet sensitive and understanding, 
accommodating but not gullible - in Samoan eyes, a man with a 'good 
heart'.2
See G.H. Scholefield (Ed.), Who's Who in New Zealand, (5th edition, 
Wellington, 1951); Mary Boyd 'The Record in Western Samoa to 1945' 
in Angus Ross (Ed.), New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in 
the Twentieth Century, (Auckland, 1969) p. 170.
Most of the Samoan informants for this study - Toluono Lama and 
Taulealea Taulauniu are examples - who participated in the Mau, 
remembered Hart and Richardson as men with 'good hearts' and Allen 
as a man who lacked human compassion.
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As far as the Mau was concerned, Hart from the beginning 
refrained from making a major issue of it, and instead approached it 
as just another problem in the administration of the Territory.
In line with this attitude, the enforcement of restrictions on travel, 
payment of taxes, Mau gatherings and such like, was relaxed. Within 
Mau ranks, these changes were welcome, although it was debatable 
whether they assisted the cause of the Mau. In any event, it was the 
duty of the Mau leaders to exploit these changes in personalities and 
policies to the advantage of the Mau, and judging by the letter they 
delivered Hart on the day he arrived in Samoa, they had been awake to 
their responsibilities.
I
The Mau message which greeted the new Administrator on his
arrival defined once again the conditions which the Mau required the
New Zealand government and the Samoa Administration to meet as a
prerequisite to meaningful discussion on the settlement of their
confrontation. It would be necessary, the Administrator was told
... to release all those who are banished or deported 
to other countries; remove all the laws restricting 
the Mau; remove the laws preventing our freedom of 
movement in our own country without a permit; restore 
freedom for our social gatherings and fonos [sic] 
according to our social system; allow us freedom to 
use any means we choose to select our representatives 
to that fono; suspend the use of firearms and the 
duties of the military police; the government should 
also give us the assurance that we may raise for discussion 
in that fono any subjects that we like without being 
punished or in any way intimidated.3
3 Tuimaleali'ifano, Tamasese, Alipia, Pulepule, Faumuina to 
Administrator, 1 May 1931, A.O. 25/1-12.
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They did not want 'those Samoans who are said to be contented 
with New Zealand' to participate in such a fono; they would have 
nothing to contribute being satisfied with the existing system. At 
the end of the letter it was revealed that they expected the fono to 
discuss 'a new constitution to restore to us our proper status according 
to our heritage ...' That heritage was one of a people in control of 
their own affairs. This public declaration of the principle that they 
retained the right to control of their own affairs was tempered by the 
rider that the status sought was as recognised in treaties between 
Samoa and certain major powers in the past - a clear indication that 
some major power was accepted as playing a role in certain areas of 
Samoa's affairs.
Hart was in no great hurry to leap into the complexities of the
Mau/Malo conflict; he wanted time to familiarise himself with the
situation before deciding on what to do with the matters raised in the
letter. In any case he was convinced that the letter was written in
Auckland by Nelson, which belief, in the established fashion of the New
Zealand officials and politicians, meant that the letter did not
represent the views of the Mau and so was not to be treated seriously.
Hart had met Nelson briefly in Auckland just before sailing for Samoa
and the latter had said that he had no regrets or apologies for the part
he had played in the controversy. He had also expressed views
concerning the 'birthright of the Samoan people' and other opinions
4very similar to the ones put in the Mau letter.
In New Zealand Nelson sent a copy of the Mau letter to the Prime 
Minister and in an accompanying note said that:
4 Nelson to Holland, 24 Apr. 1931, Nelson Papers, Apia; Administrator 
to Minister, 11 May 1931, A.O. 25/1-12.
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the letter cannot but be taken as an earnest [attempt] 
on the part of the Samoan leaders to co-operate with 
the Government to end the present deadlock by seeking 
to establish the only conditions which can be acceptable 
as an equitable basis for negotiations towards a much 
desired end. It now rests with your government to prove 
its bona fides by assisting and allowing the new 
Administrator to make way for the opening sought by the 
Samoans towards a rapprochement which if handled in a 
spirit of equity and conciliation might well tend to bring 
about an honourable and lasting settlement of this long-drawn 
struggle.5
He followed this up next day with another lengthy letter in 
which he reiterated the Mau's case in comprehensive terms. Once again, 
though, the official view that Nelson could not and did not speak for 
the Samoans in the Mau brought this initiative to a dead end.
While the official attitude towards Nelson could be understood 
in terms of the policy of non-involvement of whites in Samoan affairs 
and vice-versa, it was an unrealistic one in the circumstances.
Whatever government believed, the fact remained that the Mau had 
appointed Nelson as its representative. In this role the Mau saw 
Nelson in the same light as Samoans regarded people they chose to 
represent them over any issue. He was told of the consensus of those 
he represented and he was expected to abide by that consensus or risk 
being dismissed. Nelson knew the requirements and followed them to the 
letter; he could not afford to do otherwise.
On the other hand the Mau also saw Nelson as their adviser, much 
in the same sense as they would regard a lawyer. They instructed him, 
paid for the work done, and they expected results. They also expected 
advice and guidance, particularly in those spheres outside their own 
experience such as dealing with the New Zealand government or the
5 Nelson to PM, 12 May 1931, A.O. 25/1-12.
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League of Nations. At the same time, as their adviser and representative 
he was expected to use his discretion to promote their interests, 
especially in matters where responses were necessary before such matters 
could be referred back to the Mau for a decision. But of course the 
Mau expected more from Nelson because he was one of them, an afakasi 
who had risked his wealth and congenial existence in siding with the 
Samoans as a Samoan. The Mau had trust and confidence that Nelson would 
represent them to the best of his ability, and Nelson's unremitting 
efforts on behalf of the Mau fully justified that faith.
At this time, though, and as frequently before, the most 
significant activity concerning the conflict was again being played 
out amongst the Mau Samoans themselves. In Savai'i, Safotulafai and 
Sale'aula met in July and contemplated ending the conflict by proposing 
a fono between the Mau and the new Administrator. Reverting to the 
practice at the time when Pule meant Safotulafai and Sale'aula, these 
two centres dispatched messengers to the other four centres - former 
Itu - declaring a fono of all Savai'i and leaving it to the other 
centres to call in representatives of various districts and subdistricts 
as was the practice in the past. The aim was for this fono to discuss 
the Safotulafai/Sale'aula proposal, after which Pule would travel to 
Upolu and discuss its decision with Tumua. Understandably, the other 
centres turned down the call for a fono. Probably angered by this 
response, Safotulafai and Sale'aula pressed ahead and in the last week 
of August a malaga party of about two hundred matai and taulelea from 
these two Pule groupings left Savai'i in four fautasi (longboats) to 
consult with Tumua in Upolu.^
District Officer (Tuasivi) to Resident Commissioner, 6 July 1931;
Braisby to Administrator, 2 Sept. 1931: A.O. 25/1-12.
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The first call was made on Leulumoega. The Savai'i party, 
however, did not receive a cordial welcome, Leulumoega objecting that 
the malaga comprised only two instead of six Pule and therefore could 
not speak on behalf of Savai'i. Instead of discouraging the Savai'i 
party, this reception provoked them to continue with their mission.
They called into Afega and Malie, regarded to some extent as the Tumua 
centre for Tuamasaga district, but once again their reception was 
less than satisfactory. The Savai'i malaga then proceeded to Lufilufi, 
where they expected a better reception because the Lufilufi orators in 
the Mau had themselves raised the possibility of a Mau meeting with the 
new Administrator.
The proposal put to the Tumua matai was simple and straightforward
- the Mau should now meet the Administrator in a fono and try to work
out a settlement, not wait until Nelson's return. Lufilufi did not
see its way clear to accept this proposal immediately, but asked the
Savai'i party to give Tumua time to consider the initiative. It was
clear though that although the Lufilufi orators had been more civil in
their attitude towards the Pule proposals compared to the other Tumua
centres, Lufilufi was firm on its insistence that the Mau should wait
for Nelson, and that the other four Pule centres should be included in
any Mau consultations - conditions on which the other Tumua had earlier
insisted. The Pule visitors were outraged and threatened to abandon the
Mau and effect a conciliation with the Administrator if Nelson was not
back in Samoa by October that year to account for his efforts overseas
7on behalf of the Mau.
Braisby to Administrator, 2 Sept. 1931, A.O. 25/1-12. As usual, 
Braisby's memorandum recounted faithfully reports from the field, 
complete with detailed lists of the names of Mau people involved in 
the episodes he was reporting on, as well as full verbatim accounts 
of discussions and especially of speeches.
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The Savai'i party thus failed to bring the Mau and the 
Administrator to the conference table. But in the process of pursuing 
this initiative, Safotulafai and Sale'aula had bluntly brought the 
delicate issue of Pule hierarchy to the surface. When their call for 
a fono of Savai'i was rebuffed by the other centres, the two decided to 
proceed anyway, and when Tumua insisted that the other Pule centres had 
to be involved before an initiative could be recognised as a legitimate 
Savai'i wish, the orators of Safotulafai and Sale'aula declared that the 
two of them were the Pule in Savai'i and they did not recognise the 
other four centres as Pule. This attitude in itself was probably a 
significant factor in the cool welcome proffered by Tumua to the 
visitors, for it was Tumua that was instrumental in raising the 
standing of the other four Savai'i centres to full Pule status, and 
within the Mau, Tumua enjoyed closer ties with these four than with the 
two original Pule. It is significant also that the strongest tangible 
support for the Mau, particularly in terms of money contributions, 
came from the four Pule groupings which refused to join the malaga.
At the same time, Tumua did not want to be part of a suggestion which 
could send Savai'i and hence the whole country into civil war. 
Safotulafai and Sale'aula, however, were left in no doubt that if they 
inflamed the Pule issue, they would find themselves isolated against 
the rest of the country.
There were other reasons for the rejection of the Safotulafai/ 
Sale'aula proposal. In the first place it was widely believed amongst 
the Mau that it was an initiative undertaken at the instigation of 
Malietoa through his Safotulafai connections. The feeling was that 
Malietoa wanted to discredit the leading titleholders in the Mau - 
Tuimaleali'ifano and Tupua Tamasese - as well as Taisi, whose titles
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all belonged to the major lineage of Sa Tupua. The other reason
involved Nelson. While the Mau trusted Nelson to be doing his best
on their behalf, there had been a growing desire amongst the Mau
supporters to see more tangible results. They knew of the petitions
and they had read the newspaper (the New Zealand Samoa Guardian)
telling, for example, of letters and interviews with the Prime Minister;
but the question being raised was, what has been achieved? These
questions were most often asked when the Mau leadership requested
more money to enable Nelson to continue with his work. Many now said,
wait for Nelson before meeting the Administrator, out of the genuine
belief that Nelson would advise the best route to take and also out of
the feeling that Nelson had been loyal to the Mau and he should not
therefore be left out, but there were others who argued that the Mau
should wait for Nelson because he had been paid to carry the Mau's
9case and he should earn his money.
While the Safotulafai and Sale'aula had used the time since the 
forced dispersal from Apia to work out a reconciliation plan, the Mau 
in other districts had expended their time in strengthening the Mau 
organisation in their local communities. In the villages/districts 
where the Mau influence was dominant, local matai fono brought in 
measures to clean up villages, improve the crop plantings and the 
general upkeep of plantations; and generally adopted resolutions 
which were seen as beneficial to their people. The Mau leaders strongly 
encouraged members to put their weight behind these measures. The
See Pasia's speech at Lufilufi, reported in Braisby to Administrator,
2 Sept. 1931, A.O. 25/1-12; information from Levao Malifa of Sale'aula.
See speeches made during the Pule/Tumua fono held at Lufilufi 
(3 Aug. 1931), reported in Braisby to Administrator, 2 Sept. 1931.
9
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people were persuaded to accept that even without the government 
officials they should still keep their villages clean and their 
plantations adequately planted and regularly weeded. They were also 
urged to cooperate with the village fono in the recording of births 
and deaths. Many of these villages appointed a man to carry out 
functions usually performed by the pulenu'u and also the village fono 
designated certain matai to inspect the plantations. On a wider scale, 
village representatives joined together to form a committee which 
inspected plantations and villages throughout the district.
A'ana district was perhaps the most well-organised along these 
lines in 1931. With Alipia, the highest ranking orator of Leulumoega, 
providing forceful leadership, it was not too difficult to organise 
this populous district. While Hart was on his first malaga around Upolu 
in early July, the Mau leaders of A'ana conducted a plantation inspection 
tour of the district. Some sixty matai from villages throughout A'ana 
led by Alipia made the tour of a district which was officially 
designated wholly as a disturbed area. Because of Hart's relaxation 
of the restrictions on the Mau and because the Commissioner of Police 
was sold the story that the malaga intended to make contact with Hart's 
party and initiate discussions in a Samoan setting in a village with a 
view to settling the conflict, the Mau party was not interfered with.
In the event, the Mau party covered the whole district without making 
any overtures to the Administrator's party for a meeting. In the course 
of their tour they collected contributions from Mau supporters and held 
several fono in which their members were encouraged to remain firm in 
the Mau.^*“*
10 Report by Const. L.J. Bernard re: Malaga party headed by Alipia,
24 July 1931; Braisby's comment on this report, 27 July 1931:
A.0. 25/1-12.
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In New Zealand, meantime, Nelson on receiving the customary 
non-committal response from the Prime Minister over his representations 
in connection with the Mau letter to Hart, once again looked beyond 
New Zealand for possible relief. This time a petition was prepared 
from the 'accredited representatives' of the Mau to the governments of 
Great Britain, U.S.A. and Germany. The petition was based principally 
on the ground that these major powers contracted treaties with the 
government of Samoa during the second half of last century and in these 
treaties - specifically the Berlin Treaty 1889 - the three Powers 
recognised the independence of the Samoan government and the right of 
the Samoan people to choose their form of government according to their 
own laws and customs: the Powers were now called upon to 'fulfil their
guarantees' in the light of the actions of the mandatory power which 
were claimed to be denying the Samoans those rights guaranteed in the 
Treaties. The petition was ignored."^
A little more needs to be said about this claim by the Mau as 
it had been advanced several times since New Zealand established its 
civil administration in Samoa. The issue is a complex one, particularly 
when legal points involved are examined in detail. But when stripped 
down to its essentials, the argument runs as follows: the central claim
was that Samoa was an independent country, specifically so proclaimed 
in the Berlin Treaty 1889; that the 1899 agreement between the three 
powers, under which Samoa was partitioned and Germany established her 
administration in the western islands of the group, did not negate that 
independent status and, when New Zealand took over from the Germans and 
was granted the mandate, these changes did not affect the fundamental
11 A copy of this petition - copies of other Mau petitions as well - is 
found in the Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
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independence of Samoa and the Samoans. It is not intended to discuss 
here the legal issues involved in this matter. Sufficient it is to 
note that while a case could be argued along the lines advocated in 
this petition, it was a naive submission in the circumstances of 
colonialism which subsisted at the time, quite apart from the fact
12that it appeared that a stronger case could be made to counter it.
This aspect of the matter was probably appreciated by Nelson 
and the lawyers who assisted him in drafting the petition. At the 
same time Nelson, doubtless recognised the utility of such a petition 
in keeping the Mau a live issue both in Samoa and in other parts of the 
world. He was fully aware of the improving conditions in Samoa and the 
general trend, even amongst Mau people, to settle back in their local 
communities now that the threat to their control of local affairs had 
been removed. The Samoans, he knew, would be impressed by the petition 
and the legal complexities it contained, and it would bring home to 
them very forcibly the message that the fight was still on. On the 
other hand he would have been anxious to counteract the newly-adopted 
official attitude of not giving too much credence to the Mau and 
proclaiming to the outside world that it had ceased to be a major issue 
in a Samoa where life had returned to near normality.
Of course the fate of the Mau depended primarily on developments 
in Samoa, not least within the Mau itself, rather than on Nelsonian 
propaganda, and during 1931 and 1932, the Mau took several initiatives 
which generated a resurgence of interest in itself and its activities on 
a national scale. The most notable of these initiatives came from the
P.M. Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle (Dublin, 1974) gives a detailed account 
of the circumstances surrounding the partition of Samoa. For a legal 
examination of that episode see S. Muliaumasealii, 'The Quest for 





On 28 December 1931, the women's Mau, as it did the previous
year, commemorated the fatal clash between the Mau and the police two
years earlier with a parade through Apia, followed by a religious
service at Tamasese's graveside near Lepea. Over 500 women participated.
As a result of the unsatisfactory attendance at this ceremony by the
women of A'ana and the sub-district of Anoama'a, they were called on by
the leaders of the women's Mau to account for their lack of support in
special meetings to be held in their respective districts. On 10 February
1932 the Anoama'a fono took place at Solosolo village, and four weeks
later the A'ana fono was held at Leulumoega. At both these meetings,
members of the women's Mau in those areas, demonstrated their strong
support for their organisation by turning out in large numbers - over
400 in Anoama'a and over 800 in A'ana - and by staging impressive
displays of ceremonial food presentations and paying their lafoga
14(money contributions). At the Leulumoega gathering though the 
occasion was soured by the failure of the Aana women to honour Polatau, 
wife of Pulepule who was one of the prominent titleholders of Atua, 
with a ceremonial food presentation due her rank. As a consequence of 
this insult, Pulepule's village of Solosolo threatened to abandon the 
Mau, and Pulepule apparently gave serious consideration to becoming a 
Faipule - it would have been a tremendous victory fa'a Samoa for 
government - a post which Malo supporters, including the sitting Faipule 
in his district were keen for him to occupy.15 After withdrawing from
13
13 Braisby to Administrator, 29 Dec. 1931, A.O. 25/1-12.
Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 11 Feb. 1932; 15 Mar. 1932 and 7 Apr. 1932:
A.O. 25/1-12.
Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 7 Apr. 1932, A.O. 25/1-12.
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Mau activities for a time, Pulepule and his village returned and 
resumed their leading role in the affairs of the Mau.
When members of the women's Mau in Anoama'a had gathered for
their fono in February, the Mau leaders in that sub-district had also
congregated in Solosolo on the pretext of offering tapuai (spiritual
encouragement) to the women in their deliberations and took the opportunity
to hold a fono of their own to organise their activities. On this
occasion they instructed their members to clean their villages, roads
and plantations and they appointed parties of matai to conduct inspection
tours to follow up these instructions, and to fine those individuals and
16villages which failed to carry them out. A few months earlier, this
same group of Mau matai had considered the idea of inviting Mau
representatives from villages throughout Atua to reside at Falefa village
in Anoama'a so as to facilitate consultation and decision-making amongst
17the Mau people in their district. The idea did not bear fruit, but the 
fact that it was seriously considered clearly indicated a more 
aggressive approach to Mau affairs by the Mau leadership in Atua - 
demonstrated further by the resolutions of the Solosolo fono - and 
pointed to a desire on the part of Lufilufi and her district to take 
a leading role in the Mau.
Encouraged by the success of their gatherings at Solosolo and 
Leulumoega, the leaders of the women's Mau now embarked on a more 
challenging project; a major fa'a Samoa malaga through two areas of 
Atua district - Falealili and Aleipata - where support for the Mau was 
weak in comparison to the rest of Upolu with the exception of Manono.
Police operative to Inspector of Police, 12 Feb. 1932; Braisby to 
Sec. to Admin., 18 Feb. 1932: A.O. 25/1-12.
Braisby to Sec. to Admin., 26 Oct. 1931, A.O. 25/1-12.17
On 14 April 1932 the malaga commenced at Salani village in Falealili.
In this sub-district, the forceful leadership of its Faipule, Tuatagaloa,
had kept the majority of the people out of the Mau. On this occasion
though, practically the whole of Falealili, men and women, turned out
to welcome the women's Mau malaga and when the taalolo was presented
it was led by the three leading taupou of Falealili, including one from
18Poutasi, Tuatagaloa's own village. The women of the malaga did 
without male orators and spoke on their own behalf during the ceremonies 
and fono in the villages they visited. The leading orators of those 
villages and sub-districts, invariably delivered the speeches on behalf 
of their people, including the women's Mau in their areas.
There were several reasons for this favourable reception. In the 
first place, the malaga was led by Fa'amu - Faumuina's wife - who was 
Malietoa's sister and therefore a lady of the highest standing in the 
fa'a Samoa. She could not be ignored. At the same time, Falealili had 
a special relationship to the Malietoa title, being one of the eight 
Aiga which supported that title in times of war. Also Fa'amu's brother 
Malietoa was married to the daughter of one of the highest ranking matai 
of Poutasi village, while one of the leaders of the women's Mau malaga 
was a daughter of Tuatagaloa himself.
The malaga continued on through Lotofaga - Faumuina's village - 
Lepa and Aleipata, drawing large crowds and enjoying enthusiastic 
receptions which included both Mau and Malo supporters as happened in 
Falealili. Only the village of Amaile, seat of the Mata'afa title - 
Mata'afa had replaced Tuimaleali'ifano as Fautua - refused to 
participate in these receptions, but this was only a minor incident in
18 See reports by District Officer D.M. Grant, 16 Apr. 1932 and 22 Apr. 
1932: A.0. 25/1-13, for details of this malaga.
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a brave venture in which Samoan women had asserted their traditional 
right to participate in the political life of the country at the 
highest level, and elicited a response wThich showed conclusively where 
the hearts and minds of the Samoans lay.
While the women's Mau was conducting its successful malaga 
through Falealili and Aleipata, developments were occurring in Savai'i 
which threatened further the solidarity of the Mau on that island. 
Towards the end of March the Fa'asaleleaga district fono decided to 
dispatch a malaga party to the Tumua centres in another attempt to 
persuade them to agree to the Mau meeting the Administrator instead of 
waiting for Nelson's return. After several meetings with the Atua Mau 
parties, however, the Fa'asaleleaga group which was led by Namulauulu 
decided that the opinion of Tumua over the matter had not changed since
the Safotulafai/Sale'aula visit the previous year, and they therefore
. ... 19returned to Savai'1 .
At the same time that Fa'aseleleaga was considering sending a
party to Upolu, representatives of villages from throughout the Palauli
district were called to a meeting at Vailoa village - one of the three
villages which comprised the seat of the Palauli Pule centre. In this
fono the Palauli matai took the unilateral decision to establish the
20headquarters of the Mau in Savai'i at Vailoa village. Even if this 
was the substance of the decision, it was probably an exaggeration of 
the intention of Palauli, for the matai concerned would have known that 
the other Pule centres would be unlikely to accept that decision, 
especially as they were not consulted, and Safotulafai and Sale'aula
19
20
Report by Braisby, 1 Apr. 1932, A.O. 25/1-13.
Edward Stehlin to Resident Commissioner, 4 Apr. 1932; District 
Officer J. Bower to Inspector of Police, 6 Apr. 1932: A.O. 25/1-13.
289
were certain to reject the proposal out-of-hand. It is more likely 
that the decision was made with the primary intention of undermining 
the attempts by Safotulafai and Sale'aula to effect a reconciliation 
with the Malo, and to let everyone know that Palauli was prepared to 
go it alone in Savai1i if necessary.
In the event the other Pule centres did not in fact recognise 
Vailoa as the Mau headquarters in Savai’i. Palauli however proceeded 
with its scheme, styling Vailoa as a Mau faitotoa similar to one of 
the four Mau faitotoa around the Apia area. The Mau organisation 
within the district was tightened up and the collection of Mau 
contributions was strongly promoted. As a result, Mau funds collected 
in this district improved while the other districts were struggling 
with their collection efforts. The matai of Palauli district were 
plainly contemptuous of these futile efforts by the other districts 
and pointed out that the unsatisfactory situation which existed 
elsewhere resulted from weak matai leadership and a breakdown in fa1 a 
Samoa conventions. To underline this attitude Palauli refused to hand 
over its money to be deposited with the rest of the Mau funds in Apia, 
preferring to keep the money in Savai1 i.^
II
As the end of 1932 approached, the major topic of interest to 
both the Mau and the Malo became Nelson's return, scheduled for December. 
In the second week of April the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. G. Forbes, who
21 Ibid.
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was also responsible for the portfolio of External Affairs, wrote to 
the Administrator concerning the possibility of extending Nelson's 
term of exile: 'I am convinced myself that Nelson's activities in
New Zealand during the last two years are amply sufficient to warrant 
an extension of his period of deportation if this should be considered
v 22the proper course to adopt in our own interests' (his emphasis).
But he then went on to say that after careful consideration, he believed 
that it would not be advisable to extend the terms of exile, being 
himself inclined to the view which Hart had previously expressed that 
Nelson might reasonably be expected to settle down after he returned to 
Samoa. Because he doubted whether Nelson could control the activities 
of 'certain sections of the Samoans' Forbes suggested extra precautions 
and extra police to cater for any unforeseen circumstances of Nelson's 
return. He enclosed the written legal opinion from the Solicitor- 
General which stated that there was no power under the existing 
legislation to prevent Nelson and Gurr from returning to Samoa at the 
expiry of their period of exile.
In response to the Minister's letter Hart wrote that while
Nelson's exile 'had from twelve to eighteen months to run I would have
been willing to approve permission being granted for his return', he
23would not do so now. Instead he was 'of the emphatic opinion that
Nelson should not be permitted to return in December next, nor for a
period of two years from the time he ceases his present activities and
even then subject only to the giving of satisfactory guarantees for his 
24future conduct'. If Nelson was allowed to return anyway, the
Minister to Administrator, 14 Apr. 1932, A.O. 25/1-13. 
Administrator to Minister, 3 May 1932, A.O. 25/1-13.
24 Ibid.
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Administrator considered that an additional force of twenty-five
policemen from New Zealand would be required to reinforce the existing
force of twenty-two policemen he had in Samoa. As for the lack of
legal powers to extend Nelson's exile, Hart urged that the necessary
powers be obtained forthwith, and suggested that the powers under the
Samoa Immigration Order 1930 which applied to people of Nelson's legal
25status should be expanded and used to achieve his recommendation.
Hart's change of mind was due to certain articles published in
the Samoan supplement of the New Zealand Samoa Guardian in which Nelson
was alleged to have pledged his life and his funds to achieve the
removal of the New Zealand Administration from Samoa. In addition to
these articles Hart also had extracts of two letters allegedly written
by Nelson to the women's Mau, which he considered offensive and
calculated to inflame the situation in Samoa. These letters were read
to the gatherings of the women's Mau mentioned earlier and had been
noted down by police operatives. In one letter Nelson was alleged to
have written 'You must all be strong as I am going to see you this
year with great victories. The present soldiers who are now in Samoa
will all be deported, and the Government of New Zealand will leave
26Samoa. Samoa will then have a self-government'. In the second letter 
Nelson was said to have written that the New Zealand government was poor 
and weak, and he urged the Samoans to be strong and steadfast in the Mau 
for soon all its demands would be granted.
None of the recommendations made by Hart were accepted by the 
New Zealand cabinet. In the opinion of the Ministers, after expected 
demonstrations at the arrival of the exiles, there should be no further
25
26
Administrator to Minister, 3 May 1932, A.O. 25/1-13.
See A.O. 24/1-13, for the police reports which contained extracts 
of alleged letters from Nelson.
292
troubles emanating from them for they 'would be largely powerless to
cause trouble even if they wished to do so'. However in the event of
subsequent trouble emerging, Nelson and Gurr could again be deported or
imprisoned. The power of imprisonment, commented the Prime Minister,
was 'the key' to the whole question, because he believed that 'a period
of gaol to a man like Nelson would of course be a very different thing
from his five years of luxury and notoriety in Auckland'. Again,
Cabinet considered that Nelson's return without the victory which he
led the Mau to hope for would cost him considerable loss of prestige
and therefore favour within the movement. The biggest difficulty
however for Cabinet over this matter was its belief that public opinion
would be against it, if it tried to introduce legislation empowering
27government to extend Nelson's term of exile.
Hart did not share the optimism of his political superiors.
'I do not think Nelson is powerless to cause trouble, but on the
contrary, particularly owing to the power and the authority of the
chiefs over their people and Nelson's influence with the chiefs, it
would be exceedingly simple for him to cause great trouble without being 
28found out'. He reported that although the organisation and the numbers 
of Mau supporters were being maintained, the enthusiasm and morale 
amongst the members were not being similarly sustained and he believed 
that if that position could be held, even for one year, Nelson would 
not be able to revive it when he returned. But even with this favourable 
existing situation, and notwithstanding Mau/Malo people cooperating 
over village and district affairs, each village, he wrote, 'is like a 
smouldering fire requiring very little to stir it into a substantial
Forbes to Hart, 28 June 1932, A.O. 25/1-13. 
Administrator to Minister, 26 July 1932, A.O. 25/1-13.
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blaze'. An exaggeration, plainly, given the cooperation evident 
amongst the people in most villages and districts; Hart, however, 
had to make his point with the optimistic members of Cabinet.
This further attempt by Hart to persuade the New Zealand
government to reconsider its decision not to extend Nelson's term
of exile failed. And the Prime Minister told him to take that decision
as final. Cabinet, however, agreed to send policemen from New Zealand
- in small lots - to boost the Samoan Constabulary to thirty-five by
Christmas and it also agreed to the formation of a reserve force
locally. In addition, it approved the return from holidays of the
complement of one cruiser over the Christmas break in case assistance
was needed in Samoa on Nelson's return. In this communication the
Prime Minister stressed that New Zealand could not at that time afford
a loss of prestige over the Mau issue and clearly indicated that he
expected Hart to act decisively to ensure that the Mau did not defy
30government and the laws. While accepting the decision as final, the 
Administrator was clearly unhappy and he therefore sought a conference 
in New Zealand with the Prime Minister. His request was granted and he 
left for New Zealand towards the end of September.
Government leaders, however, were not the only people who 
looked with apprehension upon the approaching termination of Nelson's 
exile and his subsequent return to Samoa. Nelson himself was in a 
difficult position and was anything but elated at the prospect of being 
free to return to his homeland. On one hand it was imperative that he 
return to Samoa as soon as he was free to do so for business reasons.
29 Ibid.
30 Minister to Administrator, 24 Aug. 1932, A.O. 25/1-13.
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As he had admitted to Harry Holland, his firm had been 'very hard hit' 
by the depression, bad management, his long absence and 'the heavy 
expenditure of fighting my case . . . ' . He expressed fear that his 
company might need to go into voluntary liquidation to satisfy the 
court, which early in 1931 had imposed on it a fine of £5,600 after 
finding it guilty of aiding and abetting the Mau, a seditious organisation. 
Holland's view that Judge Luxford's decision, especially in the matter 
of penalties, was 'one of the gravest legal scandals in the history of 
New Zealand and that is saying a good deal'; and that he was 'suspicious 
of everything connected with the judiciary in Western Samoa' where
32proceedings 'are so clearly taken for personal and political reasons' 
would not have offered Nelson much consolation, even though these views 
supported what he had always felt and sometimes said.
The grave state of his business affairs notwithstanding,
Nelson declared that his highest priority remained the attainment of 
the 'best terms which the Samoans can get for their rightful claim to 
autonomy or at least a substantial and effective say in their own affairs'. 
It was because he felt that such terms had not been achieved that he 
was unable to look forward with happy anticipation to the end of his 
exile. Nelson's difficulties in this connnection centred round two 
major points - fears that under existing laws in Samoa another fatal 
shooting incident might occur on his arrival as it did on Smyth's 
return at the end of 1929, and recognition that he had little of 
substance to offer the Samoans in terms of successes resulting from his 
work as their representative in the last five years.
Nelson to Holland, 28 Apr. 1931, Nelson Papers, Apia.
Holland to Nelson, 24 Feb. 1931 and 24 Apr. 1931, Nelson Papers, Apia. 
Nelson to Holland, 22 July 1932, Nelson Papers, Apia.
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To meet the first contingency, Nelson, in the several months
prior to December 1932 - the last month of his exile - made a
concerted effort to wring from the authorities, both in New Zealand
and Samoa, assurances that a fatal clash similar to that which occurred
on 28 December 1929 would not be repeated. He drafted a series of
letters for the Mau leaders in which the Administrator was requested to
grant the Mau freedom to welcome its representative according to Samoan
practices and guarantee that the police would not interfere. In New
Zealand the message was conveyed to the Prime Minister. The only
assurance given by the authorities, however, was that there would be
34no police interference if the law was obeyed. And herein lay the 
heart of the problem faced by Nelson and to an extent by the Mau. The 
fact was that if the laws that existed in Samoa at that time were to 
be strictly observed, no Mau welcome for Nelson was possible. The Mau 
was still a seditious organisation and it was unlawful for anyone to 
take part in any function attributed to that organisation, and at the 
same time Samoans required permits from the authorities to travel within 
the country. Under Hart, the enforcement of the laws aimed specifically 
at the Mau had been relaxed, but as Nelson reminded the Prime Minister 
in an interview in late November, the Administrator or the police could 
at any time apply these laws just as the breaches were being ignored.
And if these requirements were enforced on the occasion of his arrival 
- Nelson considered that they would - then the police could provoke 
another fatal clash with the Mau and he and Gurr would be offenders 
without having any say in the matter. After all, while he had some 
influence on the Mau, he did not control the decisions or the actions of
Mau representatives to Administrator, 31 Aug. 1932; A/Administrator 
to Mau representatives, 11 Sept. 1932; Faumuina and Matau to 
A .C. Turnbull, 20 Sept. 1932; Nelson to PM, 28 Oct. 1932; Minister 
to Nelson, 11 Nov. 1932: A.O. 25/1-13.
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its members.
The immediate request therefore was for the authorities in 
Samoa to refrain from applying the law on the occasion of the exiles' 
arrival. But the real thrust of these representations lay in the 
logical extension of that request - the removal of these laws. This 
tied up with Nelson's second difficulty of lacking a 'victory' to 
present to the Mau on his return. If the New Zealand government would 
remove even one of the objectionable laws he would at least have a 
tangible success to show for his efforts and the expenses - both his 
own and the Mau's - incurred in the course of his work.
Although Richardson's scheme of local government had been 
abandoned by his successors, thereby removing the threat from village 
and district autonomy, and although Hart's relaxation of restrictions 
on the Mau and individual Samoans had removed many of the immediate 
causes of complaint, Nelson had been careful not to claim those as 
'victories'. He would have been aware that the laws pertaining to 
those matters still existed and that if he claimed their relaxation as 
a success and government responded by again enforcing them, he would be 
in much greater difficulties. He chose instead to refute claims by 
government that the situation in Samoa had improved dramatically and 
that life in the territory had largely reverted to normal, asserting 
that improvement could only be achieved through the removal of the 
objectionable laws.
When Hart arrived in New Zealand in early October to confer with 
government Nelson was hopeful that he would be invited to Wellington to 
discuss Samoan affairs with the Prime Minister and the Administrator. 
When that did not eventuate he began to express doubts about proceeding
35 See verbatim notes of an interview between Nelson and the Prime 
Minister in Wellington, 23 Nov. 1932; A.O. 25/1-13.
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with plans to leave for Samoa on 20 December 1932. He told the Mau
that such postponement would actually strengthen his resolve to see
'the objective of this struggle settled and Samoa recover her
inheritance from God, that is the freedom and the control of our
country in our accepted ways and the regulation of our lives according
36to the customs, usages and traditions of Samoa'.
During the last week of September the Mau, as had been the
practice since the beginning of 1930, took the opportunity of the
dedication of the L.M.S. church at Leauva'a village to gather and held
what was claimed to be the most representative Mau fono since the
December '29 shooting. Even Pasia and Lofipo, who had led the attempts
by Safotulafai and Sale'aula to seek a reconciliation with the Malo
without waiting for Nelson, were present. The main topic for discussion
was Nelson's return. After some heated exchanges, it was decided to
await developments arising from the exchange of letters between the
Mau komiti and the Administrator, before details of the reception were
finalised. This was a compromise resolution between Autagavaia, who
had argued strongly for the whole Mau to be present in Apia when Nelson
came ashore, and others who cautioned that this could place the lives
37of Mau members as well as that of Nelson in jeopardy.
As to Nelson's actual date of return, it was decided to leave 
this up to Nelson. When by mid-November no definite word had been 
received from Nelson, even after the Mau president had asked him to 
'tell us straight without further evasion' his plans of return, the 
Mau leadership, perturbed by the rising tension amongst its members
Letter from Taisi, 8 Oct. 1932, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
Matau Karauna to Taisi, 3 Oct. 1932, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
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because of the uncertainty, informed Nelson that the 'true opinion of
the Mau' was for him to stay on in New Zealand if no favourable word
was received from the Prime Minister regarding requests of safe
38conduct for Nelson and the Mau. On 23 November Nelson met Forbes, 
who was again unprepared to guarantee safe conduct, whereupon Nelson 
informed the Mau that his departure had been postponed until February 
the following year.
Nelson's worries would have been heightened by letters he had
received directly from Mau district fono urging him to remain in New
Zealand until 'everything was cleared up'. Although these messages
explained that the district decisions were due to the desire that no
harm should come to Nelson and also out of the realisation that without
him the Mau would be left adrift without direction, the Samoans in
their own subtle expressions left little doubt that the main reason
behind the decisions was that they would be unhappy for Nelson to
return without a tangible 'victory'; this would place them in a
39position of shame in their relationship with the other Samoans.
Nelson knew just how that aspect was so important to a Samoan.
Hart had made the situation more difficult for Nelson. On his 
return from New Zealand he called a fono a Faipule and when the 
inevitable topic of the Mau came up and views were expressed as to the 
need to end it quickly, particularly in view of Nelson's imminent 
return and the prospect of the Mau coming to a head again, Hart told 
the Faipule, as he did others during separate Samoan gatherings, not
Mau representatives to Taisi, 15 Nov. 1932, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., 
Apia.
Tuimavave to Taisi, 21 Nov. 1932, 28 Nov. 1932 and 30 Nov. 1932:
Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
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to be too harsh on the Mau for after all they were fellow Samoans.
He encouraged the Faipule instead to take time to reconcile their
differences with the Mau, otherwise let them be. As to Nelson's
return and the likelihood of his providing fresh encouragement to the
Mau, the Faipule were assured that Nelson had failed in all his
efforts on behalf of the Mau and when he returned he would not be
40permitted to stir up trouble again.
Tuatagaloa of Falealili, one of the most influential of the
Faipule, took the Administrator up on his word. He asked that the
Faipule be given the authority and the opportunity to attempt to
settle the conflict through fa1a Samoa means, adding that if these
efforts went well the Administration should really let the Samoans be,
by removing the restrictive laws and curtailing oppressive police
activities. Hart agreed. He however turned down the Faipule request
to remove forthwith the district officers and reinstate the Fa'amasino
41Samoa (Samoan judges). But he saw to it that the enforcement of
the restrictive laws as well as police activities - already greatly
relaxed - were scaled down even more, to the extent that the Mau reported
to Nelson that government and police were doing '... absolutely nothing.
Everything is peaceful. The Resident Commissioner in Savai'i Watson is
being very friendly to Mau people and so do government people in Apia.
42Even the papalagi policemen are friendly and smile at us now'.
In early January 1933 the effects of this situation were spelled 
out for Nelson by the Mau komiti. The Mau people were now not abiding
Tuimavave to Taisi, 28 Nov. 1932; Matau Karauna to Taisi, 
7 Dec. 1932: Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
41 Ibid.
42 Matau Karauna to Taisi, 23 Jan. 1933, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
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by earlier decisions by the Mau leadership to boycott government 
departments, the courts and especially the Lands and Titles Commission. 
Government had also subdivided Trust Estate land at Vaivaseuta near 
Apia and any Samoan could obtain a 15 acre piece of freehold land 
there. Samoans now also had easy access to dynamite for killing fish. 
Restrictions on travel were 'totally gone' and only offenders over 
the old poll tax were being selectively imprisoned. With regard to 
the sensitive area of village life, an official Mau letter recorded 
that:
Samoa is now free from so many of the restrictions
imposed by government in the past such as beetle
searches every Monday, inspections by village komiti
(as government ordered) every day of the week or every
month, district fono where the Faipule resided,
village fono where the Pulenu'u lived and many other
things. All those things are now done under the control
and direction of the Ali'i and Faipule [the matai
collectively], everything is fine, there is now an
abundance of food in every village, peace is now being
maintained in villages and districts (except for those
who have title and land cases), individuals and villages
now have time to do things over which they should
properly spend their time. That is the reason why so
many villages are now able to build churches whereas these
major projects had been impossible to undertake in the past.^
Certainly not a situation out of which one could reasonably hope
to provoke Samoans into revolt. At the same time, while there was
%
clearly a sense of relief at this state of affairs, both the Mau and 
Nelson - and particularly the latter - were sceptical about the 
motives behind the changes. The feeling was that the satisfactory 
situation was being deliberately created so that any disharmony amongst 
the Samoans and any resurgence in Mau activities which might surface 
after Nelson's arrival could be more easily blamed on him, making it a
43 Matau Karauna to Taisi, 18 Jan. 1933, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
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simple matter to punish him again, even perhaps by imposing another 
term of deportation. However, while these views were justified in 
the circumstances, the fact remained that the situation became what 
it was because the Mau people had accepted the changes.
On 21 January, Nelson wrote to the Mau and told them of the
serious crisis facing the New Zealand government, and the 'real
possibility' that it would be replaced by a government which was
sympathetic to the Mau. He decided to stay on in New Zealand and
await the outcome of the crisis in the New Zealand parliament, which
44if favourable would enable him to return with the 'victory'. On the
other hand he mentioned for the first time that he did not intend to
stay long in Samoa but planned to return to New Zealand to continue the
struggle if the Mau agreed because 'although we now see the whole thing
(mea atoa - meaning Samoa's rightful claim to independence) for Samoa,
45New Zealand still holds the validating documents over that status'.
So Nelson postponed his return further. But when the parliamentary 
session ended without a change in government and without a change of 
attitude towards Nelson and the Mau, he finalised arrangements to 
depart from New Zealand in the first week of May.
For several months the issue of Nelson's reception had been a
major topic of discussion in Mau fono. In the last week of December '32,
the Mau had written to the Administrator informing him that on Nelson's
arrival, sixty decorated fautasi would be in Apia harbour and a procession
46of six thousand matai would be in town to welcome him. Nelson had been
Letter from Taisi, 21 Jan. 1933, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia. 
Letter from Taisi, 9 Jan. 1933, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia. 
Faumuina to Administrator, 29 Dec. 1932, A.O. 25/1-4.
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most unhappy with this action, pointing out to the Mau that there
were only 8500 tax payers (matai and taulelea) in the territory and
that such a proposal was a flagrant invitation for disaster. The Mau
leaders retorted that the information conveyed to the Administrator
resulted from a decision of a full-scale Mau fono and no-one could
argue with that. However after many heated discussions and many pleas
from Nelson for a low-key reception, it was finally decided that four
Mau leaders would meet Nelson when he landed at Pagopago while the
women's Mau was given the task of providing the reception party in
Apia. Mau men from throughout the country, however, were asked to come
in for the occasion but were designated villages east and west of Apia
where they were to remain and await developments. A large reception
with ta'alolo and all other Samoan observances for such important
functions was planned, but in deference to advice from some of the
prominent Mau leaders as well as Nelson's pleas for caution, it was
decided to see how matters stood after Nelson's arrival before
47proceeding with the full-scale welcome.
Ill
On Tuesday morning (16 May) Nelson, accompanied by his five 
daughters, landed at Apia and was greeted by a party of about 1500 
members of the women's Mau. It was a quiet affair without fanfare or 
public speeches. The whole group proceeded to Vaimoso, where a 
religious service was held followed by a royal kava ceremony prepared 
by the aumaga from Falefa village - a section of Tupua's aumaga. The
47 Braisby to Administrator, 10 May 1933, A.O. 25/1-14.
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Mau leadership was gathered at Vaimoso together with several members 
from each village/district. These men, however, did not participate in 
the welcome except in the formal activities such as the presentation of 
the royal kava and certain exchanges of speeches. In the afternoon the 
women's Mau provided a large feast followed by dancing. Responding to 
this welcome Nelson, after the appropriate thanks, said that there were 
many things he would like to say, but he was not free to say them. And 
it was left at that - for the time being anyway - with the Lufilufi 
orator replying on behalf of the Mau that they were just happy to
see him again in good health after so long an absence. About 2000
48people were present at Vaimoso during the festivities.
On the following day the women presented a ta1alolo led by 
Fa'amu, Masiofo Paisami Tuimaleali'ifano and Masiofo Ala Tamasese 
wearing tuiga (ceremonial headdresses), making the occasion a royal one 
indeed. In presenting the ta1alolo formally, Fa'amu exercised the right 
of an Ali'i to speak (she was To'oa, Malietoa's taupou and therefore 
possessed a status similar to that of the Malietoa title) and declared 
that the women's Mau stood prepared and ready to finish the work of the 
Mau. Nelson in response referred to the concept of Pule na lua (dual 
authorities) which the women had used to define their place in the Mau, 
and agreed that if the men failed to 'uphold the rights of the Samoans' 
then the women must carry that responsibility. The ta'alolo presentation 
was followed by more dances and songs performed by members of the women's
Mau from different villages/districts, including some from Savai'i.
49About 3000 people were present on this day at Vaimoso.
48 Braisby to Administrator, 17 May 1933, A.O. 25/1-14.
49 Braisby to Administrator (progress report), 18 May 1933, A.O. 25/1-14.
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Over the two days, the behaviour of the Mau people was 'orderly 
and civil' and the few policemen on duty received ready cooperation. 
Although the Administrator had not formally suspended laws for Nelson's 
arrival, the failure of the police to make any arrests of Mau people 
blatantly breaking the laws by being present in a 'disturbed' area and 
participating in Mau functions meant that in effect these laws were 
suspended. This development, however, was not a dramatic one because 
for several months before Nelson's arrival these laws had not been 
enforced. The restraint on both sides resulted in this potentially 
explosive occasion passing without incident.
This peaceful scene, however, did not reflect the turmoil which 
was brewing in the councils of the Mau. The point at issue was the 
non-commital attitude shown by Nelson since his arrival. Some of the 
leaders - notably Autagavaia of Palauli and Fa'ifa'i of Lufilufi - who 
had been strong advocates of the view that the Mau should await Nelson's 
return before meeting the Administrator to thrash out a settlement, now 
demanded a more specific statement from Nelson as to his activities on 
behalf of the Mau, the results achieved and the money spent. Most 
immediately, though, they wanted an indication of how the whole struggle 
stood, particularly as related to responses and initiatives from the New 
Zealand government, the League of Nations and the outside world: did
these indicate a 'victory' for the Mau or did they not?^
That Autagavaia and his district of Palauli were at the forefront 
of this discontent was particularly serious because that district was 
where the organised support for the Mau was strongest. This was clearly 
the major reason behind Nelson's agreement to meet the Mau komiti much
50 Braisby to Administrator, 18 May 1933, A.O. 25/1-14.
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earlier than he probably considered desirable. The meeting took place 
at Vaimoso two days after his arrival. About fifty Mau matai were 
present to hear Nelson and not surprisingly - he did not have any 
concrete 'victories' to present the Mau - he used the rhetoric of the 
bible to convey his message.
Samoa, God has received our desire before him, therefore, 
may Jehovah live! Jehovah hears our prayers. The Lord 
hears our desires and although we are still confronted 
with suffering we are not forgotten by God. I exhort 
our people to let our hope in God remain firm, for he is 
all powerful. Let us not have any longer the slightest 
doubt or suspicion regarding our country for God does 
not desire a divided heart. God is concerned over his 
chosen people. The love of God for our islands of Samoa 
has not departed.51
A typical speech commonly used by Samoans either as opening 
remarks or in the main body of an address, conveying the clear message 
that one has nothing concrete to offer or that it was not politic for 
one to be more specific, leaving it up to the others to confirm one's 
message in specific terms as they see appropriate.
Autagavaia and Tuimaleali'ifano, who responded to Nelson's
address, both seized on the positive aspects of the lauga (address,
speech, sermon) and claimed that 'victory' for the Mau had been confirmed.
Yet they differed on what they meant by that expression. To Autagavaia
that 'victory' was conclusive: 'The spirit rejoices that you have come
with the victory and the manuia [blessing]'; but to Tuimaleali'ifano it
was something yet to be fully achieved: '... soon we shall rest in great 
52relief'. Again a typical response within the boundaries of Samoan 
oratory, and very useful in uncertain situations.
51 Quoted by Braisby in his report on the meeting: Braisby to
Administrator, 23 May 1933, A.O. 25/1-14.
52 Ibid.
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For the time being, the fono between the Mau leaders and 
Nelson soothed the discontented. This however was but temporary 
relief, particularly for Nelson, because the Mau now awaited tangible 
demonstration of his statement indicating the manuia for Samoa. It 
appears that the idea of the Mau being placed on an efficient 
organisational basis with a view to conducting the affairs of its 
supporters was suggested at this time. In any case the question of 
re-establishing the Mau headquarters at Vaimoso was discussed in 
village/district fono and the consensus was in favour. And so a week 
after Nelson's arrival, representatives from throughout the country 
began arriving in Vaimoso to represent their people in the rejuvenated
Mau komiti which was to operate from the old established Mau
 ^ , 53headquarters.
While documentary evidence is lacking and oral testimony hazy 
over who initiated this move, it is not unreasonable in the circumstances 
to suggest that this was Nelson's response to the Samoan demand for 
results. For both Nelson and the Mau leadership, there were not many 
options left in the way of initiatives which would appeal to the 
people. Indeed the establishment of a Mau government was probably the 
only viable one - apart from trying again to negotiate with government - 
available at this stage, given that they had exhausted the other 
alternatives, such as petitioning overseas governments as well as the 
League of Nations, without success.
As the Mau representatives started arriving in Apia, the police 
moved in and began arresting some of the leading personalities such as
53 Braisby to Administrator, 29 May 1933, A.O. 25/1-14.
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Alipia and Tagaloa for being present in a 'disturbed' area without
permits. The arrests brought an immediate reaction from the Mau,
which objected in a letter to Hart that this same law had been frequently
broken in the recent past without any police action and pointed out also
that the Mau meetings had been peaceful and orderly. The principal
message in the letter, however, was a proposal that the Administrator
meet Mau representatives 'to discuss with you all the matters at issue
between your government and the large majority of our people who are
54dissatisfied with your Government's method of administration'. Towards 
that end Hart was requested to suspend police operations, release the 
imprisoned Mau leaders for the proposed fono and guarantee freedom to 
both sides to choose whoever they wanted to represent their respective 
interests in the proposed conference.
Since the beginning of the confrontation in late 1926, this was 
the first time that the Samoans had directly asked for a fono with the 
Malo with a view to finding a settlement. Consequently Hart jumped at 
the opportunity to meet the Mau leaders. He promised to release the 
imprisoned Mau leaders to attend the fono(p); and although he did not 
mention suspending police operations, the enforcement of the laws 
relating to travel permits and illegal meetings ceased, and the police 
issued travel permits to Samoans without question. On the other hand, 
he informed the Mau leaders that he did not intend to call any 
representative to assist him and therefore he thought they could do the 
same, knowing full well that the Mau request over representatives had 
been made with the specific objective of including Nelson in the delegation.
Faumuina to Administrator, 5 June 1933, A.O. 25/1-14. 
Administrator to Faumuina, 9 June, 1933, A.O. 25/1-14.
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Over the next two months, Hart and the Mau leaders held several
meetings and exchanged numerous letters, as they tried to resolve the
matter of Nelson's participation. In the end, they failed to find a
solution as the Mau persisted in its demand for Nelson to be a member
of its delegation, and Hart on the other hand egually firm in resisting 
56that demand. To break the deadlock, Nelson had urged the Mau leaders 
to hold a fono without him, but his offer was rejected.
There were several reasons behind the Mau's stand over this 
issue. During negotiations with Hart, they had argued that Nelson 
should attend on behalf of the Mau because he had sacrificed and 
suffered for the Mau case; because the authorities had allowed him to 
represent the Mau at other times such as in supporting the petition to 
the New Zealand parliament in 1927 and during the Royal Commission 
hearings of the same year; and because he was standing by his Samoan 
blood and was therefore one of them. But there were other reasons. In 
the first place, they felt that because Nelson knew more than they did 
about what had been happening within the New Zealand government and 
parliament, within the League of Nations and within other overseas 
countries with regard to the Mau they needed him there to ensure 
that they were not misled on such matters. Also they needed his 
general advice and guidance. Secondly, there was a strong opinion 
amongst the Mau that because Nelson had been paid to advise and 
represent it over its dealings with governments and outside institutions 
he should participate in a substantive fono with the Administrator in 
order to fulfil his obligations to the Mau. Thirdly there was a keen 
desire in the Mau ranks to see a direct confrontation between Nelson and 
the Administrator:
56 See A.O. 25/1-14 and A.O. 25/1-15 for the relevant correspondence 
and the minutes of the meetings on this episode.
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The Government persists in the charge that Taisi's 
aims are selfish, and we have been misled and 
wrongly influenced by him. We therefore think it due 
to him, to us, and to the Government that he should 
be given this opportunity to prove his professions of 
goodwill to Samoa and the Samoans, and for you to 
prove the Government's allegations of selfish motives 
against him. This would either clear or discredit him 
for all time and much would be achieved thereby.^
But perhaps the most important reason was the Mau's consciousness 
of its own position as demonstrated by its repeated reminders to Hart 
that the planned fono had to be one organised and conducted on a 'basis 
of equality' in all respects. To allow the Administrator to dictate 
the composition of its delegation was to compromise the status of the 
Mau as an organisation which was accepted and upheld by a large number 
of Samoans to pursue their interests and one which the government should 
recognise and treat as such. After all, at the basic level, government 
and the Mau were but two organisations contesting the control of the 
affairs of the Samoans. This was a fundamental premise, and if the 
Administrator did not know it or chose to ignore it, then there was no 
point in holding a fono. The preliminary discussions finally ended on 
18 August without agreement on a substantive fono and Hart told the Mau 
representatives that the laws would be enforced again particularly in 
relation to travel permits and unlawful presence in 'disturbed areas'. 
Both parties had maintained a friendly and respectful attitude 
throughout the talks and Hart had shown good judgement - as compared 
to his two predecessors - in keeping an open mind and desisting from 
lecturing the Mau delegates.
As these discussions progressed, contacts between Nelson and 
the Mau leaders who had been meeting almost daily at Vaimoso to direct
57 Faumuina to Administrator, 25 July 1933, A.O. 25/1-15.
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the negotiations with Hart, became increasingly open, until komiti
members were calling at all times on Nelson either at his office or at
58his home in Tua'efu. At the same time Faumuina told Hart that the Mau
had been making use of Nelson's advice since his return, but he emphasised
that this was at the instigation of the Mau and Nelson was merely
supplying advice as requested. Hart, however, thought differently -
Nelson, he reported, had again 'assumed control of the movement and
directs it through Faumuina and the committee ...' and he was 'steadily
59developing the activities of 1926-1929'. He felt that Nelson's 
activities had gone far enough - given the Prime Minister's warning not 
to let the situation get out of hand after Nelson's return - and he 
suggested that proceedings should now be taken under 'The Samoa Seditious 
Organisations Regulations, 1930'. He was confident that he possessed 
ample evidence to convict Nelson. The Solicitor-General, however, 
advised the Prime Minister that the material collected up to 18 August 
was insufficient to bring a charge and in any event the Prime Minister 
felt that nothing that occurred while the preliminary discussions were in 
progress should be used against Nelson or the Mau, otherwise government's 
professions of goodwill and good faith would be seen as meaningless.^
As if anticipating this move by the Administrator, Nelson 
advised the Mau komiti to be more cautious in contacting him; advice 
which displeased the Mau leaders who felt that, after their rejecting the 
chance of a possible settlement by upholding his interests, Nelson should 
not be frightened and leave the Mau by itself to take the brunt of any
Braisby to Administrator, 25 June 1933 and 28 June 1933: A.O.
25/1-14; Braisby to Administrator, 5 July 1933 and 14 Aug. 1933;
Hart to Coates (personal), 21 Aug. 1933: A.O. 25/1-15.
Hart to Coates (personal), 21 Aug. 1933, A.O. 25/1-15.
Minister to Administrator, 9 Oct. 1933 and 14 Oct. 1933: A.O. 25/1-15; 
PM to Administrator, 8 Nov. 1933, A.O. 25/1-16.
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punitive measures that the Administrator might bring down. Such
measures were indeed likely, given the Mau's decision to keep the
peace but remain in Apia without the required permits. Others
however, such as the Palauli representatives, pressed for a more
aggressive approach, even violence. As a compromise it was decided
that the Mau office would be reopened and the Mau revert to the central
administration of its affairs from Vaimoso as occurred in 1928 and 1929.
As happened before 'Black Saturday', as Saturday 28 December 1929 had
become known, the Mau komiti would remain in Apia and it would conduct
its affairs, including fono and other functions, openly. At all times
though members were instructed to keep the peace and submit quietly to
arrest. In pursuing these decisions, the Mau leaders expected Nelson's 
62full assistance.
Nelson clearly appreciated the inevitable result of being
involved in Mau affairs. He had said that such involvement could result
in fifteen more years in exile and that it was up to him whether that
would happen. His plea for caution was therefore understandable, as
were his contingency plans to continue his work for the Mau overseas
where he would be more effective because he would have greater freedom
63of movement and expression. The Mau leaders, however, held a 
different opinion. They wanted him to stay on in Samoa to assist them 
and to justify his prediction of the manuia for the Mau being at hand. 
Furthermore, they wanted his involvement with the Mau to be in the open 
so that they would all be equally exposed to any government reprisal. 
Nelson had little choice but to agree.
Braisby to Administrator, 27 Aug. 1933 and 11 Sept. 1933: A.O. 25/1-15. 
Braisby to Administrator, 19 Aug. 1933 and 24 Aug. 1933: A.O. 25/1-15. 
Braisby to Administrator, 27 Aug. 1933, A.O. 25/1-15.
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Despite government warnings that laws would be enforced fully,
the Mau supporters were in fact left alone. They therefore proceeded
with their reorganisation and their other activities. During September
and October large reception functions - including ta'alolo and sua
presentations - were held at Vaimoso by Atua and A'ana districts as
well as by Palauli and Safotulafai. These were the receptions which
were planned for Nelson's arrival but were cancelled at that time for
fear of provoking police reaction. The Administrator, the Fautua and
senior officials were invited but declined. Many other leading whites
in commerce and the professions, however, attended. In each of these
functions Nelson was present and participated fully in speech and other
64ceremonial exchanges. At the same time as these festivities were being
organised the Mau leaders stepped up their efforts to encourage
increased contributions and to instill in the Mau supporters a sense of
unity and commitment. Village/district committees were encouraged to
come into Apia to see the reopened headquarters office at Vaimoso and
bring the Mau lafoga to be deposited therein. The office itself was
equipped with new typewriters and other equipment and an application for
65a telephone was also put in.
While these developments gave a strong impression of vitality, 
they were clearly moves initiated by the Mau leaders in Apia and they 
lacked the authentic support which village/district people would give 
to proposals which emanated from amongst themselves. This was clearly 
demonstrated in several instances at this time. In the first place, 
the drive for improved Mau contributions had met with little success.
64 See A .0. 25/1-15 for numerous detailed police reports on those 
functions.
65 Braisby to Administrator, 18 Oct. 1933 and 23 Oct. 1933: A.O.
25/1-15.
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While it was true that the copra price was abysmally low- 6d. per 100 
lbs. - there was little doubt that the Mau lafoga would have increased 
significantly, as occurred in the past under comparable economic 
conditions, if the hearts of the people were wholly behind the decisions 
of the Mau komiti. After all they were building bigger and more 
churches in the midst of the depression.
Secondly the villages/districts were not united in the functions
which took place in their names: the Atua reception was virtually a
Anoamaa one; the Fa'asaleleaga ta1alolo was ill-prepared (small pig and
insufficient chickens, taro, etc.) and their speech and whole demeanour
was disrespectful; the A'ana reception was delayed several times
because allocated food contributions were not being met; and even the
ta1alolo from Palauli district was4 made without the participation of
66the populous villages of Gataivai, Taga, Salailua and Gaga'emalae.
Thirdly, villages/districts were most reluctant to hand over 
whatever money had been collected to the Mau office at Vaimoso. They 
were clamouring for an explanation of where monies they had contributed 
previously had gone - they wanted a clear statement on what Nelson 
did with the money sent him by the Mau, an account of the Mau money 
held by the late Tamasese, and they wanted the komiti in Apia as well 
as their own local komiti to account for all the money that they had 
contributed to the Mau.
The case of Palauli district offers an illuminating example.
Due to the efficient administration of the Mau in this district, 
particularly after unilaterally establishing itself as a Mau faitotoa,
66 Braisby to Administrator, 14 Sept. 1933 and 29 Sept. 1933: A.O.
25/1-15.
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funds - mainly from fines - rapidly grew. By October these had 
exceeded £1000. Nelson and the other Mau leaders asked Autagavaia to 
remit this money to Apia to be deposited with Nelson so that it could 
gather interest, and the Palauli representative sent for the money 
several times. Each time, though, the messenger returned empty-handed.
The same thing happened when Autagavaia personally went himself. Before 
he went to Savai'i though, Autagavaia had told Nelson that Palauli would 
not part with their money without some kind of security. He had 
suggested shares in Nelson's firm or land on the Nelson plantation at
Palauli, but Nelson had refused to guarantee the money personally.
67Palauli district retained its money in Savai'i.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Mau leaders, in conjunction 
with Nelson, decided to establish an administrative structure, covering 
the whole span from the village level to the leadership body in Vaimoso, 
through which the affairs of those belonging to the Mau would be 
administered. The Mau of course had tried to administer the affairs 
of its members before, but there were some dramatic differences between 
what was being attempted now and what existed in the earlier period. 
Previously the Mau supporters had simply used Sairoan institutions and 
organisational practices to organise their support for the movement.
There was no attempt to depart from what they were used to - meaning 
that flexibility and freedom of choice were the governing characteristics 
with the structure of the organisation and chain of command not being 
formalised.
Now, however, under the guidance of Nelson, a man who insisted on 
efficiency in his business affairs and whose lifestyle was predictable
67 Braisby to Administrator, 25 Oct. 1933, A.O. 25/1-16.
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because it followed an orderly and organised pattern, the organisation
of the Mau was brought under a more formal and structured hierarchy.
At the national headquarters in Vaimoso four divisions of authority
would operate: in descending order the Fa'atonu (Director or Adviser),
the President, the representatives of the four faitotoa, and finally
the village/district representatives who would reside in the Apia area.
In the villages and districts - in descending order again - the District
leader who was to be the head of the faitoto1 a or headquarters which
had been designated for each district, the village guardian, who held
a similar role to the pulenu'u, the village committee, and finally,
the village people. The Mau directive summed up the procedure to be
followed by the Mau thus: 'The village section to the committee.
The committee to the Village Guardian. The Village Guardian to the
68District Leader. The District Leader to the Office of the Mau'.
The Mau had come up with exactly the same structure of village/ 
district administration Richardson had tried to establish.
This formal Mau organisation was never put into operation, which 
was probably just as well for the Mau. It is almost certain that it 
would have been ignored in every respect which did not conform with 
normal Samoan practices. Indeed the Malo plainly did the Mau leadership 
a great favour by intervening and stopping this structure from being put 
into use; the Mau leadership would most likely have suffered the same 
rejection - perhaps even a worse fate - as the Malo had experienced 
earlier.
During October and into the first weeks of November, activities 
amongst Mau leaders at Vaimoso intensified, and Nelson was kept busy in
68 Mau circular (8 Nov. 1933), A.O. 25/1-17.
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trying to induce order and regularity into certain decisions taken by
the Mau komiti to avoid confusion and clashes. One of these decisions
was for two delegations made up of Mau leaders to travel throughout
Upolu and Savai'i to discuss Mau matters with villages and districts
concerning the formation of the Mau government. When the decision was
conveyed to Nelson, he discovered that, true to their practices, the
Samoans had only settled on the numbers of the delegations - twenty-six
each - but neither names of the delegates nor the objectives of their
malaga were specified. He advised the Mau representatives that he
considered ten delegates in each party sufficient and that it was
imperative the parties conveyed the same message or 'confusion will
69result and it is important that such a malaga does not go'. He then 
offered to prepare a draft of messages to be conveyed by the parties 
for the consideration of the Mau komiti.
This advice was accepted with a few variations - the malaga 
parties, for example, numbered more than ten each - and the parties set 
out from Vaimoso on 15 November. The specific objectives of the malaga 
were to inspect villages and plantations; but the principal message was 
that the Mau leaders in Apia had established an organisational structure 
through which the affairs of those people who were dissatisfied with the 
Malo and would not accept guidance from that quarter would be administered. 
Apart from advising the local supporters on the different aspects of the 
structure to be used and helping with the appointment of office holders, 
the malaga parties were especially emphatic on the crucial need for more 
money contributions if the Mau government was to succeed.7*7
Note on 'Circuit round country' signed T. and dated 7 Nov. 1933.
Going by its contents, this note was unmistakably one from Nelson to 
the Mau leaders; A.O. 25/1-17.
Braisby to Administrator, 2 Nov. 1933; Mau circular letter (25 Oct. 1933) 
from Faumuina; Extract of Nelson to Mau letter in Braisby to Administrator 
10 Nov. 1933: A.O. 25/1-16.
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IV
Unbeknown to the Mau leaders, though, Hart had decided some
time earlier that the departure of the malaga parties would be the
signal for his move. He told the New Zealand government that he would
arrest some Samoans and execute searches at Vaimoso, Tuaefu 'and other
necessary places'. He also planned to arrest Nelson, being confident
that he already possessed sufficient evidence to bring down a conviction
71decision in court. On 16 November Hart put his plan into operation.
Searches were conducted at the Mau headquarters office at Vaimoso,
Nelson's residence at Tuaefu (twice on the same day) and at Rudolf
Kruse's residence at Mato'otua. The search at Tuaefu proved most
rewarding in terms of incriminating material uncovered. Documents
found confirmed Nelson's intimate connection with the Mau and they
confirmed also the identity of the malaga parties as messengers working
72on behalf of the Mau.
A police contingent was despatched to Luatuanu'u village on the 
Northeast coast of Upolu where the Upolu malaga party was gathered.
Eight members of this party were enticed by the police into returning 
to Apia on the understanding that they were to meet the Administrator 
and afterwards return to continue with their malaga. They were 
arrested on arrival in Apia, charged with being present in a 'disturbed' 
area without valid permits and were remanded and held in custody at 
Vaimea prison. On 21 November, Nelson was arrested on the charge of
f  ;
associating with the Mau. He was immediately released on bail on 
grounds of ill-health but his bail was subject to very strict conditions
Administrator to EA, 9 Nov. 1933, A.O. 25/1-16.
See A.O. 25/1-16 and A.O. 25/1-17 for detailed reports on these 
searches and the material uncovered.
318
forbidding any contact with the Mau. On the following day the members
of the Upolu malaga party were convicted of being active members of
the Mau and Autagavaia, the leader of the party was sentenced to twelve
months' imprisonment while the rest received six months each. The six
principal members of the Savai'i malaga party were arrested on 1 December
and two received six months imprisonment terms, two three week terms,
while two were discharged. Fa'alava'au, one of the two Mau clerical
secretaries who was the only person at the Mau office when the police
raided it, was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment. In the second
73week of December the Administration's case against Nelson commenced.
On the day following the conviction of the members of the 
Upolu malaga party, all the Mau members gathered in the Apia area 
were advised that they had twenty-four hours to disperse or face 
arrest. A general fono was convened and it reaffirmed the message 
carried by messengers dispatched to villages/districts the previous 
day to send more people into Apia where they would all await any new 
initiatives from the Malo. This fono then turned to the crucial issue 
of planning a course for the Mau in the light of the recent developments. 
The discussions lasted through the whole afternoon and continued into 
the early hours of the following morning when the consensus was reached 
that the Mau would seek a meeting with the Administrator to settle the 
whole conflict. In the meantime the Mau would request that leniency and 
consideration be extended to Nelson by the Administration because of 
what Nelson had done and suffered on its behalf, and would undertake 
that it would neither agitate on behalf of his pending court case nor 
would it now insist on his presence in a substantive fono with the
73 See A.O. 24/1-16 and A.O. 25/1-17.
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Administrator 74
The immediate problem facing the Mau was the police order to
disperse from Vaimoso by 10 a.m. on 24 November. Coming on top of the
imprisonment of the Mau leaders two days earlier, such a dispersal would
not only be disastrous to the survival of the movement but, even worse,
it would mean shame for the Mau supporters. It was imperative that the
police order be foiled, or a repeat of the events of March 1930 was
inevitable. These considerations were probably foremost in the minds
of those that attended the lengthy Mau fono on the night of 23 November,
as much perhaps as the realisation that Nelson and his assurances that
all would be alright so long as they kept the peace, were again proven
wrong. At about 7 a.m. on the morning that the police order would
become effective Faumuina, Pulepule and Mata'u Karauna travelled to
Vailima to advise the Administrator of the decision of the Mau fono.
Hart delayed discussing the matter till later in the morning in his
office. In the meantime the Mau messengers successfully persuaded the
Administrator to order the Inspector of Police to suspend his dispersal 
75instructions, thereby affording the Mau leaders breathing space to 
prepare for the next stage of a strategy aimed at enabling them and 
others in the movement to emerge - if the Mau was to end - at least 
with dignity.
Hart was pleased with the Mau decisions. He however decided 
that owing to court rules, discussions as suggested by the Mau could 
not be properly conducted while Nelson's case was before the court.
In any event a delay, said Hart, would give time for all concerned to
74 Braisby to Administrator, 24 Nov. 1933 and 25 Nov. 1933: A.O. 25/1-16.
75 Braisby to Administrator, 25 Nov. 1933; Edward Stehlin to SNA,
24 Nov. 1933: A.O. 25/1-16.
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cool down and evaluate in calmer moments the recent events and the
pressing need for the confrontation to be brought to an end. This
response thwarted the designs of the Mau leaders, whose purpose in
suggesting a fono was apparently more to give them an excuse to prevent
the Mau from being dispersed than to find an end to the Mau. The
delegation was forced to ask directly for permission for the Mau to
remain in the Apia area - 'the real object of the petition and the truth
...' It was a crude attempt and Hart had easily seen through it.
However, he believed that the Mau mission - again consisting of
Faumuina, Pulepule and Mata'u Karauna -were in fact genuine in their
desire to effect a settlement and he therefore agreed to their amended
request for representatives (five from each village/district) to remain
in Apia, to discuss, according to Faumuina, matters to be raised in a
fono with the Administrator, if one took place. Faumuina told the
Administrator that the representatives would not be involved in '... any
conduct that would cause anger in your heart Sir - for instance -
another government to be formed or officials to run the place - there
will be nothing of that sort'. And Hart had responded by urging the
Mau 'to drop Mau matters - just be patient and do nothing till the
76trial is finished'.
The Mau received the report of its delegation with joy, and 
immediate steps were taken to put the agreed arrangements into effect.
As a result of the message conveyed to the Mau supporters in the 
villages two days earlier, Mau numbers at Vaimoso, which had begun 
increasing since the Upolu malaga party was arrested, had swelled 
dramatically from about three hundred a week earlier to an estimated
76 'Minutes of meeting between ... Administrator and Mau Representatives, 
24 November 1933', A.O. 25/1-16.
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three thousand. Now all started returning to their respective villages,
77leaving behind about two hundred representatives.
Before Nelson's case began, Hart predicted that it should not 
take two or three days, so conclusive was the evidence; for the same 
reason he assumed a conviction would result. A conviction indeed was 
obtained, but the case lasted until the first week of March the following 
year. Disagreement over assessors, Nelson's sacking his lawyer 
(M. Klinkim’ller) and conducting the case himself, Nelson's being sick 
and the Chief Justice's being laid up in hospital for four weeks 
from a coral cut poisoning, and the proceedings being conducted in two 
languages - until near the end when the Chief Justice ordered only 
English to be used to speed matters up - all contributed to the protracted 
hearing. In the main, though, the case took time because after Nelson 
took over his own defence he questioned closely every piece of evidence 
and information presented by the prosecution.
It was all in vain. He was convicted of contravening 'The 
Maintenance of Authority in Native Affairs Ordinance 1928' by participating 
in unauthorised functions by Samoans and he was also found guilty of 
associating with the Mau - a seditious organisation under 'The Samoa 
Seditious Organisations Regulations 1930'. He was sentenced to eight 
months' imprisonment and ten years in exile. On 8 March, the day after 
the sentence was announced, Nelson left Samoa for New Zealand to serve 
his sentence. In New Zealand, Nelson appealed his conviction and
c'
sentence and the Court of Appeal reduced his sentence to the period 
already served, but left his exile term untouched.
It was now the turn of the Samoans. On the day that Hart told
77 Braisby to Administrator, 25 Nov. 1933, A.O. 25/1-16.
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the Mau delegation to await the end of Nelson's case before again
raising the prospect of a settlement conference, he wrote to the Prime
Minister that 'the time is now opportune to obtain finality' on the
Mau/Malo conflict. He renewed his suggestion made earlier in the month
to invoke 'The Samoa Amendment Act 1927' and deport some of the more
important members to the Tokelaus, 'unless they definitely and finally
78cease their activities'. The Prime Minister supported Hart's
suggestion but advised that his government 'would wish to avoid the
necessity for this course if possible ...' In the same communication
Hart was reminded not to overlook Faumuina and Mata'u Karauna if
deportation was imposed on Mau leaders, and he was also asked for his
views on the 'practicability and desirability of simultaneously
79offering appointment as Fautua to Tamasese'. In the event no Mau
leaders were deported and Tamasese was not appointed a Fautua at that 
time.
While Nelson's case was in progress the Mau representatives 
clashed in open confrontation. Representatives from the Pule centres 
and from Leulumoega openly accused Faumuina of betraying the Mau and 
being responsible for all the setbacks they had suffered in recent 
months. Faumuina responded that all he was interested in and all that 
he had worked for was the prosperity of Samoa; and the accusers were 
not able to produce any concrete evidence of Faumuina's alleged 
misdeeds when they were asked to provide proof for their allegations.^
At the same time the repeated counsel from Faumuina and 
Tuimaleali'ifano for the Mau to follow what was agreed between the
Hart to Forbes (personal), 24 Nov. 1933, A.O. 25/1-16.
EA to Administrator, 5 Dec. 1933, A.O. 25/1-16.
Braisby to Administrator, 1 Dec. 1933 and 8 Dec. 1933: A.O. 25/1-16.
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Administrator and the Mau delegation on 24 November, to keep the peace
and prepare for a combined fono was regarded by the representatives
of Pule led by Pasia of Safotulafai and Alipia of Leulumoega as a
sign of weakness. These orators bluntly told Faumuina and Tuimaleali1ifano
to leave the Mau, as they were really powerless, and to hand over control
of the movement to Tumua and Pule, who were the groups with the power in 
81Samoa. Lufilufi, however, favoured the conciliatory approach and in 
the end these clashes did not result in any dramatic changes within 
the leadership of the Mau. An interesting aspect of these suspicions 
as to who betrayed Mau plans to government concerned rumours which 
circulated after Mata'u Karauna died in January 1934. The rumours 
alleged that the Mau secretary was murdered because he was involved in 
the betrayal of the Mau, but in fact he died from an acute kidney 
complaint.
Although the Mau supporters had remained quiet during all the
time since government action commenced in November, Hart feared that
the conviction and remand-in-custody of Nelson on 3 March would bring a
violent reaction. The Mau indeed reacted, and strongly, but it was
a reaction of compassion rather than violence. During the four days
between the conviction and the sentencing, concerted efforts were made
by the Mau, the women's Mau, Nelson's firm and family as well as other
firms in Apia for Nelson to serve whatever sentence was passed on him
in Samoa which ironically was what the New Zealand government had wanted.
These efforts were all in vain as Hart informed the petitioners that the




See A .0 . 25/1-17 for copies of letters and petitions as well as 
records of interviews concerning this issue; Hart to Forbes (private), 
8 Mar. 1934, A.O. 25/1-17.
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Sympathy for Nelson grew rapidly amongst the Samoans - due
largely to the efforts of his daughters - and even one of the leading
Faipule, Tuatagaloa, joined the Mau leaders in requesting that Nelson
remain in Samoa. These efforts culminated on the day Nelson was to
leave Samoa - 8 March - when the Mau leaders, accompanied by Malietoa
and Tuatagaloa, travelled to Vailima and offered an ifoga - the highest
form of apology which in Samoan society sufficed for the greatest
offence - to the Administrator with a prayer, made by Malietoa, for
Nelson's retention in Samoa. Hart, however, told the ifoga party that
he could not vary the court sentence, although he would be prepared to
83meet the Mau leaders to discuss their grievances.
Long before the sentence was passed on Nelson, it had been
arranged that he would serve his time in New Zealand if his sentence
amounted to six months or more - the law provided for this. Forbes had
not been keen on Hart's suggestion over this arrangement, the Prime
Minister being of the view that a more cogent example would be made if
Nelson served his time in Samoa with the other Mau prisoners. Hart,
however, had argued strongly that there was a significant desire
amongst many Mau leaders to effect a conciliation, but with Nelson in
Samoa, even if in prison, there would be little likelihood of this growing
desire for a settlement bearing fruition. The Prime Minister finally
84agreed with the Administrator.
Braisby to Administrator, 9 Mar. 1934, A.O. 25/1-17.
EA to Administrator, 5 Dec. 1933; Hart ot Forbes (personal),




With Nelson's case completed, Hart invited the Mau leaders to a
fono as he had promised the previous November. Despite disagreements
amongst the Mau as to the appropriateness of attending such a meeting,
the leaders - with some inducement from the Fautua - attended the
Administrator's fono which included the two Fautua as well as Tuatagaloa
as representative of the Faipule. Following through an informal
suggestion from the Fautua that the Samoans in the Malo were willing to
effect a conciliation amongst all the Samoans, Faumuina asked for an
opportunity to discuss this amongst the Samoans themselves.
It is a primary point with us that the whole of the 
Samoans should be united first before we attend a 
discussion of the grievances ... We want a full and 
complete settlement. We have been informed of the 
wish and desire of the two Fautua Malietoa and Mata'afa 
and also Tuatagaloa who represents the Faipule that 
there should be a settlement between the natives and 
that after that we may discuss with your Excellency 
various matters which would best be adopted. The 
Samoans who are dissatisfied await the wish of Malietoa 
and Mata'afa for a settlement.85
Hart agreed to this procedure and the Samoans immediately set about
arranging a fono of conciliation. Savali (special messengers) were sent
out by both the Mau and the Malo groups to inform the people throughout
the country of the impending fono and to convey an open invitation to
86anyone who wished to attend to do so.
Although news of the likely conciliation amongst the Samoans 
was received with mixed feelings in the villages/districts, it appeared 
that it was generally welcomed and supporters of the Mau and the Malo 
flocked to Apia for the fono, which took place at Vaimoso on 23 March.
'Report of Discussion held in Central Office, 15 March, 1934', A.O. 
25/1-17.
SNA to Administrator, 16 Mar. 1934 and 18 Mar. 1934: A.O. 25/1-17.
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It was the first fono in eight years in which all sections of Samoan 
society were properly represented. Because the Mau leaders had agreed 
to Malietoa's desire for a conciliation - expressed in an informal 
meeting prior to the fono with the Administrator - the Vaimoso conference 
was brief. Mata'afa, speaking on behalf of the Malo, said that a 
reconciliation should be effected and then all could work together 
with the Administration in trying to resolve the Mau grievances.
Faumuina, for the Mau, responded,'Let us make a reconciliation today, 
and as to the matters of dissatisfaction of this section, let the
87burden be carried by all Samoans together and put before the Governor'. 
Specifically, the Mau wanted assistance from the Malo leaders over the 
request for the release of the imprisoned Mau leaders and for the 
return of Nelson. Goodwill being expressed on all sides, Mau and Malo 
representatives shook hands, embraced and expressed satisfaction that 
the Samoans had been reconciled after such a lengthy period of time.
They decided to see the Administrator the following week.
There was, however, a group of Mau leaders which did not appear
overjoyed with the reconciliation. This group was led by Pule (i.e.
Savai'i) Leulumoega and apparently Tamasese, who although he had not
taken any noticeable part in either internal Mau affairs or Mau/Malo
negotiations up to this stage, was an important figure to win over.
This group tried to undermine the progress made by procrastinating on
the fono with the Administrator, but the other Mau leaders, headed by
Tuimaleali'ifano, Faumina, Pulepule and Lufilufi orators went ahead
8 'Qwith the arranged meeting. S  During this fono held on 27 March and
'Reconciliation of the Samoan People' n.d.; Report by Constables 
Seiuli and Fitisemanu re: Fono between government and Mau natives,
23 Mar. 1934: A.O. 25/1-17.
SNA to Administrator, 25 Mar. 1934, A.O. 25/1-17.
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subsequent ones - attended by the full komiti - the Mau leaders
supported by the Fautua and the Faipule representative made two
requests, the determination of which they said would end the Mau.
The requests were for the release of the imprisoned Mau leaders and the
return of Nelson. As for the grievances already before government,
Faumuina said that Hart could take them up with the people now the
89Samaons were reconciled in the proper fa'a Samoa way.
The Administrator replied that the first request could be granted
- the Chief Justice in fact had recommended in court during conviction
of Nelson the release of the Samoan prisoners and had repeatedly asked
for this to be done - but the second was beyond his powers. He however
offered a lame concession that if a complete settlement of the Mau
dispute was effected he would suspend or repeal the laws under which
travel by the Samaons was restricted. He would moreover reopen four schools
which had been closed due to political activities and three further
dispensaries staffed by Native Medical Practitioners (N.M.P.) would be
opened in those districts without such facilities. In addition the
Estimates dealing with Samoan finances would be published in Samoan,
and at the same time he was prepared to reduce the export tax on copra
by a further 10/- per ton - a similar reduction was made the previous
November - and he would guarantee the return on copra to the Samoans
90to increase by 6d. per hundred pound lots.
The Mau leaders, however, insisted that a final settlement could 
not be made until their requests on the prisoners and Nelson's return 
were met. The Fautua and the Malo Samoans were not happy with this
'Notes of fono of representatives of all Samoa with ... the 
Administrator at Mulinu'u, 27 March 1934', A.O. 25/1-17.
90 Ibid.
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attitude because they had agreed to support the Mau representations to 
the Administrator on the understanding that all would abide by whatever 
decision the Administrator made. Still, they did not go back on the 
reconciliation they had made with the Mau Samoans, perhaps because they 
realised that it was unrealistic for the Mau leaders to give up too 
easily after such a long struggle and with their pride and dignity at 
stake. The Mau leaders had made it clear that while they appreciated 
Hart's patient and respectful approach to them, they nonetheless 
objected to what they considered to be an indecent hurry to end the 
Mau before he departed for New Zealand at the end of the first week of 
April. And so Hart, who had volunteered to have his term - it would 
have expired in March - extended in the hope of bringing about a 
settlement, left for his leave in New Zealand with the Mau issue still 
largely unresolved.^"*"
The deadlock meant that the tactics adopted by each side had 
failed. The Administrator had thought that removing Nelson from Samoa 
would persuade the Mau leaders to end the movement. On the other hand 
the Mau leaders had hoped that reconciling with Malo Samoans and 
getting their support for Mau demands would bring success. They now 
had to reconsider their positions. For government Hart still had the 
option of deporting certain Mau leaders while on the Mau side an attempt 
was made to exploit the reconciliation of the Samoans as against 
government. The Mau leaders sent out messengers to spread the word 
that since the Samoans had reconciled it was now a matter between the 
whole of Samoa as against the New Zealand-controlled Administration.
This message accompanied efforts in the villages and districts to win 
over Malo supporters and unite all Samoans in the cause of the Mau.
91 See A.0. 25/1-17 for details of the fono (5) between the Administrator 
and the Samoans.
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These efforts failed. The process whereby Samoans in the villages/ 
districts had resumed their normal lives after the upheavals, 
bitterness and separations of the early years of the Mau had progressed 
to a stage where people were largely immune to blandishments from both 
the Mau and the Administration. If anything, news of the reconciliation 
at Vaimoso assisted more in speeding up this normalisation process 
rather than promoting the cause of either the Mau or the Malo.
It was the harmony and the peace that existed in the Samoan
community which decided Hart against deporting Mau leaders. This
decision marked a backdown by Hart from his earlier intention of ending
the Mau once and for all when he made his move in November the previous
year. He had lowered his expectations to peaceful co-existence, hoping
perhaps that time and lack of grounds on which the Mau could base their
discontent would see it die out. Lacking any dramatic developments,
however, the demise of the Mau appeared a long way off. C.R. McKay,
who was the official closest to the Samoans not only because he was
Secretary of Native Affairs but also because of his long period in the
country - he arrived in 1919 and had been there continuously apart from
the normal leave breaks - saw it this way:
The real reason for its [the Mau's] continuing existence 
is not in any 'grievances' (the first request in the 
fonos [sic] with His Excellency was that replies to the 
grievances should be deferred) nor is it any sympathy 
for Taisi, but purely a materialistic concern on the 
part of the Mau leaders as to what would become of their
personal notoriety if they were to give it up. The Mau
today is not what it was; it is now a handful of chiefs 
whose names in the past have been prominent, others are 
unpopular with their own people and even where not 
actually banished from their districts find living in 
Vaimoso more congenial and for these reasons they prefer 
the Mau should continue.92
92 SNA to Sec. to Admin., 1 May 1934, A.O. 25/1-18.
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There was certainly something in this view; perhaps best
demonstrated by the abysmal response to calls - appeals, demands,
personal representations - for money: the real test of support.
On the other hand, reports from all parts of the Territory, told of
Samoans conducting their lives in their communities in peace and
93harmony, and paying little attention to the Mau/Malo conflict.
For the remainder of the year and up to the time of the general
elections in New Zealand in November 1935, the Mau issue dropped from
the limelight that it had occupied with such prominence since late
1926. Even the Mau leaders showed little enthusiasm and several times
scheduled fono were cancelled or postponed because members of the komiti
failed to turn up. Many of the representatives returned home of their
own accord. Response from people in the villages continued to
deteriorate, even to malaga conducted personally by people of rank.
In late 1934, for example, Fa'amu led a large women's Mau malaga
appealing for money in Savai'i, where sympathy for the Mau was
strongest, and where incidentally her Malietoa connections would have
94been most powerful. Only £18 was donated. At the same time, the 
commemoration service on 28 December 1934 drew only fifty people; in 
the previous four years, this service had invariably attracted over 
400 participants.
This general trend of decreasing interest in the Mau was 
reflected in Nelson's letters from New Zealand. He was subdued and 
downhearted about his own position. He was desperate to return to 
Samoa and indicated that he would do anything towards that end except
Ibid.; W.R. Fell to Administrator, 12 Nov. 1934; Eddie Stehlin 
to Resident Commissioner, 8 May 1934: A.O. 25/1-18.
Braisby to Administrator, 31 Dec. 1934, A.O. 25/1-18.
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ask the Samoans directly to give up the Mau struggle. The reasons 
for this attitude were clear: he had literally run out of money to
resume his activities of the earlier period and even to take care of 
himself and his children; his business had been run down to a point 
almost of collapse; the daughters whom he had cared for were now 
rebelling and those he had left in Samoa had gone to their mother 
rather than stay at Tuaefu as he had ordered; and he was physically 
aging. As he repeatedly said himself, the spirit was strong but the 
body and the resources were just not up to the demands required of 
them. He told the Mau leaders that if he returned to Samoa he wanted 
to be left alone, without anything to do with the Mau. He however 
urged the Mau leaders to be strong and steadfast in their struggle.
It was not that he was weakhearted or backed down from the Mau
objectives, it was just that there was nothing more he could do for
, 95the Mau.
Nelson was very confident that he would be allowed to return to 
Samoa before the end of 1934. The grounds on which he based this 
faith, though, showed the naivety of his idealism. He interviewed the 
Prime Minister and asked that he be allowed to return to Samoa, saying 
that he would not associate with the Mau on his return and that he was 
prepared to abide by any written conditions placed on him by government. 
And he sincerely believed that making those concessions would lead to 
his return. But as Hart observed, it was quite unbelievable that Nelson 
should imagine that his just apologising for what he had done would put 
everything right after all the troubles and the expenses which the Mau
Taisi to Faumuina, 26 July 1934; Taisi to Atoa, 26 July 1934; 




had placed the New Zealand government in, during the last eight years. 96
In Samoa, the Mau komiti continued to hold meetings and pass
resolutions which were conveyed to the people in the villages/districts;
but it was obvious that, amongst the Samoans, there was very little
interest left in the Mau. On the other hand, Hart was content to allow
the situation to develop without official interference - no threatening
proclamations, and no enforcement of the laws specifically aimed at
curbing the Mau. Without outside pressure and interference, the Samoans
resumed their normal lives, conducting their affairs their own way; the
autonomy of their society secure. Such was the peace and harmony which
prevailed, that Hart removed the names of all the districts of Upolu,
97except Vaimauga and Faleata, from the list of 'disturbed areas'.
In reporting this measure to the Minister, Hart wrote '... the elements 
of a disturbed area at the present time are non-existent, nor are
9 8there any circumstances indicating any likelihood of a recurrence'.
In November, the Labour Party won the general elections in 
New Zealand, and although Nelson had despaired of getting relief from a 
Labour victory - he had pinned his hopes on Labour gaining power too 
many times in the past, and his friend Holland had died - he greeted 
Labour's success as victory for the Mau. His optimism was not 
misplaced. The Labour government terminated his exile and sent a 
mission, comprised of F. Langstone, Minister of Lands, and J. O'Brien, 
M.P., to Samoa to negotiate a final settlement of the Mau/Malo conflict.
Hart to Forbes (private), 31 July 1934, A.O. 25/1-18: A record of
Nelson's interview with the Prime Minister in Wellington (31 May 1934) 
is also found in file A.O. 25/1-18.
Braisby to Administrator, 11 Mar. 1935; Administrator to Minister,
18 June 1935: A.O. 25/1-19,
Administrator to Minister, 18 June 1935, A.O. 25/1-18.
Minister to Administrator, 8 Apr. 1936, A.O. 25/1-18.
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The Labour victory revived interest in the Mau amongst Samoans,
in dramatic fashion. Due to a perception generated in earlier years of
the confrontation that a Labour government would favour the Mau in a
settlement of the Mau/Malo conflict, there was a feeling amongst Mau
supporters that the new Labour government in New Zealand would not only
satisfy their complaints but would also look to them, instead of their
countrymen who had remained supporters of the Malo, for advice and
assistance in matters concerning Samoans.^^ Mau supporters and
sympathisers therefore not surprisingly took up the cause again with
renewed vigour at the news of a Labour victory. As a result of this
perception though, they were disillusioned when it was announced that
the mission would hold discussions with all sections of the community,
and Nelson had to reassure them of the goodwill of the New Zealand
government towards them before they agreed to cooperate with the mission.
On 23 June 1936, they joined Malo supporters in a ceremony to welcome
Langstone and O'Brien, thereby ending their non-cooperation with
103government authorities, after a period of ten years.
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With everyone back in the same stream, Mau supporters quickly 
gained overwhelming dominance in the Samoan side of government. 
Tuimaleali'ifano was reappointed as Fautua to replace Mataafa who died 
in early 1936, and in the elections for the Fono a Faipule held in 
September later the same year, 35 of the 39 seats were filled by Mau 





See: Faumuina's speech at Vaimoso (copied verbatim), 16 Nov. 1929, A.O. 25/1-8,
Mau representatives to PM, 5 Dec. 1935; Faumuina to PM, 20 Jan. 1936:
A.O. 25/1-18.
Taisi to Faumuina, 7 May 1936, A.O. 25/1-18.
Langstone to PM, 23 June 1936; Administrator to Minister, 24 June 
1936: A.O. 25/1-18.
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their respective districts on the Mau komiti. This was the first
Faipule election under a new system whereby Faipule were elected
every three years. At the same time, three of the four Samoans
appointed to the Legislative Council were Mau supporters and the
fourth, Malietoa, voluntarily resigned his place which was subsequently
filled by another Mau matai; though only for a short period before it
reverted back to the senior Fautua. This trend continued throughout
the whole administration of Samoan affairs so that most of the other
official positions, from pulenuu at the village level to komisi at the
Lands and Titles Commission, were also filled by Mau supporters, while
Faumuina, the Chief Executive of the Mau, was appointed as Supervisor 
, . 104of Native Police.
On the other hand, Langstone's mission had initiated steps 
which led to the repeal of laws which had been enacted specifically 
to counter the Mau. As for the wrongs which had been perpetrated by 
the indiscriminate use of orders imposing banishment and removal of 
matai titles during Richardson's term, most of those had been corrected 
through the normal working of the fa'a Samoa, as government since 
Richardson's time had simply ignored to follow up those orders; while 
the inequities which remained were investigated and corrected.
In terms of harmony amongst Samoans, this ending was probably 
the best which one could have hoped for in this conflict. Through the 
repeal of the objectionable laws and through their own successes in
104
105
See: A.O. 25/1-18 and A.O. 25/1-19 for information on these
changes.
C.G.A. McKay, Samoana (Wellington, 1968), p. 55.
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winning such an overwhelming number of official positions, Mau supporters 
escaped the stigma of defeat and were able to enter government and give 
up the Mau while retaining their personal dignity and upholding the 
status of their titles, aiga, villages and districts. On the other 
hand Malo supporters were not shamed either, for the Malo had remained 
and it was the Mau which had been abandoned. Thus in terms of dignity 
and status - of crucial importance to Samoans - the Mau/Malo conflict 
had ended without damage to the standing of any section of Samoan 
society and therefore without injury to the fa'a Samoa. This situation 
enabled the complete resumption of normal life in the villages and 
districts to be effected in relative calm.
VI
In a letter to the Mau in October 1932, Nelson summed up what
the Mau was about when he wrote that he was keen to see the conflict
settled, 'and Samoa recover her inheritance from God, that is the
freedom and the control of our country in our accepted ways and the
regulations of our lives according to the customs, usages and traditions 
106of Samoa'. In the sense that Mau supporters agreed to give up the
Mau before full control of government had been assumed by Samoans, the 
Mau had failed. Yet it is negative and unhelpful to assess the Mau and 
the Samoan opposition prior to it merely in terms of attainment of this 
one objective.
In the first place, it is important to consider what Samoans
106 Letter from Taisi, 8 Oct. 1932, Mau Papers, PM's Dept., Apia.
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meant when they talk about controlling their own affairs. For most 
Samoans this meant freedom within the aiga, and autonomy within their 
villages. These things had been seriously threatened by Richardson's 
plans to individualise Samoan land and to change the system of 
administering the affairs of villages and districts. Those plans had 
been abandoned as a direct consequence of the Mau so that the sanctity 
of the aiga and the autonomy of the villages were maintained, and 
Samoans were able to live their lives 'according to the customs, usages 
and traditions of Samoa'. On the other hand, Samoans as seen above are 
extremely sensitive about the issue of representation. To them, 
representatives are people who are controlled by those whom they 
represent and it was due to this attitude that they objected to the 
Faipule whom government had not only treated as representatives of the 
Samoan people, but had also given roles and powers to which representatives 
were not entitled, regardless of who they were. Through the Mau, the 
position of the Faipule had been altered so that now they would be 
subjected to the will of the people in the villages and districts, 
instead of being chosen by the Administrator.
Samoan opposition though should be seen primarily in terms of
Samoans exercising their prerogatives in pursuit of the obligation to
107try and regain a control to which they had an inherited right.
Looking at Samoan opposition between 1920-1936 and particularly in the 
last ten years of that period in this way, it can be said that it was 
most successful as demonstrated by the fact that during the ten years 
when the Mau was active, a majority of Samoans - 95% of the Samoan
107 See Chapter 1 for an exposition on this point.
337
population according to the Mau, and 70% according to government 
ignored the authorities and conducted their own affairs. This 
demonstration also left the authorities - from the Samoa Administration 
to the League of Nations - in no doubt as to the desires of the Samoans 
concerning future control of their country.
For the Samoans too, the Mau had brought a greater awareness of 
a national unity in the political sphere, which was something different 
from the cultural unity to which they were used. Above all though, 
the Mau provided the Samoans with a dramatic expression of their own 
attitude that it was their inviolate right to control their own lives; 
in keeping that spirit strong and bright, the Mau played a large part 
in sustaining political pressure which saw Western Samoa in 1962 become 
the first island country in the Pacific to attain full independence.
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starting in October 
1926 and ending in 1946)
6/8/51 Fitialo: Inquest On
6/8/52 Molia: Inquest On
34/8/1 Naturalisation: Appln. of O.F. Nelson for
registration as British subject.
34/37 The Samoa Guardian
New Zealand
IT 1/23/8 (24 portions 
starting August 1926 
to 1939)
IT 1/23/11 (2 portions)
Mau Agitation: General
Mau Agitation: Riot of 28 Dec. 1929
IT 1/7 Garrison: Samoa
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IT 1/10 Administration: Report by Col. Logan
(8 July 1919)
IT 1/12 Administration: Information gained by
Dr Pomare whilst in Samoa
IT 1/16 Administration: petition from residents
(18/12/1915) that Samoa be placed under 
Colonial Office
IT 1/17/8 Native Dept/: Annual and Quarterly Reports
IT 1/18 Samoa Administration: Criticism of
IT 1/27 Administration: Information for Prime
Minister
IT 1/28 Administration: Internal Economy
IT 1/29 Visit by Hon. E.P. Lee in 1921
IT 1/29/1 Lee's visit: petition from residents
IT 1/33 Monthly despatch from Administrator
IT 1/33/1 Private correspondence between Richardson 
and Sir Francis Bell
IT 1/49 Messrs Vershaffelt, Park and Berendsen: 
Visit to Samoa Dec. 1928
IT 1/57 Administration: Notes by Col. S.S. Allen
IT 2/1 Administration - Colonel Logan: petition
from Natives
IT 2/9 Administration: Reports on Samoan Affairs
IT 2/11 Policy: Samoan Affairs
IT 4/10 Native Taxes
IT 8/10 (3 portions) Samoa Epidemic Commission 1919
IT 24/9 Copra: Purchase by Administration on
behalf of Natives
IT 25/1/23 (3 portions) Permanent Mandates Commission: Discussion
on Samoan Reports
IT 37/14 Mau publica t i o n s : General
IT 39/2 Occupation of Samoa: Instructions to
Col. Logan re
IT 61/19 (8 portions) Reparation Estates
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IT 79/76 (2 portions) 
IT 79/78 
IT 82/2
Parliamentary Tour of Pacific Islands 1920 
Samoa: Retention by the British
Constitution of Samoa 
Constitution of Samoa
Samoa Offenders Ordinance 1922: Appeals
Against Banishment Orders
Edwin Gurr: General Correspondence
Nelson O.F. - Samoa: General Correspondence
Col. J.W. Hütchen: Personal Correspondence




IT 88/3 (4 portions) Fono of Faipule
IT 88/5 Native Unrest
IT 88/6 Petition: to H.M. King George V
IT 88/7 Natives: Attitude towards British Rule
Destiny of Samoa




Mau Papers (uncat.) : held at the Prime Minister's Dept., Apia.
Nelson Papers: held at family home at Tuaefu.
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Baxter, F.D., 'Collection of material relating to the Mau disturbances 
in Samoa, 1926-1935': manuscript held at the Law Library,
Auckland University.
Braisby, A.L., A documentary record and history of the Lauati rebellion 
in Western Samoa - 1909 (3 vols.): held at the National
Archives of New Zealand, Wellington.
Gurr, E.W., Papers: held at Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington.
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Manuscript Bureau microfilm 144; Pacific History Library, A.N.U., Canb.
Riddell, E., Papers (includes an account of Samoan history up to 1918 by 
Te'o Tuvale): held at the Mitchell Library, Sydney.
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Note: The Samoan 'g' is pronounced 'ng' as in singing.
aiga family; kin; descent group
ali'i chief
ali'i ma faipule chiefs and orators of the village
aualuma village organisation of unmarried women
aumaga village organisation of untitled men
fa'a Samoa Samoan custom; the Samoan way
fa'alupega ceremonial address which lists the chiefly 
titles and lineage connections of a village




Fautua highest ranking official adviser
fono assembly; meeting
Fono of Faipule assembly of Samoan Councillors
gafa descent line; genealogy
ie toga finely-woven ceremonial mats
ifoga ceremonial apology
malaga journey; party of travellers
Malo Gove rnmen t; State
mamalu dignity; honour; prestige
matai general term for chief
nu'u village
pule authority; power; right of control or 
disposal; decision
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Pule honorific title held collectively by the 
orator chiefs of certain important traditional 
centres in S a v a i 'i - see Tumua
Pule f a 1a t o 'aga agricultural inspector
Pulenu'u mayor of village
sa forbidden; prohibition
saofa'i ceremonial installation of a matai
suli moni heir by descent
t a m a 'aiga holder of one of the four highest titles today
tafa'ifa holder of the four päpä which conferred 
titular supremacy
tau l e 'a l e 'a untitled person (plural taulele'a)
tautua service; serving
tulafale orator chief
Tuir.ua honorific title held collectively by the 
orator chiefs of certain important traditional 
centres in Upolu - see Pule
tupu (now) sovereign; king
